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American Hospitality rereads the canon of American literature by focusing attention on 
the centrality of hospitality to the twentieth-century American literary imagination. It 
argues that twentieth-century U.S. authors employ scenes of hospitality (scenes of 
welcoming and withholding, of invitation and rejection, of accommodation and 
imposition) and figures of hospitality (hosts and guests, strangers and trespassers, homes 
and thresholds, gifts and reciprocations) for three specific purposes: first, to reproduce 
dominant American discourses of hospitality; second, to critique these same discourses; 
and third, to model an alternative ethics of hospitality. Faced with the closing of the 
western frontier, rapid increases in immigration, the growing need to provide assistance 
to large segments of the population, an escalating call to secure and police the national 
borders, and the widespread demand to make public accommodations in all parts of the 
country more hospitable to racialized others, U.S. authors during the twentieth century 
utilized discourses of hospitality to reflect on the effects that sweeping historical changes 
were having on the nation’s ability to remain hospitable to peoples both inside and 
outside its borders. In examining discourses of hospitality in twentieth-century U.S. 
fiction, American Hospitality makes three principal contributions to scholarship. First, it 
opens the canon of American literature to reconstruction by tracing the central 
importance of scenes of hospitality across a wide range of twentieth-century American 
texts and genres, from highly canonical texts like Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath and 
Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! to less canonical texts like Zitkala-Ša’s Old Indian 
Legends and Louise Erdrich and Michael Dorris’s The Crown of Columbus. Second, it 
expands on existing work on the subject of American exceptionalism by showing how 
American exceptionalist narratives rely heavily on scenes and figures of hospitality to 
justify and disavow acts of exclusion, dispossession, exploitation, and violence. Third, it 
lays the foundation for theorizing an alternative ethics of American hospitality. Modeled 
by the texts featured in American Hospitality, this alternative ethics, which I term 
affirmative hospitality, has four core principles: recognition of the conditional nature of 
all hospitality exchanges, affirmation of the singularity of the individual, accommodation, 
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Toward a Theory of Affirmative Hospitality 
 
 
The first evening I spent under the wing of his 
hospitality, we sat a full hour at table by 
ourselves, without the least interruption, after the 
family had retired. I was extremely oppressed by 
a severe cold and excessive coughing, contracted 
by the exposure of a harsh winter journey. He 
pressed me to use some remedies, but I declined 
doing so. As usual after retiring, my coughing 
increased. When some time had elapsed, the door 
of my room was gently opened, and on drawing 
my bed-curtains, to my utter astonishment, I 
beheld Washington himself, standing at my bed-
side, with a bowl of hot tea in his hand. I was 
mortified and distressed beyond expression. This 
little incident, occurring in common life with an 
ordinary man, would not have been noticed; but 
as a trait of the benevolence and private virtue of 
Washington, deserves to be recorded. 
    -Elkanah Watson, 
     Men and Times of The Revolution (244) 
 
Elkanah Watson’s narrative of his visit to Mount Vernon in 1785 introduces a 
paradox that is central to this dissertation. On one hand, Watson’s text idealizes George 
Washington as a figure of consummate hospitality. Possessing extraordinary “private 
virtue,” Watson’s “immortal” Washington offers strangers unconditional welcome and 
does so with no “ostentation” (243-44). On the other hand, Watson’s written document 
undermines its own romantic portrait of Washington through embedded traces of critique. 
More specifically, Men and Times of the Revolution draws attention to the roles that 
textual production and textual transmission play in licensing and disavowing exclusive 
cultures of American hospitality. By asserting that Washington’s “private” act of 
hospitality “deserves to be recorded,” Watson attests to the public nature of all hospitality 
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and to the importance that a textual mythology about Mount Vernon had in establishing 
Washington’s reputation as a generous host.1 But Watson’s narrative also reveals how 
that reputation involved a carefully managed practice of selective hospitality at Mount 
Vernon that was dependent on an aristocratic tradition of written correspondence. 
Watson, a businessman from Massachusetts, gains admittance to Washington’s 
stately Virginia home only because he arrives bearing letters of introduction from a 
general and a colonel (243). Although Watson lauds Washington for receiving him with 
unconditional hospitality, his written “record” testifies to the conditional quality of its 
origins. Accordingly, we come to see that the epistolary tradition that grants Watson the 
privilege to narrate his experiences at Mount Vernon simultaneously withholds the 
privilege of narration from those strangers who arrive without written evidence of their 
investment in the social system that provides Washington with his power. In the end, it is 
a cycle of written attestations that determines what is and is not “recorded” at and about 
Mount Vernon. Watson, for instance, romanticizes Washington’s “servants” as 
“[s]miling” and the “domestic arrangements” at Mount Vernon as “harmonious,” thereby 
disavowing the very real and always present threat of violence that compelled 
Washington’s labor force of over two hundred slaves to perform the grueling work that 
made their master’s offerings of hospitality possible (244).2 What Watson’s account of 
his visit to Mount Vernon illustrates more than anything else is how the introduction of 
writing into the processes of hospitality serves both to substantiate the truth claims of 
hosts like George Washington and to lay the groundwork for the deconstruction of these 
same claims.  
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The paradoxical logic of disavowal employed by Watson in Men and Times of the 
Revolution is a central component of American discourses about hospitality. It is rooted 
in the contradictions of American exceptionalist mythology and manifested in countless 
official federal documents: in the idealistic proclamations of Jefferson’s Declaration of 
Independence, in the abstract avowals of the US Constitution’s Preamble, in the 
categorical claims endemic to American treaties with Indian nations, in the self-
contradictory judicial decisions that defined racial segregation as “separate but equal,” 
and in the disingenuous legal contracts presented by government agencies to foreign 
guest workers. It is likely that Jacques Derrida has this American practice of paradoxical 
discourse in mind when he distinguishes between the utopian promise of an absolutely 
hospitable “America” and the historical reality of a guarded, circumspect “United States” 
(M 18). “America is deconstruction,” Derrida tells us, inasmuch as the toponym 
“America” signifies the infinitely deferred promise of a space that is unconditionally 
“receptive” to the “themes and attributes of deconstruction” (M 18). With this in mind, 
Derrida reminds us that we must never stop deconstructing the American politics of 
“today” as a way of confirming and keeping alive our “messianic” faith in perfecting the 
imperfectible ideal of “America” (SM 94). In this sense, we might say that no modern 
nation has been more responsible for inviting its own deconstruction, for both opening 
itself to critique and simultaneously committing itself tirelessly to the project of deferring 
this critique. Ironically, then, in its own obsession with projecting a national ethos of 
hospitality, the United States has been exceptionally hospitable to deconstruction.  
This dissertation argues that American literature both contributes to and 
deconstructs exceptionalist myths about American hospitality. In the process, it rereads 
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and rethinks the canon of American literature by focusing attention on the centrality of 
hospitality to the American literary imagination. Even before nationhood, Phillis 
Wheatley testified in verse to the paradoxical politics of American hospitality, ironically 
extolling God for bearing her in chains from Africa’s “dark abodes” to the “safe” 
welcoming bosom of America (6). During the nineteenth century, American authors 
turned to discourses of hospitality to project and critique romantic visions of a 
burgeoning nation. We see this ambivalence at play in the countless scenes of 
intercultural hospitality featured in James Fenimore Cooper’s frontier fiction; in the 
inclusive, all-embracing voice of Walt Whitman’s democratic Muse; in the cruel 
hospitality of Mark Twain’s Colonel Grangerford; and in the majestic “world-wide 
welcome” of Emma Lazarus’s “Mother of Exiles” (Lazarus 6-7). 
But not until the twentieth century do we witness an escalation of American 
literary engagements with hospitality. Faced with the closing of the western frontier, 
rapid increases in immigration, the growing need to provide assistance to large segments 
of the population, an escalating call to secure and police the national borders, and the 
widespread demand to make public accommodations in all parts of the country more 
hospitable to racialized others, American authors during the twentieth century employed 
scenes and figures of hospitality in order to examine the effects that sweeping historical 
changes were having on the nation’s ability to remain hospitable to peoples both inside 
and outside its borders. We see this national preoccupation with hospitality in Zitkala-
Ša’s turn-of-the-century Dakota fables of intertribal exchange; in Margaret Mitchell’s 
deconstruction of the South’s romantic nostalgia for antebellum hospitality; in the 
formative moment of withheld hospitality at the door of a plantation home that causes 
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William Faulkner’s Thomas Sutpen to embark on his grand dynastic design; in the 
improvised ethics of migrant hospitality adopted by John Steinbeck’s Joads; in the “new 
humanist” hospitality of Margaret Walker’s Vyry; and in Louise Erdrich and Michael 
Dorris’s revisionist portrait of Christopher Columbus as a usurping, presumptuous guest. 
All of these authors, texts, and characters, some canonical and others underappreciated, 
are remarkable for their repeated engagement with tropes of hospitality—tropes that 
have, nevertheless, largely escaped serious scholarly attention.3 It is on this terrain of 
twentieth-century American fiction that I focus my attention. 
 Americanists have by no means shied away from exploring the ways in which the 
doctrine of American exceptionalism has been used to perpetrate and disavow acts of 
inhospitality against various marginalized groups. Donald Pease’s work, in particular, has 
helped us begin to understand the “psychosocial structures” that have permitted 
Americans to deny the disparity between the “fantasy” of an exceptional America and the 
reality of state-sponsored exclusion, deportation, confinement, and false welcome (12). 
Amy Kaplan has demonstrated how American exceptionalist discourse constructs and 
depends on racial and gender “demarcations of otherness” (184). Noting that 
“exceptionalist” and “domestic” discourses work together to “generate notions of the 
foreign against which the nation can be imagined as home” (184), Kaplan encourages us 
to think more critically about the discursive processes through which the U.S. state 
established and maintains its status as a privileged space. However, despite the 
suggestiveness of her insights about the relationship between exceptionalism and 
domesticity, Kaplan fails to follow her line of inquiry to its logical conclusion. She fails 
to recognize the central role that literary narratives of hospitality play in her own critical 
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project. We cannot adequately address how and why American exceptionalist discourse 
uses metaphors of domesticity to advance racist and gendered notions of “America” as 
“home” without first engaging in a deliberate and pointed investigation into the ways in 
which that discourse is grounded in racist and gendered tropes of hospitality. We cannot 
sufficiently interrogate the “psychosocial structures” of American exceptionalism without 
identifying how literary narratives have informed and been informed by American 
cultures of hospitality. If we are to perform the kinds of deconstructions of “America” 
that Derrida urges us to perform, we need to begin thinking more critically and precisely 
about what American literature does—both formally and thematically—with respect to 
American discourses of hospitality. 
In American Hospitality, I argue that twentieth-century American authors use 
their fiction to model an alternative ethics of hospitality. This alternative ethics, which I 
term affirmative hospitality, is marked by its attentiveness to the real-life conditions and 
contingencies of hospitality exchanges. In this way, the ethics of affirmative hospitality 
modeled by the authors in this dissertation represents something distinct from traditional 
Western conceptualizations of hospitality, which tend to treat exchanges of hospitality as 
theoretical encounters between abstract binary figures (hosts and guests, natives and 
foreigners, friends and enemies, the self and the other) rather than as historically 
contingent events taking place between singular, embodied, interdependent individuals. 
In attending to the lived experience of hospitality, the authors featured here resist the 
kinds of disavowal that abstract theorizations of hospitality tend to enable. In the process, 
they not only critique but also refashion American discourses of hospitality by generating 
alternative forms of recognition that affirm the conditions and possibilities of engaging 
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the other—alternative forms that traditional liberal American norms of hospitality tend to 
obfuscate and ignore. 
In defining affirmative hospitality and reading scenes of affirmative hospitality in 
American fiction, I draw on the work of several theorists, most notably Jacques Derrida. 
Derrida’s work on hospitality is particularly useful for elucidating the ways in which 
twentieth-century American fiction foregrounds the inherent conditionality of hospitality. 
The foundational principle of Derrida’s theory of hospitality is his distinction between 
“unconditional” and “conditional” hospitality.4 For Derrida, unconditional hospitality is a 
purely theoretical idea denoting a utopian form of hospitality offered without any 
conditions at all. Unconditional hospitality could be offered only to someone who is 
completely unknown and would require welcoming this unknown stranger without 
establishing any prerequisites for their stay and without asking anything of them in return 
(“HJR” 69-70; OH 25; “PH” 7). An act of unconditional hospitality would also require 
welcoming the other without any concern for or knowledge of established laws, codes of 
behavior, or forms of social exchange (“A” 129; OH 135).   
Recognizing that unconditional hospitality is a practical impossibility, Derrida 
notes that all acts of hospitality are conditioned by prejudices, expectations, obligations, 
and pre-existing power relationships (“A” 129). Because no host is ever willing to 
surrender fully their sovereignty, every act of hospitality is both a welcoming of the other 
and an act of self-protection: “We offer hospitality only on the condition that the other 
follow our rules, our way of life, even our language, our culture, our political system” 
(“A” 128-29; “H” 3).5 By simply asking a guest to provide their name or by requesting 
that they adhere to cultural norms, a host establishes the conditions under which a guest is 
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welcomed (OH 25). What’s more, the very act of extending an invitation of hospitality, 
of offering to surrender space to the other, doubles as an act of self-affirmation, a 
confirmation of one’s own power as host (“H” 4, 14; OH 54). In turn, by accepting 
hospitality, a guest enters into a kind of “contract” with their host, one that involves 
explicit and/or implicit obligations (“H” 4-8; “HJR” 69; OH 23; “PH” 6). These 
obligations, whether restricted to private forms of reciprocal exchange or operating as 
part of generalized networks of public exchange, are bound to repeat and multiply, to 
engender future exchanges and obligations. The inevitability of this repetition of 
exchange prevents any act of hospitality from being offered as a disinterested gift.6 
Derrida’s distinction between unconditional and conditional hospitality is central 
to this dissertation for three reasons. First, as we have already seen, dominant American 
narratives of hospitality are often predicated on abstract claims to unconditionality. Being 
able to identify and articulate the ways in which these narratives traffic in pretensions to 
unconditionality helps us understand how American discourses employ utopian visions of 
unconditional hospitality to disavow exclusion and oppression. Second, although 
narratives of unconditional hospitality are often used to disavow violence and exclusion, 
unconditional visions can also be employed to highlight the differences between rhetoric 
and reality, between American claims to unconditionality and the conditioned realities of 
American life. When used for this purpose, narratives of unconditional hospitality take on 
an aspirational quality; they present us with impossible yet necessary fictions that allow 
us to see more clearly how existing practices and policies of hospitality fall short of 
American ideals. Third, Derrida’s idea of unconditional hospitality is valuable because it 
helps us appreciate the affirmative nature of conditional hospitality. As Derrida points 
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out, it is the notion of unconditional hospitality that allows us to recognize the positive 
value of acts of conditional hospitality. It is the “thought” of a hospitality liberated from 
the constrains of contingency that enables us to understand what it means to offer 
hospitality in a world filled with contingency (“A” 129). The ethics of affirmative 
hospitality modeled by the authors in this dissertation begins with this recognition of the 
positive value of acts of conditional hospitality. 
In labeling the model of hospitality that I observe in twentieth-century American 
fiction an affirmative ethics, I intend to apply two different meanings of the word 
“affirmative.” First, affirmative hospitality is affirmative in the sense that it represents a 
positive response to the question posed by the arriving other. Faced with the call of the 
other, a host offering affirmative hospitality says “yes” (Derrida “TL” 180).7 This “yes” 
represents an affirmation of the other; it signifies faith in the positive potential of the 
other. Second, acts of affirmative hospitality are affirmative in the sense that they 
represent affirmative actions—which is to say that they are actions taken with 
deliberation and with the intention of engaging critically and actively with the other. 
Derrida refers to this kind of active and relational engagement with the other as a “living 
yes” (“UG” 56).8 The acts of affirmative hospitality that we see in American Hospitality 
are offered in the active, relational spirit of Derrida’s “living yes.” 
The texts in this dissertation model four fundamental principles of hospitality. 
These four principles form the basis of the ethics of affirmative hospitality that I outline 
in American Hospitality. These four principles are (1) a recognition of conditionality, (2) 
affirmation of the singularity of the individual, (3) accommodation, and (4) deliberation. 
Affirmative hospitality is grounded first and foremost in a recognition of the conditional 
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nature of all exchanges of hospitality. Hosts who offer affirmative hospitality do so with 
the understanding that the hospitality they offer is conditional. In openly recognizing the 
conditional nature of their hospitality, these hosts do not pretend that they can or are 
willing to offer hospitality to everyone. They acknowledge that there is a limit to what 
they can provide, that they must take into account their own needs and obligations when 
deciding whether to welcome guests and under what conditions they are willing to 
welcome them. This includes recognizing that hosts and guests have explicit and/or 
implicit obligations to one another. These obligations may include the guest following 
certain rules or guidelines, the guest reciprocating the host’s hospitality at a later time, or 
the host affording the guest certain privacies, among others. Similarly, affirmative 
hospitality’s recognition of conditionality involves an acknowledgment that acts of 
hospitality do not take place in isolation from society, that exchanges between hosts and 
guests are informed by pre-existing power structures. Hosts and guests who engage in 
affirmative hospitality do so in a spirit of keeping these power structures in mind rather 
than disavowing them. This does not mean that they seek to reinforce these power 
structures; it means that they make efforts not to use exchanges of hospitality as a means 
of reproducing these power structures. Moreover, affirmative hospitality’s emphasis on 
conditionality involves a recognition of the interdependent nature of the host-guest 
relationship and of all human exchange. This recognition of interdependency includes 
attention to concerns of body and affect—concerns that tend to challenge static character 
typologies and the presumptions that underlie them. Finally, affirmative hospitality attests 
to the vital role that hospitality plays in cultivating cultures and enabling intercultural 
exchange. Thus, the scenes of affirmative hospitality that are featured in this dissertation 
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often draw attention to the function that these scenes play in cultivating communities and 
bringing people of different backgrounds together.9 
In addition to this central focus on recognizing and affirming conditionality, the 
texts in this dissertation model three additional principles of hospitality. These additional 
three principles are secondary to and grounded in affirmative hospitality’s main emphasis 
on conditionality. Although all texts in American Hospitality promote an ethics of 
hospitality that foregrounds conditionality, only some emphasize these three additional 
principles. The first of these principles is affirmation of the singularity of the individual. 
Hosts affirm the singularity of the individual by making a concerted effort to view and 
treat their guest as a singular human being. This effort begins with a recognition that the 
other can never be fully known to us, that the other is always more than what we can 
possibly know or understand.10 Putting this principle of hospitality into action means 
doing everything in one’s power to resist prejudging people and treating them according 
to established stereotypes. It means resisting the instinct to “thematize” the other, to treat 
them as “an object, thing, or theme” (Derrida A 48). At the same time, however, this 
emphasis on not thematizing the other does not mean that hosts and guests should pretend 
that we are all the same by disavowing one another’s differences. On the contrary, an 
ethics of affirmative hospitality is committed to treating all forms of difference (race, 
gender, class, sexuality, religion, ethnicity, disability, political affiliation, etc.) as 
qualities to be affirmed rather than demonized or denied. This resistance to thematization 
also involves an effort to think beyond determined oppositions (host-guest, self-other, 
friend-enemy, native-foreigner, citizen-non-citizen) by remembering that we are all more 
complex than we might at first appear. By resisting the instinct to think in terms of 
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determined oppositions, acts of affirmative hospitality seek to de-emphasize the 
hierarchical nature of the host-guest relationship while still recognizing the importance of 
honoring the essential privileges and obligations of hosts and guests.  
The second of the three additional principles of affirmative hospitality is 
accommodation. Hosts who are accommodating strive to be considerate, open, and 
flexible in their interactions with guests. Being a considerate host means trying to 
consider things from the perspective of the guest. It means imagining oneself in the 
position of the guest and thoughtfully contemplating their needs and expectations.11 This 
may include recalling one’s own previous experiences being a guest and drawing on 
these personal memories to identify with what the guest is experiencing. Being an open 
host means being receptive to the needs and expectations of the guest. It means listening 
to the guest with an open mind. Derrida describes this kind of openness in a host as 
receiving the other “with one’s hand held out” (A 26). This image of the host holding 
their hand out to the guest points to an important component of openness: being open 
includes making it apparent to the guest that you are open and receptive; it means 
signaling your openness explicitly and purposefully.12 An accommodating host is also 
flexible, which means they are willing to and capable of adapting to given contexts, 
responding creatively to unforeseen contingencies, and engaging in compromise. Flexible 
hosts recognize that the host-guest relationship is dynamic, that relations between hosts 
and guests can be complex and unpredictable. They show creativity in their relations with 
guests by thinking outside existing norms and finding new and sometimes even 
unsanctioned ways of providing hospitality. We see this kind of flexibility in hosts who 
offer hospitality under atypical conditions, such as during migration, war, or other forms 
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of crisis. Under such conditions, it is often necessary to think creatively in order to reach 
some form of compromise that is mutually beneficial to host and guest. This willingness 
to seek and reach compromise is often what enables scenes of affirmative hospitality to 
take place.13  
It is important to note that the kinds of accommodation that authors in American 
Hospitality promote should not be thought of as forms of tolerance. As Derrida points 
out, tolerance amounts to a “circumspect” form of hospitality (“A” 128). When we are 
tolerant, we offer hospitality “only on the condition that the other follow our rules, our 
way of life, even our language, our culture, our political system” (128). In this sense, 
hosts who are tolerant are intent on limiting their welcome in order to protect their own 
sovereignty (128). In contrast, the hosts in American Hospitality who are accommodating 
are intent on being considerate, open, and flexible in order to make their guests feel 
welcome. Accommodating hosts aim to affirm the otherness of their guests; tolerant hosts 
aim to reaffirm their own beliefs, customs, and sovereignty.  
 The third and final additional principle of affirmative hospitality is deliberation. 
Acts of affirmative hospitality are often deliberative, which means that they arise from 
carefully considered decisions.14 Scenes of affirmative hospitality that are deliberative 
feature moments of careful consideration prior to formal invitations of hospitality. These 
deliberations can be independent or communal; they can be communicated to us by way 
of dialogue, interior monologue, third-person narration, or any other form of narrative 
discourse. In most cases, these moments of deliberation draw attention to potential risks 
involved in offering hospitality. In doing so, they underscore the affirmative nature of 
affirmative hospitality. They emphasize the fact that hosts of affirmative hospitality 
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respond in the affirmative to the question of hospitality, which is to say the question of 
the other. After carefully calculating the risks, they say “yes” when they could say “no.” 
It is the deliberative nature of affirmative hospitality that makes acts of affirmative 
hospitality ethical acts. Without deliberation, the act of hospitality is automatic, simply a 
matter of course.15 The deliberative quality of affirmative hospitality also points to the 
fact that acts of affirmative hospitality require hosts to make decisions without sufficient 
knowledge of their guests, their backgrounds, or their intentions. In this way, affirmative 
hospitality attests to the need to answer the call of hospitality – to make a decision, 
whether in the affirmative or the negative – despite never being in a position when it is 
possible to predict the future.16   
To be clear, American Hospitality is not interested in advocating a monolithic 
theory or practice of hospitality. It is interested in identifying and describing the ways in 
which twentieth-century American fiction models an ethics of hospitality grounded in a 
commitment to recognizing and affirming conditionality.  
When in this dissertation I talk about narratives of hospitality, I am talking about 
established narrative conventions in American fiction and in Western literature more 
broadly. These conventions include known character types, such as hosts, guests, 
strangers, uninvited guests, and trespassers. These conventions also include identifiable 
narrative events, such as invitations, greetings, gatherings, potlucks, and leave-takings. 
Because the authors in this dissertation are particularly intent on challenging traditional 
models of hospitality and scrutinizing the conventional tropes associated with them, the 
scenes of hospitality examined in American Hospitality often feature but also critique 
these established conventions. 
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 American Hospitality carries out three distinct but interrelated investigations 
across four chapters. Along the way, it explores the ways in which twentieth-century 
American fiction reproduces prevailing American discourses of hospitality, critiques 
these same discourses, and models an ethics of affirmative hospitality. I begin in Part One 
by recovering the crucial role that narratives of American hospitality played in framing 
and challenging dominant formulations of the nation during the first decades of the 
twentieth century. In Chapter One, I show how John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath 
explores the terms, conditions, and limitations of American hospitality during a time of 
national crisis. I argue that Steinbeck delivers a sympathetic critique of New Deal 
welfarism that both endorses Roosevelt’s Depression-era policies and draws attention to 
the limited capacities of the federal government to effect real and lasting changes for 
migrant laborers and their families. In contrast to previous critics, who emphasize the 
significant role that The Grapes of Wrath played in convincing the Roosevelt 
administration to increase federal relief for California’s migrant population, I conclude 
that Steinbeck was more concerned with galvanizing the American public to embrace a 
culture of individual responsibility. By calling attention to the myriad ways in which the 
material demands of migrant life destabilize traditional Western conceptions of 
hospitality, The Grapes of Wrath urges us to recognize that New Deal welfarism is 
insufficient unless complemented by a culture of hospitality that is based on 
accommodation, deliberation, and affirmation of the individual. In the process, 
Steinbeck’s narrative of the Joads lays the groundwork for imagining and theorizing a 
model of affirmative hospitality. 
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 Whereas Part One of American Hospitality considers Steinbeck’s engagement 
with questions of hospitality at a national level, Part Two shifts to a regional focus on the 
Jim Crow South and argues that southern writers during the middle decades of the 
twentieth century employ scenes and figures of hospitality to interrogate the racial, 
gender, and class politics of the South. In making this argument, Part Two calls for a 
reconsideration of three major novels of the period: Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With The 
Wind, William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!, and Margaret Walker’s Jubilee. I contend 
that all three of these novels are centrally invested in examining the ideological functions 
and implications of southern hospitality. I begin with a reading of Gone With The Wind 
that diverges from the conventional reading of the novel as an apology for the South. 
Focusing attention on Mitchell’s characterization of Rhett Butler, I show how Mitchell 
uses the figure of the stranger to lay bare the lived contradictions of southern hospitality. 
Through Rhett’s outsider perspective, Mitchell reveals the privileged role that strangers, 
particularly white male strangers, can play in recognizing and exploiting these lived 
contradictions. In addition, I demonstrate how Mitchell uses her characterizations of 
Ashley Wilkes and Frank Kennedy to expose the ideological pretenses that allowed white 
male hosts to disavow their violence toward and exploitation of women, blacks, and poor 
whites in the South, both before and after the Civil War. Wilkes and Kennedy reveal the 
extent to which the role of the southern host consisted of a series of performances 
motivated by anxieties about maintaining sovereignty in private and public spaces. 
Finally, I show how Mitchell undermines the paternal logic of southern hospitality by 
presenting us with three female hosts (Ellen O’Hara, Scarlett O’Hara, and Melanie 
Wilkes) capable of possessing sovereignty and bestowing hospitality. Together, 
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Mitchell’s female hosts provide us with an alternative model of southern hospitality that 
is based not on any essentialized notion of femininity but instead on a collective 
dissatisfaction with the discriminating ideology of southern male hosts.   
Following my discussion on Gone With The Wind, I argue that Faulkner’s 
Absalom, Absalom! offers an even more complex and critical examination of southern 
hospitality. In particular, I suggest that Faulkner’s novel portrays southern hospitality as 
fetishistic in nature by depicting southern codes of hospitality as predicated on strategic 
disavowals. Through the example of Thomas Sutpen, Faulkner shows how the South’s 
fetishism of hospitality is motivated in large part by a desire to disavow the fact that 
cultures of hospitality in the South are actually designed to produce and reproduce power 
in the hands of privileged white men. I argue that this fetishism represents an inhospitable 
attitude toward history and that the novel’s form mimics the South’s reluctance to 
recognize and come to terms with its past. 
 In the final section of Part Two, I suggest that Margaret Walker offers readers a 
positive vision of interracial hospitality in the South. I argue that Walker’s novel Jubilee 
communicates a redemptive narrative of southern hospitality that highlights the vital role 
that biblical and folk tropes of hospitality played in providing southern blacks with a 
means to envision scenes of freedom. Committed to what she describes as a “new 
humanism” that rejects racist ideologies, Walker envisions a black female protagonist in 
Jubilee who responds to the South’s white patriarchy not with bitterness and hatred but 
with a determination to achieve redemption through acts of forgiveness and generosity. 
Through her acts of forgiveness and generosity, Walker’s Vyry models for us a spirit and 
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practice of affirmative hospitality that recalls but also differs markedly from the migrant 
model of affirmative hospitality embodied by Steinbeck’s Joads. 
 Part Three of American Hospitality presents a third vantage from which to 
reconsider American narratives of hospitality. Framed by Native American discourses of 
hospitality, Part Three occasions a radical rethinking of the investigations put forward in 
Parts One and Two. In Chapter Three, I show how Yankton Dakota author Zitkala-Ša 
offers a distinctly Native American critique of American hospitality that undermines 
American claims to original and natural sovereignty. Through readings of Zitkala-Ša’s 
fiction and non-fiction, I also show how the Yankton Dakota author articulates what I 
describe as an indigenous womanist ethics of affirmative hospitality that anticipates the 
political and theoretical contributions of the indigenous feminist movement and the 
womanist movement. 
 In the fourth and final chapter of American Hospitality, I argue that Louise 
Erdrich and Michael Dorris employ a theoretical lens of hospitality to critique settler 
colonialism and liberal multiculturalism. More specifically, I contend that Erdrich and 
Dorris’s novel The Crown of Columbus reveals how settler colonial narratives of 
hospitality utilize a liberal multicultural politics of recognition to justify and disavow acts 
of displacement, dispossession, and exploitation. In addition, I maintain that The Crown 
of Columbus also demonstrates how indigenous peoples can and do employ discourses of 
hospitality to expose, critique, and resist settler colonialism. At the same time, I contend 
that recent revelations about the parasitic nature of Erdrich and Dorris’s collaborative 
writing process suggest that we should read their criticisms of settler colonialism and 
liberal multicultural recognition as self-reflexive meditations—meditations that, in their 
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own strategies of repression, reproduce the same kinds of disavowal that Erdrich and 
Dorris aim to critique in their novel.  
  






Coming To Terms With Conditionality: 
Affirmative Migrant Hospitality in Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath 
 
 Just over three pages long, John Steinbeck’s short story “Breakfast” presents us 
with a utopian vision of unconditional hospitality. Wandering in a valley one morning, 
Steinbeck’s first-person narrator comes upon a young woman nursing a baby while 
cooking over an old iron stove. As the narrator approaches and begins to warm his hands 
over the fire, two men, one young and the other old, emerge from a tent next to the stove 
(62). Without exhibiting any outward signs of deliberation and without exchanging 
names or histories, the men invite their unexpected guest to “sit down” with the family 
for breakfast (63). Over coffee, bacon, biscuits, and gravy, the narrator learns that the 
men thrive in their work as cotton pickers. They are “eating good,” they say, because 
they’ve had twelve straight days of work (63). Overjoyed with their own recent success, 
the two men ask their guest if he’d like to join them in their work for the day: “’Fyou 
want to pick cotton, we could maybe get you on” (63). However, the narrator turns the 
men down, explaining, “No. I got to go along” (63). After refilling his plate and eating 
until he is “full,” the narrator thanks the family for their hospitality. Asking for nothing in 
return, the old man waves his hand “in a negative” (63). The story ends with the narrator 
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recalling how he parted from his generous hosts and “walked away down the country 
road” (64). 
 “Breakfast,” a relatively unknown story, provides the occasion for a radical 
reevaluation of Steinbeck’s most rigorously studied novel, The Grapes of Wrath.17 
Initially published in short story form in 1936, the scene from “Breakfast” reappears three 
years later in Chapter 22 of The Grapes of Wrath (290-93).18 Making only minor changes 
to the scene, Steinbeck replaces the first-person narrator of “Breakfast” with Tom Joad 
and relocates the encounter to the Weedpatch Camp, a federal relief facility where the 
Joads live for about a month toward the end of The Grapes of Wrath. The repetition of 
this scene of hospitality in Steinbeck’s fiction is crucial. On one hand, the fact that a story 
invested so categorically in a thematics of hospitality could fit so smoothly into The 
Grapes of Wrath cues us to consider the proposition that hospitality is a central concern 
of the novel as well. Indeed, revisiting The Grapes of Wrath with this episode from 
“Breakfast” in mind leads to the realization that Steinbeck’s novel is filled with scenes of 
hospitality—scenes that employ many of the same conventional tropes of hospitality that 
we see featured in “Breakfast”: the arrival of an unexpected guest, the invitation of 
hospitality, the reception of hospitality, the expression of gratitude for hospitality, and the 
departure of the guest. Through its reiterations of these tropes, The Grapes of Wrath, like 
“Breakfast,” treats hospitality as an indispensable component of migrant life. 
On the other hand, the subtle yet significant changes that Steinbeck makes to the 
“Breakfast” scene in order to incorporate the events of the original story into the narrative 
of The Grapes of Wrath suggest that the novel is offering a more complex and considered 
interrogation into the ethical and political dynamics of hospitality than Steinbeck had 
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previously put forward. Devoid of context and, therefore, free of contingency, 
“Breakfast” imparts a naïve and isolated fantasy of absolute hospitality. In The Grapes of 
Wrath, Steinbeck shatters this fantasy by drawing attention to the conditional nature of 
the migrant experience. In the process, he transforms the meaning of the stranger’s 
encounter with his migrant hosts. What Steinbeck envisages in “Breakfast” as an isolated 
act of unconditional hospitality becomes in The Grapes of Wrath a contingent event of 
affirmative hospitality. 
 Steinbeck’s emphasis on conditionality in his rewriting of the scene from 
“Breakfast” points to a major shift in his thinking about hospitality. The Grapes of Wrath 
marks Steinbeck’s disillusionment with notions of unconditional hospitality, particularly 
notions of unconditional federal hospitality. (I use the term federal hospitality to refer to 
food, housing, or other form of financial or material assistance provided by the United 
States federal government to individuals or groups).19 Despite the prevailing critical 
opinion that The Grapes of Wrath amounts to an unequivocal and “unabashedly 
sentimental” endorsement of Roosevelt’s welfare agenda (Szalay 167), examining the 
novel’s politics through a theoretical lens of hospitality reveals that Steinbeck uses the 
narrative of the Joads to challenge the rhetoric and politics of federal welfarism. 
Accordingly, rather than interpret Steinbeck’s Weedpatch Camp as an idealistic vision of 
a federal “utopia,” as previous scholars have traditionally done, I read Steinbeck’s 
depiction of the relief camp as evidence of his belief that federal hospitality was both 
necessary and inadequate in the case of Dust Bowl migrants.20 Although The Grapes of 
Wrath did play a significant role in convincing the Roosevelt administration to increase 
federal relief for California’s migrant population, I argue that Steinbeck was more 
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concerned with galvanizing the American public to embrace a culture of individual 
responsibility.21 The example of the Joads suggests that federal hospitality is not a 
panacea for migrant poverty. Real, lasting change would require also cultivating a culture 
of individual hospitality. By exploring the ways in which the material demands of 
migrant life destabilize the discursive tropes and juridical hierarchies that inform 
traditional American models of hospitality, Steinbeck offers us an alternative model of 
ethical engagement that is grounded in the unforeseeable and irreducible ethical relation 
between the host and the arriving other. Thus, The Grapes of Wrath provides us with a 
laboratory space both for theorizing affirmative hospitality and for charting the 
progression of Steinbeck’s thinking about hospitality. It is through the narrative of the 
Joads’ migration that Steinbeck gradually teaches us to abandon naïve visions of 
hospitality and to adopt more sophisticated ones.  
 
I 
 In a crucial sequence early in The Grapes of Wrath (72-103), Steinbeck glosses 
the Joads and their upcoming migration through conventional tropes of hospitality. 
Satisfying the trope of the unexpected guest in this sequence is Jim Casy, who arrives 
unannounced at Uncle John’s house along with Tom Joad (72). Serving as hosts to Casy 
are Pa and Ma Joad, who display excessive attentiveness to their guest by persistently 
reiterating their invitations of hospitality: when Casy first arrives, Pa assures him, 
“You’re welcome here, sir” (72); shortly thereafter, when breakfast is served, Ma echoes, 
“You’re welcome” (80); then, Pa once again confirms, “You’re welcome” (80). Just as Pa 
and Ma are conscientious in their roles as hosts, Jim Casy is mindful and deferential in 
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his position as guest, politely waiting behind Uncle John’s house while the Joads meet in 
a squatting circle to decide whether they will invite the preacher to join them in their trip 
to California: “He, out of delicacy, was sitting on the ground behind the house. He was a 
good preacher and knew his people” (100).22 In response to Pa’s query “kin we feed a 
extra mouth?” Ma Joad recounts a family history distinguished for an unfailing 
commitment to providing hospitality to strangers: “. . . it’s a long time our folks been 
here and east before, an’ I never heerd tell of no Joads or no Hazletts, neither, ever 
refusin’ food an’ shelter or a lift on the road to anybody that asked” (102). In accordance 
with this longstanding family tradition, the Joads proffer an invitation to Jim Casy, one 
that Steinbeck depicts for us by figuring the Joads’ squatting circle as a kind of metaphor 
for the home that the family has lost: “Casy got to his feet. He knew the government of 
families, and he knew he had been taken into the family. Indeed his position was eminent, 
for Uncle John moved sideways, leaving space between Pa and himself for the preacher. 
Casy squatted down like the others, facing Grampa enthroned on the running board” 
(103). Dispossessed of their physical “house” (99), the Joads treat the improvised 
squatting circle metonymically as a site of hospitality—as a space from which they can 
provide welcome to Jim Casy. In the process, they lay the groundwork for future scenes 
in which they and other migrants carry out acts of hospitality in temporary and 
indeterminate spaces. 
 The tropes of hospitality that Steinbeck utilizes in these early interactions between 
the Joads and Jim Casy are by no means unique to this sequence of scenes. In The Grapes 
of Wrath, we see tropes of hospitality everywhere. As early as the opening scene of the 
narrative, when Tom Joad hitches a ride with a truck driver, Steinbeck introduces the 
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foundational tropes of host, guest, and site of hospitality. Figuring the truck’s cabin as a 
desirable space into which the driver, as host, receives Tom, as guest—“he took in the 
hitch-hiker”—Steinbeck establishes a precedent for treating mobile spaces as sites of 
hospitality (7). Thus, we are later prepared to recognize the Joads’ Hudson truck as a site 
from which the family offers hospitality to fellow migrants. Like the squatting circle, the 
Hudson functions both physically and metaphorically as a substitution for the Joads’ lost 
“house”: “The house was dead, and the fields were dead; but this truck was the active 
thing, the living principle. The ancient Hudson . . . was the new hearth, the living center 
of the family; half passenger car and half truck, high-sided and clumsy” (99-100). From 
the Hudson truck, the Joads offer hospitality to the Wilsons when the two families decide 
to ride “together” in Oklahoma (148) and later to a fellow migrant in California while 
searching for work: “Come on, then. Git up back, an’ we’ll all look” (318).23 
 As the examples above demonstrate, Steinbeck portrays provisional spaces, like 
the Hudson truck and the squatting circle, as sites of hospitality in The Grapes of Wrath 
by employing recognizable tropes that clearly identify characters in given scenes as hosts 
and others as guests. When Sairy Wilson invites a dying Grampa Joad to “lay down” and 
“rest” in the Wilsons’ tent—“How’d ya like to come in our tent?”—there is no mistaking 
the metonymic symbolism: Sairy is figured as host, Grampa as guest, and the tent as a 
site of hospitality (136). Numerous other scenes in the novel are configured according to 
this same recognizable tropology. In Chapter 6, we see Muley Graves assume the role of 
host when he shares his supper with unexpected guests Tom and Casy on the front porch 
of the Joads’ abandoned home: “You sharin’ with us, Muley Graves?” (49). At a roadside 
hamburger stand in Oklahoma, a server named Mae acts as a host when she “h[olds the 
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screen door open” for a migrant family and then agrees to sell them a loaf of bread for a 
reduced price (160). In the woods outside Hooper Ranch, Jim Casy performs the role of 
host when he enthusiastically welcomes Tom Joad inside the makeshift tent that he shares 
with his fellow picketers: “Come on in, Tommy. Come on in” (381).  
No character in The Grapes of Wrath is figured as a host more times than Ma 
Joad. We see her provide hospitality at the Hooverville camp when she decides to share a 
portion of the family’s stew with starving children: “I’m a-gonna set this here kettle out, 
an’ you’ll all get a little tas’ . . .” (258). At the Weedpatch Camp, we see her offer 
hospitality first to Jim Rawley—“We’d take it in honor ‘f you’d have some breakfus’ 
with us” (304)—and later to the Ladies’ Committee: “I’d be proud to have you ladies 
come an’ set while I make up some coffee” (312). And in the novel’s final scene, Ma 
once again assumes the position of host when she facilitates Rose of Sharon’s act of 
hospitality and escorts the remaining Joads’ out of the barn: “She herded them through 
the door, drew the boy with her; and she closed the squeaking door” (454).  
 However, prevalent as it is as a framing discourse in The Grapes of Wrath, 
hospitality is never treated uncritically in Steinbeck’s novel. In The Grapes of Wrath, 
unlike in “Breakfast,” Steinbeck introduces notions and images of categorical and 
unconditional hospitality so as to critique them.24 For example, in the scene at Uncle 
John’s house when the Joads meet to decide whether to invite Jim Casy along on their 
trip, Steinbeck portrays the decision facing the family in terms of a clear opposition 
between two conflicting approaches to the question of hospitality. Suggesting that the 
Joads should “figger close” when making their decision, Pa focuses his attention on 
practical considerations, like whether the Joads can afford to “feed a extra mouth” and 
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whether there will be enough “room” in the Hudson (102). “It’s a sad thing to figger 
close,” Pa concedes, but he believes it is necessary for the protection of the family (102). 
In contrast, Ma eschews her husband’s practicality, recounting the family’s long history 
of categorical hospitality and arguing that the Joads would be dishonoring that history if 
they fail to invite Casy to join them: “As far as ‘kin,’ we can’t do nothin’, not go to 
California or nothin’; but as far as ‘will,’ why, we’ll do what we will. An’ as far as 
‘will’—it’s a long time our folks been here and east before, an’ I never heerd tell . . .” 
(102). Rather than make an ethical decision in response to what Pa regards as a moment 
of undecidability, Ma discounts the idea of undecidability altogether. She treats the 
arrival of Casy not as an aporia that demands an ethical choice but as an opportunity to 
reassert her devotion to a pretense of categorical hospitality—a pretense that necessarily 
involves a stubborn disregard for contingency. In other words, the question for Ma is not 
whether the Joads “kin” offer hospitality to Casy but whether they “will” remain true to 
an impracticable family ethos. In the end, Ma’s idealism wins out over Pa’s pragmatism 
but not before Steinbeck uses a discourse of hospitality to depict Ma and Pa as host-
figures with competing mindsets, thereby setting the stage for a dramatic upheaval in the 
family’s gender hierarchy.25 
 At this early point in the novel, then, Ma Joad describes—and, to her credit, 
treats—hospitality as a categorical imperative. Indeed, when Steinbeck first introduces us 
to Ma in Chapter 8, we witness her bestow hospitality to Tom and Casy blindly and 
unhesitatingly, never even seeing their faces before offering to feed them:  
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     Pa stepped into the open doorway and stood there blocking it with his wide 
short body. He said, “Ma, there’s a coupla fellas jus’ come along the road, an’ 
they wonder if we could spare a bite.” 
     Tom heard his mother’s voice, the remembered cool, calm drawl, friendly and 
humble. “Let ‘em come,” she said. . . . 
     Pa stepped inside, clearing the door, and Tom looked in at his mother. She was 
lifting the curling slices of pork from the frying pan. The oven door was open, and 
a great pan of high brown biscuits stood waiting there. She looked out the door, 
but the sun was behind Tom, and she saw only a dark figure outlined by the bright 
yellow sunlight. She nodded pleasantly. “Come in,” she said. (73-4) 
Steinbeck uses this scene both to figure Ma as a maternal symbol of categorical 
hospitality and to undermine the very idea of categorical hospitality altogether. On one 
hand, adorned in her “Mother Hubbard” and “thick with child-bearing,” Ma embodies a 
male fantasy of unwavering maternal hospitality (74). In her role as provider, she is 
“superhuman,” as “faultless” as a “goddess.” Like the “open” doors that surround her, she 
is welcoming and receptive (74). What’s more, she appears fully invested in the 
patriarchal ideology that has assigned her the “position” of provider: “She seemed to 
know, to accept, to welcome her position . . .” (74).26  
On the other hand, despite the surface appearance of blind hospitality in this 
scene, the exchange between Ma and her unexpected guests actually works to undercut 
Ma’s later claim to categorical hospitality. Ma does welcome Tom and Casy without 
laying eyes on them, but she does so only after Pa has vetted them. By coming to the door 
and asking Ma if the family “could spare a bite,” Pa reveals to his wife that he has 
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already judged the visitors worthy of consideration. Undoubtedly, one of the unspoken 
implications of Pa’s description of the two visitors as “a coupla fellas” is that they are 
white fellas. As Ma herself makes clear later in the novel when she recalls the time that 
Uncle John “converted an Injun an’ brang him home,” the presence of a non-white guest 
in the home of one of the Joads was a rare event that took place only under exceptional 
circumstances (396). Moreover, although Pa is performing a role in this scene in order to 
“fool” Ma, his behavior has important symbolic resonances (75). Standing in the open 
doorway to shield Tom from Ma’s view, Pa himself physically embodies the 
conditionality that Ma’s claim to categorical hospitality seeks to disavow. By “blocking” 
the entrance to Uncle John’s house until Ma issues her invitation, Pa calls attention to the 
fact that receiving hospitality from the Joads does, in fact, involve a contingent process of 
authorization, even if that process simply amounts to a performance. In fact, it is 
precisely the performative nature of this scene—even if Ma Joad herself is unaware of the 
role that she plays—that serves to remind us that all exchanges of hospitality are always 
already performances of known and recognizable tropes. In short, by making us aware 
that a performance is taking place, Steinbeck draws our attention to the reflexive nature 
of Ma’s welcome, thereby undermining her later claim to categorical hospitality. 
 Steinbeck also uses this scene to underscore the inherent dangers of a model of 
hospitality that seeks to disavow difference. By offering hospitality to Tom and Casy 
without first seeing them, Ma welcomes her guests without making any effort to 
recognize or affirm their singularity. Accordingly, although she wears a “kindly” 
expression, the invitation Ma confers is an impersonal one (74). It is only after Tom steps 
“over the doorsill” into the house that he and Ma experience their memorable moment of 
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recognition—a sunlit and hazy face-to-face encounter that emphasizes the artificial nature 
of the distinctions between host and guest, known and unknown, self and other (73-4). Of 
course, this bestowal of hospitality to the stranger who turns out to be a member of the 
family prepares us for the novel’s later deconstruction of traditional Western notions of 
family.27 But, more importantly, Ma’s first act of hospitality in The Grapes of Wrath 
reveals that practicing an ethics of categorical hospitality would necessarily require an 
indifference to the singular difference of the other. In the impersonality of her welcome, 
Ma treats her own son as a trope—that is, as just another unknown guest who arrives 
unexpectedly. For Derrida, it is this same trope—the trope of the “absolute, unknown, 
anonymous other”—that makes it possible to envision an “ideal” of unconditional 
hospitality (OH 25; “A” 131). However, Steinbeck seems to be suggesting in this scene 
and in a number of later scenes in The Grapes of Wrath that perhaps unconditional 
hospitality is not an ideal form of hospitality, after all. Perhaps, Steinbeck’s novel seems 
to suggest, we should abandon the kinds of naïve visions of unconditional hospitality that 
we see imagined in “Breakfast” and, instead, focus on finding ways for hosts and guests 
to be more aware of and receptive to the irreducible singularity of the other.  
Ma is not the only character in The Grapes of Wrath who imparts a vision of 
categorical hospitality early in the novel. In Chapter 6, Muley Graves proffers hospitality 
according to what he describes as a universal imperative. When Tom and Casy encounter 
Muley unexpectedly and ask if he is willing to share his supper with them, he assents but 
only after explaining that he has no “choice”: 
     Muley fidgeted in embarrassment. “I ain’t got no choice in the matter.” He 
stopped on the ungracious sound of his words. “That ain’t like I mean it. That 
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ain’t. I mean”—he stumbled—“what I mean, if a fella’s got somepin to eat an’ 
another fella’s hungry—why, the first fella ain’t got no choice. I mean, s’pose I 
pick up my rabbits an’ go off somewheres an’ eat ‘em. See?” (49) 
Muley does not expand on his view of hospitality beyond what he states here, so the logic 
behind his maxim of universal hospitality remains unclear. Jim Casy, who is in the 
process of sorting out his own vision of an interconnected human soul, is unsurprisingly 
enamored by Muley’s formulation: “Muley’s got a-holt of somepin, an’ it’s too big for 
him, an it’s too big for me” (49).  
Although Muley is no doubt unaware, the ethics of hospitality he articulates here 
is very much in keeping with the model of “universal hospitality” outlined by Kant in 
Perpetual Peace (Kant 137). Like Kant, who proposes a theory of hospitality grounded 
not in a spirit of “philanthropy” but in an abstract notion of a universal “right to 
visitation,” Muley characterizes the figure of the host as one who provides hospitality out 
of a sense of shared human obligation (Kant 138). But Muley’s physical behavior and his 
“ungracious” tone indicate that perhaps his maxim does not, in fact, reflect his belief in a 
universal code of ethics. On the contrary, perhaps Muley’s comments simply point to the 
fact that hosts feel obligated to provide hospitality because they share an innate instinct 
for survival. To be sure, Tom Joad, newly released from prison after serving a four-year 
sentence for homicide, presents an intimidating figure. One can only imagine that Tom’s 
direct and gruff appeal to Muley’s hospitality feels like a demand made by a man very 
capable of physical violence: “Four solemn years I been eatin’ right on the minute. My 
guts is yellin’ bloody murder. What you gonna eat, Muley?” (48). In other words, maybe 
it is Muley’s fear of Tom Joad and not his sense of ethical obligation that prevents him 
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from going “off somewheres” and eating alone. In the end, the important thing is that 
Muley, like Ma Joad, communicates a categorical model of hospitality, one that 
renounces “choice” and, in the process, attempts to disavow the ethical component that a 
moment of undecidability makes possible. In the end, despite Jim Casy’s fondness for 
Muley’s universal maxim, it is Muley’s effort at universalizing that makes his model 
inoperable as an ethics of hospitality. It is simply “too big” to be of any practical use.   
Through Ma Joad and Muley Graves, Steinbeck calls attention to the central role 
that disavowal plays in perpetuating myths of categorical hospitality.28 Through Ma, in 
particular, Steinbeck introduces us to a discourse of disavowal rooted firmly in the 
American experience. Portraying the Joads as representatively American in their 
expansion westward—“it’s a long time our folks been here and east before”—Ma 
grounds her claim to categorical hospitality in an exceptionalist logic that takes for 
granted her family’s rightful claim to American lands.29 We see Ma employ this same 
unapologetic logic later in the novel when she attempts to portray the Joads as rightful 
hosts unfairly divested of their hard-fought sovereignty: “We’re the Joads. We don’t look 
up to nobody. Grampa’s grampa, he fit in the Revolution. We was farm people till the 
debt. And then—them people” (307). However, despite Ma’s efforts, the history of 
Native-American dispossession haunts the narrative of the Joads, lurking below the 
surface and undermining their claims to natural sovereignty. As early as Chapter 5, 
Steinbeck’s intercalary narrator reminds us that the westward expansion of white 
Europeans and Americans was dominated not by acts of white hospitality but by gross 
violations of Native-American hospitality: “Grampa took up the land, and he had to kill 
the Indians and drive them away” (33). As we shall see, it is often through the voice of 
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the novel’s intercalary narrator that Steinbeck lays bare the racist hypocrisies of his own 
characters. In the meantime, the narrative chapters often feature Ma Joad reenacting the 
same kind of aggressive assertiveness as her ancestors. As her multiple “revolts” against 
Pa indicate, Ma is willing to fight—“jack handle” in hand, if necessary—to keep her 
family together and to uphold the family’s longstanding ethos of hospitality (168-69). 
 Ma’s act of blind hospitality to Tom and Casy implies an indifference to race that 
the Joads are never given an opportunity to affirm in The Grapes of Wrath. At no point 
during the course of the novel are they in a position to offer to or withhold hospitality 
from anyone who is not white. In fact, according to the narrative chapters in The Grapes 
of Wrath, the Joads encounter only one non-white character during their entire journey, a 
half-Cherokee migrant named Jules Vitela whom Tom meets at the Weedpatch Camp 
(339). In place of the foreign and black migrants who had been toiling away in 
California’s fields for decades, Steinbeck substitutes the more assimilable figure of the 
recently arrived white American “Okie.”30 And through the fetishistic stereotype of the 
“Okie”—a stereotype that is itself racialized by hostile Californians—Steinbeck 
constructs an identifiable symbol of the unwelcome guest for his white American 
audience. Underwriting the demonization of Dust Bowl migrants as “Okies” is a practice 
of racialization. Okies are, we are told, as “dangerous as niggers in the South” and not a 
“hell of a lot better than gorillas” (236, 221). Although Steinbeck fails to include non-
white migrants in his novel, he does use the example of the Joads to draw attention to a 
strategy of disavowing inhospitality through a rhetoric of racialization. Fixating on the 
discrimination experienced by the Joads and other Okies allows Steinbeck to downplay 
prior and concurrent histories of discrimination in the California agricultural economy, 
    34 
histories riddled with acts of racial exclusion, forced repatriation, the selective 
withholding of state and federal aid, wage manipulation, and unlawful land seizure.  
Accordingly, we might say that, as a text, The Grapes of Wrath is markedly inhospitable 
to non-white characters; or, at the very least, we might say that Steinbeck is clearly 
reluctant to welcome non-white characters into the dominant spaces of the narrative. 
Noting the absence of non-white characters in the novel, Colleen Lye has recently argued 
that Steinbeck achieves “migrant representability” in The Grapes of Wrath through a 
“resignification of whiteness” and a concomitant disregard for racial difference (143). 
However, this characterization of the novel is not entirely accurate. Although Lye and 
others have demonstrated convincingly that Steinbeck’s narrative of the Joads 
misrepresents the racial and national demographics of the California migrant population 
during the late 1930s, what has received less critical attention are the ways in which 
Steinbeck uses the intercalary chapters to challenge the repressive nature of his own 
narrative.31 
In The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck utilizes the dialectical structure of his novel to 
present us with a generally repressed but occasionally acknowledged disavowal of racial 
difference.  Steinbeck’s intercalary narrator’s intermittent and often fleeting references to 
Mexican, Chinese, Japanese, and Filipino migrant workers undermine the dominant 
narrative’s fetishizing of the Joads as representative California migrants. Chapters 19 and 
23 exemplify the text’s paradoxical attitude toward race by, on one hand, drawing 
attention to the narrative’s disavowal of racial difference and, on the other, replicating 
that disavowal by reiterating the stereotypes that both enable and disguise racist acts of 
inhospitality in the novel. In the opening sentence of Chapter 19, for instance, the 
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intercalary narrator recognizes the repressed histories of Mexican and Mexican-American 
migrants by recalling, “Once California belonged to Mexico and its land to Mexicans; 
and a horde of tattered feverish Americans poured in” (231). Yet, only two pages later, 
Steinbeck’s text undercuts this recognition of native status for Mexicans through the 
voices of racist Okies: “We ain’t foreign. Seven generations back Americans, and beyond 
that Irish, Scotch, English, German. One of our folks in the Revolution, an’ they was lots 
of our folks in the Civil War—both sides. Americans” (233). Here, we see how Steinbeck 
uses the heteroglossia of his novel to deconstruct the signifying binaries—native/foreign, 
host/guest, white/non-white, American/non-American—that have been used both to 
expropriate and defend the rights of marginalized others in North America for centuries. 
In Chapter 23, Steinbeck further destabilizes these binaries by again employing a number 
of narrative voices to reference a similar history of expropriation in the case of Native 
Americans (325-27). In each of these examples, Steinbeck takes advantage of the 
dialectical form of his novel to interrogate and/or directly contradict the dominant 
discourses of hospitality voiced by the Joads and other white characters.32 In the process, 
he encourages us to read the narrative chapters of the novel more critically and to rethink 
and perhaps even reread earlier scenes with a more critical eye. In this way, Steinbeck’s 
intercalary chapters encourage us to be on the look out for moments when the narrative or 
characters in the narrative are guilty of disavowing racial difference. If the novel’s 
narrative chapters are inhospitable to non-white migrants—in the sense that non-white 
migrants do not appear as characters in the novel—then the intercalary chapters are, if 
nothing else, more willing to accommodate their repressed histories and points of view. 
Accordingly, we might say that Steinbeck’s intercalary chapters provide a space where 
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repressed acts of disaccommodation can be disclosed and inscribed within a historical 
narrative of dispossession.33  
Ultimately, Steinbeck accomplishes his most effective and insightful critiques of 
dominant Western discourses of hospitality in The Grapes of Wrath by way of his 
deliberate focus on the ethical complexities of migrant life. Traditional theories of 
hospitality are grounded in the premise that hospitality cannot be offered or received 
without the presence of a threshold that marks the border between the interior of the 
home (household, state, region, nation, etc.) and the exterior of the outside world.34 It is 
this threshold that privileges the host as local resident and defines the guest as alien. In 
this sense, the act of offering hospitality both requires and affirms the boundaries of the 
home. The host, Derrida explains, “must be assured of his sovereignty over the space and 
goods he offers or opens to the other as stranger” (“H” 14). Thus, it is the host’s 
sovereignty over the space of the home that establishes and contributes to his or her 
“power of hospitality” (OH 54-5). 
 Yet, what traditional conceptions of hospitality do not take into account is what 
happens when the thresholds we conventionally take for granted are undefined or 
contested. In The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck uses the narrative of the Joads to 
demonstrate how dispossession of the home destabilizes the discursive tropes, normative 
codes of behavior, and juridical hierarchies that inform dominant Western models of 
hospitality. Along the way, Steinbeck’s novel urges us to ask ourselves: What ethical 
responsibilities do we have to one another when the frontiers of our sovereignty cannot 
be identified, when the lines between the home and the outside world, between private 
and public, cannot be delimited? What happens, in other words, when it is no longer 
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possible to distinguish between the host and the guest, between the resident and the 
stranger, between the one who welcomes and the one who is received? 
 As early as the first chapters of The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck focuses attention 
on the disorienting effects of dispossession and displacement. When Tom Joad 
approaches his family home after being released from prison, he finds it abandoned and 
dilapidated. The house itself has been “pushed off its foundations,” and the nearby 
outhouse lies “on its side” (40). One corner of the house is “mashed”; the windows are 
“broken out”; and the fences that used to surround the house are “gone” (40-1). With 
cotton growing “in the dooryard and up against the house,” the territorial boundaries of 
the home have been breached (40). Tom is able to locate and identify the doorstep to the 
house, but it no longer serves any functional purpose: “Doorstep’s here . . . But they’re 
gone” (41).  
Steinbeck’s portrait of the Joads’ deserted home functions symbolically as a 
metaphor for the migrant experience. As the overrun state of their home indicates, the 
Joads have come to experience what Homi Bhabha has called “the unhomely”: “the 
shock of recognition of the world-in-the-home, the home-in-the-world” (“The World” 
141). Driven out of their home, the Joads assume a kind of “in-between” existence 
marked by an inability to maintain a firm and grounded interior space of their own (“The 
World” 148). Displaced to their Hudson truck—where home itself is, by definition, 
mobile—the Joads must reimagine the contours of their lives: “The families, which had 
been units of which the boundaries were a house at night, a farm by day, changed their 
boundaries” (195-96). Alongside highways, the Joads and other migrant families make 
and remake ad hoc worlds, temporary living spaces informed by the erratic demands of 
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nomadic life. In the evenings, they pitch their tents; in the mornings, they take them down 
(195). Eventually, the Joads end up in a neglected boxcar, where they cohabitate with the 
Wainwrights. A tarpaulin initially hangs across the middle of the car to separate the 
families, but Al takes it down during the rainstorm to spread it over the Hudson: “Now, 
without the separation, the two families in the car were one” (436). Without stable and 
secure borders to protect and enclose the family, the Joads find that the “privacy” of the 
home can no longer be differentiated from the “public” of the world (Bhabha “The 
World” 141). Thus, for the Joads, the uncanny experience of migration entails a loss of 
the “private” and, therefore, a radical reassessment of the traditional distinction between 
“public” and “private.” 
The experience of migration forces the Joads to abandon naïve visions of 
categorical hospitality and to accept conditionality as an undeniable factor in their 
interactions with others. At the gate to a New Mexico campground, the family learns that 
it is unlawful simply to “lay down an’ rest” on land currently unoccupied by others (186). 
As the proprietor of the campground informs them, “Got a law against sleepin’ out in this 
State. Got a law about vagrants” (186). In direct contrast to Kant’s universal “law” of 
hospitality, which is grounded in the cosmopolitan principle that all humans share a 
“common claim” to the “surface of the earth” (138), the laws forbidding vagrancy in New 
Mexico—and later in Arizona and California—are motivated by nativist hostility and 
justified according to a rhetoric of racialization. Collectively racialized as “Okies,” the 
Joads and their fellow laborers are always already unwelcome when they arrive in search 
of hospitality (236, 221). Stopping at a squatter “encampment” shortly after arriving in 
California, the Joads are informed in no uncertain terms that they and all other “goddamn 
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Okies” should move along (214). “We don’t want none of you settlin’ down here,” they 
are warned (213). In order to rationalize their fear of otherness and to deny the ethical 
implications of their exclusionary behavior, Steinbeck’s Californians maintain that their 
state has reached what François Mitterand once referred to as a “threshold of tolerance”: 
the point beyond which it is no longer “decent” to ask a community to “welcome any 
more foreigners” (qtd. in Derrida “A” 128).35 “It ain’t big enough,” Californians argue in 
one of the intercalary chapters. “There ain’t room enough for you an’ me, for your kind 
an’ my kind, for rich and poor together all in one country . . .” (120). Through this 
organicist rhetoric, Californians in The Grapes of Wrath argue that what appears to be 
inhospitality is really, in fact, a necessary precaution exercised in response to a natural 
phenomenon. Whereas Ma Joad and Muley Graves contend that they have no “choice” 
but to offer hospitality to arriving strangers, Steinbeck’s Californians assert that they 
have no choice but to exclude them. Like Ma and Muley, then, nativist hosts in California 
deny the existence of a moment of undecidability. However, unlike Ma and Muley, they 
treat inhospitality, and not hospitality, as a foregone conclusion. For them, inhospitality 
takes the form of a self-evident act of collective self-preservation.  
The turning point in the Joads’ struggle to come to terms with conditionality takes 
place at a Hooverville camp in Chapter 20. Named pejoratively after President Herbert 
Hoover, “Hoovervilles” were squatter villages that cropped up in areas where migrants 
tended to populate in search of work (Gregory 64-8; Stanley 25).36 Filled with migrants 
in various stages of starvation, these anarchic squatter camps tested the limits of their 
inhabitants’ hospitality.37 Not surprisingly, then, it is at a Hooverville camp that the Joads 
are obliged to recognize their own limitations. While cooking a pot of stew during the 
    40 
Joads’ first evening at the camp, Ma learns that a group of children standing around and 
watching her have eaten nothing but fried dough since breakfast (253). When she finishes 
cooking, Ma openly acknowledges that she is experiencing a moment of undecidability: 
“I dunno what to do. I got to feed the fambly. What’m I gonna do with these here?” 
(257). Forced to make a decision—to choose between her personal allegiance to her 
family and her feeling of ethical responsibility to the starving children—Ma ultimately 
decides to reduce the dinner portions for her family and to leave the children “what’s 
lef’” of the stew (257-58). Instructing the children to find flat sticks to use as utensils, Ma 
sets a pot on the ground with the remaining stew, looks “apologetically” at the starving 
faces, and then hurries away into the Joad tent so that she does not have to “see” the 
children fight over the food (258). 
On one hand, Ma’s conditional act of hospitality in this scene constitutes an early 
example of the kind of affirmative hospitality that the Joads impart later in the novel. 
Confronted with a moment of undecidability, Ma chooses to affirm the needs of the 
children who stand before her, even though she knows that the hospitality she provides is 
limited. The novel’s most vocal proponent of the integrity of the family, Ma is driven 
here to expand the scope of her sympathy outward and to do so at the expense of her 
family. As she herself admits, setting aside food for the children has left the Joads with 
“nowhere near enough” to eat (258). At first glance, then, this scene appears to exemplify 
what numerous scholars have described as a “progressively widening experience of 
sympathetic engagement” in The Grapes of Wrath (Sklar 509). Often pointing to this 
scene, in particular, critics have consistently argued that Steinbeck uses the narrative of 
the Joads to advocate for a cosmopolitan ethics that deemphasizes the importance of the 
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biological family.38 Certainly, Jim Casy’s notion of a universal and interconnected 
“human sperit” contributes to this impression (24). 
However, when examined in terms of its impact on how the Joads approach future 
scenes of hospitality, this scene is significant not because it leads the Joads to begin 
offering hospitality to strangers without any consideration for the needs of the family but, 
quite the contrary, because it teaches them that they must sometimes withhold hospitality 
in order to save the family. Ma herself comes to this conclusion only minutes after 
leaving the stew for the children: “We can’t do that no more . . . We got to eat alone” 
(258). Signaling a major shift in Ma’s sense of the family’s capacity to offer hospitality, 
this moment engenders a fundamental change in the Joads’ interactions with strangers. 
From this point forward in the novel, every action the Joads take to feed or otherwise 
provide for others is carried out without a pretense of unconditionality. By the time the 
Joads reach the Hooper Ranch in Chapter 26, they freely admit that their own survival as 
a family is their foremost concern. As Tom explains to Casy, “We was outta food . . . 
Tonight we had meat. Not much, but we had it. Think Pa’s gonna give up his meat on 
account a other fellas? An’ Roseharn oughta get milk. Think Ma’s gonna wanta starve 
that baby jus’ cause a bunch a fellas is yellin’ outside a gate?” (384). No longer deluded 
by Ma’s impossible claim to categorical hospitality, the Joads have finally come to accept 
the reality of conditionality.39 
II 
 In February of 1939, two months prior to the publication of The Grapes of Wrath, 
the left-leaning San Francisco News featured a sketch by political cartoonist Douglas 
Rodger celebrating President Roosevelt’s formation of an interagency federal 
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commission tasked with coordinating relief efforts for California’s migrant labor 
population (Fig. 1).40 In the cartoon, a beleaguered mother figure, wearing an apron that 
identifies her as “CALIFORNIA,” frantically stirs a large pot at her kitchen stove while a 
horde of starving migrants begs at her feet. In the open doorway of the kitchen stands a 
dapper Uncle Sam with a Rooseveltian Cheshire-cat smile. Turning from her boiling pot, 
California gazes in desperate relief at the arriving male savior. Above the cartoon, a 
caption reads: “AND ARE WE GLAD TO SEE HIM!”  
 
Fig. 1  “AND ARE WE GLAD TO SEE HIM!” San Francisco News, Feb. 21, 1939, 4. 
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 Strikingly similar to Steinbeck’s image of Ma Joad cooking stew while 
surrounded by starving children at the Hooverville camp, Rodger’s cartoon employs a 
narrative of hospitality to legitimize and naturalize the exercise of federal power in 
California. Figuring California as a besieged female host and the US nation (through the 
metonym of the Rooseveltian Uncle Sam) as a long-awaited male guest, Rodger utilizes 
conventional tropes of hospitality to portray New Deal federal intervention as a necessary 
and welcome complement to state aid. Standing in the open doorway of California’s 
kitchen, Uncle Sam, with his hat doffed out of courtesy to his host, is represented not as 
an uninvited alien force but as a respectful and benevolent guest. At the same time, 
however, by virtue of his vast capacity to provide hospitality, Rodger’s Uncle Sam—i.e. 
President Roosevelt—is imagined here as the superlative host, as the true and 
overarching sovereign.41 Moreover, arriving unexpectedly during a time of crisis, 
Roosevelt is pictured as a savior host, a kind of deus ex machina of hospitality. He is, 
according to the gendered tropology of the cartoon, the essential male provider, capable 
of supplying what the female California cannot. Yet, despite the wealth, confidence, and 
authority that Rodger’s Uncle Sam clearly exudes, the cartoon gives us no reason to 
believe that his power in any way threatens California’s sovereignty. On the contrary, the 
sketch and its caption suggest instead that the arrival of a commanding and resourceful 
federal presence is wholly desirable. In other words, although Rodger suggests that true 
sovereignty lies not with the state of California but with the federal government, his 
image of Uncle Sam as a deferential guest works to assuage our fears about Roosevelt’s 
use of federal power. 
    44 
 Rodger’s cartoon is significant with respect to The Grapes of Wrath because it 
represents an image of federal welfarism that Steinbeck endorses in the years leading up 
to The Grapes of Wrath but which he eventually chooses to reject in his novel.42 Critics 
have long argued that The Grapes of Wrath reflects Steinbeck’s unwavering faith in the 
efficacy of federal intervention. Ever since Edmund Wilson famously dismissed Grapes 
as a New Deal “propaganda novel” in 1941, opponents and proponents of the novel have 
persistently reiterated Wilson’s reductive claim (42).43 Cliff Lewis has gone as far as to 
dub Steinbeck the “literary executor of the New Deal” (35).44 More recently, Michael 
Szalay has denounced The Grapes of Wrath for being, as he puts it, “morally didactic” in 
its championing of “national welfarism” (167, 182).  
 The prevailing theory that Steinbeck wholeheartedly supports Roosevelt’s New 
Deal welfarism is based primarily on the claim that he idealizes the Weedpatch Camp as 
a federal utopia in The Grapes of Wrath. Characterizations of Weedpatch as a kind of 
federal paradise are standard and numerous in Steinbeck criticism. Henry Veggian, 
Michael Denning, Danica Cerce, and Michael Szalay all refer to Steinbeck’s government 
camp as a “utopia” (Veggian 355; Denning 266; Cerce 29; Szalay 175).45 John Seelye 
describes Weedpatch as a “heaven on earth” (18). Peter Lisca likens the camp to “the 
land of Canaan” (302). Film producer Darryl Zanuck was so enamored by Steinbeck’s 
Weedpatch that he chose to end his 1940 film adaptation at the federal camp rather than 
follow the Joads to the boxcar and eventually to the rainy barn where the novel’s 
controversial final scene takes place. In fact, Zanuck goes as far as to completely shift the 
setting of Tom and Ma’s memorable goodbye scene from the cave outside Hooper Ranch, 
where it takes place in the novel, to the outskirts of the Weedpatch dance floor.46  
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By altering the ending of the Joads’ narrative, Zanuck contributed to the mythologization 
of Weedpatch—and to the federal camps more generally—as representing a solution to 
migrant homelessness and unemployment.47 To those, like Leslie Fiedler, who find the 
final scene of the novel morbid and sentimental, Zanuck’s film provides a welcome 
alternative, an ending that more closely aligns with what Steinbeck’s detractors have 
themselves identified as the novel’s “avowed politics” of welfarism (64).48   
 Two and a half years prior to the publication of The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck 
himself offered a first-hand journalistic account of the federal migrant camps that has 
often been cited as evidence of his novel’s staunch federalism.49 Having gained a 
reputation as a farm-labor sympathizer in early 1936 with the publication of In Dubious 
Battle, Steinbeck was invited by the left-leaning San Francisco News—the same 
newspaper that ran Rodger’s federalist cartoon—to write an editorial series about the 
federal government’s burgeoning efforts to construct relief camps for homeless Dust 
Bowl migrants.50 In August of 1936, accompanied by Eric Thomsen, the Director in 
Charge of Management for the Resettlement Administration (the New Deal agency 
initially responsible for the migrant camps), Steinbeck traveled through California’s San 
Joaquin Valley, visiting several Hooverville camps and one federal camp, the Arvin 
Federal Camp in Kern County, known unofficially as “Weedpatch” because it was 
located close to the town of Weedpatch and situated right off Weedpatch Highway 
(Stanley 29).51 Opened in early 1936, Arvin was the second migrant relief camp 
constructed by the Resettlement Administration. By 1940, when the Resettlement 
Administration (RA) was transformed into the Farm Security Administration (FSA), the 
federal government had constructed approximately fifteen migrant camps in California 
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(Benson “To Tom” 163).52 During his visit to Arvin in 1936, Steinbeck met and 
befriended the camp manager, Tom Collins, who served as an invaluable source of 
information and later provided Steinbeck with the model for Jim Rawley, the Weedpatch 
Camp manager in his novel.53 Steinbeck and Thomsen spent two weeks at Arvin, meeting 
with residents and officials, reading camp reports, attending committee meetings, and 
traveling around the region.54 
 Steinbeck’s “Harvest Gypsies” series, a collection of seven articles published in 
The San Francisco News in October of 1936, does, in fact, idealize the Resettlement 
Administration’s relief camp project as an antidote to California’s migrant labor crisis.55 
Celebrating the Arvin Camp as a “success,” Steinbeck argues that the federal camp helps 
“restore dignity” to the migrants by reassigning them a “valid position in regard to 
society” (42, 39). “The result of this responsible self-government has been remarkable,” 
Steinbeck reports. “The inhabitants of the camp came there beaten, sullen, and destitute. 
But as their social sense was revived they have settled down. The camp takes care of its 
own destitute, feeding and sheltering those who have nothing . . .” (40). Thus, Steinbeck 
contends, the federal camp instills in migrants a renewed “ethics toward society,” 
transforming “potential criminals into citizens” (39, 42-3). In the end, Steinbeck 
concludes that the Resettlement Administration has created something “unique,” a new 
model of federal assistance that should be expanded to accommodate as many Dust Bowl 
migrants as possible (40).56 
 In some ways, Steinbeck’s depiction of Weedpatch in The Grapes of Wrath 
replicates the federalism that he expresses in his “Harvest Gypsies” series. The Joads 
arrive at the fabled “gov’ment camp” at the beginning of Chapter 22 after escaping the 
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poverty and chaos of the Hooverville camp (280). Having already heard much about 
Weedpatch from their fellow migrants—“You never seen such a place” (254)—the Joads 
are not disappointed by what they find. In terms of the federal government’s professed 
objectives—“to improve the living conditions of the migrants while en route between 
work”—Steinbeck’s Weedpatch is exemplary (Baldwin 222). Unlike the anarchic 
Hooverville camp, Weedpatch boasts elected committee officers, a childcare program, 
running water, washtubs, basic healthcare, and even a dance hall. In addition, Weedpatch 
also facilitates and promotes acts of hospitality. Setting an example for Weedpatch 
residents is the camp manager, Jim Rawley, who quickly wins over an initially 
incredulous Ma Joad with his “warm” manner (304). In contrast to the numerous 
antagonistic and self-interested hosts whom the Joads meet during their travels, Rawley 
appears to have no ulterior motives when he graciously welcomes the Joads to 
Weedpatch: “[Ma Joad] looked for motive on his face, and found nothing but 
friendliness” (305). Likewise, Tom experiences similar generosity during the Joads’ first 
morning at the camp when, in Steinbeck’s retelling of the “Breakfast” scene, a family of 
fellow migrants invites him to join them for breakfast (290-93). Weedpatch also provides 
residents with the opportunity to invite “guests” to camp dances, a privilege that fills 
them with great pride: “Our people got nothing, but jes’ because they can ast their frien’s 
to come here to the dance, sets ‘em up an’ makes ‘em proud” (340). In other words, 
Steinbeck’s account of Weedpatch suggests that the federal camp makes possible 
otherwise impossible acts of hospitality. Endorsed, subsidized, and policed by the federal 
government, the exclusive space of Weedpatch affords the Joads and their fellow 
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migrants the protection to partake in exchanges of hospitality without fear of outside 
interference from hostile Californians.57  
 Ultimately, however, Steinbeck’s portrayal of Weedpatch is much more complex 
and conflicted than critics have previously recognized. Although the novel does present a 
favorable account of the migrant camp, it also draws attention to the limitations of federal 
hospitality. In short, Steinbeck’s Weedpatch Camp is not an isolated federal utopia but an 
inherently conditional space of limited welcome. Emphasizing rather than disavowing the 
exclusive and contingent nature of federal hospitality at Weedpatch, Steinbeck portrays 
New Deal welfarism as impractical and insufficient. In the process, he rejects the FSA’s 
detached ethics of federal hospitality in favor of an affirmative ethics of individual 
responsibility. By the time the Joads leave Weedpatch in Chapter 26, it is clear that 
Steinbeck’s migrants can survive only if they individually and collectively adopt a culture 
of hospitality that can accommodate the unique exigencies of migrant life.58 
 But what accounts for Steinbeck’s changed attitude toward federal hospitality 
between October of 1936, when he wrote his “Harvest Gypsies” series, and May of 1938, 
when he began writing The Grapes of Wrath? How can we explain Steinbeck’s 
disillusionment with the FSA’s relief camp project during this time? After his first visit to 
the Arvin Federal Camp in 1936, Steinbeck returned to the San Joaquin Valley three 
more times before he began work on The Grapes of Wrath. Altogether, Steinbeck spent 
about two months at Arvin and in the surrounding areas visiting with migrants, learning 
their stories, and assisting Tom Collins in his role as camp manager.59 The most crucial 
of Steinbeck’s visits—and the one that was most responsible for transforming his views 
on federal hospitality—came in February and March of 1938 during a period of 
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catastrophic flooding. Dispatched to Visalia (about one hundred miles north of Arvin) by 
the FSA, Collins invited Steinbeck to accompany him and to assist in the relief effort. 
Unable to drive into the flooded areas, Collins and Steinbeck spent one night wading 
through wet fields before they finally arrived at a camp outside Visalia, where four 
thousand migrant families had been “drowned out of their tents” (Steinbeck Life 159). As 
Collins would later recall in an unpublished memoir, the two men spent their first forty-
eight hours at Visalia providing uninterrupted aid: “For forty eight hours, and without 
food or sleep, we worked among the sick and the half starved people, dragging some 
from under trees to a different sort of shelter, dragging others from torn and ragged tents, 
floored with inches of water, stagnant water, to the questionable shelter of a higher piece 
of ground” (Collins 221).60 Collins and Steinbeck remained at Visalia for two weeks 
offering whatever support they could to help the starving and sick migrants (Collins 224). 
 Although Steinbeck spent only a short time at Visalia, the trip had a profound 
impact on him. Initially, he experienced this impact in the form of unprecedented 
physical pain: “Damn it, I know something hit me and hit me hard for it hurts inside clear 
to the back of my head. I got pains all over my head, hard pains. Have never had pains 
like this before. Make me nervous as hell” (Collins 225). Eventually, however, Steinbeck 
realized that this oppressive pain was a physical manifestation of the overwhelming 
shock of his flood experience. As he later told Collins, “I’ve seen and experienced so 
much I ache all over—inside. Hell, I’m all right otherwise, for I have good health. It’s 
something inside me, goddam it” (226). Steinbeck’s trip to Visalia was devastating for 
him not simply because of the destitution and misery that he witnessed. Perhaps more 
importantly, it was because what he saw forced him to recognize the practical limitations 
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of federal hospitality. Prior to his experience during the flood, Steinbeck believed that a 
massive, government-subsidized relief effort was the answer to the migrant labor problem 
in California. In a letter to a friend written only days before he left for Visalia, Steinbeck 
rejected outright the idea that one person alone could make a worthwhile difference in the 
San Joaquin Valley: “Of course no individual effort will help. Ten thousand people are 
affected in one area” (Life 159). 
Yet, the failure of the FSA and other agencies to provide for the basic needs of 
migrants during the flood revealed to Steinbeck that federal hospitality was not the 
solution to migrant poverty and homelessness. No longer willing to resign himself to the 
rationale that it is acceptable to “do nothing” simply because it feels as if “the problem is 
so great,” Steinbeck resolved that it was time for Americans to stop relying on the federal 
government to provide hospitality to those in need (Life 161).61 In a letter dated March 7, 
the day he returned from Visalia, Steinbeck embraced a new ethics of individual 
responsibility: “. . . the argument that one person’s effort can’t really do anything doesn’t 
seem to apply when you come on a bunch of starving children . . .” (Life 161). 
Committing himself to the project of sharing his transformative experience and using it to 
revolutionize the moral conscience of the nation, Steinbeck announced to Collins before 
he left Visalia that the time had come to start writing: “I’m going back home right now. 
I’ve got to get home as fast as that old pie truck can get me there. I’ve got a big job to do 
. . .” (Collins 226). By mid-May, Steinbeck had mapped out and begun writing The The 
Grapes of Wrath.62 
Steinbeck uses the intercalary chapters in The Grapes of Wrath to express his 
disappointment in the federal government’s relief agencies: 
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     Then some went to the relief offices, and they came sadly back to their own 
people. 
     They’s rules—you got to be here a year before you can git relief. They say the 
gov’ment is gonna help. They don’ know when. (433) 
Indeed, the federal government’s “grant-in-aid” program, adopted in response to the great 
floods of February 1938, provided relief only to families in which “one member had 
worked at agriculture in the year prior to migration,” and even then, it supplied this relief 
for only one year (Stein 85).63 Significantly complicating the question of relief for Dust 
Bowl migrants was the fact that they had forfeited their right to receive federal 
unemployment when they gave up their residency status in their home state (Stein 141).64 
As interstate migrants, the Joads and their fellow laborers were denied aid based on the 
premise that neither the federal government nor the State of California was responsible 
for their welfare (Stein 143-44). As Steinbeck details in Chapter 29 of The Grapes of 
Wrath, the result of this cooperative denial of hospitality was that migrants were forced to 
“beg” at the homes and businesses of California’s citizens: “They splashed out through 
the water, to the towns, to the country stores . . . to beg for food, to cringe and beg for 
food, to beg for relief . . .” (433). However, this begging was met with “anger” and 
“fear,” emotions that reflected a shared cultural belief that it was the government’s job 
and not the individual’s to provide hospitality to the masses of desperate migrants (434). 
This was, above all, what Steinbeck realized during the flood: a culture invested so 
fervently in a romantic image of federal hospitality effectively discouraged private 
citizens from carrying out individual acts of hospitality.  
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 No scene in The Grapes of Wrath is more indicative of Steinbeck’s changed 
attitude toward federal hospitality than the revised scene from “Breakfast,” which takes 
place during the Joads’ first morning at Weedpatch. In Steinbeck’s updated version, the 
core elements of the encounter remain the same: a man comes upon a young woman 
nursing her baby while cooking over a stove; the man begins to warm his hands over a 
fire; two men emerge from a tent and invite their unexpected guest to join them for 
breakfast; the hosts do not ask for anything in return for what they provide; and the man 
thanks his hosts for their hospitality. Reframed within the context of The Grapes of 
Wrath, however, Steinbeck’s unexpected guest’s encounter with his generous hosts takes 
on an entirely different meaning. Whereas the narrator’s migrant hosts in “Breakfast” 
boast of their bountiful success as cotton pickers and leave for work attired in brand new 
dungaree jeans and coats (62), their counterparts in The Grapes of Wrath admit with 
“shame” that they “near starve’ to death” struggling to find steady employment in 
California (293). During their ten months in California, Timothy and Wilkie Wallace—in 
the novel, we learn Tom’s hosts’ names—have been so desperate for food that they have 
had to sell their car for “ten dollars”: “We sol’ our car. Had to. Run outa food, run outa 
everything. Couldn’ get no job” (293).65 Hence, although the Wallaces, like the unnamed 
hosts in “Breakfast,” are currently benefiting from twelve days of consecutive work, they 
offer hospitality to Tom despite the acknowledged and very real possibility that they 
could be starving again in a few days. Rather than save what they have for themselves 
and for the future, they affirm the present needs of the arriving other who stands before 
them. In other words, they treat Tom’s arrival as an event to be affirmed, as a lived 
experience that occurs in a specific time and place. Moreover, it is this same sense of 
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responsibility to the other—what Derrida would call a “spirit” of affirmation (OS 94) —
that brings the Wallaces to invite Tom to join them in their work laying pipe for a nearby 
landowner, despite the obvious threat that he poses to their already tenuous job security. 
Tom himself makes their sacrifice explicit when he bluntly asks, “What you cuttin’ your 
own throat for?” (293). In the end, unlike his precursor in “Breakfast,” Tom 
enthusiastically accepts his hosts’ offer of work: “Ya goddamn right I want” (291). In 
contrast to the narrator of Steinbeck’s short story, who has the luxury of declining his 
hosts’ invitation, Tom simply cannot afford to turn down a chance to make money for his 
family. Indeed, as we later learn, this is one of the very few opportunities for work that 
the Joad men have during their month at Weedpatch (350). 
 It is by viewing Steinbeck’s revised scene alongside its original that we can 
understand the full import of Tom’s encounter with the Wallaces at Weedpatch. As 
Derrida notes, it is the very “idea” of unconditional hospitality—the very “thought” of a 
hospitality entirely liberated from the constraints of contingency—that allows us to 
recognize the positive value in acts of conditional hospitality (“A” 129). It is Steinbeck’s 
original vision of a practically impossible scene of hospitality—a scene that takes place 
in an unspecified location at an indeterminate time and imagines an unreserved act of 
welcoming offered to an anonymous and unexpected other—that allows us to more 
readily recognize the conditional nature of the scene at Weedpatch and to more fully 
appreciate the affirmative quality of the Wallace’s hospitality. Viewed alongside 
“Breakfast,” the scene at Weedpatch becomes legible as a symbolic moment of 
affirmation. The Wallaces do not offer hospitality simply as a matter of course; rather, 
they do so with deliberate intention and in the messianic spirit of Derrida’s “yes” (“TL” 
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180). By responding in the affirmative to Tom’s call for hospitality, the Wallaces choose 
to welcome the arriving other despite their knowledge that their act of hospitality could 
very well be self-defeating. In the process, they say “yes” to the unknown future; they 
welcome the future “to come” (“H” 14). 
 It is not simply Tom’s encounter with the Wallaces that draws our attention to the 
inherent limitations of the federal hospitality at Weedpatch. The FSA facility offers the 
Joads temporary relief, but it cannot shelter them permanently from the harsh realities of 
migrant life outside the camp. After only one month at Weedpatch, the Joads are forced 
to leave because they are unable to earn enough money to feed themselves (350). 
Subsisting on a diet consisting only of fried dough, the young Winfield and the pregnant 
Rose of Sharon are starving by the time the family leaves Weedpatch (350). During their 
month at the camp, Tom manages to procure only “five days’ work,” and the rest of the 
men in the family find “no work” at all (350). Not surprisingly, Steinbeck portrays the 
Joads’ experiences of being denied work as scenes of withheld hospitality: “Been goin’ in 
ever’ gate, walkin’ up to ever’ house, even when we knowed they wasn’t gonna be 
nothin’. Puts a weight on ya. Goin’ out lookin’ for somepin’ you know you ain’t gonna 
find” (350). Recounting these scenes of withheld hospitality from the safe confines of 
Weedpatch, Pa Joad unwittingly pinpoints the fundamental problem with the FSA model 
of federal hospitality: functioning merely as palliatives, the relief camps do nothing to 
address the systemic causes of migrant labor exploitation in the American capitalist 
economy.66 Though admirable and certainly appreciated, the federal hospitality offered at 
Weedpatch cannot prevent hosts at farms and ranches all throughout California from 
continuing to withhold hospitality from migrants.  
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 Unlike in his “Harvest Gypsies” series, Steinbeck acknowledges the conditional 
nature of New Deal welfarism from the outset in The Grapes of Wrath. When we first 
hear about Weedpatch from a starving girl at the Hooverville camp in Chapter 20, we are 
told that the FSA facility is “full up” (254). Thus, Steinbeck introduces the FSA camp to 
us as an exclusive space of limited welcome. As the young girl’s account of Weedpatch 
suggests, the FSA camps were places where many Depression-era migrants “wisht” to 
live but from which they were regularly denied entrance (254). The Arvin Federal Camp, 
for example, could accommodate only 450 residents at one time (Campbell 403). By 
sheer necessity, then, federal officials at the camp were forced to turn away starving 
migrants every day. Only by consistently upholding a policy of selective hospitality could 
FSA officials ensure that they were able to provide ample accommodations for those 
residents who were fortunate enough to arrive when the camp had open spaces.   
 However, receiving hospitality at FSA camps was not simply a matter of showing 
up at the right time. As Tom Joad’s lengthy interview with the watchman at Weedpatch 
suggests (286-87), being offering federal hospitality was contingent on meeting several 
requirements.67 Although the Joads meet the prerequisites for admission, Steinbeck’s 
account of the screening process at Weedpatch hints at more egregious practices of 
discrimination at federal camps.68 Indeed, not all prospective guests were treated equally 
at the gates to FSA relief facilities. Despite the popular narrative of Roosevelt’s 
“comprehensive” welfarism (Savage 125), foreign-born laborers were systematically 
excluded from receiving federal hospitality during the 1930s and 1940s, especially at 
federal camps. For example, more than 94% of the migrants who received aid through the 
federal government’s Transient Program during the mid-1930s were “native-born 
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persons” (US Department 562). Populated principally by Dust Bowl refugees, the FSA 
camps extended government relief to white families, like the Joads, but regularly denied 
entry to racialized foreign migrants, such as Mexicans and Filipinos. African-American 
migrants were also customarily refused admission to FSA camps, having to congregate in 
“isolated enclaves” that were not endorsed or subsidized by the federal government 
(Gregory 166).69 On the whole, therefore, non-white laborers “remained virtually 
untouched by the FSA camp experiment” (Ngai 136).70  
 Ultimately, Steinbeck uses the example of Weedpatch to suggest that federal 
hospitality would be more effective if combined with and cultivated by a culture of 
affirmative hospitality. In his depiction of Weedpatch, Steinbeck demonstrates how a 
deprecation of “charity” was a defining feature of the FSA’s culture of welfarism. We 
can see this most clearly in Steinbeck’s parody of the Weedpatch Ladies’ Committee.71 
Reiterating anxieties voiced by the Joads earlier in the novel about being perceived as 
receiving “charity,” the women of the Ladies’ Committee vehemently claim that 
“charity” does not exist at Weedpatch: “They ain’t no charity in this here camp. We 
won’t have no charity” (316).72 Through the example of Mrs. Joyce, who is encouraged 
to take on “credit” at the Weedpatch store in order to pay for her family’s groceries, we 
learn that the camp culture insists on a clear distinction between the private “charity” of 
individuals and the public “Aid” of the federal government (315). The former, we are 
told, is a demeaning form of assistance, while the latter is a perfectly acceptable form of 
government hospitality. As one Ladies’ Committee member explains, “Mis’ Joad, we 
don’t allow nobody in this camp to build theirself up that-a-way. We don’t allow nobody 
to give nothing to another person. They can give it to the camp, an’ the camp can pass it 
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out. We won’t have no charity” (316). Villifying any form of hospitality that is not 
administered by and through the federal government, the Ladies’ Committee describes 
private acts of hospitality (i.e. exchanges of hospitality between residents of the camp) as 
irredeemably demoralizing for the recipient: “If a body’s ever took charity, it makes a 
burn that don’t come out. . . . if you ever took it, you don’t forget it” (316). Like the 
Joads, the Ladies’ Committee associates “charity” with “begging”: recalling a time when 
she was weak and had to accept charity, one Ladies’ Committee member laments, “We 
was hungry—they made us crawl for our dinner. They took our dignity” (316). 
According to the Ladies’ Committee, “charity” deprives the recipient of his or her dignity 
by making humiliation a prerequisite of reception, thereby treating humiliation as an 
acceptable form of reciprocation. Federal “Aid,” on the other hand, is described as an 
entitlement, a privilege of residency at Weedpatch that allows for the possibility of 
financial reciprocation but does not require it. “You’ll pay if you can,” Mrs. Joyce is told. 
“If you can’t, that ain’t none of our business, an’ it ain’t your business” (316).73 
In their obsessive veneration of public “Aid” and their corresponding 
condemnation of private “charity,” the Weedpatch Ladies’ Committee performs an 
unwitting reification of the traditional public/private binary. In the process, they reveal 
how camps like Weedpatch are implicitly invested in reinforcing existing models of 
hospitality.74 Rather than provide migrants with a new model of hospitality that would 
encourage them to rethink their assumptions and imagine alternative ethical horizons of 
possibility, the FSA’s aggressive culture of welfarism simply reinscribes the same 
artificial binary that informs and authorizes capitalist exploitation in the first place. 
Dispossessed of their homes and forced to abandon most of their possessions, many Dust 
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Bowl migrants understandably found the prospect of subsidized and cooperative living 
appealing. However, the obvious limitations of Weedpatch lay bare the inadequacies of 
the FSA model of hospitality.  
 
III 
 Departing Weedpatch early in the morning, the Joads drive west and then north 
toward Bakersfield. On the outskirts of the city, they are approached by a man who 
invites them to work at Hooper Ranch, a peach farm located about fifty miles north of 
Bakersfield. “You’ll find plenty of work there,” the Hooper recruiter assures them (364). 
A physical embodiment of the advertising handbills that lure the Joads to California in 
the first place, the recruiter in this scene represents a reiteration of the many false 
invitations of hospitality that Steinbeck’s migrants receive throughout The Grapes of 
Wrath. As written forms of false invitation, the handbills mislead migrants into 
formulating romantic visions of an Edenic California capable of providing unlimited 
welcome.75 On a number of occasions, the Joads indicate that the advertisements appear 
legitimate to them precisely because of their textuality. For example, before the family 
leaves for Oklahoma, Ma quickly dismisses an oral account of California as false, 
reasoning, “Your father got a han’bill on yella paper, tellin’ how they need folks to work. 
They wouldn’ go to that trouble if they wasn’t plenty work. Costs ‘em good money to get 
them han’bills out” (92). Later, during the Joads’ drive across New Mexico, Pa Joad 
reiterates his wife’s rationale: “I got a han’bill says they need men. Don’t make no sense 
if they don’t need men. Cost money for them bills. They wouldn’ put ‘em out if they 
didn’ need men” (189).76 
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The Joads begin to question the handbills only once they realize that other 
migrants have seen the same advertisements that they have seen: “Why, that’s the one I 
seen. The very same one” (147). As printed texts, the handbills can be reproduced 
endlessly. What’s more, after they have been produced and reproduced, they can also be 
circulated endlessly: “This fella wants eight hundred men. So he prints up five thousand 
of them things an’ maybe twenty thousan’ people sees ‘em” (189). Refuting the Joads’ 
logic that the handbills must be genuine because they are costly, a fellow migrant 
explains that California’s agricultural corporations, farmers’ associations, and large 
landowners benefit more from printing thousands of written invitations than they do from 
withholding them: “You can print a hell of a lot of han’bills with what ya save payin’ 
fifteen cents an hour for fiel’ work” (245). 
 One could very easily interpret Steinbeck’s emphasis on the textuality of the 
handbills as an attempt to reinscribe a metaphysics of presence.77 Without the real-time 
exchange of the lived experience of hospitality, the advertising handbills lack the 
eventness of the face-to-face invitation. Yet, the sudden appearance of the Hooper Ranch 
recruiter in the novel requires us to abandon this simplistic interpretation and to rethink 
the symbolism of the handbills. As it turns out, Steinbeck’s focus on the handbills does 
not represent an attempt to argue that hospitality is losing its aura in an age of mechanical 
reproduction. On the contrary, the handbills in The Grapes of Wrath are an invention of 
Steinbeck’s imagination designed to draw attention to the textuality inherent in all 
exchanges of hospitality. Despite their ubiquity in the novel and their formative role in 
generating a romantic image of California for Steinbeck’s migrants, the handbills did not 
exist outside the fiction of The Grapes of Wrath. In fact, not only were California’s 
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agricultural companies prevented by law from distributing advertisements in Dust Bowl 
states, but many of these companies actually took out ads in local newspapers 
discouraging migrants from coming to California.78 Consequently, in the seventy-five-
plus years since the publication of The Grapes of Wrath, not one single handbill has been 
produced that bears a resemblance to the advertisements described in the novel (Starr 
259-60). 
 However, it would be a mistake to begrudge Steinbeck this fiction. As symbols of 
false hospitality, the advertising handbills are essential to Steinbeck’s investment in the 
discursive dynamics of hospitality in The Grapes of Wrath. Through the handbills, we 
come to recognize that hospitality is always already about reading texts. The example of 
the Hooper Ranch recruiter reminds us that spoken invitations are no more or less 
authentic than written ones. By reiterating the written message of the handbills, the 
recruiter simply assumes a role previously performed by printed text. Yet, the spirit of the 
message remains the same: both the written and spoken invitations are issued as 
infelicitous speech acts, invitations designed not as affirmative offerings of welcome but 
as disingenuous acts of exploitation.79 Both create the illusion of future hospitality but 
fail to follow through with their promise. In the end, it is through the Joads’ continuing 
inability to read these invitations critically, to interrogate them with suspicion, that 
Steinbeck teaches us to think more critically about how we read texts, which includes 
how we read one another as texts.80 
 Steinbeck’s emphasis on the textuality of hospitality is central to his vision of 
affirmative hospitality in The Grapes of Wrath. Through his account of the Joads’ 
migrant experience, Steinbeck suggests that the Dust Bowl migration requires 
    61 
Californians—indeed, all Americans—to engage in a radical rethinking of existing 
models of hospitality. Jim Casy, more than anyone else in the novel, seems to understand 
the grand scale of the migration and the fundamental changes that it will bring: “They’s 
stuff goin’ on that the folks doin’ it don’t know nothin’ about—yet. They’s gonna come 
somepin outa all these folks goin’ wes’—outa all their farms lef’ lonely. They’s comin’ a 
thing that’s gonna change the whole country” (173-74). By way of the novel’s intercalary 
narrator, Steinbeck urges his readers to convert this “change” into a new “concept” and to 
use that “concept” to achieve substantive “action”: “The Western States are nervous 
under the beginning change. Need is the stimulus to concept, concept to action” (152). 
For the Joads and their fellow migrants, the “concept” of affirmative hospitality grows 
out of a shared experience of migration. Interacting in undefined spaces with unclear 
thresholds, Steinbeck’s migrants are unable to rely on normative principles and laws of 
hospitality. Out of necessity, they collectively adopt an ethics of hospitality that can 
accommodate the erratic demands of migrant life. Experiential in nature, this ethics 
provides us with a practical model for achieving the “action” that Steinbeck urges us to 
pursue. At the center of this migrant model of hospitality is a concerted focus on 
affirming the irreducible and nonappropriable singularity of the other—that is to say, on 
affirming the textuality of otherness. 
 Although the affirmative hospitality that Steinbeck’s Dust Bowl migrants 
ultimately embrace in The Grapes of Wrath is generated out of their nomadic experience, 
Steinbeck sets the stage for imagining acts of affirmative hospitality in his novel even 
before the Joads leave Oklahoma. In fact, as early as the novel’s opening narrative scene, 
Steinbeck presents us with an unmistakable moment of undecidability:  
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     The hitch-hiker stood up and looked across through the windows. “Could ya 
give me a lift, mister?” 
     The driver looked quickly back at the restaurant for a second. “Didn’ you see 
the No Riders sticker on the win’shield?” 
     “Sure—I seen it. But sometimes a guy’ll be a good guy even if some rich 
bastard makes him carry a sticker.” 
     The driver, getting slowly into the truck, considered the parts of this answer. If 
he refused now, not only was he not a good guy, but he was forced to carry a 
sticker, was not allowed to have company. If he took in the hitch-hiker he was 
automatically a good guy and also he was not one whom any rich bastard could 
kick around. He knew he was being trapped, but he couldn’t see a way out. And 
he wanted to be a good guy. He glanced again at the restaurant. “Scrunch down 
on the running board till we get around the bend,” he said. (7) 
This scene—the very first scene of hospitality in the novel—establishes conditionality as 
a fundamental reality in The Grapes of Wrath. Conditionality, that which is so 
scrupulously disavowed in “Breakfast,” is immediately acknowledged as undeniable in 
Steinbeck’s novel. The truck driver’s experience of undecidability is what makes a 
decision of hospitality possible in this scene, especially when we consider that the 
driver’s decision is conditioned by concern for his own self-interest. In other words, it is 
the driver’s willingness to give Tom a ride despite the risks involved that lends his act of 
hospitality its affirmative character. As we learn later in the scene, the driver is aware 
from the start that Tom has just been released from McAlester prison (11-12). One can 
only imagine that a recently released convict would not be a truck driver’s first choice for 
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a cabin guest, particularly when that driver is under corporate obligation to abide by a 
categorical policy of refusing rides to hitch-hikers. By disregarding the “No Riders” 
policy, then, the driver treats Tom as a singular individual and their encounter as a 
singular event. He receives Tom neither as a thematized “rider” nor as a thematized 
“convict” but, instead, as one man requesting a ride in a certain place at a certain time. To 
be sure, Tom manipulates the driver’s decision by appealing to his self-image and by 
alluding to a shared class-consciousness. But Tom’s manipulation does not change the 
fact that the driver chooses to welcome Tom into his cabin and that he himself, as host, 
benefits from the company that his guest provides for a short time.81   
 Perhaps no scene in The Grapes of Wrath offers a more sustained focus on the 
importance of affirming singularity than an encounter that takes place in Chapter 15 
between a migrant family and a hamburger-stand server named Mae. The most fully 
formed narrative scene in an intercalary chapter in the novel, the encounter presents us 
with a replication of the kind of xenophobia that we see on display in the narrative 
chapters and a profound moment of undecidability that leads to an act of affirmative 
hospitality. As the hamburger stand’s primary “contact” for interaction with customers, 
Mae has seen Dust Bowl migrants come and go. To her, they all fit one type. She can 
predict what they will say and do: 
Mae knows. They’ll drink a five-cent soda and crab that it ain’t cold enough. The 
woman will use six paper napkins and drop them on the floor. The man will choke 
and try to put the blame on Mae. The woman will sniff as though she smelled 
rotting meat and they will go out again and tell forever afterward that the people 
in the West are sullen. (156) 
    64 
Thematizing all Dust Bowl migrants as shiftless and ungrateful “shitheels,” Mae has 
given up on treating them as singular individuals (156). Because she “knows” in advance 
how all of them will behave, she cannot imagine a scenario in which one of them will 
surprise her and act differently. Adding to Mae’s frustration is the fact that, unlike the 
truck drivers who visit the hamburger stand regularly, Mae knows that the poor migrants 
will never become return customers. In short, Mae believes that there is nothing that the 
migrants can give her that she needs.82  
 After establishing Mae as a character who is especially resistant to treating Dust 
Bowl migrants as singular individuals, Steinbeck uses her as an example of how hostile 
hosts can overcome their xenophobia and recognize the value in performing acts of 
affirmative hospitality. The turning point for Mae comes when a migrant family arrives 
and the “man” of the family asks if she would be willing to sell them “ten cents’ worth” 
of bread (159-60). At first, Mae refuses, explaining, “‘F we sell bread we gonna run out” 
(159). More concerned about being able to provide for and profit from future 
customers—particularly customers who are able to pay full price for what they 
purchase—Mae does not at first prioritize the present needs of the man and his family. 
Eventually, however, with the encouragement of Al, the cook, Mae recognizes that 
perhaps there could be worse things than running out of bread at some point in the future. 
Perhaps it is the “curious humility” of the man or the “half-naked” bodies of the man’s 
two boys, but Mae seems to understand suddenly that her anxiety about the future is 
inconsequential when compared to the present poverty of the migrant family (159-60). 
Emphasizing the affirmative nature of Mae’s hospitality is Steinbeck’s description of the 
moment of welcoming: “She held the screen door open and the man came in, bringing a 
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smell of sweat with him. The boys edged in behind him . . .” (160). Like the truck driver, 
Mae comes to represent a spirit of affirmation precisely because she exhibits initial 
reluctance. 
 The moments of affirmation that we witness in the hitchhiker scene and at the 
hamburger stand and later at the Weedpatch Camp all play a part in communicating 
Steinbeck’s vision of affirmative hospitality in The Grapes of Wrath. But it is the scenes 
in which Steinbeck’s migrants engage with one another in provisional and unregulated 
spaces that we get our clearest sense of what this vision would look like in practice. One 
such scene takes place in Chapter 13 when the Joads first encounter the Wilsons 
alongside the highway in western Oklahoma: 
     Tom leaned out the window. “Any law ‘gainst folks stoppin’ here for the 
night?” 
     The man had seen only the truck. His eyes focused down on Tom. “I dunno,” 
he said. “We on’y stopped here ‘cause we couldn’ git no further.” 
     “Any water here?” 
     The man pointed to a service-station shack about a quarter of a mile ahead. 
“They’s water there they’ll let ya take a bucket of.” 
     Tom hesitated. “Well, ya ‘spose we could camp down ‘longside?”  
     The lean man looked puzzled. “We don’t own it,” he said. “We on’y stopped 
here ‘cause this goddamn ol’ trap wouldn’ go no further.” 
     Tom insisted. “Anyways you’re here an’ we ain’t. You got a right to say if you 
wan’ neighbors or not.” 
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     The appeal to hospitality had an instant effect. The lean face broke into a 
smile. “Why, sure, come on off the road. Proud to have ya.” And he called, 
“Sairy, there’s some folks goin’ ta stay with us. Come on out an’ say how d’ya 
do” (134-35) 
Even though he knows that the Wilsons do not own the land alongside the highway and 
cannot legally claim the sovereign status of host, Tom assumes the role of guest when he 
offers Ivy Wilson the right of refusal. The “appeal” of Tom’s deference, I argue, lies in 
the fact that he offers to enter into a pact of hospitality that operates irrespective of the 
law. It is in order to emphasize this point that Steinbeck clearly establishes the extralegal 
nature of the exchange from the outset. Moreover, unlike in his earlier encounters with 
the truck driver and Muley Graves, Tom does not manipulate his way into receiving 
hospitality from the Wilsons through veiled provocations or threats. Instead, all 
indications suggest that Ivy Wilson welcomes the Joads out of respect for Tom’s frank 
and deferential request for hospitality.83 
 This initial exchange between the Joads and the Wilsons is essential to 
understanding the ethos of migrant hospitality in The Grapes of Wrath. In the absence of 
prescribed and regulated codes of behavior, Steinbeck’s migrants affirm the lived 
experience of hospitality. Accordingly, the ethics they adopt evolves not out of a sense of 
obligation to existing law but out of a desire to respond in a spirit of affirmation to what 
Derrida describes as “a law come from the other” (“A” 134). Arising suddenly in the 
moment of the other’s arrival, this law “come from” and “of” the other arrests the host on 
the threshold and obliges him or her to make a “decision,” a decision that cannot be 
deferred indefinitely and must be made “here” and “now” (134). This law, in other 
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words, arises from an “undeniably real” relation to the other, a “responsibility” to the 
other that, in its eventfulness, supersedes all prior attempts at prescription (134). Through 
their affirmation of this eventfulness, Steinbeck’s migrants engage in acts of hospitality 
that cannot be regulated or virtualized; they are acts, therefore, that take place “in 
actuality” and not “potentiality,” acts that exist not in the foreseeable domain of the 
“should-be” but in the unforeseen “being” of the here and now (“A” 134; “H” 8).  
 The improvisational nature of the ethics practiced by migrants in The Grapes of 
Wrath is most clearly illustrated in the “codes” of “living” that they adopt in their 
makeshift camps (194, 163). These codes emerge as a result of urgent and shared material 
concerns, not as a consequence of any outside legal authority. Together, Steinbeck’s 
migrants “learn” what “rights” need to be observed in order to “insure” both their 
individual and collective survival (194-95). Unlike the culture at Weedpatch, then, this is 
a culture that establishes and embraces community not at the expense of the individual 
but in order to affirm the individual. Openly acknowledging the function that community 
plays as a kind of collective form of “insurance,” Steinbeck’s migrants do not attempt to 
disavow the conditionality of their exchanges (195). The Joads and the Wilsons, for 
example, are able to cultivate a mutually beneficial relationship precisely because they do 
not pretend that they offer one another hospitality without any concern for their own self-
interests. When Al and Tom offer to help “fix” the Wilsons’ car so that the two families 
can drive to California together, Ma openly acknowledges that the help the Joads provide 
is not disinterested: “We’d keep together on the road an’ it’d be good for ever’body. . . . 
Each’ll help each, an’ we’ll all git to California” (148). Likewise, Sairy Wilson concedes 
that the assistance her family offers to the Joads has its own self-interested motivations: 
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“I ain’t felt so—safe in a long time. People needs—to help” (141). With each iteration of 
exchange, the two families reaffirm the value of their union. All the while, Steinbeck’s 
narrator informs us, the reciprocal nature of the “relationship” remains “plain” (148). 
The ethics of affirmative hospitality that Steinbeck’s migrants ultimately embrace 
in The Grapes of Wrath represents a significant departure from the naïve visions of 
categorical hospitality that characters espouse early in the novel. No character in The 
Grapes of Wrath better exemplifies this dramatic shift in the novel’s engagements with 
notions of hospitality than Ma Joad. Abandoning her early idealism and gradually 
committing herself to a new ethos of affirmative hospitality, Ma embodies the kind of 
ethical transformation that Steinbeck hopes to inspire with his novel. However, failing to 
recognize both the importance of hospitality to Steinbeck’s novel and the central role that 
Ma plays in communicating that importance, critics have either undervalued or simply 
misunderstood Ma’s character in The Grapes of Wrath. The general consensus in 
Steinbeck criticism is that Ma is a conventional and static character. Leslie Fiedler, for 
example, argues that Steinbeck’s characterization of Ma Joad calls to mind the kind of 
“stock” image that one would find on a “Mother’s Day greeting card” (57-8). Likewise, 
Nellie McKay contends that Ma is introduced to us as a stereotype of female motherhood 
and that she never deviates from this stereotype: “. . . she never achieves an identity of 
her own . . . She is never an individual in her own right” (52). According to McKay, any 
time Ma opposes Pa or otherwise intervenes in family decisions, she immediately reverts 
back to her assigned woman’s “place” (63). Warren Motley, whose article on Ma Joad 
has achieved canonical status in Steinbeck scholarship, suggests that Ma’s static character 
is simply a reflection of her innate femininity: “. . . Steinbeck suggests that the ‘pain and 
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suffering’ of childbirth and the woman’s role as attendant of the sick and dying leave her 
with an essentially tragic view of life that, in turn, generates a sustaining stoicism. . . . Ma 
Joad possesses the psychological qualities to govern her family community because she 
has actually given birth to it and nurtured it” (407). Yet, despite the feminine “strength” 
Ma exhibits, Motley concludes that Ma herself “gives no particular direction to the 
family” (407). Her “function” is merely to nurture the family so that it can “endure” 
(407). 
 To be sure, early passages in The Grapes of Wrath offer a portrait of a patriarchal 
culture that fully endorses a separate spheres ideology. The first five chapters of the novel 
repeatedly figure women as child-bearers and homemakers. Women, we are told on more 
than one occasion, “watch” from inside the home while men do the important work of the 
family, such as “thinking” and “figuring” (4, 34-5).84 Ma herself appears to indicate her 
acceptance and approval of this separate spheres ideology when she tells Jim Casy in 
Chapter 10 that he should not salt the meat because it is “women’s work” (107). Later in 
the novel, even after the Joad men have been divested of their traditional gender roles and 
Ma herself has ascended to the supreme position of authority in the family, Ma still 
reiterates a separate spheres mentality by imparting an essentialist notion of femininity: 
“Woman can change better’n a man . . . Woman got all her life in her arms. Man got it all 
in his head. . . . Man, he lives in jerks—baby born an’ a man dies, an’ that’s a jerk—gets 
a farm an’ loses his farm, an’ that’s a jerk. Woman, it’s all one flow, like a stream . . .” 
(423). 
Yet, Steinbeck’s novel undermines and ultimately rejects patriarchal and 
essentialist conceptions of gender, and it does so most effectively by deconstructing the 
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conventional trope of the authoritative male host. By the time Ma gives voice to her 
essentialist position in Chapter 28, the narrative of the Joads has already demonstrated 
that simplistic representations of gender do not provide an accurate picture of reality. By 
her own example, Ma refutes the essentialism she espouses, invalidating any and all 
assertions in the novel that attempt to treat gender or any other form of identity as 
reducible. Steinbeck’s text begins deconstructing the trope of the male host during the 
squatting scene at Uncle John’s house when Ma successfully challenges Pa’s authority as 
host, leaving Pa weakened and “ashamed” (102). As Ma’s “control” over the family 
increases, so does her power and influence as a host (169). At the Hooverville camp, for 
example, she decides on her own to share the family’s food with the starving children and 
how much food to share (258). She also decides independently shortly thereafter that the 
family needs to be more careful when it comes to sharing with strangers (258). Later, at 
Weedpatch, it is Ma and not Pa who protects Rose of Sharon from the abusive Lisbeth 
Sandry by denying her hospitality in the Joad tent: “Git out now, ‘fore I git to be a sinner 
a-tellin’ you where to go” (320). 
By the time the Joads end up in a boxcar in Chapter 28, Ma has divested Pa 
entirely of his traditional duties as host. When the Wainwrights approach the Joads about 
arranging a marriage between Al and Aggie, Ma assumes ultimate responsibility for 
orchestrating and authorizing the union: “‘Pa’ll talk to Al,’ said Ma. ‘Or if Pa won’t, I 
will’” (422). By assuming authority in this scene, Ma carries out a duty traditionally 
performed by the male host. Dating back to classical and Biblical literature, the trope of 
the male host has been associated with the power to oversee and negotiate the exchange 
of dependents. In these negotiations, the role of the wife has been to serve merely as a 
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“hostess”—that is, as a delegated “intermediary” consigned with the responsibility to 
provide hospitality to male guests with the objective of ensuring a favorable union (Still 
“Hospitality” 152). In this sense, scenes of hospitality have traditionally treated the figure 
of the wife as the medium—indeed, the female body—through which “homosocial” pacts 
of hospitality are secured (Still “Hospitality” 152-53). In The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck 
inverts this traditional tropology, offering us a vision of a female host who is more than 
capable of serving as the family’s ultimate authority in matters of exchange.85  
The Grapes of Wrath concludes with a scene that both reiterates this inverted 
tropology and provides us with a symbolic moment of affirmative hospitality. Perhaps no 
scene in twentieth-century American literature has received more critical condemnation 
than Steinbeck’s final tableaux of Rose of Sharon breastfeeding a starving man. Both 
proponents and detractors of The Grapes of Wrath have singled out Steinbeck’s 
concluding passage as a target of denunciation since the novel’s publication. Over the 
years, the scene has been variously derided as “gaudy” (Long 497), “painfully mawkish” 
(Visser 28), “maudlin” (O’Connell 57), “inconclusive” (Cowley 350), “a disaster” 
(Levant 29), “inept” (Hoffman 166), “puerile symbolism” (Marshall 578), “the tawdriest 
kind of fake symbolism” (Fadiman 81), and “pornography” (Kuhl 165).86 The primary 
criticism directed at the scene is that it is an exemplary instance of Steinbeck’s unabashed 
sentimentalism (Fiedler 55; Levant 29; Pollock 224-26; Seelye 17; Szalay 167; 
Williamson 88-92). Reiterating and expanding on this standard claim, Michael Szalay has 
recently argued that Steinbeck employs the sentimentalist mode throughout The Grapes 
of Wrath and especially in the final scene in an attempt to promote a detached ethics of 
“national welfarism”: 
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Rose’s almost mechanical extension of herself to a stranger for whom she has no 
personal feelings is the apotheosis of this process. For Rose has been taught not so 
much to care for strangers as if they were a part of her family, but to care for 
strangers in the complete absence of producing even an imaginary personal 
relation to them. Steinbeck’s national welfarism is potent not because it 
extrapolates from codes of familiar care, but because it supplants them entirely, 
eschewing the sentimental justifications and personal identifications once required 
for such care. (182) 
Steinbeck’s final scene does not, Szalay argues, make human suffering “real and 
palpable” but, instead, treats that suffering as “abstract” (167-68). In this sense, Szalay 
claims, rather than teach us to celebrate and value “attachment and affective interpersonal 
identification,” Roseharn’s act signifies and advocates “detachment and impersonal 
charity” (167).87 
 However, examining the final pages of The Grapes of Wrath through a theoretical 
lens of hospitality reveals that we need to radically rethink the politics and symbolism of 
the novel’s final scene. The entire novel up to this point has taught us how to read this 
scene, which is to say that it has taught us how to read it as a scene of hospitality. Like 
the numerous scenes of hospitality that precede it, this one employs and deconstructs 
conventional tropes. Once again, Steinbeck stages a meeting between strangers in a space 
that does not meet standard criteria for a site of hospitality. When the Joads come upon 
the “rain-blackened barn,” they stumble in through an “open end” where there is “no 
door” (453). The only thing that separates the interior of the barn from the exterior of the 
outside world is a “curtain” of rain (453). In this unhomely place, neither the Joads nor 
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the strangers they encounter can claim legal rights as hosts or as guests. Although the boy 
perceives the Joads as “newcomers” when they first enter the barn, he makes no attempt 
to assert or establish any kind of privileged status (453). Instead, he deferentially asks the 
Joads, “You own this here?” (453). In response, Ma explains that, “No,” the Joads are, 
like the boy and his father, merely trespassers “come in outa the wet” (453). 
 Despite the absence of any established distinction between host and guest in this 
scene, the two families proceed to engage in an exchange of hospitality with one another. 
In this exchange, roles and responsibilities are not dictated by recognized law or by 
prescribed norms of behavior; instead, they emerge organically in response to the present 
needs of the other. Thus, when Ma appeals to the boy for hospitality and he responds in 
the affirmative, the boy temporarily assumes the role of host: 
     “No,” Ma said. “Jus’ come in outa the wet. We got a sick girl. You got a dry 
blanket we could use an’ get her wet clothes off?” 
     The boy went back to the corner and brought a dirty comfort and held it out to 
Ma. 
     “Thank ya,” she said. (453) 
Ma’s appeal for hospitality, like Tom’s appeal to Ivy Wilson alongside the highway in 
Chapter 13, initiates a mutually beneficial exchange between two families. In this latter 
exchange, Steinbeck uses the symbol of the “dirty comfort” to emphasize the reciprocal 
and conditional nature of the relationship. The “comfort” isn’t much, and it isn’t ideal. 
But it is all that the boy has to give. Receiving the boy’s hospitality, in other words, 
means accepting the condition in which it is “held out” (453). The same can be said of the 
hospitality that Rose of Sharon offers in reciprocation. Just as Roseharn needs warmth, 
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the boy’s father desperately needs nourishment. Of course, breast milk is not what the 
boy has in mind when he requests hospitality from the Joads: “You folks got money to git 
milk?” (454). But the Joads don’t have money. Nor do they have any food. Rose of 
Sharon’s breast milk is all that they have to give. Although the starving man is clearly 
uncomfortable with the manner in which he is being provided sustenance—“He shook his 
head slowly from side to side”—Roseharn convinces him that, in order to survive, he 
must accept the condition in which she is able to offer him hospitality: “‘You got to,’ she 
said. She squirmed closer and pulled his head close. ‘There!’ she said.” (455). In the end, 
it is the “dirty comfort” that serves as a visible and symbolic link between the boy’s 
initial gesture of hospitality and Rose of Sharon’s response. Only by pulling aside the 
comfort can Roseharn bare her breast and invite the starving man to receive her 
hospitality: “Rose of Sharon loosened one side of the blanket and bared her breast” (455). 
 Far from advocating a detached ethics of federal welfarism, Steinbeck’s final 
scene exemplifies and promotes an ethics of affirmative hospitality through its emphasis 
on singularity, undecidability, and conditionality. Shortly after completing the manuscript 
for The Grapes of Wrath, Steinbeck wrote a letter to his editor, Pascal Covici, in which 
he insisted that the starving man in the barn “must be a stranger” in order for the 
“meaning” of his novel to be fully realized: “To build this stranger into the structure of 
the book would be to warp the whole meaning of the book. The fact that the Joads don’t 
know him, don’t care about him, have no ties to him—that is the emphasis” (Life 178). 
Szalay interprets Steinbeck’s insistence on the man’s strangeness as confirmation that the 
narrative of the Joads discourages “interpersonal identification” (167). What’s more, 
Szalay suggests that Steinbeck “replaces Rose’s child with a stranger” in the final scene 
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in order to conclude his novel on a note of “national” rather than “familial” affiliation 
(171). Yet, the starving man’s strangeness in no way contributes to an impression that 
Roseharn’s act is meant to be a symbolic expression of national welfarism. Nor does it in 
any way preclude “interpersonal identification.” On the contrary, the man’s strangeness 
functions as the essential means through which Rose of Sharon is able to encounter, come 
to terms with, and affirm otherness. Only through the conventional trope of the absolute 
stranger could Steinbeck accomplish his objective of making the abstract figure of the 
Dust Bowl migrant familiar to his American audience. In the absolutely unknown and 
infinitely unknowable face of the starving man, Roseharn recognizes something familiar, 
something worth affirming: “She moved slowly to the corner and stood looking down at 
the wasted face, into the wide, frightened eyes. Then slowly she lay down beside him” 
(455). In the face of the stranger, Rose of Sharon finds both the source and the object of 
her affirmation. Finally willing to expand the scope of her sympathy outward and beyond 
her own narcissistic concerns, Roseharn, like her mother, comes to embody the kind of 
ethical transformation that Steinbeck’s novel is designed to inspire. At the same time, 
however, Steinbeck makes clear that Roseharn’s act is by no means an unconditional one. 
She herself gets pleasure out of the act she performs: “She looked up and across the barn, 
and her lips came together and smiled mysteriously” (455).88 
 Pascal Covici worried that Steinbeck’s introduction of the starving man into the 
narrative of The Grapes of Wrath at the very end was “too abrupt”: 
Your idea is to end the book on a great symbolic note, that life must go on and 
will go on with a greater love and sympathy and understanding for our fellowmen. 
Nobody could fail to be moved by the incident of Rose of Sharon giving her 
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breast to the starving man, yet, taken as the finale of such a book with all its 
vastness and surge, it struck us on reflection as being all too abrupt. It seems to us 
that the last few pages need building up. The incident needs leading up to, so that 
the meeting with the starving man is not so much an accident or chance 
encounter, but more an integral part of the saga. (qtd. in Life 177) 
However, it is the suddenness of the encounter in the barn that helps convey the severity 
of the man’s predicament and, therefore, the gravity of Rose of Sharon’s decision. For 
Steinbeck, as for Derrida, the question of hospitality is an urgent one. It comes upon us 
unexpectedly and demands our attention here and now. If Steinbeck was going to 
convince his readers to embrace a new culture of affirmative hospitality, he knew that he 
needed to communicate the urgency of the crisis in California. But he also understood 
that any ethical decision undertaken on behalf of a suffering Dust Bowl migrant would 
necessarily require and proceed from a moment of undecidability. In the barn, this 
moment of undecidability is unmistakable: 
     Suddenly the boy cried, “He’s dyin’, I tell you! He’s starvin’ to death, I tell 
you.” 
     “Hush,” said Ma. She looked at Pa and Uncle John standing helplessly gazing 
at the sick man. She looked at Rose of Sharon huddled in the comfort. Ma’s eyes 
passed Rose of Sharon’s eyes, and then came back to them. And the two women 
looked deep into each other. The girl’s breath came short and gasping. 
     She said “Yes.” (454) 
If this moment is “melodramatic” (Long 497; “Oakies” 87) and “theatrical” (Cowley 
350), it is because Steinbeck recognized that an ethical decision made in the face of 
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“death” is not a trivial decision. The scene is designed to emphasize the fact that the 
moment of undecidability can lead to mortal consequences for those who are in dire need 
of our hospitality. Standing “helplessly gazing” at the starving man, Pa and Uncle John—
the men in this scene—embody the kind of “aporetic paralysis” that Derrida warns us 
against (“HJR” 66).89 They do not have the strength and/or the imagination to come up 
with an answer in response to the seemingly impossible question of the boy’s desperate 
plea for hospitality. Ma and Roseharn, on the other hand, share a silent moment of 
undecidability—a moment that concludes with an undeniably affirmative response: 
“Yes.” The fact that Pa and Uncle John are physically incapable of performing the act of 
hospitality that Rose of Sharon undertakes could indicate that Steinbeck is making a 
statement about the essential power that women have as providers of hospitality. Indeed, 
numerous scholars have interpreted this scene as symbolic of a uniquely maternal 
capacity to nurture.90 Yet, I would argue that Rose of Sharon’s act is more representative 
of a capacity to respond imaginatively and decisively to the unexpected call of the other. 
Through the examples of Ma and Roseharn, Steinbeck urges all Americans to break free 
from existing models of hospitality and begin to take it upon themselves to find new and 
innovative ways of providing for those who are in desperate need of their help.    
  




Whereas Part One of American Hospitality considers Steinbeck’s engagement 
with questions of hospitality at a national level, Part Two shifts attention to the Jim Crow 
South and argues that southern writers during the middle decades of the twentieth century 
employ scenes and figures of hospitality to interrogate the racial, gender, and class 
politics of the South. Chapter Two calls for a reconsideration of three major southern 
novels: Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With The Wind, William Faulkner’s Absalom, 
Absalom!, and Margaret Walker’s Jubilee. I contend that all three of these novels are 
centrally invested in examining the ideological functions and implications of southern 
hospitality. Taken together, the readings in this chapter highlight the central role that 
stories about southern hospitality played in informing the South’s regional identity and in 
narrativizing this identity in terms of a romanticized antebellum past. 
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Chapter Two 
Southern Disavowal: 
Strangers, Fetishes, and Redemptions in Mitchell, Faulkner, and Walker 
 
I 
 Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With The Wind has contributed more to our conception 
of southern hospitality that any other literary text. The novel was greeted with 
unprecedented popular success in the summer of 1936, selling almost one million copies 
within six months of its publication (Pierpont 87). As of 2003, Gone With The Wind had 
sold nearly thirty million copies, making it the best-selling historical novel in U.S. history 
(McPherson 47). Despite the passage of time, Mitchell’s novel has not lost its prestige: in 
a 2008 nationwide Harris Poll that asked American readers, “What is your favorite 
book?” Gone With The Wind placed second only to The Bible (“The Bible”). In 2011, Pat 
Conroy called Mitchell’s novel “the most successful novel ever published in our 
republic” (12).  
 Considering Gone With The Wind’s sustained popularity, it is no surprise that the 
novel has experienced a resurgence in critical attention in recent years. Initial reviews of 
the novel were mixed. On one hand, the novel received effusive praise. Critics celebrated 
Mitchell’s work for its “imagination,” “whole-heartedness,” “richness of texture,” 
“narrative vigor,” “sweep and abundance,” and “generosity of incident and of drama” 
(qtd. in Pyron 203-24). Many complimented Mitchell on her ability to create a narrative 
that could provide contemporaries suffering from the Great Depression with an 
imaginative window into a parallel era of devastation in American history (Pyron 203-
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24). On the other hand, critics of Gone With The Wind faulted the novel for what they 
saw as its “triteness and sentimentality” and its “empty-headed” assessment of Southern 
culture (Cowley 20). Then, between 1938 and 1970, Gone With The Wind all but 
disappeared from literary criticism. If anything, it existed as “little more than a negative 
reference point” for discussions about the failures of the plantation romance (Pyron 208). 
However, with the rise of regional studies of the South, African-American studies, 
and women’s studies, literary critics since the 1970s have begun paying more attention to 
Gone With The Wind. During the past fifty years, readers have offered new and important 
analyses of Mitchell’s account of race and gender relations in the South, as well as 
analyses of how her novel both perpetuated and revised myths about the antebellum 
planter aristocracy (O’Brien; Young). But it has been in the twenty-first century that 
critics have begun to appreciate Gone With The Wind as a document of regional and 
national significance. Amanda Adams has recently situated Gone With The Wind in its 
proper “southern, modernist context” by demonstrating how the novel participated in and 
contributed to the literary and regional politics of the 1930s (60). Martyn Bone has shown 
how Mitchell’s novel both eulogizes the plantation South and champions the rise of the 
New South (142-44). Tara McPherson has detailed the role that Gone With The Wind 
played in “reifying” the plantation household as a “site of southern history and 
femininity” (44). Similarly, Scott Romine shows how Mitchell manipulates elements of 
“memory” and “desire” to produce a simulacrum of the antebellum South that serves not 
as an accurate representation of a lost home but instead as an imagined site of nostalgia 
(28-9). 
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Yet, despite Gone With The Wind’s considerable critical history, no one has yet 
examined the relationship between the novel’s politics and its conflicted attitude toward 
southern hospitality. One cannot understand the politics of Gone With The Wind without 
understanding how and why the novel reflects the South’s vexed position on the subject 
of hospitality during the first decades of the twentieth century.91 On one hand, Mitchell’s 
novel romanticizes southern hospitality by treating unconditional southern hospitality as a 
real but lapsed regional practice. During the antebellum period, Mitchell’s narrator tells 
us, the “old custom of hospitality” would not allow “any traveler, great or humble, to go 
on his journey without a night’s lodging, food for himself, and his horse and the utmost 
courtesy the house could give” (478). Guests were never turned away, regardless of “sex” 
or “age”; even “convalescents” were “always welcome” (160). And hosts never placed 
limits on the duration of a guest’s stay: “When a southerner took the trouble to pack a 
trunk and travel twenty miles for a visit, the visit was seldom of shorter duration than a 
month, usually much longer. . . . Often when newly married couples went on the usual 
round of honeymoon visits, they lingered in some pleasant home until the birth of their 
second child. Frequently elderly aunts and uncles came to Sunday dinner and remained 
until they were buried years later” (160). In passages like these, Gone With The Wind 
contributes to the myth of unconditional southern hospitality by treating the antebellum 
southern host as a figure capable of and willing to offer hospitality unconditionally: 
“Visitors presented no problem, for houses were large, servants numerous and the feeding 
of several extra mouths a minor matter in that land of plenty” (160).92 
 At the same time, however, characters and events in Gone With The Wind 
contradict the narrator’s romantic descriptions of southern hospitality by revealing the 
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various ways in which hospitality in the South, both before and after the Civil War, was 
conditioned by questions of race, gender, and class. First, Rhett Butler demonstrates how 
the ideology of southern hospitality perpetuated a self-interested politics that both 
required and conditioned the reception of strangers in southern households. Through 
Rhett’s outsider perspective, Mitchell lays bare the lived contradictions of southern 
hospitality and reveals the privileged role that strangers, particularly white male 
strangers, can play in recognizing and exploiting these lived contradictions. Second, 
Ashley Wilkes and Frank Kennedy betray the ideological pretenses that allowed white 
male hosts to disavow their violence toward and exploitation of women, blacks, and poor 
whites in the antebellum South. Wilkes and Kennedy reveal the extent to which the role 
of the southern host consisted of a series of performances motivated by anxieties about 
maintaining sovereignty in private and public spaces. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, three of Mitchell’s female characters—Ellen O’Hara, Scarlett O’Hara, and 
Melanie Wilkes—undermine the paternal logic of traditional southern hospitality by 
assuming roles as female hosts in Gone With The Wind. Capable of possessing 
sovereignty and bestowing hospitality, Mitchell’s female hosts offer readers an 
alternative model of southern hospitality that is based not on any essentialized notion of 
femininity but instead a collective dissatisfaction with the discriminating ideology of 
southern male hosts.   
 Margaret Mitchell understood that the myth of unconditional southern hospitality 
is predicated on stories about southern hosts offering hospitality to strangers. She 
understood that these stories depend on the figure of the stranger—that it would be 
impossible to tell stories about unconditional southern hospitality without the idea of an 
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absolutely unknown other capable of receiving unconditional welcome.93 But Mitchell 
also recognized that the reception of strangers in the South depends on strategic 
disavowals designed to deny the conditions under which strangers are received as guests. 
In Gone With The Wind, Mitchell uses the outside perspective of Rhett Butler to expose 
these strategic disavowals and the conditions they deny. As a stranger, Rhett affords us a 
look into southern society from the perspective of one who has been “cast . . . out” 
(238).94 He allows us to “see” from without what southerners cannot see from within 
(238). In the process, he highlights the role that anxieties about race, gender, and class 
played in defining and conditioning the figure of the stranger in mid-nineteenth-century 
southern society.  
 Mitchell is strategic in figuring Rhett as a stranger in Gone With The Wind. At the 
Wilkes barbecue, Rhett is introduced to us as a “stranger” when Scarlett first catches 
sight of him in the crowd: “. . . her eyes fell on a stranger . . .” (110). The label of 
“stranger” follows Rhett through the novel. He is later described to us as a “perfect 
stranger” (188), as a “strong stranger” (364), as “a careless stranger” (862), as “a mad 
stranger” (871), as “a savage stranger” (872), as “an impersonal stranger” (902), and as 
“a swarthy sodden stranger” (929). Yet, despite all the novel’s references to Rhett as a 
stranger, Mitchell is clear that Rhett is no conventional stranger. He is by no means an 
absolute other who wanders into town with no history and no connections. He is a known 
quantity before he even arrives in Georgia, and his disreputable past has, we are told on 
numerous occasions, earned him a reputation as someone who is “not received” (112-13, 
196, 202, 224, 228, 231). However, Rhett is received by aristocratic southern society, 
despite his disreputable past and his purported strangeness. In showing us how and why 
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Rhett receives hospitality in the homes of the southern aristocracy, Mitchell reveals how 
the ideology of southern hospitality perpetuated a self-interested politics that both 
required and conditioned the reception of strangers. 
 As an unwelcome but still received guest, Butler draws attention to the 
disingenuous quality of southern customs of hospitality and gift exchange by exploiting 
the self-interests of southern hosts and hostesses. We first learn that Rhett “isn’t 
received” in Chapter 6 (112). Yet, we learn this during a scene when he is being received 
at the Wilkes plantation. As a kind of second-order guest, Rhett is invited to the barbecue 
at Twelve Oaks because he is visiting Frank Kennedy at Jonesboro on business. Despite 
his reputation, Rhett is accepted at the plantation because it would be improper to prevent 
a guest (Kennedy) from bringing along his own guest (Rhett). Failure to provide Rhett 
with hospitality would violate cultural codes of hospitality and expose the pretense of 
unconditional hospitality to strangers. Accordingly, even after Rhett disrupts the ball to 
espouse his skepticism about the approaching war, he is allowed to continue speaking 
because those present accord him “the politeness due an outsider” (122). What methods 
would be used to silence Rhett or to prevent him from attending the party altogether are 
not made clear in Mitchell’s novel.95 Despite regular reminders that Rhett is not 
“received” in southern households, Mitchell never once confirms this fact by depicting a 
scene in which hospitality is denied him. Thus, the narrative of Gone With The Wind 
undermines the claims of the novel’s characters, causing us to question the accuracy of 
reports about Rhett and, more importantly, to wonder why Rhett is received when his 
reputation suggests that he should be turned away.   
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Numerous scenes in Gone With The Wind confirm that Rhett gains entry into the 
households of the southern elite through his wealth, his privileged status as a white male, 
his handsome and fashionable appearance, and his ability to manipulate southern customs 
of hospitality to his advantage. Understanding the pretentious nature of southern claims 
regarding unconditional hospitality, Rhett acquires admittance by appealing to the self-
interests of southern hosts and hostesses. Always arriving bearing gifts, Rhett obliges 
those who receive his gifts to receive him into their households. For example, each time 
Rhett arrives at Aunt Pittypat’s door, “she set her fat mouth and told the girls that she 
would meet him at the door and forbid him to enter. And each time he came, a little 
package in his hand and a compliment for her charm and beauty on his lips, she wilted” 
(235-36). Gaining entry through the pretense of offering unconditional gifts, Rhett allows 
hosts and hostesses like Aunt Pittypat to maintain the illusion that he is received not 
because he provides them with something valuable in return for hospitality but because 
he is afforded the unconditional welcome of a stranger. In other words, Rhett disavows 
commercial exchange in the form of an unconditional gift. In the process, he both reveals 
and exploits the reciprocal logic of southern hospitality. Although mythologized as 
unconditional, southern hospitality is, it turns out, grounded in implied reciprocal 
obligations. When, for instance, Rhett sends Maybelle Merriwether “yards of gleaming 
white satin and a lace veil” as a wedding gift, Mrs. Merriwether is unable to accept the 
elaborate gift without making some kind of “concession” (225). Reluctantly, she invites 
Rhett for dinner (226). Similarly, Rhett’s first invitation to Miss Pittypat’s home comes 
only after he returns Melanie’s wedding ring, which she had spontaneously donated to the 
Confederate cause. His unexpected act on behalf of Melanie is received as the act of a 
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“gentleman” and leads to a Sunday dinner invitation, an opportunity required so that 
Melanie can properly “thank him” (201). In truth, Rhett’s “gallant” gesture is a calculated 
ruse, a backhanded strategem designed with the intention of being “asked into Pittypat’s 
house” so that he can spend time with Scarlett (201). Thus, by playing the part of the 
hospitable guest, Rhett manipulates heads of southern households into performing their 
socially constructed roles as welcoming hosts. Together, host and guest maintain an 
illusion of unconditionality, all the while engaged in reciprocal exchange.  
Rhett’s status as an unwelcome guest in Gone With The Wind is further 
complicated by questions of race, gender, and regional politics. Although his gender and 
wealth afford him privileges denied women and poor whites, Rhett’s ambiguous racial 
identity underscores the role that anxieties about race played in establishing and 
perpetuating the ideology of southern hospitality. Through repeated instances of racial 
coding, Mitchell suggests the possibility that Rhett is a kind of black interloper—a black 
man who gains entry by passing as a white stranger.96 Despite the public’s impression 
that Rhett is white, he is coded as black in many scenes. His skin is described as “dark” 
and “swarthy”; his lips are “full” and “red”; and his dark complexion is further 
accentuated by his “animal-white teeth” (110). In the novel’s infamous “rape” scene, 
Rhett abuses Scarlett with “large brown hands” and towers over her with his “insolent 
black head,” like a “savage stranger” (868-72).97 Forced into a “black darkness” by a 
“mad stranger” she had imagined was her husband, Scarlett comes to “know” Rhett for 
the first time (871). On the other hand, of course, Scarlett’s indulgence in the rape feeds 
into white male anxieties about white female desire for the black male body. Despite a 
regional code of etiquette driven first and foremost by the conviction that white women 
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needed to be protected from black men, Scarlett “glorie[s]” in Rhett’s “dark” sexual 
violence, achieving the first orgasm of her life: “Suddenly she had a wild thrill such as 
she had never known . . .” (871). Coded as black in a scene where he is committing rape, 
Rhett symbolizes the need to police the sexual desires of black men and white women, as 
well as the need to maintain rigid laws preventing black men from gaining access to 
white women. If, in fact, Rhett is black, then the sexual violence he perpetrates occurs 
because white hosts and hostesses are not discriminating enough to recognize his racial 
difference and deny him hospitality. In other words, when properly effected, the ideology 
of southern hospitality functions both as a bulwark against the imagined threat of 
interracial sexual violence and as a justification for laws aimed at preventing that 
violence. Thus, although advertised as unconditional, the customs of southern hospitality 
operate as a means of excluding specific populations, such as blacks, based on socially 
constructed perceptions alleging that these demonized populations threaten the safety of 
southern hosts and/or hostesses.98 
 No character in Gone With The Wind is more invested in upholding the ideology 
of southern hospitality than Ashley Wilkes. In contrast to Rhett Butler, Ashley possesses 
all the qualities of the archetypal southern host. Like his father, he exudes “hospitality” 
(109). Born for the “leisure” of the plantation, he can “ride” and “play poker with the 
best,” can “drink” abundantly, and is “courteous always” (54, 46). In short, Ashley is 
both a “country gentleman” and a man of “honor” (212, 279, 501, 764). It is precisely 
these aristocratic qualities of the southern male host that initially make Ashley so 
appealing to Scarlett.   
    88 
However, the collapse of the planter aristocracy during and after the Civil War 
reveals the less honorable qualities of Ashley’s character—qualities that directly 
contradict his public persona as a hospitable southern host. As a soldier during the war, 
Ashley fights to preserve his own privileges (212). These privileges, Ashley now 
understands, were granted to him not because of any substance in his character but 
because of his inherited social standing (212). Now bereft of that social standing, Ashley 
finds himself lost, completely ill-equipped to fend for himself and his family: “My home 
is gone and all the money that I so took for granted I never realized I had it. And I am 
fitted for nothing in this world, for the world I belonged in has gone” (496). What is most 
startling to Ashley during the war is not the gruesomeness of war itself or the physical 
deprivation of life as a soldier but, rather, his physical proximity to men of lower class: 
“The worst thing about the war was the people I had to live with. . . . I had sheltered 
myself from people all my life, I had carefully selected my few friends. But the war 
taught me I had created a world of my own with dream people in it.  It taught me what 
people really are, but it didn’t teach me how to live with them” (498). Unable to rely on 
the class etiquette and the class divisions that the ideology of southern hospitality 
employed to protect southern hosts from sustained physical interaction with poor whites, 
Ashley is forced to confront the extent to which he systematically avoided the “intrusion” 
of “people and situations which were too real, too vital” (498). As it turns out, the life of 
an antebellum southern host is not about offering unconditional welcome to strangers but 
about avoiding anything that threatened to undermine one’s elevated sense of self. It is 
about convincing oneself and others that you deserve the privilege to withhold hospitality 
from all but a “selected” few. The life of a southern host is, therefore, in Ashley’s words, 
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a “shadow show,” a cultural production and performance designed to perpetuate the 
wealth and status of a self-proclaimed aristocracy (498).   
 After the war, Ashley and his fellow southern hosts resort to vigilante violence in 
order to uphold their ideology. Although Margaret Mitchell has been widely criticized for 
appearing to celebrate the Ku Klux Klan in Gone With The Wind, close examination of 
the text reveals ironical undertones in the narrator’s praise for Ashley Wilkes and his 
fellow KKK members (Beye 367; Railton 54-5; Rubin 94; Taylor 181). For example, in 
Chapter 42, the narrator describes the KKK’s rationale behind the lynching of a black 
man who is known to have “boasted” about raping a white woman: “The Klan had acted 
to save the as yet unnamed victim from having to testify in open court. Rather than have 
her appear and advertise her shame, her father and brother would have shot her, so 
lynching the negro seemed a sensible solution to the townspeople, in fact, the only decent 
solution possible” (695). Despite the claim that the lynching is a “sensible solution,” the 
reaction of the white women in Mitchell’s narrative proves otherwise. Instead of making 
white women feel safe, the lynching causes widespread violence: blacks threaten 
“retaliatory house burnings,” and there are rumors of “wholesale hangings by the 
Yankees” (695). Fear of interracial sexual violence does not decrease because of the 
lynching but escalates: “Since the Ku Klux lynching, the ladies had been practically 
immured, not even going to town to shop unless there were half a dozen in their group” 
(700). In the end, the extralegal violence of the KKK only produces more fear and 
divisiveness. Intended as a means of reasserting the privileges of southern male hosts, the 
lynching is a self-destructive act that underscores the inextricable relationship between 
the ideology of southern hospitality and white male violence.   
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Through her characterizations of Ashley and Frank Kennedy, Mitchell 
demonstrates how the vigilante actions of the Ku Klux Klan represented a widening of 
the already sizeable gulf between the favorable public personas of southern male hosts 
and the reality that they maintained their privileges through violence.99 In the novel’s first 
reference to the Klan, we hear that the organization prides itself on its secrecy: 
“Klansmen aren’t supposed to tell” (528). Scarlett’s inability to recognize that Ashley 
and her husband are both members of the KKK emphasizes the power of the southern 
host’s ideology. Despite numerous signs to the contrary, including unexplained late-night 
outings, Scarlett does not believe that Ashley and Frank are capable of such violence: 
“Scarlett, lying exhausted in bed, feebly and silently thanked God that Ashley had too 
much sense to belong to the Klan and Frank was too old and poor spirited” (695). The 
artifice of the southern male host is apparently so convincingly deceptive that it can fool 
even the host’s wife. Scarlett may not be particularly fond of Frank, but she certainly 
never considers the possibility that he would partake in violence against blacks and other 
minorities. But her failure to see through Ashley’s duplicity is even more troubling. 
Recognizing Ashley for what he really is would require Scarlett to shatter her illusion of 
the ideal southern host, an act that Scarlett is not prepared for at this point in the novel. 
Her image of Ashley as a hospitable, well-mannered, and honorable gentleman is still too 
attractive for her to surrender.  
 In the end, the most significant threat to the ideology of southern hospitality in 
Gone With The Wind is the figure of the female host.100 Mitchell presents readers of her 
novel with three distinct examples of the female host figure: Ellen O’Hara, Scarlett 
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O’Hara, and Melanie Wilkes. Each of these three female characters threatens the 
ideology of southern hospitality in a different way. 
Possessing real but not publicly acknowledged authority on the Tara plantation, 
Ellen O’Hara undermines the myth of the antebellum male host’s unrivaled sovereignty. 
Perpetuating the fiction that Gerald O’Hara is the true host of Tara, Ellen and the other 
members of her household secretly subvert the ideology of southern hospitality while 
simultaneously contributing to its hold over the public imagination. Despite Gerald 
O’Hara’s aristocratic male pretensions, he does not possess sovereign authority on the 
Tara plantation. As early as the second chapter of Gone With The Wind, we learn that 
“only one voice” is “obeyed” at Tara, and that voice is the “soft voice” of Ellen (49). In 
contrast to Gerald, whose “blustering” and “roaring” voice is often “quietly disregarded” 
by slaves, Ellen never needs to raise her voice in “command” or “reproof” because she is 
always “obeyed instantly” at Tara (58). Exhibiting a “stately gentleness” that “awe[s] the 
whole household,” Ellen, not Gerald, is responsible for maintaining order on the 
plantation and for managing the slaves (59). Unafraid to give her husband direction, she 
commands Gerald to fire Jonas Wilkerson with no hesitation at all: “Mr. O’Hara, you 
must dismiss Jonas Wilkerson. . . . He must be dismissed, immediately, tomorrow 
morning. Big Sam is a good foreman and he can take over the duties until you can hire 
another overseer” (87). Forcing Gerald to discipline Jonas Wilkerson for impregnating 
Emmie Slattery, Ellen exhibits control over her husband in a proto-feminist act that 
simultaneously repudiates society’s double standards regarding male and female 
promiscuity. 
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We can only assume that Ellen’s self-confidence is bolstered significantly by her 
work outside the house. Not confined to the home like the typical hostesses of the 
antebellum South, Ellen comes and goes from Tara of her own free will, often leaving her 
home at odd hours of the night to nurse young women of the county. While her husband 
sleeps soundly in his bed, Ellen performs the duties of her public life, all the while 
providing the young Scarlett with a model of femininity that directly contradicts the 
model of female domesticity cultivated by the ideology of southern hospitality: “As a 
child, she often had crept to the door and, peeping through the tiniest crack, had seen 
Ellen emerge from the dark room, where Gerald’s snores were rhythmic and untroubled, 
into the flickering light of an upheld candle, her medicine case under her arm, her hair 
smoothed neatly into place, and no button on her basque unlooped” (59). 
 Ellen O’Hara maintains her authority at Tara only because all members of the 
household help maintain the fiction that Gerald O’Hara is the real host of the plantation. 
Fully aware that she cannot single-handedly overturn the ideology of southern hospitality, 
Ellen performs her public role as a hostess admirably, thereby not threatening the 
pretense of Gerald’s sovereignty. Being sure to “praise” Gerald’s “cleverness” and to 
give him “credit” for the “management” of Tara, Ellen makes sure not to upset the 
perceived balance of power on the plantation (75). In other words, only by appearing not 
to undermine Gerald’s authority can Ellen exercise her own authority. Only by appearing 
not to subvert the ideology of southern hospitality can Ellen exploit its pretenses. Thus, 
despite her regular exhibitions of authority at Tara, Gerald fails to consciously recognize 
her legitimate power as a female host. “It was a secret he would never learn,” the narrator 
explains, “for everyone from Ellen down to the stupidest field hand was in a tacit and 
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kindly conspiracy to keep him believing that his word was law” (49). Experiencing what 
must be a kind of cognitive dissonance, Gerald chooses to believe in the reassuring 
fiction of ideology rather than accept the reality of his wife’s supremacy.   
 When we first meet Scarlett O’Hara in the novel’s opening chapter, she 
demonstrates a reluctance to perform the duties expected of her as an aristocratic hostess. 
Neglecting to invite Stuart and Brent Tarleton for dinner, she befuddles and offends the 
twins with her violation of social custom: “Don’t it look to you like she would of asked 
us to stay for dinner?” (32). Later, Mammy reiterates the twins’ disapproval, scolding 
Scarlett for her “breach of hospitality” (43). Here, the gender politics of southern 
hospitality dictate that Scarlett, as an eligible sixteen-year-old girl, show male suitors 
customary deference, regardless of her personal feelings about them or her passion for 
other men. Failure to perform her assigned role as a hostess reflects poorly on her father 
and on her household. But the young Scarlett is apathetic. Frustrated with Mammy for 
lecturing her about “such a trivial matter,” Scarlett explains that she sent the Tarletons 
home because she was simply “tired of hearing them talk” (43).  
 As the novel progresses, Scarlett gains social, domestic, and economic power by 
brazenly defying and subverting the ideology of southern hospitality. During the war, 
Scarlett assumes control over Tara, seizing the position of “supreme” host from her 
impotent father (411). In order to establish and retain her power, she undertakes duties 
and commits acts that violate gender and class norms. She shoots a Yankee soldier who 
enters Tara without being invited (417-23), refuses to cower in stereotypical feminine 
fear when Yankee soldiers light a fire in her kitchen (443-44), and relinquishes her white 
“gentility” when she resorts to laboring in the fields of the plantation (570). Moreover, as 
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the new host of Tara, Scarlett employs her authority to engage in economic transactions 
with men, including matrimonial transactions. Accordingly, when Will Benteen is ready 
to ask for permission to marry Suellen, he approaches Scarlett, reasoning, “I figger you’re 
the head of the house now” (646). By transacting the terms of Suellen’s marriage with 
Will, Scarlett performs one of the oldest and most essential duties of the host figure in the 
Judeo-Christian tradition: the disposal of female property. Granting Will “approval” to 
marry Suellen, Scarlett contracts the future management of Tara to the capable hands of 
Will, thereby securing her future wealth and the perpetuation of her aristocratic status 
(646). In a reversal of the gender hierarchy, Will takes on the position of Scarlett’s 
delegate, managing the household under the strict guidance of his female host.  
 Ultimately, Scarlett’s most overt challenges to the ideology of southern 
hospitality manifest themselves in her public actions as an independent and successful 
businesswoman in Atlanta. Despite Frank Kennedy’s skepticism that Scarlett’s interest in 
business is both misguided and “unbecoming,” his wife evinces an aptitude in the public 
sphere that shocks Atlanta’s social elite (577). First usurping control over Frank’s store 
and then purchasing her own sawmill, Scarlett reveals that she is more than capable of 
succeeding as an entrepreneur and of generating her own wealth. The realization of newly 
acquired financial independence leads Scarlett to a life-altering revolution in her 
worldview: “With the idea that she was as capable as a man came a sudden rush of pride 
and a violent longing to prove it, to make money for herself as men made money. Money 
which would be her own, which she would neither have to ask for nor account for to any 
man” (580). Therefore, when Scarlett begins to make money from the mill, she chooses 
not to give “any part of it” to her husband (597). Instead, she sends most of it to Will with 
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explicit instructions about how to use the money to improve the plantation (597). 
Frustrated by his wife’s actions, Frank Kennedy’s musings about Scarlett’s behavior 
underscore the central role that misogynistic notions about female domesticity played in 
contributing to the logic of the ideology of southern hospitality: “Go into business for 
herself! It was unthinkable. There were no women in business in Atlanta. In fact, Frank 
had never heard of a woman in business anywhere. If women were so unfortunate as to 
be compelled to make a little money to assist their families in these hard times, they made 
it in quiet womanly ways . . . These ladies made money but they kept themselves at home 
while they did it, as a woman should” (595-96). 
By leaving the “protection” of the home and then succeeding as a 
businesswoman, Scarlett reveals that the South’s firmly established gender divisions of 
labor are a patriarchal fiction designed to preserve the privileges of male hosts (596). 
Furthermore, by refusing to accept her socially assigned role as Frank’s hostess, Scarlett 
undermines her husband’s social status as a host. Without a female delegate at home to 
function as an intermediary in exchanges of hospitality, Frank finds himself both publicly 
emasculated and personally dumbfounded. Unable to accept that a female could naturally 
possess qualities that would help her succeed in the public sphere, Frank concludes that 
Scarlett has “unsex[ed] herself” (599). “In the brief period of the courtship, he thought he 
had never known a woman more attractively feminine in her reactions to life, ignorant, 
timid and helpless,” Frank thinks to himself. “Now her reactions were all masculine. 
Despite her pink cheeks and dimples and pretty smiles, she talked and acted like a man. 
Her voice was brisk and decisive and she made up her mind instantly and with no girlish 
shilly-shallying” (598). Perhaps Frank’s need to interpret his wife’s “reactions” as 
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“masculine” reflects his unwillingness to admit the possibility that he himself does not 
possess the qualities he so despises in her. After all, if being “brisk” and “decisive” are 
qualities natural to men, then Frank must possess those qualities, right? Only by 
continuing to believe in the misogynistic logic of the ideology of southern hospitality can 
Frank rationalize his emasculation. Initially reluctant in her assigned role as a hostess, 
Scarlett O’Hara eventually seizes her position as a female host by challenging patriarchal 
assumptions central to the production and reproduction of the ideology of southern 
hospitality. Exhibiting sovereignty over her household and over the public space of the 
workplace, Scarlett overcomes prevailing beliefs about female domesticity. 
Finally, through the character of Melanie Wilkes, Mitchell offers her readers an 
idealized vision of feminine hospitality, one based not on any essentialized notion of 
femininity but instead generated out of a dissatisfaction with the discriminating ideology 
of southern male hosts. Melanie offers hospitality to strangers not out of self-interest but 
out of a genuine desire to affirm the singularity of others. Despite the unrealistic nature of 
Melanie’s hospitality, her example provides readers with a much-needed alternative 
model of hospitality, one distinct from the model of discrimination practiced by southern 
male hosts.   
 Unlike Scarlett, who assumes the position of female host in order to achieve 
independence and gain wealth, Melanie Wilkes utilizes her role as a female host to offer 
hospitality to strangers. Initially, Melanie performs the duties of a host in order to mollify 
her own fears. During the war, Melanie chooses to give her “share” of food at Tara to 
destitute soldiers, a choice that leaves her weak and malnourished (479). Though 
admirable, Melanie’s generosity is not motivated by selflessness. “You don’t know how 
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it helps me,” she tells Scarlett. “Every time I give some poor man my share I think that 
maybe, somewhere on the road up north, some woman is giving my Ashley a share of her 
dinner and it’s helping him to get home to me!” (479). In other words, Melanie gives not 
because she feels empathy for the other but because, by acting as though she feels 
empathy for a hungry soldier, it makes her feel that it is more likely that someone else is 
capable of exhibiting the empathy she lacks. 
However, in the act of performing hospitality, Melanie begins to see what it 
means to affirm the other. In the years after the war, she moves beyond mere 
performance to acts of hospitality that disregard the racial, gender, and class politics of 
the ideology of southern hospitality. In the basement rooms of her Atlanta home, 
“miserable and ragged transients” are “fed, bedded and sent on their way with packages 
of food” (697). Melanie sends no one away, providing hospitality to “illiterate” and 
“rough” soldiers, the homeless, those without families, widowed women, “brown and 
withered country women,” and even a Republican (697-98). Despite the neighborhood’s 
disapprobation at learning that some of Melanie’s guests are “foreign” and speak “little or 
no English,” she continues to accept visitors regardless of their backgrounds (697). Even 
Bette Watling, the town prostitute, receives an invitation from Melanie (760). 
But it is Melanie’s conscious decision to invite Archie, a convicted murderer, into 
her home that most amazes everyone. “Melanie,” Scarlett thinks, “knew this man was a 
murderer and a woman murderer at that and she hadn’t rejected him from her house” 
(704). Willing to forgive Archie for his murder and to place his need for shelter above her 
fear of violence, Melanie offers him hospitality despite her knowledge of his past. In 
contrast to the self-serving ideology of hospitality perpetuated by southern hosts, 
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Melanie’s hospitality is motivated not by a desire to preserve her own privilege but by a 
desire to make others feel welcome and affirmed. Disillusioned by the southern male 
preoccupation with the sins, failures, and offenses of the past, Melanie provides us with a 
model of hospitality that affirms the future potential of the other. Grounded in the belief 
that an offering of unconditional welcome is more likely to promote friendship than a 
guarded and anxious welcome, Melanie’s hospitality focuses on trying to build a positive 
future without fixating on the past.  
Melanie’s basement rooms function as a kind of heterotopia in Gone With The 
Wind. They serve as a space where otherwise impossible acts of hospitality take place. 
The hospitality that Melanie provides in this heterotopic space is not intended as a 
realistic model of southern hospitality. It is intended, instead, as an idealized alternative 
to reality, a counterexample that highlights the extent to which real-life acts of southern 
hospitality are conditioned by various forms of difference. In this way, Melanie’s 
hospitality reminds us that the starting point to affirming the singularity of the other is 
recognizing the reality of conditionality. 
 
II 
Whereas Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With The Wind is plainly and pervasively 
concerned with questions of hospitality, William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! is less 
explicit in its engagements with hospitality. Accordingly, although a number of critics 
have addressed the ways in which other Faulkner novels are fundamentally concerned 
with hospitality, no one has yet offered a reading that focuses on Faulkner’s treatment of 
hospitality in Absalom, Absalom!101 Yet, it is undeniable that two of the most important 
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scenes in Absalom, Absalom!—Sutpen being turned away from the front door of the big 
house in Chapter 7 and Clytie attempting to prevent Rosa from ascending the stairs in 
Chapter 5—are both scenes of inhospitality. Reconsidering these two scenes in light of 
their pointed engagements with hospitality allows us to see that Absalom, Absalom! is 
just as invested in interrogating the politics of southern hospitality as Gone With The 
Wind and that, in fact, Faulkner’s novel provides an even more complex and critical 
examination of the ideological functions and implications of southern hospitality. 
The first of the two pivotal scenes noted above takes place when Thomas Sutpen 
is fourteen years old. Sent by his father to deliver a message to the big house of a 
Virginia plantation, Sutpen arrives at the front door of the plantation home only to be 
“barred” from entry by a “monkey-dressed nigger butler” who stands in the doorway and 
tells him that he should “never come to that front door again but to go around to the 
back” (187-92). This scene introduces Sutpen to the conditionality of southern 
hospitality. In particular, it makes him aware that acts of hospitality in the South are 
conditioned by class. Having arrived at the big house in his “patched made-over jeans 
clothes and no shoes,” Sutpen realizes that he is denied entry through the front door 
because he is too poor to merit the planter’s hospitality (188). Reimagining this scene 
almost a century later causes Quentin Compson to reflect on the ways in which southern 
codes of hospitality are predicated on strategic disavowals. In recounting Sutpen’s 
childhood, Quentin identifies these strategic disavowals specifically and the desires they 
repress. He notes, for example, that men and women in the South disavow their desire to 
“look down on” others by subscribing to and acting in accordance with codes of 
hospitality that license and promote discrimination based on race and class (179). A 
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culture of hospitality that defines people based on “what color their skins happened to be 
and what they happened to own” is a culture that excuses “down-looking” by normalizing 
it (179). Quentin likewise observes that slaveholders in the antebellum South disavowed 
their desire to “evade” physical labor by maintaining codes of hospitality that required 
black men and women to perform the labor of hospitality—preparing for, attending to, 
and cleaning up after guests (179-85).102 He also notes the “pleasure” that slaveholders 
received from having their neighbors and guests see them “being waited on” and how 
slaveholders disavowed their desire for this pleasure by claiming that they provided 
hospitality for the benefit of their guests.103 In identifying and diagnosing these strategic 
disavowals, Quentin portrays southern hospitality as a fetishistic ideology produced and 
reproduced by the region’s elite for the disavowed purpose of maintaining power in the 
hands of the few.104 
Quentin’s observations about the fetishistic nature of southern hospitality are 
borne out in Sutpen’s response to the scene at the big house. In the aftermath of his 
encounter at the big house, Sutpen chooses to fetishize rather than resist the region’s 
dominant codes of hospitality. He formulates a “design” to acquire “money, a house, a 
plantation, slaves, a family” (212). This design has all the hallmarks of a classical 
Freudian fetish. It serves as a substitutive idea around which Sutpen fixates his thinking 
and through which he displaces his trauma to his unconscious.105 According to Sutpen, 
the purpose of the design is to acquire the means to be able to provide the hospitality that 
he himself is denied as a boy. In imagining the realization of his design, Sutpen envisions 
a utopian scene in which he offers unconditional hospitality to a shoeless and disheveled 
boy much like himself: 
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. . . he would take that boy in where he would never again need to stand on the 
outside of a white door and knock at it: and not at all for mere shelter but so that 
that boy, that whatever nameless stranger, could shut that door himself forever 
behind him on all that he had ever known, and look ahead along the still 
undivulged light rays in which his descendants who might not even ever hear his 
(the boy’s) name, waited to be born without even having to know that they had 
once been riven forever free from brutehood just as his own (Sutpen’s) children 
were . . . (210)  
This utopian scene provides Sutpen with a positive vision of hospitality to replace the 
memory of his own trauma.106 It provides him with a means through which to “shut” the 
door on his past—which is to say, to be inhospitable to it. 
For Sutpen, the encounter at the Virginia big house is traumatic because it makes 
him aware of his class difference, what he calls his “brutehood” (210). Quentin 
recognizes as much when he describes Sutpen awakening to his “difference” in the 
aftermath of the encounter: “. . . he was learning that there was a difference between 
white men and white men not to be measured by lifting anvils or gouging eyes or how 
much whiskey you could drink . . .” (183).107 By fetishizing his design, Sutpen attempts 
to disavow his knowledge of his difference and to erase his memory of the traumatic 
encounter in which he learned of this difference. His fantasy of preventing his children 
and the boy’s descendants from ever having to know that they once descended from 
brutes doubles as a fantasy of erasing his own memory of brutehood. Sutpen repeats his 
attempt to erase the past every time he fixates on his design, which he regards with 
“unsleeping care” (40-1).108 The plantation house at Sutpen’s Hundred—which, we are 
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told, is “even bigger and whiter” than the big house in Virginia—becomes the physical 
manifestation of Sutpen’s fetish (209). Fixation on the construction and preservation of 
the big house provides the repeated disavowals that repression of Sutpen’s trauma 
requires. 
 Sutpen’s attempts to repress his traumatic memory reflect an inhospitable attitude 
toward the past. Faulkner prompts us to read Sutpen’s disavowal of the past as a form of 
inhospitality by repeatedly figuring the past as an unwelcome guest in Absalom, 
Absalom!109 The novel is filled with scenes in which visitors from the past—living and 
dead—arrive uninvited and “haunt” the present as “ghosts” (4).110 We learn early on that 
these “ghosts” are a symptom of southern disavowal, a consequence of the South’s 
reluctance to accept its past. Southerners in the novel are haunted by “stubborn 
backward-looking ghosts” because they are unwilling to recognize the sins and defeats of 
their individual and collective pasts (7).111 For Sutpen, the most haunting of these ghosts 
is Charles Bon. Sutpen makes Bon into a ghost by denying his son’s existence. Bon is a 
“phantom,” a “shadow” come from Sutpen’s past to haunt the present in search of 
recognition (82). Bon’s unexpected arrival at Sutpen’s Hundred in 1859 brings Sutpen 
face-to-face with his disavowed past (215). The question of whether to show hospitality 
to Bon doubles as a question of whether to show hospitality to the past. In choosing to 
welcome Bon into his home, Sutpen offers his son a kind of uncanny hospitality, a 
hospitality offered to one who represents one’s own repressed past. With this act of 
reluctant hospitality to the past, Sutpen feels his design collapse in on itself: “. . . he must 
have felt and heard the design—house, position, posterity and all—come down like it had 
been built out of smoke . . .” (215). 
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The collapse of Sutpen’s design comes not from the act of hospitality itself but 
from what it betrays to Sutpen: that he is unwilling to honor the stated purpose of his 
design. The full irony of Sutpen’s tragedy cannot be appreciated without understanding 
the significance of this “betrayal” (220). Bon’s arrival affords Sutpen the opportunity to 
realize the utopian vision of hospitality about which he has fantasized: “. . . he stood there 
at his own door, just as he had imagined, planned, designed, and sure enough and after 
fifty years the forlorn nameless and homeless lost child came to knock at it . . .” (215). 
But Sutpen is unwilling to grant Bon the ancestral oblivion that he had previously 
imagined granting to the “whatever nameless” boy in his vision; he is unwilling to “rive” 
Bon “forever free” from his past. Sutpen’s fetishism of southern hospitality is at no point 
more apparent than in this moment. Like the Virginia planter before him, Sutpen is 
unwilling to offer his guest a hospitality that is not conditioned by race and class. So 
thoroughly has Sutpen internalized the values and codes of southern hospitality that he 
cannot help but see his son as “alien” (254). In rejecting Bon, Sutpen denies his 
biological ties to Bon and reestablishes his own white subjectivity. He also reaffirms his 
position in southern society as a white male host determined to uphold the values of the 
dominant ideology.112 
 The lesson we learn from Sutpen’s example is that inhospitality to the past cannot 
prevent the past from haunting us in the present. Sutpen is by no means the only character 
in Absalom, Absalom! who teaches us this lesson by example. We also learn this lesson 
from Rosa during her encounter with Clytie in Chapter 5.113 Summoned to Sutpen’s 
Hundred on the day that Henry kills Bon, Rosa arrives at the big house to find Clytie 
standing “rocklike and firm” at the base of the stairs and “barring” her from ascending to 
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the second floor (109). Like the “monkey-dressed nigger butler” of Sutpen’s childhood, 
Clytie uses her body to “bar” a prospective guest from entering into a space she guards 
(209-11).114 Yet, what makes Clytie’s encounter with Rosa different from the butler’s 
encounter with Sutpen is that Clytie actually makes physical contact with Rosa: “Then 
she touched me . . . that black arresting and untimorous hand on my white woman’s 
flesh” (111). Appalled by Clytie’s “touch,” Rosa “stop[s] dead” before recollecting 
herself and declaring her sovereign privilege on behalf of the white South: “Take your 
hand off me, nigger!” (112).115 According to Rosa, she speaks not to Clytie here but 
“through” her to the “negro” she represents (112). 
 In retrospect, however, Rosa recognizes that something significant happened in 
the moment when Clytie “touched” her at the base of the stairs. Until the moment of 
physical contact, Rosa and Clytie “glare at one another” not as “two faces” but as “two 
abstract contradictions”—not as singular individuals who once played together as 
children but as disembodied strangers prejudiced by racial stereotypes (111).116 Yet, in 
the moment when Clytie’s “black” hand touches Rosa’s “white woman’s flesh,” the racist 
logics of southern hospitality—“the devious intricate channels of decorous ordering”—
“abrogate” (111-12). With the “touch of flesh with flesh,” the South’s codes of 
hospitality—the “eggshell shibboleth of caste and color”—crack, freeing up Rosa and 
Clytie to confront one another in their unmediated nakedness (111-12). 
 Although Rosa treats Clytie with moral indifference during their encounter at the 
base of the stairs, the moment is still an ethical one. Clytie’s touch enables Rosa to 
reconnect with the self she disavows—the “central I-Am” that Rosa tells us is every self’s 
“private own” (112). Despite her failure to affirm Clytie’s alterity in the moment that she 
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recognizes her otherness, Rosa’s narration reveals the contradictory nature of southern 
hospitality: the regional customs that are purportedly designed to make neighbors and 
strangers feel welcome actually preclude the face-to-face discourse that ethical obligation 
requires. It is only after the “eggshell shibboleth” is removed that affirmative hospitality 
can be imagined. In the end, Rosa’s failure to change her behavior despite her 
acknowledgement of the “eggshell” quality of southern hospitality testifies to the power 
of the ideology’s hold over race relations in the South. Rosa continues to treat Clytie as a 
racialized abstraction despite her recognition of Clytie’s otherness and she does so 
because she is unable to shake off the traditions of southern hospitality that legitimize and 
perpetuate the region’s racial hierarchies. She is unable to come to terms with the 
postbellum South because she is still struggling to accept the reality of the past. She 
continues to cling to the “dream” of the antebellum South despite her own efforts to 
wake: “Ay, wake up, Rosa; wake up—not from what was, what used to be, but from what 
had not, could never have ever, been; wake, Rosa—not to what should, what might have 
been, but to what cannot, what must not be; wake, Rosa, from the hoping . . .” (113). 
 The scenes I have thus far examined in my discussion of Absalom, Absalom! are 
just two pivotal scenes of hospitality in a novel filled with scenes of hospitality. Some of 
these scenes of hospitality, like Charles Bon’s visits to Sutpen’s Hundred, are crucial to 
the plot of the novel (77, 106, 215, 255).117 Others are less crucial yet still noteworthy. 
These include the novel’s first scene, in which Rosa welcomes Quentin into her home 
after sending him a “formal” invitation of hospitality (5); Goodhue Coldfield and General 
Compson providing Sutpen with protection and supplies when he first arrives in Jefferson 
(9, 12, 23)118; Wash Jones not being “permitted” to “approach” Sutpen’s mansion home 
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“from the front” entrance (20, 99, 107, 149, 226); Sutpen supplying Rosa with “food and 
shelter and protection” at Sutpen’s Hundred after her father’s death (47, 137); Rosa’s 
neighbors leaving “baskets of provisions on her front porch at night” when she returns 
home from Sutpen’s Hundred and becomes a “charge upon the town” (137-38); Sutpen’s 
father being forcibly removed from a doggerel by a black man (182); and Clytie 
sheltering, feeding, and clothing Charles Bon’s wife, son, and grandson at Sutpen’s 
Hundred over a period of decades (158-70). 
 What is most striking about scenes of hospitality in Absalom, Absalom! is the 
deliberate focus that Faulkner places on figuring characters as strangers in these scenes. 
Although it may not initially appear so, all of the major characters in the novel—from 
Sutpen and Ellen to Rosa and Bon to Quentin and Shreve—are figured as strangers. Like 
Mitchell, Faulkner understood the essential role that the stranger played in southern 
stories about hospitality and in helping to maintain a pretense of unconditional southern 
hospitality. By figuring all of the major characters in Absalom, Absalom! as strangers, 
Faulkner enables us to see how each of these characters receives hospitality on the 
condition that their respective differences are disavowed. In the process, he draws 
attention to the differing processes whereby varied categories of strangeness are 
welcomed in southern society. Whereas Mitchell denaturalizes the ideology of southern 
hospitality from Rhett’s privileged white male perspective, Faulkner estranges us from 
southern hospitality utilizing the perspectives of strangers from different racial, gender, 
and class backgrounds.   
 No character in Absalom, Absalom! is more deliberately figured as a stranger than 
Thomas Sutpen. Like Rhett Butler, Sutpen is identified as a “stranger” immediately upon 
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his arrival in the novel: “. . . and there the stranger was” (23). Everything about Sutpen 
makes him a stranger to the people of Jefferson. He has a name that “nobody ever heard 
before” (9). He has a face and a horse that “none of them had ever seen before” (24). He 
rides into town “out of nowhere and without warning” with no “discernible past” or 
“purpose” (5, 7, 24). The townspeople corner Sutpen in dining rooms and lounges and 
“give him the opportunity to tell them who he was and where he came from and what he 
was up to,” but he tells them “nothing whatever” (25). Even after settling in Jefferson, 
Sutpen remains a “stranger” to the people of the town, in large part because he refuses to 
answer any questions about his past (24). Sutpen’s unwillingness to answer any questions 
only feeds the town’s curiosity. They talk and wonder endlessly about him, and they 
begin to repeat his “strange” name over and over like some sort of incantation: “. . . the 
stranger’s name went back and forth among the places of business and of idleness and 
among the residences in steady strophe and antistrophe: Sutpen. Sutpen. Sutpen. Sutpen” 
(24). Later, we learn that, at least in part, Sutpen does not disclose his origins to the 
people of Jefferson because he himself is unaware of the precise date and place of his 
birth. Having run away from his family at the age of fourteen, Sutpen can no longer recall 
with any certainty the location of his family’s original home in the mountains of western 
Virginia or his own age (184). In a sense, then, Sutpen is a stranger even to himself: he 
knows “neither where he ha[s] come from nor where he was nor why” (184).119 
Faulkner’s emphasis on Sutpen’s strangeness is no accident. It is as a stranger that 
Sutpen provides us with an outsider’s insights into southern hospitality. This is true even 
before Sutpen arrives in Mississippi. As a child in Virginia, Sutpen is able to recognize 
the fetishistic nature of southern hospitality precisely because he is estranged from the 
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dominant culture. Sutpen’s childhood accounts of southern hospitality are all recounted 
from a place of estrangement. Faulkner emphasizes Sutpen’s feeling of estrangement by 
focalizing these childhood scenes through Sutpen’s outsider perspective. In one scene, 
Sutpen watches as his father is forcibly removed from a Virginia doggery (182). In 
another scene, Sutpen watches unseen as a plantation owner lies in a hammock and is 
“waited on” by his slaves (184-85). 
Sutpen’s unfamiliarity with the South’s culture of hospitality enhances his feeling 
of estrangement. He knows nothing of the region’s codes and customs of hospitality 
when he first arrives in Virginia. Sutpen’s ignorance affords us the ability to see southern 
hospitality anew. We watch as Sutpen witnesses and experiences acts of inhospitality, 
and we watch as he comes to identify the many categories of difference that the South’s 
ideology of hospitality works to exclude. From Sutpen’s estranged perspective, we come 
to see the ways in which the lived experience of southern hospitality differs from the 
ideal of unconditional hospitality espoused by ideology.  
When Sutpen returns to the South as an adult, he again provides us with a 
stranger’s perspective on southern hospitality. But the stranger’s perspective Sutpen 
provides as an adult is very different from the one he provides as a child. As an adult, 
Sutpen exploits his status as a stranger to his own advantage. In the process, he highlights 
the ways in which southern hospitality to strangers is conditioned by questions of class. 
Sutpen leaves Virginia for Haiti in order to recreate himself in the image of a stranger 
who will be welcomed in the households of southern hosts. The stranger who arrives in 
Jefferson is a stranger of Sutpen’s own making. He is a self-made stranger. Having 
learned during his childhood what categories of difference are met with inhospitality in 
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the South, Sutpen knows that he must shed all signs of his “brutehood” if he is to be 
afforded the privileges of a stranger in Jefferson (210). Thus, when he arrives in 
Jefferson, he arrives with outward signs of wealth—an imposing horse, two pistols, and a 
gold Spanish coin worth enough to purchase one hundred square miles of the best land in 
the country (24-6). He receives hospitality at the Holston House, where he is furnished 
with a room and is welcome in the hotel’s dining hall and lounge (25).120 In playing the 
part of a wealthy stranger, Sutpen is effective at hiding the fact that the outward signs of 
his wealth are all that he “possesse[s] at the time” (24). When he returns to Jefferson with 
a covered wagon, a French architect, and a crew of negroes, he solidifies his reputation as 
a stranger worthy of the town’s welcome (26-7). The result is the hospitality he receives 
from General Compson, who “lend[s] him seed cotton for his start” (30), and from 
Goodhue Coldfield, who “complete[s] the shape and substance of [Sutpen’s] 
respectability” by providing “the shield of a virtuous woman” (31, 9).121 Sutpen’s ability 
to remake himself into a respectable stranger who receives the hospitality of southern 
hosts speaks to the arbitrariness of southern hospitality. The difference between the boy 
Sutpen who is turned away from the big house in Virginia and the adult Sutpen who is 
afforded hospitality in Jefferson is a difference of appearances, not a difference of any 
inborn quality or class. Sutpen is received in Jefferson because he is effective at playing 
the part of the welcome stranger. Like Rhett, Sutpen highlights the advantages that white 
males have in appealing to discriminating southern hosts and in exploiting southern hosts 
to their own advantage. 
Whereas Sutpen helps reveal the ways in which southern hospitality is 
conditioned by questions of class, other strangers in Absalom, Absalom! underscore the 
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ways in which the region’s ideology of hospitality is conditioned by questions of race and 
gender. The most obvious of these strangers is Charles Bon. Like Sutpen, Bon is 
repeatedly figured as a stranger. Mr. Compson introduces Bon to us in Chapter 4 as 
Henry’s “strange” new friend from college: “. . . this stranger . . .” (90). Later, Shreve 
reiterates this classification, referring to Bon as “the stranger” (255).122 Like his father, 
Bon arrives in Jefferson out of nowhere, “without background or past or childhood” (74). 
It is as if Bon appears “almost phoenix-like, fullspring from childhood, born of no 
woman and impervious to time” (58). But, as we learn, Bon does have a past, and this 
past makes him, to the dominant culture of Jefferson, even more strange than Sutpen. 
Bon is not just a stranger; he is a foreign stranger and a racially mixed one at that. Born in 
Haiti of a black mother and raised in the “foreign city” of New Orleans, Bon threatens 
Jefferson’s isolated and racially demarcated community with his “French” ways and 
“alien blood” (58, 106, 254).123 Ultimately, it is Bon’s racial otherness that most clearly 
demarcates him as a stranger in the novel. And, like his mother before him, Bon attempts 
to conceal his racial otherness. In hiding their mixed racial heritage, both Bon and Eulalia 
represent the threat of concealed strangeness. Their example serves to explain the 
importance that Jeffersonians place on inquiring into the family lineages of newcomers 
like Sutpen. 
More importantly, Bon’s racial otherness affords us the ability to see southern 
inhospitality from the perspective of one who can pass outwardly as white but who is 
nevertheless ultimately rejected because of his race. Bon is desperate both to conceal his 
racial otherness and to have his racial otherness recognized and affirmed. This internal 
struggle is revealed to us in passages where Sutpen’s inhospitality to Bon is focalized 
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through Bon’s perspective. Bon fantasizes about walking into Sutpen’s house and 
receiving “indisputable recognition” from his father: “So at last I shall see him, whom it 
seems I was bred up never to expect to see, whom I had even learned to live without, 
thinking maybe how he would walk into the house and see the man who made him and 
then he would know, there would be that flash, that instant of indisputable recognition 
between them and he would know for sure and forever . . .” (255). But Sutpen denies Bon 
the recognition he craves. He “sa[ys] nothing, d[oes] nothing” to “acknowledge” Bon as 
his son (255-57). Although Sutpen receives Bon into his home, the hospitality he affords 
his son is an impersonal hospitality, a hospitality conditioned by his unwillingness to 
recognize and affirm Bon’s racial otherness. 
The conditional nature of Sutpen’s hospitality to Bon contrasts markedly with the 
hospitality that Henry promises Bon when he invites his half-brother to Sutpen’s 
Hundred: “From now on mine and my sister’s house will be your house . . .” (255). 
Henry’s invitation to Bon is offered in the utopian spirit of unconditional southern 
hospitality. It reflects belief in a culture of hospitality capable of offering unconditional 
welcome. Shreve notes the utopian nature of Henry’s invitation when he describes 
Henry’s vision of shared sovereignty as a “fairy tale” (255). What Shreve and Bon realize 
but Henry is too naïve to understand is that unconditional welcome at Sutpen’s Hundred 
would be possible only if “nothing else save them existed” (255). The ideology of 
southern hospitality, with its racist exclusions, is too powerful for Henry’s naïve vision to 
withstand reality. Henry’s inability to make his utopian vision a reality, to remain faithful 
to the spirit of his invitation, represents the failure of southern hospitality to live up to its 
own impossible ideal. 
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Further critique of southern hospitality comes from Ellen and Rosa, both of whom 
Faulkner figures as strangers. Though she inhabits Sutpen’s Hundred and possesses the 
outward trappings of wealth and happiness, Ellen “live[s] and die[s] a stranger” in her 
own home (111).124 Forever estranged from her husband and his disavowed past, Ellen 
provides us, often through Rosa’s second-hand narration, with insights into the life of a 
woman forced to serve the needs of a husband intent on upholding an impossible ideal of 
the southern host. Like Ellen, Rosa offers us a stranger’s perspective into the life of a 
southern white woman forced to accept the hospitality of a white man. Though born and 
raised in Jefferson, Rosa is very much a stranger in the South. Born twenty-eight years 
after her sister and raised by a father who is himself “irrevocably estranged” from his 
neighbors, Rosa feels out of time and place in Jefferson (66). As a child, Rosa watches 
from the sidelines, “looking out” on the world around her with a sense of alienation: “She 
seemed to stand, to lurk, behind the neat picket fence of a small, grimly middleclass yard 
or lawn, looking out upon the whatever ogreworld of that quiet village street with that air 
of children born too late into their parents’ lives . . .” (15). Yet, as Quentin points out, 
Rosa’s estrangement grants her a special ability to see and understand things about 
“human behavior” that others cannot (15). There is something “Cassandralike” about her, 
something “sternly prophetic” in her view of the world (15). Rosa’s estranged perspective 
affords us the ability to see the ways in which the ideology of southern hospitality 
interpellates women as compulsory guests of white men. We see this in Rosa’s account of 
the hospitality she receives at Sutpen’s Hundred during the two years after her father’s 
death:  
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. . . an orphan a woman and a pauper, I turned naturally not for protection but for 
actual food to my only kin: my dead sister’s family: though I defy anyone to 
blame me, an orphan of twenty, a young woman without resources, who should 
desire not only to justify her situation but to vindicate the honor of a family the 
good name of whose women has never been impugned, by accepting the 
honorable proffer of marriage from the man whose food she was forced to subsist 
on. (12-3) 
In emphasizing the compulsory nature of the hospitality she receives at Sutpen’s 
Hundred, Rosa highlights the important role that the South’s culture of hospitality played 
in enabling men like Sutpen to exploit estranged women like Rosa in the name of 
hospitality. 
 Then, there are Shreve McCannon and Quentin Compson. Having never visited 
the South, Shreve is a stranger to the region and its culture. Just as the story of Sutpen is a 
story about a stranger, it is a story that is told to a stranger—to one who, like so many of 
its characters, is unfamiliar with Jefferson and its people. Furthermore, though Shreve is 
from the North, he is not from the American North. He is Canadian, which means he is 
not personally implicated in the American North’s opposition to the South. He is alien to 
the story of the South, alien to the history of American slavery, personally removed from 
the decades of infighting between North and South. This alienation—this strangeness—is 
central to the role he plays in the novel both as a listener and as a narrator. 
 Like Ellen and Rosa, Quentin is born and raised in Jefferson. Yet, also like Ellen 
and Rosa, Quentin provides us with a stranger’s perspective on southern hospitality. The 
Compsons are native to Yoknapatawpha County and to the South. But, for much of 
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Absalom, Absalom!, Quentin isn’t in Yoknapatawpha County or the South. He is in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, a place far removed from the South where he is treated as and 
feels like a stranger. Harvard University and the whole of New England feel alien to 
Quentin. The New England snow is “strange” (41). The dorm room he shares with Shreve 
is “strange” (141). The lamplit table in the dorm room is also “strange” (141).125 It is no 
accident that a story told about a stranger to a stranger is narrated from a place that feels 
strange to its narrator. Quentin’s ability to tell Shreve about the South and the region’s 
relationship to and with strangers is heightened by his own experience of estrangement in 
Cambridge. This estrangement allows him to see the South more clearly and to better 
understand what it feels like to be a stranger in the South. 
 More than any other character in Absalom, Absalom!, Quentin is hospitable to the 
past. We learn in the first chapter that Quentin is haunted by a constant barrage of living 
and dead “ghosts” who have arrived unbidden and taken up residence in his “body”: “His 
childhood was full of them; his very body was an empty hall echoing with sonorous 
defeated names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth. He was a 
barracks filled with stubborn back-looking ghosts . . .” (7). Quentin’s “very body” is a 
“hall” where the “defeated” ghosts of the South’s past seek recognition from a present 
that is intent on disavowing any memory of them. It is as if Quentin’s body is a site of 
hospitality and he is host to the past, a host interpellated by his culture, forced to fill the 
role that no one else will. Rosa invites Quentin into her home in the novel’s opening 
scene for the specific purpose of telling him a story about the South. Rosa’s hospitality is 
compulsory: her “summons” is one that he must “obey” (6). It does not matter that he has 
“already” heard the story of Sutpen before; sitting and listening to stories about the South 
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is an essential part of his southern education (23). Aware that Quentin is “going away” to 
Harvard and that he may never return, Rosa makes her guest “spend a whole afternoon 
sitting indoors and listening while she talk[s]” in the hope that he will someday 
“remember” the story she tells and “write about it” (5).  
 Despite the demands placed on him, Quentin is a receptive host. He understands 
that what the South’s “garrulous outraged baffled ghosts” seek above all is to be listened 
to (4). He may be reluctant to listen at times, but he does try to listen attentively. He is 
hospitable to Rosa and his father, to the stories they tell, and also hospitable to the voices 
of the ghosts in those stories, to the haunting calls of Sutpen and Bon and their progenies. 
Rosa imagines that Quentin might make a history out of the memories she passes on, and 
though it is not easy, Quentin does try. He struggles with Shreve to retell, to reanimate 
and make sense of, the stories of a disavowed past. He tries to receive these stories with a 
spirit of affirmation, to recognize and grant value to them and to the characters who 
inhabit them. 
 The form of Absalom, Absalom! reflects the reluctant but affirmative quality of 
Quentin’s hospitality to the past. The novel’s repetitions, disavowals, and deferrals all 
mimic the South’s fetishism of southern hospitality.126 But these formal strategies of 
fetishism also mirror Quentin’s struggles to show hospitality to a past that forcibly and 
repeatedly imposes itself upon him. In its deployment of these strategies, the novel 
proffers the reader the same reluctant hospitality that Quentin proffers the past. The 
narration of Absalom, Absalom! is anything but welcoming. The novel’s opening scene 
plunges us headfirst into the story of Thomas Sutpen without formally introducing us to 
the story’s major characters and their complicated histories. We enter the scene as 
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strangers, unfamiliar with our surroundings and bewildered by the barrage of oblique 
allusions to the past. The experience is disorienting. Trying to make sense of Rosa’s 
tortuous style of narration in the opening scene—“It (the talking, the telling) seemed (to 
him, to Quentin) to partake of that logic- and reason-flouting quality of a dream which 
the sleeper knows must have occurred, stillborn and complete . . .”—is alienating, if not 
off-putting (15). The effect is to keep us at a remove, on the outside looking in, detached 
from the events themselves, estranged from indoctrination in the culture that the narration 
depicts. We are never made to feel welcome in Sutpen’s story, never made to feel as if 
our needs and desires as readers have been taken into account in the telling. Yet, there is 
also something alluring, something inviting, about the novel’s aloofness. For all its 
estrangement and disorientation, Absalom, Absalom! draws us in. It taunts us, bit by bit, 
deferral by deferral. It keeps us wanting more, yearning for a more informed, less broken 
narrative of history. It makes us want to fill in the holes that its characters refuse to fill, to 
listen to the ghosts its characters deny. In this, it makes us want to be hospitable to the 
history Quentin struggles so desperately to tell. 
 
III 
Asked in an interview to comment on the similarities between her 1966 novel, 
Jubilee, and Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With The Wind, Margaret Walker chose instead to 
point out how the ideology of southern hospitality informed the different perspectives of 
the two works. “I am sometimes amused at the comparison,” Walker explained. “In some 
respects I suppose we could compare superficially the two Margarets—Margaret Mitchell 
and Margaret Walker. But she was coming out of the front door, and I was coming out of 
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the back door” (Rowell 24).127 Raised in Alabama and Louisiana, Walker was all-too-
familiar with the dominant white South’s narrative of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
periods. “I knew that the society in which I have grown up and lived, the segregated 
society, didn’t want to believe that story,” Walker says about the story of Jubilee, which 
is based on her great-grandmother’s experiences in Georgia and Alabama during the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century. “They had another story that they were always 
telling, Gone With the Wind. And that wasn’t my story” (Bonetti 136).128 Whereas 
Mitchell’s Gone With The Wind interrogates the ideology of southern hospitality through 
a focus on the lives of privileged white characters, Walker’s Jubilee demonstrates how 
blacks during and after emancipation relied on biblical and folk tropes of hospitality to 
maintain visions of freedom.129 In particular, Walker’s novel shows how blacks during 
the second half of the nineteenth century claimed privileged status in the South through a 
cultural reinterpretation of the Old Testament jubilee. In the process, Jubilee emphasizes 
the role that claims to land ownership played in attempts made by freed blacks to 
establish sovereignty in the spaces of the South after emancipation. Finally, Walker’s 
novel also provides readers with a vision of interracial hospitality—the kind of vision that 
many other twentieth-century writers, most notably Richard Wright, were unable to 
imagine. Committed to what she describes as a “new humanism” that rejects racist 
ideologies, Walker envisions a black female protagonist in Jubilee who responds to the 
South’s white patriarchy not with bitterness and hatred but instead with a determination 
to achieve redemption through acts of forgiveness and generosity (“The Humanist 
Tradition” 128-30).130 The redemption that Walker imagines in Jubilee manifests itself as 
a lived ethics of affirmative hospitality. 
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Vyry, the protagonist of Jubilee, is born a slave on the Dutton Plantation in 
Dawson, Georgia, around 1840. The son of her slave master, John Morris Dutton, Vyry 
has “sandy hair,” “gray-blue eyes,” and “milk-white skin.” Although she can pass as 
white, she identifies entirely with blacks.131 As a teenager, Vyry falls in love with 
Randall Ware, a free and literate black man, with whom she has two children (Jim and 
Minna) before a failed escape attempt from the Dutton Plantation forces the two lovers 
apart. Left alone with Jim and Minna after emancipation, Vyry eventually meets Innis 
Brown, a former field slave who takes responsibility for Vyry and her children, and who 
fathers Vyry’s third child, Harry, before the family settles in Greenville, Georgia.  
 As early as the first pages of Jubilee, Walker’s characters summon images of 
God’s hospitality for comfort. While praying at Vyry’s mother’s death bed in the novel’s 
opening chapter, Brother Ezekiel, the Dutton plantation preacher, recalls Matthew 7:7-8 
in his description of God’s mercy as a gracious welcoming into Heaven: “Lord, God-a-
mighty, you done told us in your Word to seek and we shall find; knock and the door be 
open . . . your humble servant is a-knockin, and askin for your lovin mercy, and your 
tender love” (12). For Ezekiel, God is the supreme host, capable of “[g]ather[ing]” the 
dying Hetta into His “bosom” and offering her a seat at his “welcome table” (13). 
Heaven, the ultimate space of privilege, is figured not as foreign or alien but as eminently 
familiar. “This here sister is tired a-sufferin, Lord, and she wants to come on home,” 
Brother Ezekiel beseeches. “Take her home, Lord God, take her home” (12-3). Later, the 
figuration of Heaven as home is reiterated when we learn that Vyry’s favorite spiritual is 
“The Wayfaring Stranger,” which describes the journey of a poor and helpless stranger in 
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search of shelter. The destination sought by the stranger is a “city called heaven” that he 
hopes to make his “home” (57).132  
Juxtaposed against the comfort and familiarity of Heaven, Brother Ezekiel 
describes the Big House of the Dutton plantation as unwelcoming and alien. In Ezekiel’s 
retelling of the story of Exodus, Pharaoh’s house is recast as “the Big House,” the black 
folk equivalent of the “House of Bondage” (45-6). Barred from receiving hospitality in 
the space of the Big House, the young Vyry seeks images of welcoming in her 
unconscious. In her sleep, she struggles against the ideology of southern hospitality, 
trying to envision a world where a black man—presumably Randall Ware—possesses the 
power to welcome her into a space of freedom: 
Once she dreamed she saw a beautiful door and she tried to enter it, because 
someone told her the name of the door was Freedom, but the door was locked and 
although she kept trying the lock and turning the golden knob, it would not open. . 
. . Then she saw a black man standing by the door. He held a golden key dangling 
from a dazzling chain, and he was smiling at her and promising to open the door . 
. . (95) 
Eventually, of course, it is Abraham Lincoln, the Moses figure of black folklore, who 
serves as the host to freedom when he opens the “golden door” for Vyry and her fellow 
slaves, a moment that is chronicled in Jubilee with the reading of the Emancipation 
Proclamation to freed slaves on the Dutton plantation (279).133 Too old to live beyond the 
end of the war but alive for Lincoln’s Proclamation, Brother Ezekiel dies believing that 
he has seen “the year of Jubilee” and the overthrow of the pharaohs of the South (242-
43). 
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Determined to present a realistic and detailed account of southern black life 
during the nineteenth century, Walker grounds Jubilee in the southern black folk 
tradition. “I always intended Jubilee to be a folk novel based on folk material: folk 
sayings, folk belief, folkways,” Walker explains (“How I Wrote” 62). For her “folk 
material,” Walker relied on stories told to her by her ancestors and published collections 
of “spirituals, work songs, popular tunes, and even minstrel songs” (60).134 All fifty-eight 
chapters in Jubilee begin with a spiritual or secular epigraph.135 Together, these epigraphs 
help establish what Nigel Thomas has called the “black ethos” of Walker’s characters 
(140). Through her use of folklore in Jubilee, Walker demonstrates how blacks 
constructed a cultural imaginary that helped them assume an “identity quite apart from” 
the identity that the dominant white South sought to impose on them (Thomas 140).   
The epigraphs to the chapters in Jubilee reveal how heavily blacks relied on a 
cultural reinterpretation of the biblical jubilee as a means of envisioning freedom. The 
first epigraphic mention of the jubilee comes in the opening to Chapter 35:  
 De marster run?  Ha, ha! 
 De darkey stay?  Ho, ho! 
 Hit must be now de kingdom coming 
 And de year of jubilo!  (268) 
Here, in Henry Work’s well-known spiritual “Kingdom Coming,” the jubilee is figured as 
a time of usurpation—as a time when blacks acquire sovereignty while whites flee in 
fear. Although Walker’s epigraph includes only the first verse of the spiritual, the 
remaining verses of “Kingdom Coming” foreshadow the events that follow in the novel. 
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When Vyry and her children move into the Dutton Big House only three chapters later, 
Jubilee enacts the third verse of “Kingdom Coming”: 
 De darkeys feel so lonesome libing 
 In de log house on de lawn, 
 Dey move der tings to massa’s parlor 
 For to keep it while he’s gone, 
 Dar’s wine an’ cider in de kitchen, 
 An’ de darkeys dey’ll hab some; 
 I spose dey’ll all be confiscated 
 When de Linkum sojers come. (Minstrel Songs 180-81) 
In its reference to the confiscation of white property, Work’s “Kingdom Coming,” which 
was first published in 1862, testifies to the widespread belief, held both in the North and 
the South, that the federal government would follow through with the threats made in the 
Confiscation Acts. In addition, by analogizing emancipation to the biblical jubilee, 
“Kingdom Coming” participates in the cultural production of the belief that victory by 
the North would result in land redistribution in the South, a belief that Henry Work 
iterated even more explicitly in “Babylon is Fallen,” which Walker quotes in her epigraph 
to Chapter 40 of Jubilee: 
We will be de marster, 
 He will be de sarvant, 
 Try him how he like it for a spell; 
 So we crack de Butt’nuts, 
 So we take de Kernel, 
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 So de cannon carry back de shell; 
 Look out dar now!  We’s gwine to shoot, 
 Look out dar, don’t you understand? 
 Babylon is fallen!  Babylon is fallen! 
 And we’s gwine to occupy de land!  (Walker 303; “Babylon is Fallen!” 3-5) 
Composed as a sequel to “Kingdom Coming,” Work’s “Babylon is Fallen,” published in 
1863, grants both narrative agency and land sovereignty to blacks by figuring freed slaves 
as the authoritative speakers of the song and as occupiers of the southern landscape.  At 
the same time, Work’s “Babylon is Fallen” describes southern white men as usurped of 
their status as hosts and of their property; like the hedonistic sinners of Babylon in The 
Book of Revelation, they are forced to experience the destruction of the luxuries they 
once took for granted.  
 By comparing the biblical jubilee to the emancipation of slaves in the United 
States, Walker’s novel contributes to a cultural reinterpretation of Old and New 
Testament texts—a reinterpretation that relies on a claim of native status for freed blacks 
in the South. According to biblical texts, the Israelite jubilee does not allow for the 
freeing of foreign slaves. Leviticus 25, the passage in the Pentateuch that deals most 
extensively with the jubilee, tells of a holy “fiftieth year” during which “liberty” will be 
widespread throughout Israel: “It shall be a jubilee for you: you shall return, every one of 
you, to your property and every one of you to your family” (Lev. 25:10).136 After 
delineating the particular requirements and allowances involved in the theological 
economy of the jubilee, Leviticus 25 stipulates how servants and slaves are to be treated 
during the holy year. The text is clear to distinguish between native servants and foreign 
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slaves. On one hand, we read of “dependent” kin who assume the status of “resident 
aliens” in the homes of familial hosts. Native to Israel, these kin are afforded certain 
privileges: “Do not take interest in advance or otherwise make a profit from them, but 
fear your God; let them live with you. You shall not lend them your money at interest in 
advance, or provide them food at a profit” (Lev. 25:35-37). Along with other Israelite 
natives who take on the status of “hired” or “bound” laborers, dependent kin are granted 
their freedom at the time of the jubilee: “They shall serve with you until the year of the 
jubilee. Then they and their children with them shall be free from your authority; they 
shall go back to their own family and return to their ancestral property. For they are my 
servants, whom I brought out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as slaves are 
sold” (Lev. 25:40-42). The distinction made here between the “servants” of God, on the 
one hand, and “slaves” unprotected by God, on the other, is further clarified in the text’s 
provisions regarding the enlistment of slaves: 
As for the male and female slaves whom you may have, it is from the nations 
around you that you may acquire male and female slaves. You may also require 
them from among the aliens residing with you, and from their families that are 
with you, who have been born in your land; and they may be your property. You 
may keep them as a possession for your children after you, for them to inherit as 
property. These you may treat as slaves, but as for your fellow Israelites, no one 
shall rule over the other with harshness. (Lev. 25:44-46) 
The “aliens” residing in Israel and their descendants are distinct from those who are 
native to the space of Israel, including those servants who live as “resident aliens” on the 
property of their hosts. In other words, no Israelite may enslave another native Israelite.  
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All slaves must be of foreign origin. Finally, slaves, unlike “resident aliens,” are not 
granted liberty at the time of the jubilee. Denied the mercy of God, the slaves of Leviticus 
25 remain slaves until they die.137   
 Thus, in order for the freed blacks of the U.S. South to receive the benefits of the 
biblical jubilee—namely, emancipation and access to land—they must be viewed as 
native. Accordingly, Walker’s novel claims native status for southern blacks by 
emphasizing their connection to the land. Whereas Walker depicts blacks working, 
eating, sleeping, and playing in the fields and forests of the South, she portrays whites as 
disassociated from the land. White characters in Jubilee have no connection with the land 
outside of the work their slaves carry out for them in the fields. On the other hand, both 
Innis Brown and Vyry exhibit close connections to the land. A “born farmer,” Innis’s 
dream is to own and operate a farm, to live off the land and cultivate it with respect 
(294).138 And, in moments of need, Vyry calls on the land for comfort and support. In one 
of the novel’s final chapters, for example, Vyry finds that she can speak to God only 
through the medium of the land: “Before she realized where she was going she found 
herself deep in the woods. . . . She found herself a rock, and instead of sitting down she 
dropped to her knees.  Instinctively she began to pray . . . ‘I come down here, Lord, cause 
I ain’t got no where else to go’” (454). Ultimately, in her characterizations of blacks as 
tied to the southern landscape, Walker constructs what Rashall Smith-Spears describes as 
“an allegory for the African American’s journey toward home in an America that was not 
fully committed to his/her inclusion within its boundaries” (137). Rather than describe 
the space of the South as foreign to blacks, Jubilee depicts it as familiar and comforting.  
Hence, the acquisition of land after emancipation is figured as a kind of reacquisition—as 
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a return to home. After all, the biblical jubilee brings about a reunion with one’s land and 
property rather than a seizure of something new (Lev. 25:10). 
Although the presence of the folklore tradition in Walker’s novel emphasizes how 
blacks used the image of jubilee to maintain their faith in freedom and land acquisition, 
Jubilee also narrativizes the North’s failure to provide the hospitality that it promised to 
blacks after emancipation. The epigraph to Chapter 51, taken from the spiritual “Great 
Day,” points to the vast incongruity between the promises made by the North and the 
realities faced by blacks during Reconstruction. Although “Great Day” talks of the “day 
of jubilee” when God sets “His people free” and the “Righteous” march in thankfulness 
for their liberty, the living conditions for Vyry and her family in Chapter 51 are far from 
ideal (Work American Negro Songs 182). As we learn in the opening paragraph to the 
chapter, 
In the spring of 1870, five years after freedom from chattel slavery, Vyry and 
Innis Brown were still unsettled.  Vyry’s longing for her children to learn to read 
and write and cipher on their hands was still unfulfilled.  Innis Brown was 
preparing to settle on another farm, but Vyry had learned from bitter experience 
that the white world around them deeply resented Negroes settling the lands and 
building new farms. (413) 
After the war, Vyry and Innis hear of Sherman’s “Special Field Order, No. 15” from 
Union soldiers: “Soldiers say colored folks been had them acres in Georgy on the ocean 
front . . .” (343). Innis hears specifically that the “gov’mint gwine give every colored 
farmer forty acres and a mule” (343). Interpreting Sherman’s Field Order as a kind of 
contract, Innis trusts that the “gov’mint” will follow through with its promises because it 
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has given freed blacks its “word” (343).139 However, Innis and Vyry find instead that 
black life during Reconstruction is “similar” to the life they had known as slaves (344).  
While trying to homestead in Alabama, they encounter not hospitality but “white 
hostility” (344). Despite the stipulations laid out in the Southern Homestead Act, the 
Browns find themselves forced to sharecrop on the land of a white southerner, Mr. 
Pippins, who exploits them by making Innis sign a contract that he cannot read (350). 
Then, when the Klu Klux Klan burns down a home that the Browns finally manage to 
build on land near Troy, Alabama, in the spring of 1869, Innis loses his patience when a 
representative of the Freedmen’s Bureau insists that the federal government is willing and 
able to provide hospitality for him and his family: 
Gov’mint?  Gov’mint?  Gov’mint you say?  I done heard that word Gov’mint 
until I’m sick to my stomach.  The Gov’mint gwine give you this, the Gov’mint 
gwine give you that.  The Gov’mint gwine give every nigger forty acres and a 
mule.  The Gov’mint got good land.  The Gov’mint will help you get settled.  The 
Gov’mint gwine have free schools for colored.  Sir, does you want to know what 
the Gov’mint done give me?  Nothing.  Not nary nickel’s worth of nothing.  Do 
you hear me? (385) 
The discrepancy between Innis’s notion of hospitality and the federal government’s 
becomes clear when the representative from the Freedmen’s Bureau argues that blacks 
“got [their] freedom on account of the Government” (385). For Innis, the role of 
government is to protect the rights of individuals, not to grant them rights. Therefore, he 
feels no gratitude for having his rights announced to him.   
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 Despite the hardships faced by the Browns, Jubilee both advocates and depicts 
exchanges of interracial hospitality in the South. Vyry insists on interracial trust and 
forgiveness, particularly during times of crisis. In a scene that recalls the generosity 
demonstrated by Ma Joad to starving children at the Hooverville camp in The Grapes of 
Wrath, Vyry extends hospitality to a haggard white family in rural postbellum Alabama.  
Despite the suffering that she and other blacks experienced during slavery, Vyry cannot 
witness the destitution of whites without acting on their behalf. “Sh-sh,” Vyry tells Innis 
Brown when he wonders why she has offered the family’s food to a strange and unknown 
white family, “can’t you see these folks is hungry?” (348). Although the Browns’ supply 
of food is severely limited, Vyry’s hospitality is bountiful: “. . . if you thinks your 
chilluns would like some you is welcome to share what we got, sitch as it is” (348). On 
the morning before the white family sets off on their horses, Vyry wakes early and makes 
sure to fill “their stomachs full of hot food” (349). What makes the scene particularly 
striking is that the interracial exchange takes place in a space currently occupied not by 
the Browns but by the white family. In the absence of a host capable of providing 
hospitality to guests and to family, Vyry assumes the role because she possesses the 
means and the character—what the narrator describes as her “generous spirit of 
hospitality”—to see beyond racial and familial boundaries. Perhaps most importantly, 
Vyry also succeeds in not making the recipients of her hospitality feel obligated to her. In 
fact, she somehow manages to make “the poor white woman and her husband feel they 
[are] doing her a favor” (348-49).  
For Vyry, hospitality and friendship are unthinkable without acts of forgiveness. 
Her belief in the significance of forgiveness becomes clear in the final chapters of the 
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novel. After Innis beats Jim for failing to take responsibility while working in the field, 
Vyry insists on her son’s need to forgive his adopted father: “You gotta forgive, like you 
expects God to forgive you” (457). For Vyry, forgiveness entails a willingness to look 
past—indeed, to forget—the wrongs committed by others. When Jim concedes that he is 
willing to “forgive” Innis Brown but not to “forgit” what he has done, Vyry explains that 
her son’s commitment to his memory of the past only serves to make him less hospitable 
to others. “Then you is still hating, and you ain’t forgiving,” Vyry tells her son.  
“Keeping hatred inside makes you git mean and evil inside. We supposen to love 
everybody like God loves us. And when you forgives you feel sorry for the one what hurt 
you, you returns love for hate, and good for evil. And that stretches your heart and makes 
you bigger inside with a bigger heart so’s you can love everybody when your heart is big 
enough” (457). Vyry’s forgiveness is offered in the spirit of affirmative hospitality. It 
involves recognizing and accepting the other’s flawed humanity over and above concern 
for one’s own feelings. Giving “love” in response to “hate” is an affirmation of alterity, a 
commitment to the kind of humanism that Walker so adamantly espoused. Vyry urges her 
son to forgive Innis Brown because she understands that Jim cannot move forward with 
an open heart if that heart is filled with “hatred,” if the forgiveness he offers Innis is 
merely a performance of conciliation rather than a selfless act of recognition.   
In the novel’s final chapters, the question of forgiveness takes on added 
significance when Randall Ware arrives and challenges Vyry’s commitment to interracial 
forgiveness and hospitality. Ware declares that interracial friendship is not possible 
because whites and blacks are “natural” enemies: “Well, Vyry, you might as well face it, 
the white man is your natural enemy and he regards you as his natural enemy” (473). 
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Unwilling to accept Ware’s worldview, Vyry advocates a spirit of interracial hospitality 
based first and foremost on forgiveness. Recalling the horrible treatment she experienced 
as a slave, including the beating that left her back forever scarred, Vyry nevertheless 
proclaims that she bears her tormentors “no ill will” (484). Employing an image that 
reflects the novel’s preoccupation with tropes of hospitality, Vyry articulates her devotion 
to interracial forgiveness by asserting, “I honestly believes that if airy one of them 
peoples what treated me like dirt when I was a slave would come to my door in the 
morning hungry, I would feed em” (485). Choosing hospitality when others might be 
inclined to choose spite, Vyry demonstrates what Innis Brown sees as an admirable 
“capacity for love, redemptive and forgiving love” (486). The sins committed by John 
Morris Dutton, Grimes, Miss Salina, and the other whites on the Dutton plantation do not 
merit Vyry’s forgiveness; nor have the perpetrators requested forgiveness from their 
victims. Vyry’s forgiveness of white slave owners and masters is independent of any 
legal judgment or punishment; rather, it is an affirmation of a common humanity between 
whites and blacks: “We both needs each other. White folks needs what black folks got 
just as much as black folks needs what white folks got, and we’s all got to stay here 
mongst each other and git along, that’s what” (480). Nor is Vyry’s commitment to 
interracial hospitality naïve or ignorant; she is well-aware of reality and chooses love 
despite her knowledge of hatred’s powers: “I’m gwine leave all the evil shameless 
peoples in the world in the hands of the Good Lawd and I’m gwine teach my childrens to 
hate nobody, don’t care what they does.  I ain’t gwine teach my childrens hate cause hate 
ain’t nothing but rank poison.  I knows they is evil peoples in the world and I knows 
everything don’t always turn out like we think is right . . .” (482).140 
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In a 1973 interview, Margaret Walker argued that “it is only in terms of 
humanism that the society can redeem itself” (Rowell 25). For Walker, a belief in 
humanism means an “appreciation of every human being” and an acknowledgment that 
“mankind is only one race—the human race” (Rowell 25). Appreciating the value of 
others, Walker tells us, requires regarding “the sacred nature of a brother or sister as one 
values [one’s] own privacy and inner sanctity” (Walker “The Humanistic Tradition” 
128). The relationship between hospitality and Walker’s humanism is nowhere more 
clear in Jubilee than in the epigraph to Chapter 44: 
Every nigger’s gwine to own a mule, 
Jubili, Jubilo! 
Every nigger’s gwine to own a mule, 
And live like Adam in the golden rule, 
And send his chillun to the white-folk’s school 
In the year of Jubilo!  (342) 
In this excerpt from Stephen Vincent Benét’s epic 1928 poem John Brown’s Body, racial 
equality is framed as an ethics of reciprocity (Benét 73). By generating conditions under 
which whites and blacks live together in the spirit of “the golden rule,” the jubilee of 
John Brown’s Body makes acts of interracial hospitality possible. And it is only through 
acts of hospitality, both Walker and Vyry make clear, that we have any chance of 
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PART III: 
NATIVE AMERICAN HOSPITALITY 
 
During the previous two parts of this dissertation, I have suggested at various 
points that Native American characters are uniquely positioned to critique dominant 
American models of hospitality. In Part Three, I turn my attention to the work of three 
seminal figures in twentieth-century Native American literary studies: Zitkala-Ša, Louise 
Erdrich, and Michael Dorris. Despite the absence of critical work on the subject of 
hospitality in Native American literary studies, hospitality is without question a central 
discourse in Native American literature. As we shall see, it is by deconstructing and 
reappropriating dominant American tropes of hospitality that Zitkala-Ša, Erdrich, and 
Dorris reject existing American ethical models and formulate alternative models of 
hospitality—models that, as we shall also see, are critically informed by and inextricably 
tied to indigenous ways of knowing and living. 
Through their concerted focus on discourses of hospitality in twentieth-century 
Native American literature, the final two chapters in this dissertation both complement 
and critique an ongoing discussion in Native Studies about the role that a liberal pluralist 
“politics of recognition” has played in North America during the past few decades in 
reproducing the kinds of colonialist, racist, and patriarchal forms of oppression that 
advocates of indigenous rights have historically sought to overturn.141 As Richard Day 
has observed, formal acts of state recognition, issued by U.S. and Canadian governments 
over the past few decades on behalf of indigenous peoples in the name of liberalism, have 
failed to produce “any increase” in “equality” for Native communities (198). Rather than 
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formally “recognize” the inherent “value” of Native communities, Day notes, liberal acts 
of recognition have served merely to “recognize” the “existence” of these communities 
(198).142 Expanding on Day’s argument, Glen Sean Coulthard has recently suggested that 
the liberal “practices” of “conciliation” that U.S. and Canadian governments have 
adopted in response to calls for indigenous recognition have actually reiterated the 
“colonial” relationship between North American Indians and the state (6).143 The state’s 
“grand gestures of recognition,” Coulthard reveals, work to reproduce a “circumscribed 
mode of recognition that structurally ensures continued access to Indigenous peoples’ 
lands and resources” (156).144 By “appearing to address” their colonial history through 
“symbolic acts of redress,” U.S. and Canadian governments have used a liberal politics of 
recognition to justify and disavow the continued displacement and exploitation of North 
American Indians (155). 
 In order to combat the counterproductive effects of liberal pluralism’s politics of 
recognition, Coulthard advises the practice of an “alternative politics” aimed at achieving 
“affirmative” forms of recognition (3). For Coulthard, this politics “is less oriented 
around attaining legal and political recognition by the state, and more about Indigenous 
peoples empowering themselves through cultural practices of individual and collective 
self-fashioning that seek to prefigure radical alternatives to the structural and subjective 
dimensions of colonial power . . .” (18). Central to Coulthard’s vision of affirmative 
recognition is his call for a reinvestment in an indigenous land-based ethics. Arguing in 
favor of what he calls an ethics of “grounded normativity,” Coulthard contends that the 
land, as a “mode of reciprocal relationship,” provides us with a model for “living our 
lives in relation to one another and our surroundings in a respectful, nondominating and 
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nonexploitative way” (60). Instead of reproducing “asymmetrical” forms of recognition, 
Coulthard suggests, an alternative politics that is grounded in an indigenous land-based 
ethics can create the conditions under which face-to-face “dialog” can take place and lead 
to reciprocal relations (25, 36). 
 In the following two chapters, I argue that Native American literature has 
provided a space for imagining and articulating Coulthard’s vision of affirmative 
recognition since the beginning of the twentieth century. In Chapter Three, I show how 
Yankton Dakota author Zitkala-Ša (1876-1938) promotes a land-based ethics of 
affirmative hospitality that is informed by Sioux notions and customs of kinship, 
reciprocity, sexual complementarity, and land stewardship. In Chapter Four, I show how 
Louise Erdrich and Michael Dorris use their collaborative novel, The Crown of 
Columbus, to draw attention to the formative role that settler colonial narratives of 
hospitality play in enabling and perpetuating a settler colonial politics of recognition.145 
More specifically, I show how Erdrich and Dorris expose the ways in which settler 
colonial regimes dating back to Columbus have used false discourses of hospitality to 
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Chapter Three 
Toward A Native American Critique of American Hospitality: 
Zitkala-Ša’s Indigenous Feminism 
 
 In 1896, as a twenty-year-old undergraduate student at Earlham College, Zitkala-
Ša1 presented a speech to her fellow undergraduates wherein she drew attention to a 
suppressed history of Native American hospitality to European colonists, explorers, 
traders, and missionaries. Speaking specifically about the hospitality that Abenaki Indians 
provided to the Pilgrims at Plymouth Colony, Zitkala-Ša recounted, “The invasion of his 
 
1 Born as Gertrude Simmons on the Yankton Sioux Reservation in South Dakota in 1876, Zitkala-
Ša was a central figure in Native-American literary and political life during the first decades of 
the twentieth century. Born to a Dakota mother and an Anglo-French father who abandoned the 
family before his daughter’s birth, Zitkala-Ša spent the first eight years of her life at Yankton 
before leaving for boarding school in 1884 (Lewandowski 18; Kunce 73; Johnson & Wilson 27; 
Fisher 231). She attended White’s Manual Labor Institute, a boarding school for Native 
Americans in Wabash, Indiana, for two periods during her childhood and adolescence, from 1884 
to 1887 and then again from 1891 to 1895. In the intervening years, she returned to the Yankton 
Reservation, where she resumed her Dakota education under the tutelage of her mother (Johnson 
& Wilson 28). After graduating from White’s, Zitkala-Ša enrolled at Earlham College, where she 
excelled as a writer, violinist, and orator (Johnson & Wilson 28; Rappaport 62). Then, following 
a year at the Boston Conservatory of Music, she served as an instructor at the famous Carlisle 
Indian Industrial School in Pennsylvania from 1899 until 1901 (Rappaport 90). In 1900, she 
became one of the first Native Americans to communicate her life story to a national audience 
without the aid of a translator when three of her autobiographical stories—“Impressions of an 
Indian Childhood,” “The Schooldays of an Indian Girl,” and “An Indian Teacher Among 
Indians”—were published in Atlantic Monthly over a three-month period (Hafen xxiv; Davidson 
& Norris xviii). The following year, at the age of twenty-five, Zitkala-Ša received critical acclaim 
for Old Indian Legends, a collection of traditional Dakota stories translated into written English. 
In 1903, Zitkala-Ša and her husband, Raymond Bonnin, moved to Uintah and Ourah Reservation 
in Utah, where they lived for fourteen years. During this time, Zitkala-Ša established and 
managed a community center on the reservation that provided work, support, and provisions for 
members of the Ute Indian Tribe. Relocating to Washington, DC, with her family in 1916, 
Zitkala-Ša spent the next two decades lobbying on behalf of the rights of Native Americans. In 
her capacity as Secretary-Treasurer of the Society of American Indians (SAI) and chief editor of 
the Society’s journal, American Indian Magazine, she took a leading role in advocating for Indian 
citizenship, tribal sovereignty, and women’s rights. In 1926, she founded the National Council of 
American Indians, one of the first pan-Indian organizations in the United States. She served as 
President of the NCAI until her death in 1938. 
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broad dominions by a paler race brought no dismay to the hospitable Indian. Samoset 
voiced the feeling of his people as he stood among the winter-weary Pilgrims and cried 
‘Welcome, Englishmen’” (223).146 Twenty-five years later, in one of the last political 
essays that she would publish, Zitkala-Ša chose once again to focus attention on the 
subject of Native American hospitality to Europeans. In the first sentence of her essay, 
entitled “America’s Indian Problem,” she boldly suggests that it was Native American 
hospitality that made it possible for Europeans to survive in the New World: “The 
hospitality of the American aborigine . . . saved the early settlers from starvation during 
the first bleak winters” (155).  
 Zitkala-Ša’s use of a discourse of hospitality to narrate the history of New World 
contact is by no means unique to these two instances. In the intervening twenty-five years 
between delivering her speech at Earlham and composing “America’s Indian Problem,” 
Zitkala-Ša repeatedly utilized discourses of hospitality to interpret, narrativize, and 
ultimately deconstruct post-Columbian North American history. Both her fiction and 
non-fiction are filled with scenes and figures of hospitality. In her Dakota legends, tropes 
of hospitality serve as the dominant rhetorical features through which she allegorizes the 
contact period. Virtually every one of her twenty-four legends centers around a crucial 
scene in which a host must decide whether to provide or withhold hospitality. In her 
original short stories, these same tropes resurface but in modernized settings and with 
contemporary political implications. Scenes of hospitality take place in homes on 
reservations and at Issue Houses where tribal rations are distributed. In her 
autobiographical narratives, tropes of hospitality are no less present. They are practically 
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ubiquitous in her descriptions of her childhood on the Yankton Reservation and in her 
detailed accounts of her experiences as a student and teacher at Indian boarding schools.  
 Despite the increasing critical attention that Zitkala-Ša has received in recent 
years, what has remained conspicuously absent from these scholarly discussions has been 
any consideration for the role that hospitality plays in her writing.147 In this chapter, I 
recover the central importance of hospitality to Zitkala-Ša’s work by demonstrating that 
hospitality functions as the central discourse around and through which Zitkala-Ša 
structures and coordinates her social, cultural, and political critiques. Recognizing the 
centrality of hospitality to Zitkala-Ša’s critical project allows us to identify linkages 
among these various critiques that have until how escaped scholarly attention. We can, 
for example, begin to see how Zitkala-Ša’s critique of American sovereignty is expressed 
through the same tropes of hospitality as her critique of the federal government’s Indian 
boarding school program. Likewise, we can see how her critique of the American nuclear 
family is communicated through the same tropes of hospitality as her critique of capitalist 
modes of exchange. Performing the important work of recovering these connections in 
Zitkala-Ša’s writing helps us not only better understand her critical project but also more 
clearly comprehend Zitkala-Ša’s significance as a pioneering figure in Native American 
literature. It is largely through discourses of hospitality, I maintain, that Zitkala-Ša 
provided future Native American authors with a foundation for carrying out their own 
critiques of American and Indian cultures. 
 Zitkala-Ša viewed hospitality as the dominant discourse of the oppressor—which 
is to say, she viewed hospitality as the dominant discourse through which the oppressor 
justifies oppression. By appropriating this discourse and resignifying the tropes that have 
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been used to license oppression, Zitkala-Ša achieves what Scott Richard Lyons has 
termed “rhetorical sovereignty”: she claims her “right” and establishes her “ability” to 
“determine” on her own the “modes, styles, and languages” through which she desires to 
express herself publicly (449-50).148 At the same time, however, Zitkala-Ša chooses to 
center her work around and through a discourse of hospitality for another reason. Just as 
she shows that a discourse of hospitality can be used to justify oppression, she also shows 
that it can be used in very powerful ways to imagine more positive relations between 
Natives and non-Natives. In both her fiction and non-fiction, she vindicates Indian 
cultures—particularly her native Dakota culture—by revealing the many ways in which 
indigenous conceptions and customs of hospitality provide an ethical foundation for re-
imagining U.S.-Indian relations. Thus, Zitkala-Ša uses hospitality as a double-faced 
discourse: it provides her with the means both to critique and to imagine otherwise. 
I 
 Zitkala-Ša translated twenty-four traditional Dakota legends during her lifetime. 
The first fourteen were published as Old Indian Legends in 1901, and the remaining ten 
remained undiscovered until 2001 when they were published, along with a number of 
other previously unknown Zitkala-Ša manuscripts, in a collection entitled Dreams and 
Thunder.149 Past scholars have often treated both sets of legends as rote translations. In 
doing so, they have failed to recognize the unique qualities of Zitkala-Ša’s retellings. As 
a translator, Zitkala-Ša adapts her source material to address her own contemporary 
political concerns and to address her audience’s limited familiarity with Dakota culture. 
In her “Preface” to Old Indian Legends, Zitkala-Ša herself draws explicit attention to the 
adapted nature of her translations when she describes the tales in her collection as 
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“transplant[ed]” from their “native” language, mode of communication, and cultural 
context (5). Incorporated into her revised legends are allusions to critical issues facing 
Native Americans at the turn of the century, such as land allotment, compulsory boarding 
school education, the distribution of tribal rations, and renewed challenges to tribal 
sovereignty. By incorporating these allusions, Zitkala-Ša transforms traditional Dakota 
legends into political allegories designed specifically for non-Native readers.150  Treating 
figures of hospitality unambiguously as allegorical symbols, Zitkala-Ša establishes a 
vocabulary of hospitality in her legends that she further develops and repurposes 
throughout her work. Central to the tropes at issue here are recurring figures of the host, 
the guest, and the parasite.  
 In her legends, Zitkala-Ša delivers five overarching critiques of dominant Western 
discourses of hospitality. First, she challenges European and American claims to 
“original” sovereignty in North America. Through the symbolic register of allegory, 
Zitkala-Ša restages scenes of contact in which characters coded as Native American are 
clearly figured as prior sovereigns—that is, as hosts possessing sovereignty prior to the 
arrival of Europeans and Americans. In the process, she recovers a suppressed history of 
Native American hospitality to European and American colonists, explorers, traders, 
missionaries, and government officials.151 Second, she challenges American claims to 
natural sovereignty in North America. Refuting the racist and paternalistic logic of the 
discovery doctrine, she uses her legends to remind us that Americans acquired 
sovereignty over Indian lands not by natural right but by exploiting Native American 
hospitality and by committing deliberate acts of violence. Third, Zitkala-Ša charges the 
US federal government with using hospitality as a pretense for exterminating indigenous 
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peoples and cultures. Portraying American Indian policy as essentially false and 
insidious, she suggests that the federal government has disguised spaces of confinement 
as sites of hospitality in order to conceal their true functions as sites of extermination. 
Fourth, Zitkala-Ša rejects and reverses the American trope of the Indian parasite. 
Recasting non-Natives as parasites, she condemns Americans for repeatedly violating the 
terms of their reciprocal contracts with Indian tribes. Moreover, through the negative 
examples of her characters, she demonstrates that parasitism runs counter to the 
foundational values of Sioux cultures. Fifth, Zitkala-Ša depicts American free market 
capitalism as an inherently inhospitable economic system. Undermining the claims of 
capitalist characters who attempt to portray their system of exploitation as fair and 
natural, Zitkala-Ša represents capitalism as a premeditated form of trickery. 
 As an alternative to the dominant Western discourses of hospitality that she 
critiques, Zitkala-Ša uses her legends to begin envisioning a land-based ethics of 
reciprocal hospitality. Like Coulthard, who models his theory of “grounded normativity” 
on the reciprocal relationships that he sees in nature, Zitkala-Ša imagines an ethics of 
reciprocity modeled on the hospitality that we receive from and witness in nature 
(Coulthard 60). Centrally informing this model of reciprocal hospitality is her belief in a 
Sioux cosmology that treats Mother Earth as the original host of all things—of the land, 
of all living beings, and of all natural resources (“California Indian Trails” 250-52). By 
portraying Mother Earth as the original host, Zitkala-Ša not only invalidates all European 
and American claims to original sovereignty in North America. She also defers infinitely 
the question of original human sovereignty altogether. If the Earth itself is the one true 
original host, then we—humans, animals, and all other living beings—are always already 
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Her guests. Thus, Zitkala-Ša distinguishes between the prior sovereignty that she claims 
on behalf of Native Americans and the original sovereignty that she assigns to Mother 
Earth. This distinction provides the theoretical foundation for an ethics of hospitality 
committed to the Dakota values of kinship, reciprocity, and land stewardship. 
 Zitkala-Ša lays the groundwork for her critique of American sovereignty in her 
“Preface” to Old Indian Legends. In the first sentence of the “Preface,” she challenges 
American claims to original sovereignty by announcing that her legends are the product 
of an indigenous relationship with the land that predates the arrival of Europeans in North 
America: “These legends are relics of our country’s once virgin soil” (5). As “relics” of 
this pre-Columbian history, the legends testify to the antecedent “character” of Indian 
sovereignty in North America (5). Tied to local sites and customs, the legends also 
provide Dakotans with a means through which to maintain and continuously renew their 
connection to the land. The very act of storytelling itself, Zitkala-Ša explains, offers the 
Dakota people an opportunity to celebrate and nurture their ties to nature and to the local 
landscape: “Under an open sky, nestling close to the earth, the old Dakota story-tellers 
have told me these legends. In both Dakotas, North and South, I have often listened to the 
same story told over again by a new story-teller” (5). Declaring that the time has come to 
share these traditional Dakota legends with non-Natives, Zitkala-Ša proffers her 
translations in the spirit of an invitation. Asserting that Natives and non-Natives share a 
common human “kinship,” she invites her Anglo audience not only to read her legends 
but also to pursue “further study of Indian folklore” (5). In making this invitation, 
however, Zitkala-Ša reiterates her earlier assertion of prior Indian sovereignty by 
referring to the English language as the “second tongue” of “America”: “And now I have 
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tried to transplant the native spirit of these tales—root and all—into the English language, 
since America in the last few centuries has acquired a second tongue” (5). In making this 
originary claim on behalf of indigenous languages, Zitkala-Ša suggests that Native 
American “folklore” constitutes the original literature of America. Firmly rooted in the 
“once virgin soil” and in the “native spirit” of indigenous American experience, Indian 
legends speak in the original voice—the first tongue—of “America.”152 At the same time, 
however, Zitkala-Ša will later undermine this formulation when she refers to the 
“language” of Mother Earth as preceding all human language (“California Indian Trials” 
250-51). In this way, Zitkala-Ša continually encourages us to question all human claims 
to originality. 
 Zitkala-Ša also uses her “Preface” to begin invalidating the paternalistic tropes of 
hospitality that Europeans and Americans have used for centuries to justify claims to 
original and natural sovereignty in North America. Sioux legends, or ohunkakan, are 
traditionally addressed to children and designed to instruct young members of a given 
tribe in culturally acceptable modes of behavior.153 Signifying on this tradition, Zitkala-
Ša assumes a paternalistic discourse when addressing her white American readers in the 
“Preface”: “The legends of America belong quite as much to the blue-eyed little patriot as 
to the black-haired aborigine. And when they are grown tall like the wise grown-ups . . .” 
(5). As Jeffrey Myers has pointed out, Zitkala-Ša addresses her legends to “the little blue-
eyed patriot” because “in the vast, millennia-long history of the human inhabitation of 
North America, recently arrived Euroamericans are children—and children clearly in 
need of instruction as to how to behave in relation to other people and beings in the 
natural world . . .” (122).154 By implying that her non-Native readers require the kind of 
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instruction that is customarily intended for children, Zitkala-Ša self-consciously inverts 
and draws rhetorical attention to the conventional American stereotype of the Indian 
child-savage.155 In doing so, she undermines the pretense of paternalism through which 
Americans have repeatedly usurped and disavowed Indian sovereignty since Columbus’s 
arrival in North America.156 As we will later see, Zitkala-Ša reiterates and expands on 
this critique of American paternalism in her original short stories, autobiographical 
narratives, and political essays. 
 But how do these critiques of false American hospitality find initial expression in 
Zitkala-Ša’s Dakota legends? In other words, how precisely does Zitkala-Ša use tropes of 
hospitality to communicate these critiques? A highly illustrative instance is her legend 
“The Badger and the Bear.” A variation of a well-known Sioux legend, Zitkala-Ša’s “The 
Badger and the Bear” communicates its critique through recognizable tropes of 
hospitality and undisguised references to the history of settler colonialism in North 
America. The tale opens with a scene of categorical hospitality: arriving unexpectedly at 
the home of a badger family, a starving bear is offered food and shelter. Clearly figured 
as a guest, the bear is unknown to the badgers and is welcomed warmly and treated as a 
“friend”: “How, how, friend! Your lips and nose look feverish and hungry. Will you eat 
with us?” (27-8). Affording the bear the honor of a “guest,” the mother badgers feeds him 
the family’s “most tender red meat” until he is fully satiated (28). Pleased with the 
generous welcome that he receives, the bear returns to the home of the badgers the next 
day and then in the days that follow. Each day, he is treated with utmost deference. Out 
of respect for her guest, the mother badger places a fur rug on the ground near the 
doorway and leaves it there for the bear to use each day (28). “She did not wish a guest in 
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her dwelling to sit upon the bare hard ground,” Zitkala-Ša’s narrator informs us, thereby 
reemphasizing the fundamental importance of the trope of the “guest” to this retelling of 
the legend. No longer the “unexpected newcomer” he was when he first arrived, the bear 
has become the badger family’s “regular” guest (28).  
 In these early passages of “The Badger and the Bear,” Zitkala-Ša models an ideal 
form of Dakota hospitality for her readers. Receiving the bear as a “friend” despite his 
strangeness, the badgers exhibit an ethos of hospitality that is grounded in indigenous 
notions of universal kinship.157 The bear is not only unknown to the badgers; he is also a 
member of a different species. By showing the bear hospitality, the badgers affirm their 
belief that ties of kinship extend beyond biological classifications of species. In this 
sense, the badgers anticipate Zitkala-Ša’s later calls for an interracial ethics of hospitality. 
This all-inclusive notion of kinship is, as we shall see, central to the model of hospitality 
that Zitkala-Ša envisions both in her legends and in her later work. Populated by 
characters representing dozens of different species, Zitkala-Ša’s legends imagine a 
fictional universe in which interspecies exchanges of hospitality are not only common but 
also often necessary for survival. 
 The ideal model of hospitality that Zitkala-Ša presents in the early scenes of “The 
Badger and the Bear” is by no means limited to the initial act of categorical hospitality 
carried out by the badgers. Together, the badgers and the bear contribute to this ideal 
model through reciprocal expressions of recognition. As a guest, the bear repeatedly 
recognizes his hosts’ sovereignty over the space of their home. During his first visit to the 
badgers’ home, the bear readily cedes space to the mother badger in order to allow her to 
perform her work as host: 
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     Hereupon the mother badger took long strides across the room, and as she had 
to pass in front of the strange visitor, she said: “Ah han! Allow me to pass!” 
which was an apology. 
     “How, how!” replied the bear, drawing himself closer to the wall and crossing 
his shins together. (28) 
In the future, the bear further exhibits his respect for the mother badger and for the 
hospitality she provides by “[a]lways” sitting “with crossed shins” (28). He also signals 
his appreciation for the mother badger’s cooking by “smacking his lips together” when he 
is finished with his meal (28).158 In recognition of these expressions of deference and 
gratitude, the mother badger places the rug inside the door that the bear sits on every day 
(28). Ultimately, although these expressions of respect between the badgers and the bear 
do not last, they reflect Zitkala-Ša’s commitment to providing her readers with a vision of 
hospitality rooted in acts of reciprocal hospitality—acts that self-consciously and 
deliberately affirm their own reciprocal nature.  
 Zitkala-Ša also uses these early passages in “The Badger and the Bear” to draw 
attention to a suppressed history in which Europeans and Americans recognized Indian 
sovereignty prior to disavowing it.159 Figuring the badgers’ home as a metonym for 
“America,” she treats the bear’s recognition of the badgers’ sovereignty as a symbolic 
representation of this early recognition of Indian sovereignty. Although Zitkala-Ša is 
fully aware that Europeans and Americans often usurped Indian sovereignty without ever 
recognizing Indians as hosts, she is more interested in exploring instances in which non-
Natives, like the bear, acknowledged Indian sovereignty in order to take advantage of 
Indian hospitality. References to historical examples of non-Natives exploiting Indian 
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hospitality by first recognizing or pretending to recognize Indian sovereignty recur 
throughout Zitkala-Ša’s fiction and non-fiction. Zitkala-Ša often points to US treaties 
with Indian tribes as representative examples of this kind of exploitation. Recounting 
scenes in which tribal chiefs are treated as sovereigns in their treaty negotiations with US 
government officials, she reminds us that US-Indian treaties were, according to 
established international law, premised on a recognition of Indian sovereignty.160 Gaining 
millions of acres of land by making what appeared to be “good faith” acknowledgments 
of Indian sovereignty, the US federal government then proceeded to justify violating the 
terms of their agreements—terms they themselves set and insisted on—by disavowing 
the truth of prior Indian sovereignty (“America’s Indian Problem” 156). In his overtures 
of recognition to the badgers in the early scenes of “The Badger and the Bear,” Zitkala-
Ša’s bear represents this history of deliberate exploitation. Moreover, through the bear’s 
example, we come to see how the American inclination to disavow a history of Native 
American hospitality is a product of a much deeper need to disavow the truth of prior 
Indian sovereignty. 
 Eventually, the bear in Zitkala-Ša’s legend grows fat “upon the badger’s 
hospitality” (28). Having regained his strength and pride, the bear arrives one day and 
announces that the badger and his family must vacate the premises because he has 
decided to take up residence in their home. Standing upon the rug and displaying a “row 
of large sharp teeth,” the bear roars, “I have no dwelling. I have no bags of dried meat. I 
have no arrows. All these I found here on this spot . . . I want them! See! I am strong!” 
(29). Despite the badger’s efforts to remind the bear of the hospitality that he showed 
him—“I fed you. I called you friend, though you came here a stranger”—the bear 
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forcibly removes the badgers, tossing one after another out of their home (29). 
Dispossessed of their home and their possessions, the badgers build a makeshift hut and 
“beg” for their meals (29-30). Unable to secure any food for his family, the badger is 
forced to return to his old home and plead for hospitality. However, his pleas are met 
only with more violence (30). 
 In his attempts to justify his usurpation of the badgers’ home, the bear employs 
the same rhetoric that Europeans and Americans have historically used to validate their 
claims to sovereignty in North America.161 In particular, he echoes the rhetoric of the 
discovery doctrine when he asserts that he has a right to claim the badgers’ home and 
possessions as his own simply because he “found” them in the “spot” where he now 
stands.162 This claim to sovereignty by way of discovery denies the formative role that 
the badgers’ hospitality played in providing the bear with the strength to make a claim to 
sovereignty in the first place. In so doing, it attempts to deny a history of agency—a 
history in which the badgers chose repeatedly to welcome the bear into their home. It also 
attempts to deny the parasitical nature of the bear’s ascension to sovereignty. Perhaps 
aware that his discovery claim serves as insufficient justification for his actions, the bear 
resorts to claiming sovereignty by right of brute strength: “I am strong!” In his explicit 
reference to his physical strength and in the naked violence of his act of usurpation, the 
bear reminds us that European and American claims to sovereignty in North America 
have always been informed and legitimized by acts of violence and/or threats of 
violence.163  
II 
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 Through analysis of “The Badger and the Bear” and the “Preface” to Old Indian 
Legends, we have to come to see how Zitkala-Ša uses discourses of hospitality to 
undermine American claims to original and natural sovereignty. We now turn our 
attention to the three remaining critiques of American hospitality in Zitkala-Ša’s legends. 
In large part, Zitkala-Ša communicates these three remaining critiques through her 
characterization of the Sioux trickster figure Iktomi. Although Iktomi is a well-known 
and important character in both the Lakota and Dakota storytelling traditions, he 
customarily shares the stage equally with other similarly recognizable mythological 
characters, such as Wakan Tanka, Inyan, and Hestovatohkeo’o.164 In other collections of 
Sioux legends composed during the first decades of the twentieth century, Iktomi appears 
only sporadically. For example, in Charles Eastman’s Wigwam Evenings (1909), Iktomi 
appears in only four of the collection’s twenty-seven tales. Likewise, he appears in only 
five of the forty tales in Marie McLaughlin’s Myths and Legends of the Sioux (1916) and 
only nine of the fifty-four stories in Ellen DeLoria’s Dakota Texts (1932).165 Yet, in 
Zitkala-Ša’s translations, Iktomi emerges as far and away the dominant mythological 
figure. He is the central character in each of the first five tales of Old Indian Legends and 
appears in ten of the collection’s fourteen tales. In addition, he reappears in three of the 
remaining Zitkala-Ša legends later published in Dreams and Thunder. Altogether, then, 
Iktomi is present in thirteen of Zitkala-Ša’s twenty-four translations.166  
 Iktomi performs three interrelated functions in Zitkala-Ša’s legends.167 Each of 
these functions contributes directly to Zitkala-Ša’s sustained critique of American 
hospitality. First, Iktomi instigates scenes of hospitality. A perpetual wanderer by nature, 
he is constantly coming in contact with strangers during his travels. Through her accounts 
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of Iktomi’s encounters, Zitkala-Ša explores the ethical complexities posed by the arrival 
of the other. Second, Iktomi provides Zitkala-Ša repeatedly with a negative example 
through which to critique American hospitality. Figuring Iktomi as a synecdoche for 
white settler colonialism, Zitkala-Ša uses the trickster’s repeated pattern of behavior to 
teach her readers how not to act as hosts and guests. Third, Iktomi deconstructs dominant 
American discourses of hospitality by continually disregarding established customs of 
exchange and by exposing existing hierarchical binaries of hospitality to be exploitative 
and unnatural. In the process, Zitkala-Ša’s trickster reveals how dominant American 
discourses of hospitality fundamentally inform and help maintain asymmetrical power 
relations. 
 In her third critique of American hospitality, Zitkala-Ša uses the figure of Iktomi 
to charge the US federal government with using hospitality as a pretense for 
exterminating indigenous peoples and cultures. As a trickster, Iktomi regularly offers and 
receives hospitality under false pretenses. He is both a shapeshifter and a shrewd actor, 
capable of disguising both his appearance and his motives at any given time. He is also 
“wily” with his “words”, a master at employing “false” rhetoric to his advantage (7, 37). 
He is, in short, the ultimate “impostor” (41). This is evident in “Shooting of the Red 
Eagle” when Iktomi masquerades as the avenger in order to gain admittance into a 
chieftain’s home and to exploit his hospitality (39-41). Likewise, Iktomi’s wily ways are 
on display in “The Tree-Bound” when he tricks the avenger into procuring food for him 
by “play[ing him] false” (37). What these two scenes suggest and numerous other scenes 
in Zitkala-Ša’s legends confirm is that Iktomi regularly utilizes his skills as a trickster 
specifically in order to perform recognizable hospitality tropes. It is, as we shall see, by 
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pretending to satisfy conventional expectations of what a deferential guest looks like or 
what a generous host looks like that he ultimately succeeds in exploiting his victims. 
 In “Iktomi and the Ducks,” the first tale in Old Indian Legends, Zitkala-Ša 
introduces a specific critique of false American hospitality that returns throughout her 
work, especially in her boarding school narratives. Through her figuration of Iktomi, 
Zitkala-Ša argues that the US federal government has disguised spaces of confinement as 
sites of hospitality with the deliberate purpose of using these spaces as sites of 
extermination. In her very first description of Iktomi in Old Indian Legends, Zitkala-Ša 
figures the trickster as a synecdoche for American settler colonialism: 
Soon he came to the edge of the great level land. On the hilltop he paused for 
breath. With wicked smacks of his dry parched lips, as if tasting some tender 
meat, he looked straight into space toward the marshy river bottom. With a thin 
palm shading his eyes from the western sun, he peered far away into the lowlands, 
munching his own cheeks all the while. “Ah-ha!” grunted he, satisfied with what 
he saw.  
     A group of wild ducks were dancing and feasting in the marshes. With wings 
outspread, tip to tip, they moved up and down in a large circle. With the ring, 
around a small drum, sat the chosen singers, nodding their heads and blinking 
their eyes. (8) 
Facing westward and greedily fixing his gaze upon the unsuspecting ducks below, 
Zitkala-Ša’s Iktomi calls to mind an image of the white colonialist arriving at the border 
of Indian country. Entirely uninterested in establishing anything resembling a reciprocal 
relationship with these newly encountered strangers, Iktomi is concerned only with what 
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they can provide him. Disguising his true motives, he ingratiates himself to the ducks 
when he first arrives at the river bottom by performing the role of a deferential guest. 
“My friends,” he tells the ducks when they begin asking him questions, “I must not spoil 
your dance” (8). Charmed by Iktomi’s deference, the ducks welcome him into their 
singing circle (8-9). In this way, Iktomi, like the bear from “The Badger and the Bear,” 
gains the trust of his hosts by recognizing them as hosts before exploiting their 
hospitality. 
Yet, unlike the bear, Iktomi does not wait long before taking violent action 
against his hosts. In a plot detail that is unique to Zitkala-Ša’s translation of this legend, 
Iktomi quickly tricks the ducks into recognizing him as a prospective host by telling them 
that he carries a bag of songs and that he can sing these songs only indoors: “I will build 
first a round straw house, for I never sing my songs in the open air” (9).168 Eager to enjoy 
Iktomi’s gift of song, the ducks hurriedly waddle into the makeshift hut as soon as it is 
completed. Sealing off the entrance, Iktomi informs his trapped guests that they must 
close their eyes and dance while he sings: “With eyes closed you must dance. He who 
dares to open his eyes, forever red eyes shall have” (9). Heeding Iktomi’s dictum, the 
ducks are unable to defend themselves from the horrific violence that befalls them—that 
is, until one curious duck opens his eyes and is able to warn his remaining companions 
about what is taking place: 
     At length one of the dancers could close his eyes no longer! It was a Skiska 
who peeped the least tiny blink at Iktomi within the center of the circle. “Oh! oh!” 
squawked he in awful terror! “Run! fly! Iktomi is twisting your heads and 
breaking your necks! Run out and fly! fly!” he cried. Hereupon the ducks opened 
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their eyes. There beside Iktomi’s bundle of songs lay half of their crowd—flat on 
their backs. 
     Out they flew through the opening Skiska had made as he rushed forth with his 
alarm. 
     But as they soared high into the blue sky they cried to one another: “Oh! your 
eyes are red-red!” “And yours are red-red!” “Ah-ha!” laughed Iktomi, untying the 
four corners of his blanket, “I shall sit no more hungry within my dwelling.” 
Homeward he trudged along with nice fat ducks in his blanket. He left the little 
straw hut for the rains and winds to pull down. (10) 
Central to the allegorical scheme of this passage is Iktomi’s improvised straw house, 
which doubles as a stand-in for the various spaces of confinement—the Indian 
reservation, the boarding school, the sanitarium, the insane asylum, the prison—in which 
indigenous peoples have been interned by Americans under the guise of being provided 
with hospitality. Like the historical spaces to which Iktomi’s space of confinement refers, 
the trickster’s straw house is presented to its future inmates as a welcoming and 
benevolent site of hospitality. Moreover, like Indian reservations and Indian boarding 
schools, which, in particular, promised to produce the “general improvement” of Native 
Americans by providing them with the “gifts of civilization and Christianity” but which, 
in truth, were designed to bring about the annihilation of indigenous peoples and cultures, 
Iktomi’s straw house uses a pretense of providing hospitality to orchestrate destruction 
(Lea 3-4; Murray 18).169 As a symbol of false American hospitality, Zitkala-Ša’s gift of 
song brings to mind the innumerable promises and hollow enticements that Europeans 
and Americans have proffered to Indians over the years in the name of hospitality. The 
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“gift” of alcohol, in particular, comes to mind, especially when we consider the 
destructive effects it has had on Native American communities for centuries.170  
 Despite Iktomi’s terrible violence and the historical parallels that this violence 
evokes, Zitkala-Ša’s “Iktomi and the Ducks” does provide consolation. Through the 
character Skiska, Zitkala-Ša suggests there is hope so long as Native Americans maintain 
their skepticism in the face of American invitations of hospitality. By opening his eyes in 
spite of Iktomi’s warning, Skiska embodies both the curiosity and the courage that 
Zitkala-Ša hopes to inspire in her readers. In a figurative sense, his example testifies to 
the need for Native Americans to open their eyes to the conditional nature of American 
hospitality. More precisely, Skiska reveals that we need to keep our eyes open to the 
many ways in which American invitations of hospitality serve as the discursive means 
through which acts of oppression and exploitation are both licensed and disavowed.  
III 
In her fourth critique of American hospitality, Zitkala-Ša rejects and reverses the 
familiar American trope of the Indian parasite. Dating back to Columbus’s depictions of 
Indians as a “race of people” who “take what they can get” without being able to give 
“anything” of value in “return,” the trope of the Indian parasite has for centuries played a 
central role in justifying failed removal, reservation, education, and allotment policies in 
the US (Columbus 110-13).171 The persistent figuration of the Indian as parasite has from 
the very beginning been predicated on a concomitant figuration of the Euro-American as 
supreme provider. Since Columbus, settler colonial discourse in the New World has 
rationalized the dispossession and exploitation of indigenous peoples by treating 
Christianity as an “incommensurable” gift (Murray 18).172 Figured as recipients of that 
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which is incommensurable, North American Indians have been repeatedly portrayed as 
fundamentally incapable of reciprocating the hospitality they receive from their European 
and American benefactors. In their ignorance of Christianity, they are marked by an 
“absence” that can be filled only by the “abundance” of European and American 
hospitality (Murray 49). According to this paternalistic logic, Native Americans are 
powerless to prevent their own parasitism. They are, in other words, interpellated as 
always already parasites of their European and American hosts. 
 The perpetuation of the trope of the Indian parasite has also relied heavily on 
persistent misrepresentations of indigenous cultures of reciprocal gift exchange. These 
misrepresentations provide the etymological background for the pejorative “Indian 
giver,” a phrase that, by the middle decades of the nineteenth century, performed the 
ideological work of treating Indian practices of reciprocal exchange as signs of 
“selfishness” and “calculation” (Murray 19). However, it is important to note that settler 
colonial discourse in the New World did not initially associate Indian reciprocity with 
selfishness or calculation. Columbus, for example, condemns Indians not for failing to 
give willingly of their possessions—in fact, he praises them for the “docile” manner in 
which they “give what all they have got”—but, instead, for the impoverished quality of 
the hospitality they do provide (113).173 Indians are, Columbus writes, a “people very 
poor in everything” who, though they “give what they possess in exchange for anything 
that may be given,” ultimately possess “so little that it counts for nothing” (127, 121). In 
other words, for Columbus, the problem is not that Indians are greedy or manipulative 
but, rather, that their relative poverty invalidates and makes essentially meaningless the 
hospitality they willingly give. According to Columbus’s formulation, then, Indians are 
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parasites not because they take and don’t give back—or even, as the phrase “Indian 
giver” would later have us believe, because they give and then take back what they’ve 
already given—but because what they give is always believed to be incommensurate with 
what they receive. 
 Why, then, do Native American practices of reciprocal exchange begin to take on 
negative connotations in American discourse? And how do these reciprocal practices 
eventually become associated with parasitism? It is not until the Jacksonian Era that 
Indian practices of reciprocity become an object of persecution in American discourse. 
We can pinpoint this change in American attitudes toward Indian reciprocity by tracing 
the changing connotations of the phrase “Indian giver” in Anglo-American discourse 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.174 Prior to the 1830s, the phrase is rarely 
used. When it is used, it appears to have a neutral, if not positive, connotation. Thus, in 
his 1765 account of The History of the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay, English scholar 
Thomas Hutchinson defines an “Indian gift” as a “proverbial expression, signifying a 
present for which an equivalent return is expected” (469 note). For Hutchinson, who 
associates Indian practices of reciprocal exchange with the “hospitable” welcome that 
Native Americans offered to Englishmen when they first arrived in the New World, the 
“Indian gift” represents “courtesy,” “compassion,” “gratitude,” and “friendship” (468-
69). By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the figures of the “Indian gift” and 
the “Indian giver” have taken on entirely new meaning. What’s more, the expressions 
have become commonplace in American discourse. This dramatic change in the meaning 
and relative popularity of the two phrases begins during the 1830s. An 1838 article in the 
weekly newspaper The New-York Mirror reports that “Indian giver” has come to mean 
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someone “who gives a present and demands it back again” (OED “Indian” S2a). Ten 
years later, J. R. Bartlett’s Dictionary of Americanisms similarly defines an “Indian 
giver” as a person who proffers a gift but then expects “that the same thing may be given 
back to him” (148).175 Three years after Bartlett, US Supreme Court Justice Levi 
Woodbury informs us that the meaning of “Indian giver” has expanded to include those 
persons who expect to receive in return “much more” than they themselves have given 
(200).176  
 It is, of course, no accident that Indian practices of reciprocal exchange become a 
target of discrimination in American discourse during the 1830s. In an attempt to justify 
his own unwillingness to abide by treaty promises—some of which were negotiated by 
his predecessors but many of which were negotiated by himself—President Andrew 
Jackson launched a federal campaign aimed at demonizing Indian cultures of 
reciprocity.177 According to Jackson, US treaties with Indian tribes were a “farce” that 
“could only have arisen at a time when the Government was too weak to execute any law 
passed for the regulation of the Indian tribes” (Cave 1333; Bassett II 281; Bassett III 37; 
Bassett II 279; Bassett III 37). Prefiguring Zitkala-Ša’s figuration of the bear in “The 
Badger and the Bear,” Jackson announced as early as 1820 that the “arm of the 
Government” had become “sufficiently strong” that it no longer had to pretend to enter 
into reciprocal agreements with Indian tribes in order to secure possession over Indian 
lands (Bassett III 37). As “empty gesture[s]” reluctantly agreed to during a prior era of 
American weakness, US treaties with Indian tribes were, in Jackson’s opinion, never 
“really binding” at all (1332). Denying both the legal authority of the US Constitution 
and the precedents of international law, Jackson argued that Indian tribes never really had 
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a legal right to “treat” with the US because, in his view, indigenous peoples were always 
“Subjects” of the federal government and never “independent nation[s]” (II 279-80).178 
Disclaiming his own government’s prior recognition of Indian sovereignty—that is to 
say, taking it back—Jackson reasoned that Native Americans were never able to claim 
“the right of domain” over North American lands (II 280).179 
In order to substantiate his disavowal of Indian sovereignty and his violation of 
US-Indian treaties, Jackson misrepresented and demonized Indian expectations of 
American reciprocity. Vehemently insisting that he was “just” and “humane” in his own 
dealings with Indian tribes, Jackson just as vehemently insisted that Indian appeals to 
American reciprocity were signs of Indian “avarice”: “. . . for it is too true that avarice 
and fear are the predominant passions that govern an Indian” (II 281).180 By the end of 
Jackson’s term in office, Native Americans had become notorious for the “avarice” they 
showed in seeking to achieve American reciprocity and in seeking to take back lands they 
had previously ceded to the US (after finding that the US had violated the terms of its 
agreements). In this way, the trope of the Indian giver functioned ideologically as an 
inverse projection of false American hospitality. Rather than admit their own 
unwillingness to reciprocate treaty promises, Americans projected their own avarice back 
on Native Americans.  
 In the decades following Jackson’s presidency, further misrepresentations of 
Indian expectations of reciprocity led to widespread accusations of Indian parasitism. In 
particular, Indian appeals to the federal government to distribute promised rations were 
misrepresented as indications of a concerted strategy on the part of Native Americans to 
parasite off the liberal hospitality of the American people. Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
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designation of Indians as “ward[s]” of the US federal government during Jackson’s 
presidency—a designation to which Zitkala-Ša refers numerous times in her political 
essays and speeches—helped provide the legal foundation for accusing Native Americans 
of parasitic dependency (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia).181 What these misrepresentations 
of Indian expectations of reciprocity fail to recognize is the extent to which Indian 
dependency on federal hospitality was a forced dependency. Even if Native Americans 
were intent on parasiting off federal hospitality, their parasitism was not a voluntary 
parasitism; it was a parasitism that was forced upon them by the United States 
government. The forced relocation of Indian tribes to reservations during the second half 
of the nineteenth century only served to reinforce this impression of dependency.182 
Unlike Jackson’s politics of Indian exclusion, which aimed simply to exclude Indians 
from the dominant spaces of American society, the reservation system was represented 
by the US federal government as a measure taken in order to protect and provide for 
indigenous peoples. Reservations were “refuges” created in order to make it possible to 
provide Indians with much-needed hospitality (Perry 6). This pretense of providing 
Native Americans with federal hospitality was easily used as a further pretense for 
accusing Indians of parasitism. By 1880, the trope of the Indian parasite had become a 
central discursive feature of American policy concerning Native Americans. In fact, it 
was a major contributing factor in the federal government’s decision to adopt a policy of 
compulsory boarding school education for Native American children.183 As the Board of 
Indian Commissioners stated in their 1880 report to the Secretary of the Interior, “As a 
savage we cannot tolerate [the Indian] any more than as a half-civilized parasite . . . The 
only alternative left is to fit him by education for civilized life” (7).  
    158 
In her Dakota legends, Zitkala-Ša attacks the trope of the Indian parasite directly 
and repeatedly. Emphasizing the central importance of reciprocal exchange to her vision 
of hospitality, she demonstrates that parasitism runs counter to the foundational values of 
North American Indian cultures. As usual, Zitkala-Ša communicates her critique most 
convincingly through the figure of Iktomi. In his unwillingness to embrace an ethics of 
reciprocity, the trickster undermines a carefully maintained balance of exchange between 
the human world and the spiritual world. We see this clearly in “Iktomi’s Blanket,” the 
second tale in Old Indian Legends. Unwilling to do the work of procuring food for 
himself, Iktomi decides to go see Inyan, the great stone god, to beg for food (13). Falling 
upon Inyan with his hands outstretched, the trickster makes his desperate plea for 
hospitality: “Grandfather! pity me. I am hungry. I am starving. Give me food. Great-
grandfather, give me meat to eat!” (13). Hearing this plea, the “all-powerful Great Spirit,” 
who has the power to listen to and grant prayers spoken to Inyan, smiles down at Iktomi: 
“The sunset poured a soft mellow light upon the huge gray stone and the solitary figure 
beside it. It was the smile of the Great Spirit upon the grandfather and the wayward 
child” (14). Understanding that his prayer has been “heard,” Iktomi gratefully presents 
his “half-worn blanket” to Inyan as a “thank-offering”: “Now, grandfather, accept my 
offering; ‘tis all I have” (14). Placing his blanket “upon Inyan’s cold shoulders,” the 
trickster leaves the stone god and heads home (14).  
On his way home, Iktomi stumbles upon the “answer” to his prayer: a “freshly 
wounded deer” lies in his path (14). However, while preparing a fire to cook the deer, 
Iktomi grows cold and begins to regret giving his blanket to Inyan: “The old great-
grandfather does not feel the cold as I do. He does not need my old blanket as I do. I wish 
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I had not given it to him” (14). Experiencing a moment of undecidability, Iktomi 
“pause[s]” to consider his options. Eventually, he decides to return to Inyan and “take 
back” his blanket (14). “Give my blanket back, old grandfather! You do not need it. I 
do!” proclaims the trickster as he seizes back his thank-offering (14-5). But when Iktomi 
returns to his fire, he finds that his deer meat has all been eaten. All that remains are dry 
rib bones (15). Rather than feel “grieved” for making the “wrong” decision to steal back 
his blanket, Iktomi concludes that his only mistake was not eating the meat when he had 
the chance: “If only I had eaten the venison before going for my blanket!” (15). Still 
starving, Iktomi begins to cry. This time, however, the Great Spirit does not “heed” the 
trickster’s appeal for hospitality (15). Knowing Iktomi’s tears to be “selfish tears,” the 
Great Spirit leaves “the wayward child” to fend for himself (15). 
Through the negative example of Iktomi, Zitkala-Ša promotes an ethics of 
hospitality committed to recognizing and maintaining a reciprocal relationship with the 
spiritual world. A central grounding force behind this ethical model is Zitkala-Ša’s 
reverence for Inyan and the Great Spirit, two spirit gods whose legendary histories attest 
to the interconnectedness of the human world and the spiritual world. As Zitkala-Ša 
explains in her essay “Why I Am A Pagan,” the legends of Inyan and the Great Spirit are 
“[i]nterwoven” with a “knowledge” of the “kinship” that exists among “all parts of this 
vast universe” (115). By translating her Dakota legends into English, Zitkala-Ša imparts 
this “knowledge” of universal kinship to her Anglo-American readers. Moreover, by 
attributing human qualities to Inyan and the Great Spirit, she humanizes the hospitality 
they provide and treats that hospitality as part of an ongoing economy of reciprocal 
exchange between humans and spirit gods. When Itkomi takes back his blanket from 
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Inyan, he upsets this economy of exchange. The result is a temporary upheaval in the 
cosmic order: the moon rises on the wrong side of the sky (15). However, the Great Spirit 
restores balance to the universe by punishing Iktomi for his parasitic behavior. 
Iktomi’s parasitism often threatens to destabilize the social order as well. 
Nowhere is this more apparent than in “Zicha, the Squirrel, and Iktomi,” a legend 
featured in Dreams and Thunder. A “real-do-nothing,” Iktomi makes no effort to provide 
for his family (65). Instead, he and his family “live off” the “hospitality” of their 
neighbors (66). Each day, Iktomi and his wife and children make their “rounds of calls” 
in search of food (66). Refusing to do any hunting of his own, Iktomi is unable to 
reciprocate the hospitality that he receives from his neighbors: “Not by any chance did 
Iktomi ever have food in his dwelling” (66). He is not even able to perform the basic 
local “custom” of offering arriving guests a “hot drink of herbs” (65). Because he is 
unable to perform his responsibilities as a host, Iktomi is viewed as an “unreliable” 
member of the tribe: “No one could depend upon him . . .” (65). Yet, the tribespeople still 
pity Iktomi’s wife and children, who are, by and large, victims of the trickster’s 
parasitism. Zicha, Iktomi’s neighbor, is particularly affected by the sight of Iktomi’s 
children when he is in their presence: “The peaked faces of the lean and hungry Iktomi 
children impressed him” (66). Recognizing in the faces of Iktomi’s children a need for 
food, Zicha invites the trickster and his family to dine at his home on several occasions 
(66). Unfortunately for Zicha and his wife, who show their guests generous “hospitality,” 
Iktomi violates the one “rule” of “etiquette” that Zicha specifies in his offer of 
hospitality—to not “break any of the joints of the bones” when eating (67). This “breach 
of etiquette” constitutes one of the many instances in Zitkala-Ša’s legends when Iktomi 
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demonstrates an inability to abide by the conditions of hospitality to which he previously 
agrees (67).184 Repeatedly failing to reciprocate the hospitality he receives, Iktomi 
becomes a recurring symbol of parasitism in Zitkala-Ša’s legends. Because the trickster 
has been previously figured as a symbol of white settler colonialism in “Iktomi and the 
Ducks,” it is difficult to deny the allegorical implications of Zitkala-Ša’s emphasis on 
Iktomi’s parasitism.  
IV 
 In her fifth critique of American hospitality, Zitkala-Ša argues that American free 
market capitalism is an inherently inhospitable economic system. Figuring Iktomi as a 
stand-in for the American capitalist, she portrays the inhospitality of capitalism as a 
premeditated form of trickery. We see this most clearly in two tales from Old Indian 
Legends: “Iktomi and the Muskrat” and “Iktomi and the Turtle.” Both legends feature 
Iktomi disavowing his responsibilities as a host by treating scenes of hospitality as 
antagonistic contests. In the opening scene of “Iktomi and the Muskrat,” the trickster 
hovers over a soup of boiled fish when a muskrat approaches. Seeing the bowl of soup, 
the muskrat hopes that Iktomi will follow “the custom of the plains people” and invite his 
guest to join him: “The muskrat stood smiling. On his lips hung a ready ‘Yes, my friend,’ 
when Iktomi would ask, ‘My friend, will you sit down beside me and share my food?” 
(16). However, Iktomi remains silent at first, ignoring the muskrat. In the face of such a 
“lack of hospitality,” the muskrat cannot help but “feel awkward” (16). Eventually, 
Iktomi speaks, but rather than invite his guest to share in his dinner, he invites the 
muskrat to compete against him in a contest: “My friend, let us run a race to see who 
shall win this pot of fish. If I win, I shall not need to share it with you. If you win, you 
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shall have half of it” (17). Although Iktomi is a much faster runner than the muskrat, he 
assures his guest that the race is a “fair one” (17). Fully aware that he cannot possibly 
beat Iktomi in a race, the muskrat pretends to agree to the terms of the race and then 
steals the bowl of soup while Iktomi is running (17-8). Returning to find the muskrat 
sitting up in a tree and eating his soup, Iktomi has the temerity to beg the muskrat for 
hospitality: “I am hungry. Give me a bone!” (18). In response, the muskrat throws down a 
small sharp bone that sticks in Iktomi’s throat and almost makes him choke to death (18). 
Then, voicing the legend’s epigram, the muskrat advises Iktomi, “Next time, say to a 
visiting friend, ‘Be seated beside me, my friend. Let me share with you my food’” (18). 
 Events in “Iktomi and the Turtle” unfold in more or less the same way. Rather 
than simply offer hospitality to the turtle, Iktomi suggests that he and his guest engage in 
a competition: “Now let us have a little contest. Let us see who can jump over the deer 
without touching a hair on his hide. . . . Let the winner have the deer to eat!” (42). By 
“flattering” the turtle, Iktomi convinces his guest that he has the “skill” to compete in the 
impromptu contest (42-3). However, the turtle fails to make the jump and falls hard up 
against the side of the deer, while Iktomi makes the jump easily (43). Afterward, Iktomi 
asks the turtle to watch the deer while he goes to get his children (43). Realizing that the 
trickster has made him feel and look “foolish,” the turtle takes the deer and brings it 
home to his creek (44). Later, when Iktomi comes to the creek to take back the deer, the 
turtle tricks him into drowning himself while his children watch (44). 
 Both “Iktomi and the Muskrat” and “Iktomi and the Turtle” allegorize the 
historical convergence of Native American and Euro-American cultures of exchange. 
Accustomed to Sioux cultures of generalized exchange, in which acts of hospitality are 
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reciprocated either directly (by the recipient of the exchange) or indirectly (by another 
member of the tribe), the muskrat and the turtle expect Iktomi to offer them hospitality 
when they encounter him on their travels.185 But Iktomi does not afford his guests the 
privileges they expect. Instead, he asks them to work for these privileges—to earn them 
through their labor. Iktomi treats his food not as gifts to be exchanged for future gifts but 
as commodities to be won or lost through competition. Rather than make reciprocity the 
condition of exchange, he makes competition the precondition. The muskrat and the turtle 
are not bound to reciprocate the gains they make, but they are bound to compete and to 
compete according to Iktomi’s conditions if they want to gain anything at all. Of course, 
Iktomi sets the conditions of competition to his extreme advantage. As a symbol of settler 
colonial capitalist exploitation, he uses his wealth and power not to provide his guests 
with wealth and power but, instead, to secure and reinforce his own powerful standing in 
a market economy. However, the fact that Iktomi ends up with nothing when both 
legends end suggests that, despite all the trickster’s scheming, market capitalism amounts 
to a bankrupt ethics—one motivated by affirmation of the self rather than affirmation of 
the other. 
 The depth of Zitkala-Ša’s critique of American capitalism lies in her depiction of 
Iktomi’s persistent attempts to treat capitalism as a natural and fair economic system. By 
insisting that his race with the muskrat is a “fair one,” Iktomi attempts to disavow the 
ethical implications of his decision to withhold hospitality from the muskrat (17). In 
doing so, he suggests that offering hospitality to the muskrat would be less “fair” than 
giving the muskrat the opportunity to win his hospitality in a race. In other words, he 
describes a culture in which hospitality is earned through competition as more “fair” than 
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a culture in which hospitality is offered under the expectation that it will be reciprocated. 
Of course, it is Iktomi’s “flattering tongue” that convinces the muskrat and the turtle of 
this backwards logic (43). But it is also Iktomi’s complete and confident disregard for the 
possibility of providing his guests with hospitality that makes his invitations to compete 
for hospitality seem like reasonable proposals. It is by ignoring the very idea of reciprocal 
hospitality that he makes a capitalist model of hospitality seem natural. 
 The conclusions to “Iktomi and the Muskrat” and “Iktomi and the Turtle” feature 
an important recurring topos in Zitkala-Ša’s legends: the topos of wish fulfillment. 
Virtually every one of Zitkala-Ša’s Iktomi legends features a concluding scene in which 
the trickster is punished for his actions. Sometimes, as we have seen, these punishments 
are very severe. For Zitkala-Ša’s Native American readers, the conclusions to these 
legends provide an opportunity to achieve catharsis. As a representation of white 
inhospitality, Iktomi epitomizes symbolically the object of emotional aggression for 
Native American readers who seek retribution for countless violations of hospitality. In 
the absence of substantive real-world retribution, the punishments of Iktomi provide a 
cathartic alternative. However, if the conclusions to Zitkala-Ša’s Iktomi legends offer 
Native American readers catharsis, what do they offer Euro-American readers? After all, 
Zitkala-Ša does address Old Indian Legends to her white American readers (“Preface” 5). 
How might these white American readers respond to Zitkala-Ša’s carefully constructed 
figuration of Iktomi as white and to the numerous scenes in which retribution is visited 
upon him? In her legends, Zitkala-Ša rarely portrays Iktomi as an object of sympathy or 
empathy. Although we can identify with his instinct for self-protection and his desire to 
satisfy his hunger, Zitkala-Ša’s legends never encourage us to identify with him when he 
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withholds hospitality from a prospective guest or exploits the hospitality of a host. In 
other words, in every scene in which Iktomi behaves inhospitably—which is to say, in 
every scene of hospitality in which he appears—we are encouraged to identify with the 
victims of his inhospitality and not with him. Even in “Zicha, the Squirrel, and Iktomi,” 
where Iktomi’s inhospitality is largely a result of his ignorance, the trickster’s complete 
disregard for others makes it impossible to feel any sympathy for him or to identify in 
any meaningful way with his actions. The result of this careful manipulation of reader 
response is that Iktomi—Zitkala-Ša’s primary figurative representation of the white 
man—emerges as the primary object of the reader’s repudiation and disidentification.186 
With no choice but to disapprove of Iktomi’s actions, Zitkala-Ša’s Euro-American 
readers are tricked into denouncing their own historical pattern of behavior. Perhaps 
some are even drawn to recognize themselves as contributors to this pattern. 
 Ultimately, it is Zitkala-Ša’s ability to portray Iktomi’s inhospitality as a repeated 
pattern of behavior that makes her allegorical critique of European and American 
inhospitality so effective. Linking legends together through intertextual references, 
Zitkala-Ša creates a continuous narrative of Iktomi’s inhospitality. The Iktomi we 
encounter at the beginning of “Iktomi and the Blanket,” for example, is clearly the same 
Iktomi we leave at the end of “Iktomi and the Ducks.” The first words that Iktomi speaks 
in the latter tale make this immediately apparent: “Those bad, bad gray wolves! They ate 
up all my nice fat ducks!” (13). Likewise, the Iktomi of “Shooting the Red Eagle” is 
without question the same Iktomi of “The Tree-Bound” and “Iktomi and the Fawn.” 
Events in these stories plainly follow one another. We should not, in other words, read 
Zitkala-Ša’s Iktomi legends as isolated fables, each with its own separate and distinct 
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story to tell. Instead, Zitkala-Ša urges us to read these tales as interwoven stories that 
together constitute a record of Iktomi’s inhospitality and, by analogy, reference an 
extensive and repeated pattern of European and American inhospitality. Accordingly, 
although each Iktomi legend can in itself be read as a discrete allegory, it is by viewing 
the whole of Zitkala-Ša’s Iktomi legends together that we can appreciate more fully the 
allegorical implications of her critique of the trickster.   
V 
As an alternative to the false, parasitic, and capitalist culture of hospitality 
represented by Iktomi, Zitkala-Ša uses her legends to begin envisioning a land-based 
ethics of hospitality. Central to this ethical model is her belief in a Sioux cosmology that 
treats Mother Earth as the original host of all things—of the land, of all living beings, and 
of all natural resources (“California Indian Trails” 250-52). Being “appreciative” of all 
that Mother Earth provides should, Zitkala-Ša suggests, encourage us “not to be 
wasteful” with the Earth’s resources (“California Indian Trails” 252). Out of respect for 
Mother Earth and for all other living beings, we have a responsibility to share and 
preserve the land and its resources. We see this ethics of land and resource stewardship 
promoted in several Zitkala-Ša legends. For example, in “When the Buffalo Herd Went 
West,” when an Indian man and woman suddenly find themselves in possession of “meat 
and skins in plenty,” they do not hoard the food for themselves (18). Instead, they 
immediately make plans to share their bounty with the rest of the world: “I shall go forth 
to invite the world to feast with us” (18). Sharing and preserving resources, Zitkala-Ša 
would later argue in a 1922 speech, is particularly essential during times of famine: “No 
real man cares to save himself alone and see the rest of the folks die” (“Hear to Heart 
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Talk” 262). Thus, characters in Zitkala-Ša’s legends who hoard resources when others are 
in need are always punished. In “Iktomi and the Ducks,” the trickster is punished not just 
for killing “half” of the ducks (10). He is also punished for killing more ducks than he 
needs to eat (10-12). By returning home with so many ducks and burying some under 
burning ashes, Iktomi threatens to upset the balance of the ecosystem.187 
 The land-based ethics of hospitality that Zitkala-Ša envisions in her legends is an 
ethics modeled on nature. Like Coulthard, who argues that we should practice an ethics 
of reciprocity modeled on the reciprocal relationships that we see in nature, Zitkala-Ša 
proposes an ethics of reciprocal hospitality that can be achieved only by first learning to 
“understand the language” of nature (“California Indian Trails” 250-51). Learning to 
“hear” and be “sensitive” to the land and to all other living beings is, for Zitkala-Ša, the 
foundation of all ethics (251). It is by listening attentively to the voices of the “ancient 
trees” that we are reminded that we are all children of the same Mother and that we are 
all part of one “big family circle” (“California Indian Trails” 251-52; “Heart to Heart 
Talk” 262). Moreover, it is by being attentive to these voices that we can also begin to 
appreciate the reciprocal qualities of the relationships that we see in nature and, through 
the example of these relationships, begin to imagine an ethics of reciprocal hospitality.   
 Zitkala-Ša offers her most fully considered vision of a land-based ethics in her 
legend “The Hawk Woman,” a tale featured in Dreams and Thunder.  In the tale’s 
opening scene, Cetan, a “handsome young brave,” embarks on a hero’s quest (27). 
Leaving his home, he journeys downstream in a rawhide boat in search of his fate (27). 
Feeling that “everywhere under the sky was home to him,” Cetan does not fear the 
“strange” places through which he travels (27). One night, he is “visited” by five 
    168 
“callers”: a field mouse, a cougar, a brown hawk, a rattle snake, and an owl (27). All of 
these visitors appeal to Cetan for hospitality and ask to join him on his journey until such 
time as they discover a “country better suited” to their individual needs (27). Cetan 
readily consents to their requests for hospitality and welcomes them into his boat on the 
following day (27). When the group arrives at a “country” that features hickory trees and 
wild carrots, the field mouse announces that he would like to stay and live there. In 
parting, the mouse promises Cetan a reciprocal gift for his hospitality: “. . . when you 
return this way, I shall have a present ready for you” (28). Over the next few days, each 
of Cetan’s guests finds a country that suits his needs, and each promises Cetan a present 
upon his return (28).  
 Eventually, Cetan himself finds a country to settle down. Drawn to a people who 
are starving because their buffalo have been “frightened away” by their enemies, he helps 
return the buffalo to their original land by performing a traditional ceremony in honor of 
nature and the spirit gods (28). In appreciation, the chieftain of the tribe offers Cetan his 
favorite daughter to wed (29). After two years, Cetan and his wife and their twin sons 
leave the tribe to return to Cetan’s home (29). On their journey, Cetan and his family are 
invited to stay and visit with the field mouse, the cougar, the hawk, the rattle snake, and 
the owl. At each stop, they are presented with a gift and Cetan’s sons are welcomed as 
“brothers” (29-30). Finally returning home, Cetan finds that his tribespeople have been 
almost entirely decimated by his sister, who is bewitched by an evil spirit. After feeding 
the remaining tribespeople with rice that he received from the field mouse, Cetan uses the 
remaining gifts from his journey to perform ceremonies in honor of the gods and 
eventually to kill his evil sister and to “restore” balance to the world (32-3).  
    169 
 In Zitkala-Ša’s translation of “The Hawk Woman,” Cetan’s hero’s quest is 
reimagined as a tutorial on the value of reciprocal hospitality. The initial acts of 
hospitality that Cetan offers to the mouse, the cougar, the hawk, the rattle snake, and the 
owl lead to reciprocal acts of hospitality that allow for the survival of Cetan, his family, 
and his tribespeople. Likewise, the offerings of hospitality that Cetan makes to the spirit 
gods first in his wife’s country and later in his own country both lead to reciprocal acts 
that revive dying communities. Faced with the historical prospect of the “vanishing 
Indian” at the turn of the twentieth century, Zitkala-Ša uses the narrative of Cetan to 
encourage her Native readers to adopt a culture of reciprocal hospitality in order to ensure 
their survival. It is worth noting that Zitkala-Ša does not at any point attempt to disavow 
the conditionality of the acts of hospitality performed by Cetan, his animal friends, and 
the gods. Rather, she openly celebrates these acts as reciprocal acts. In contrast to other 
American writers, who offer us idealized visions of hospitality that seek to disavow 
conditionality, Zitkala-Ša chooses instead to celebrate conditionality and to treat 
reciprocal hospitality as an ideal form of hospitality. In doing so, Zitkala-Ša advocates an 
affirmative model of hospitality that recognizes the self-benefits inherent in all acts of 
hospitality and that encourages Natives and non-Natives to use reciprocity as a mutually 
beneficial principle of exchange.  
VI 
 The same tropes of hospitality that we see featured in Zitkala-Ša’s Dakota legends 
resurface in her other work. These tropes take on new meaning as Zitkala-Ša applies 
them to modern settings and grounds them in concrete historical contexts. In her original 
short stories, autobiographical narratives, political essays, and public speeches, Zitkala-
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Ša repurposes these tropes in order to reiterate and expand on a specific critique of 
American hospitality that she introduces in her legends. Perhaps more importantly, 
Zitkala-Ša also uses both her fiction and non-fiction to model an ethics of affirmative 
hospitality that is grounded in the cultural values, life experiences, and contributions of 
Indian women. Outlining the core principles of this ethics is the focus of the final section 
of this chapter. 
 Above all, Zitkala-Ša’s ethics of affirmative hospitality features and celebrates 
acts of hospitality performed by Native American women. In her political essays and 
speeches, Zitkala-Ša recovers a historical lineage of Native American female hospitality 
that predates the arrival of Europeans in North America. In her essay “The Coronation of 
Chief Powhatan Retold” (1919), she revises the dominant Western narrative of American 
democracy by identifying Pocahontas as the original host of democracy in North 
America: “Springing from the tribal democracies of the new world, Pocahontas was the 
first emissary of democratic ideas to caste-ridden Europe” (196). It was Pocahontas, 
Zitkala-Ša suggests, who introduced not only democracy but also democratic ideals of 
hospitality to Europeans during the early seventeenth century. Moreover, reminding her 
readers that “Mrs. Woodrow Wilson” is a lineal descendant of Pocahontas, Zitkala-Ša 
traces this history of indigenous female hospitality directly to the White House (196). 
Further elaborating on this historical lineage, she points in another essay to the hospitality 
of Lady Cofitachequi, who “graciously received” Hernando De Soto and his fellow 
conquistadors into her chiefdom during the sixteenth century (“America’s Indian 
Problem” 155).188 Elsewhere, Zitkala-Ša draws attention to contemporary Indian women 
who have shown hospitality to Americans, Europeans, and/or fellow Indians. She praises 
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Chipeta, of the Ute tribe, for the generous “audience” she shows to visitors on the Uintah 
and Ouray Reservation and, more specifically, for the hospitality she afforded to white 
neighbors during her childhood (“Chipeta” 175). In her editorials for American Indian 
Magazine, Zitkala-Ša regularly cites examples of Native American women who have 
made contributions on behalf of American and European soldiers fighting in the Great 
War. We hear of an old Indian grandmother who donated five hundred dollars to the Red 
Cross and was left with only thirteen dollars to her name (“America, Home” 194). And 
we also hear of the Indian women who made buckskin moccasins for French children 
orphaned by the War (“America, Home” 194). By calling attention to and praising these 
acts of wartime hospitality, Zitkala-Ša promotes a transnational ethics that affirms Native 
American notions of universal kinship. 
 In her fiction, Zitkala-Ša complements these historical accounts of indigenous 
female hospitality by composing texts that feature strong, authoritative female hosts. 
Some of these hosts, like the mother badger in “The Badger and the Bear,” perform acts 
of hospitality in partnership with men. These partnerships are informed by a long 
tradition of complementary sexual relations in Sioux cultures—relations that, as 
numerous scholars have pointed out, promote “mutual obligation and reciprocity among 
male and female members” (Stremlau 266).189 In “The Badger and the Bear,” Zitkala-Ša 
makes it clear that the mother badger and the father badger both play essential roles in the 
production and presentation of hospitality. While the father badger hunts, the mother 
badger performs the equally valuable labor of drying, seasoning, and preserving the meat 
(27). It is the mother badger’s careful and skillful attention to the family’s limited supply 
of meat that affords the badgers the ability to provide visitors with hospitality. 
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Furthermore, Zitkala-Ša emphasizes the importance of the mother badger’s role in the 
presentation of the family’s hospitality through her detailed descriptions of the mother 
badger’s interactions with the bear. Although the bear undoubtedly abuses the hospitality 
he receives from the badgers, he does indicate that the mother badger commands respect 
as a host when he willingly crosses his shins and moves closer to the wall in order to let 
her pass (28). Zitkala-Ša provides us with an analogous vision of complementary sexual 
relations in “Zicha, the Squirrel, and Iktomi” through her account of the squirrels’ 
hospitality. In contrast to Iktomi, who debases his wife by “command[ing]” her to 
perform specified acts of hospitality—“Heat water in the kettle with the red hot stones. 
Have boiling water ready.”—Mr. and Mrs. Zicha proffer their hospitality as equal 
partners (68). Together, they make Iktomi and his family “welcome” in their home and 
provide for them generously, despite the rudeness of their “guests” (66-7). Through both 
the Zichas’ positive example and Iktomi’s negative example, Zitkala-Ša models an ideal 
of hospitality for her readers that is grounded in and reflects Sioux traditions of sexual 
complementarity. 
 On the other hand, Zitkala-Ša also uses her fiction to present her readers with 
examples of women acting independently as hosts. Through these examples, she 
communicates a model of hospitality—and, by extension, of the household—in which 
men play no role in the production or presentation of hospitality. Both her legends and 
short stories regularly feature scenes in which single women welcome guests into their 
homes. In all of these scenes, Zitkala-Ša’s female hosts exhibit sovereignty over their 
homes and great skill as providers of hospitality. In the opening scene of “The Buffalo 
Woman,” the title character welcomes a starving Dakota hunter into her teepee and 
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affords him the hospitality of an honored guest (8). Later, even after the hunter becomes 
the buffalo woman’s husband, he yields “humbly” to her authority (10). Eventually, the 
buffalo woman assumes sovereignty over the hunter’s entire village, among whom she 
commands “great respect” and “rule[s] the people wisely” (9). Similarly, in her 
translation of the well-known legend “The Stone Boy and the Grizzly,” Zitkala-Ša makes 
a point of celebrating the hospitality of the Stone Boy’s single mother.190 In the opening 
scene of her translation, she emphasizes the tenderness and generosity with which the 
Stone Boy’s mother welcomes her “foster son” into her home (42). Later, the Stone Boy 
shows reciprocal appreciation for his mother’s hospitality by returning to live with and 
take care of her during her old age (53-4). 
 Throughout her fiction and non-fiction, Zitkala-Ša further emphasizes the 
redeeming value and originary importance of indigenous female hospitality by 
continually reminding her readers that Mother Nature is the original and indispensable 
host of all things. In her descriptions of Mother Nature, Zitkala-Ša is clear to identify the 
supreme provider both as female and as Indian. Thus, we hear of the abundant generosity 
of “Indian Mother-Nature” and of all that “she” has “brought fourth” on behalf of “the 
people of the earth” (“Indian Gifts” 184). If Mother Nature is both female and Indian, 
then it follows that American hospitality is both originally female and originally Indian. It 
is by recognizing the essential contributions of Mother Nature and of all Native American 
women, Zitkala-Ša suggests, that Americans can learn to appreciate the true nature and 
potential of American hospitality. 
Without question, the most important host in Zitkala-Ša’s writing is her mother, 
Taté I Yóhin Win (Reaches for the Wind). Zitkala-Ša lays the groundwork for her ethics 
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of hospitality through her portrait of her mother in “Impressions of an Indian Childhood” 
(1900). Raising Zitkala-Ša as a single mother, Taté I Yóhin Win provided her daughter 
with a positive and sustainable model of hospitality that centered around the lives and 
contributions of Dakota women. Through her example, Taté I Yóhin Win promoted a 
culture of hospitality that recognized rather than disavowed conditionality, stressed the 
importance of considering and anticipating the needs and desires of others, cultivated 
homosocial bonding among women, valued the sentiments of hosts and guests over and 
above the quality of their performances, and emphasized the vital role that acts of 
hospitality play in promoting intercultural narrative exchange and in sustaining oral 
storytelling cultures. Each of these key features of Taté I Yóhin Win’s hospitality 
emerges as essential to the model of hospitality that Zitkala-Ša promotes in her writing 
and practices in her activism. 
Zitkala-Ša’s recollections of her childhood on the Yankton Sioux Reservation are 
dominated by accounts of her mother’s hospitality. We learn early in “Impressions of an 
Indian Childhood” that hospitality was both a daily occurrence and a valued pastime in 
Taté I Yóhin Win’s home. Zitkala-Ša recalls that strangers passing by were invited to 
“rest” in the family’s wigwam and to “share” in the family’s meals (70-1). In addition, 
she recalls that neighbors from the village were regularly invited to “eat supper” with the 
family and encouraged to stay late into the night recounting “old legends” around the 
campfire (71-2). Yet, in recollecting these scenes of hospitality from her childhood, 
Zitkala-Ša does not feel the need to romanticize her mother’s hospitality by describing it 
as unconditional or categorical. Instead, she openly recognizes the practical limitations of 
Taté I Yóhin Win’s “welcome” (71). She acknowledges, for instance, that strangers could 
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be “sure” of Taté I Yóhin Win’s hospitality “if they but asked a favor” in the name of one 
of her relatives (71). The implication, of course, is that, despite Taté I Yóhin Win’s 
renowned generosity as a host, not all strangers were afforded welcome in her home. 
Zitkala-Ša does not specify under what conditions prospective guests would be turned 
away, but her candid acknowledgment of the conditional nature of her mother’s 
hospitality in “Impressions” anticipates her later emphasis on the importance of 
recognizing the inherently conditional nature of all hospitality. What’s more, by 
composing a positive but practical portrait of her mother as host, Zitkala-Ša provides us 
with a valuable counterexample to the many portraits of hosts in American literature that 
romanticize their subjects by attempting to disavow conditionality altogether. 
In the opening scene of “Impressions of an Indian Childhood,” Zitkala-Ša 
identifies for us the central overriding principle of her mother’s hospitality. Above all, 
Taté I Yóhin Win believed that it was important for a host to be accommodating. We see 
Taté I Yóhin Win practice this principle of hospitality in her approach to offering 
invitations. When proffering invitations, a host should always avoid “intruding [her]self 
upon others” (28). As her mother’s deputy in matters of hospitality, Zitkala-Ša was given 
the task of visiting nearby wigwams to invite neighbors to supper. Per her mother’s 
instructions, she always paused “a moment” outside before entering and issuing her 
mother’s invitations: “Running all the way to the wigwams, I halted shyly at the 
entrances. Sometimes I stood long moments without saying a word” (71). It was not 
“fear” of prospective guests or a desire to “withhold” her mother’s invitations that 
motivated these pauses (71) Rather, the reason for Zitkala-Ša’s hesitation was to make 
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sure that her invitations did not “hinder other plans” (71). “If other plans are being 
discussed,” Zitkala-Ša’s mother told her, “do not interfere, but go elsewhere” (71).  
In her recounting of her childhood invitations, Zitkala-Ša presents an account of 
undecidability that differs markedly from the accounts of undecidability that we 
traditionally see in Western literary scenes of hospitality. Dating back to ancient Greek 
and Roman literature, moments of undecidability in Western scenes of hospitality have 
customarily taken place on the threshold of the host’s home. In these moments, the host 
“hesitates” on the threshold in order to weigh her decision before making a formal offer 
of hospitality (Reece 17). In his work on hospitality, Derrida argues that the moment of 
undecidability in an exchange of hospitality results from the host’s recognition of her 
own otherness in the face of the arriving other. For Derrida, it is the arrival of the other 
on the threshold that prompts the host to experience the “self-interruption” that makes 
ethical decision possible: “. . . as master and host, the self, in welcoming the other, must 
interrupt or divide himself or herself” (“HJR” 81). However, Zitkala-Ša requires us to 
rethink Derrida’s theorizations of undecidability and self-interruption by locating the 
moment of undecidability not on the threshold of the host’s home but on the threshold of 
the prospective guest’s home. In Zitkala-Ša’s narrative, the question of interruption—of 
provoking self-interruption in the other, of interfering with the other’s plans—is not a 
question of whether the arriving other will interrupt the host but of whether the host will 
interrupt the guest by offering hospitality. In her directives to avoid intruding on and 
interfering with the other, Taté I Yóhin Win taught her daughter to consider and 
anticipate the needs and desires of her guest before even engaging in a face-to-face 
encounter with the other. What’s more, she taught Zitkala-Ša that the needs and desires of 
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her prospective guests are just as important—if not, at times, more important—than her 
own needs and desires. In this way, Taté I Yóhin Win used her hospitality not to affirm 
her sovereignty or social standing as a host but, instead, to cultivate community and 
respect among her neighbors.   
Zitkala-Ša’s account of her childhood invitations also works to deconstruct the 
conventionally hierarchical relationship between the host and the guest. The image of the 
young Zitkala-Ša pausing outside a prospective guest’s home to deliver an invitation of 
hospitality reveals the interchangeable relationship between host and guest. Although 
Zitkala-Ša went to offer hospitality to her neighbors, she first had to play the part of the 
guest in order to make her offer known. She had to receive the hospitality of her future 
guests before she could reciprocate that hospitality. Through this example, we come to 
see how cultures of reciprocity are predicated on a recognition of the fundamental 
interchangeability between host and guest. Through the act of hospitality, the host 
interpellates the guest as host. The guest who receives hospitality is always already a 
host, always already obligated to reciprocate what she receives. There is no pure host or 
pure guest; we are always already both.191 
Perhaps the most significant way in which Zitkala-Ša’s account of her mother’s 
hospitality serves as a valuable counterexample to dominant American depictions of 
hospitality is that it portrays exchanges of hospitality as opportunities for cultivating 
homosocial solidarity among women. In “Impressions of an Indian Childhood,” scenes of 
hospitality are populated almost entirely by female characters. In fact, at no point in 
Zitkala-Ša’s narrative of her childhood on the Yankton Sioux Reservation do we witness 
a scene in which a male figure performs the role of host. Male characters appear 
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occasionally, but when they do, Zitkala-Ša never makes them the focus of her 
attention.192 Instead, she focuses her attention on describing the homosocial bonding that 
occurs between and among women while they produce, present, and receive hospitality. 
This is especially the case in Zitkala-Ša’s descriptions of the interactions between her 
mother and her aunt.193 Recounting a scene from her childhood, Zitkala-Ša recalls an 
autumn day when her aunt came to visit in order to help Taté I Yóhin Win preserve foods 
for the winter (81). While helping her sister-in-law prepare for winter meals—meals that 
would feed not only Zitkala-Ša and her mother but also their regular guests—Zitkala-Ša’s 
aunt performed the equally important function of lightening Taté I Yóhin Win’s mood 
through her humor: “It was during my aunt’s visit with us that my mother forgot her 
accustomed quietness, often laughing heartily at some of my aunt’s witty remarks” (81). 
Raising their daughters as single mothers, Taté I Yóhin Win and her sister-in-law relied 
on one another for material assistance and emotional support in carrying out their 
responsibilities as parents and as hosts. But they also relied heavily on the female elders 
of their tiospaye, or extended kinship family, who helped provide a “nurturing, 
communal atmosphere” in which Zitkala-Ša and her cousin Warca-Ziwin could grow and 
mature as Yankton women (Lewandowski 18). In her descriptions of these tribal elders, 
Zitkala-Ša once again notes the important role that scenes of hospitality played in 
providing Yankton women with an occasion to bond through humor. Calling to mind an 
evening from her childhood when her mother had invited guests to sit around the 
campfire and tell stories, she remembers that the “old women made funny remarks, and 
laughed so heartily that [she] could not help joining them” (72). We witness similar 
scenes of homosocial bonding in Zitkala-Ša’s descriptions of her interactions with her 
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childhood “playmates” (75). In one passage, Zitkala-Ša recalls that she and her girlfriends 
often bonded by playacting as their mothers. It is worth noting that in these performances 
the girls impersonated their mothers as hosts engaging in exchange: “I remember well 
how we used to exchange our necklaces, beaded belts, and sometimes even our 
moccasins. We pretended to offer them as gifts to one another. We delighted in 
impersonating our own mothers. We talked of things we had heard them say in their 
conversations. We imitated their various manners, even to the inflection of their voices” 
(75). Through passages such as these, in which Yankton women and girls act as hosts and 
engage in homosocial bonding while performing as hosts, Zitkala-Ša constructs a 
narrative that both normalizes the figure of the indigenous female host and models the 
kind of womanist solidarity that she hopes to inspire among Indian and non-Indian 
women.  
Zitkala-Ša’s accounts of homosocial female hospitality in “Impressions of an 
Indian Childhood” challenge dominant American and dominant Sioux cultures of 
hospitality. Publishing “Impressions” in Atlantic Monthly during the winter of 1900, 
Zitkala-Ša speaks to and critiques both cultures simultaneously. On one hand, she 
undermines traditional American cultures of hospitality by rejecting the socioeconomic 
model around which these cultures are structured: the American nuclear family. This 
rejection of the American nuclear family came at a time when Native Americans were 
under considerable pressure from the federal government to abandon their traditional 
kinship ties. The passage of the Dawes Act in 1887 required Native Americans to accept 
land allotment or suffer the loss of federal rations. Although the Sioux aggressively 
resisted allotment, the reduction of their rations by half during the late 1880s and early 
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1890s eventually forced many to acquiesce (Gibbon 136; Hoover 38-40). By 1896, the 
Yankton Sioux had agreed to sell half of their land to the federal government in exchange 
for individual 160-acre allotments (Hoover 38). 
The effects of allotment on the Yanktons were devastating. In the past, Yankton 
life centered around the collective needs and contributions of the tiospaye. Banded 
together as “one large family,” the multiple households of each tiospaye cooperated 
together to ensure that all members were safe and secure (Zitkala-Ša “The Great Spirit” 
116). This entailed cohesive collaboration “in carrying out the daily chores of 
homemaking, rearing children, celebrating, and worshiping; in caring for the aged; and in 
burying the dead” (Hassrick 107). However, with the forced move to allotment, the 
tiospaye model became unsustainable. In place of kinship networks, Yanktons were 
compelled to settle on their new allotted lands as isolated nuclear families and to rely 
primarily on the federal government rather than one another for hospitality.194 Yet, in her 
autobiographical account of her childhood tiospaye, Zitkala-Ša makes a case for the 
viability of the kinship model in the face of the federal government’s continuing efforts to 
destroy kinship ties. In the process, Zitkala-Ša offers her readers a positive and practical 
alternative to the patriarchalism and heteronormativity of the nuclear family model.  
At the same time, Zitkala-Ša’s positive emphasis on female homosociality in 
“Impressions of an Indian Childhood” undermines strongly held Sioux beliefs in the 
essential values of sexual complementarity. The sustainability of the Sioux kinship 
model—and, by extension, of Sioux cultures of hospitality—depends on the willingness 
of tribal members to accept and perform complementary roles within the community 
(Stremlau 265-68). Although the complementary roles customarily ascribed to men and 
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women were viewed as equally valuable, there still existed a clear differentiation between 
the kind of work expected of men and that of women (Wingred 13-4, 42-3; Gibbon 72-4; 
Albers 17-8). By presenting her readers with a positive account of a tiospaye that is 
sustained largely through the contributions and collaborations of women, Zitkala-Ša 
challenges the logic of sexual complementarity. Not only, Zitkala-Ša suggests, are Native 
American women capable of producing and presenting hospitality without the assistance 
of men, but they are also more than capable of performing the work necessary to sustain a 
community on their own. 
While engaging in a critique of the socially constructed roles assigned to men and 
women in exchanges of hospitality, Zitkala-Ša recognizes the inherently performative 
nature of all exchange. We see her foreground performance in her description of the 
playacting that she and her girlfriends engaged in as children (75). It is by 
“impersonating” their mothers that the young girls learned to perform as hosts (75). But 
Zitkala-Ša also makes clear that she was raised to believe that the quality of a person’s 
performance in an exchange of hospitality is less important than the sentiment that 
inspires their performance. In “Impressions,” she recalls a summer afternoon from her 
childhood when she was left alone at home and faced with the challenge of having to 
welcome a guest into her mother’s wigwam on her own. When an “old grandfather” of 
the tribe arrives unexpectedly in search of her mother, Zitkala-Ša understands that it is 
her responsibility “to play the part of a generous hostess” (78). Although she has never 
made coffee before, she turns to her mother’s coffeepot and attempts to reproduce the 
actions that she has seen her mother carry out so many times before. However, despite 
her best efforts, the coffee she produces turns out to be no more appetizing than “muddy 
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warm water” (78). Ashamed by the poor quality of the coffee, the young Zitkala-Ša is 
surprised when the old grandfather compliments her on her “performance” (78). Rather 
than “embarrass” Zitkala-Ša, the old man shows “the utmost respect” for the sincerity of 
sentiment that motivated her act of “hospitality” (79). Through this example, Zitkala-Ša 
promotes an ethics that recognizes both the positive value and the limited importance of 
performance in exchanges of hospitality. Just as she chooses not to disavow 
conditionality in her accounts of her mother’s hospitality, she chooses not to disavow 
performativity in her accounts of her own hospitality. In this way, she provides us with a 
model of hospitality that is noticeably different from dominant American models that 
attempt to disavow both conditionality and performativity by stubbornly insisting on their 
own unconditionality and genuineness.  
The final important feature of Zitkala-Ša’s account of her mother’s hospitality is 
her emphasis on the vital role that acts of hospitality play in promoting intercultural 
narrative exchange and in sustaining oral storytelling cultures. In “Impressions,” Zitkala-
Ša describes hospitality as the precondition of narrative exchange in oral storytelling 
cultures. When recounting stories about the hospitality that her mother offered to 
strangers, Zitkala-Ša notes that she enjoyed these visits because they afforded her 
opportunities to hear peoples from other places and cultures “relate” stories about their 
lives (71). It was through these childhood encounters with strangers that Zitkala-Ša 
learned to appreciate the abiding value of intercultural narrative exchange. Isolated on the 
Yankton Reservation, the stories of strangers were her only way of learning about life 
away from home and developing connections with non-Dakotans. Ultimately, however, 
the young Zitkala-Ša “loved best” the evenings during her childhood when neighbors 
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from the village would gather around her mother’s fire and recount “old legends” (71). 
Lying in her mother’s lap, Zitkala-Ša absorbed herself in the voices of the storytellers, 
“eagerly listening to every word” (72). Focusing on the aural aspects of these scenes in 
her retelling, Zitkala-Ša integrates into her narrative what Gerald Vizenor has called 
“native presence” (Vizenor 63-66). Aware that the immediate presence of oral 
storytelling is unavailable to her reader, she makes the scene of oral storytelling present 
on the page. She conveys to the reader traces of her original experience through detailed 
descriptions of the sights and sounds that she recalls from childhood: “the distant howling 
of a pack of wolves”; “the hooting of an owl”; “the stars as they peeped down” from the 
night sky; “the bright flames” of fire on the “faces of the old folks” (72). Perhaps most 
importantly, Zitkala-Ša emphasizes how these scenes of hospitality from her childhood 
helped sustain Dakota culture by facilitating the continued circulation of tribal legends 
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Chapter Four 
 
Louise Erdrich and Michael Dorris’s The Crown of Columbus: 
Settler Colonial Narratives of Hospitality and The Politics of Recognition 
 
 Almost one hundred years after Zitkala-Ša spoke at Earlham College as an 
undergraduate and drew attention to a suppressed history of Native American hospitality 
to early Europeans, Louise Erdrich and Michael Dorris draw on this same suppressed 
history to highlight the formative role that settler colonial narratives of hospitality play in 
enabling and perpetuating a settler colonial politics of recognition. Through analysis of 
Erdrich and Dorris’s collaborative novel The Crown of Columbus (1991), this chapter 
shows how settler colonial regimes use false discourses of hospitality to disguise acts of 
oppression as acts of recognition. It reads The Crown of Columbus as a critique of Euro-
American settler colonial discourses of hospitality dating back to Columbus. In addition, 
it suggests that this critique doubles as a self-reflexive critique of Erdrich and Dorris’s 
own writing collaboration. In making this claim, this chapter argues that Erdrich and 
Dorris use self-referential metaphors in The Crown of Columbus to figure their own 
writing partnership as a colonial relationship and to reveal the ways in which they use 
false discourses of hospitality to disavow the colonial nature of their collaboration. In the 
process, it establishes a theoretical foundation for thinking about acts of literary 
collaboration as acts of hospitality and colonization. Finally, this chapter reads The 
Crown of Columbus as a narrative of survivance through which Erdrich asserts her 
authorial presence by resisting Dorris’s attempts at simulating colonial domination. 
I conclude this dissertation with a reading of Erdrich and Dorris’s The Crown of 
Columbus because it is a novel that invites us to think critically about the underlying 
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tensions that inform narratives of hospitality, especially American narratives of 
hospitality. The Crown of Columbus is a text that entertains liberal utopian narratives 
about American hospitality but ultimately abandons these narratives after acknowledging 
the inherent limitations and historical contradictions of American policies and practices. 
It is a text that reminds us that stories of hospitality are always in some way stories about 
repression and disavowal. In this sense, The Crown of Columbus refers us back to 
previous discussions in this dissertation about the appeals and hazards of utopian 
narratives of hospitality. Erdrich and Dorris echo Steinbeck in contemplating a utopian 
vision of an “America” capable of and willing to offer equal welcome to all peoples. Yet, 
like Steinbeck, they discard this vision as false and ultimately dangerous. At the same 
time, The Crown of Columbus, like other texts previously discussed in this dissertation, is 
at times complicit in perpetuating and licensing a liberal politics of recognition that relies 
on false discourses of hospitality to dispossess and exploit racialized, gendered, and 
classed others. For, as we shall see, Erdrich and Dorris do not wholly reject liberal 
utopian visions of recognition and hospitality in The Crown of Columbus. They simply 
fail to actually envision them. 
I 
 Since its publication in 1991, Erdrich and Dorris’s The Crown of Columbus has 
been both celebrated and condemned for embracing a liberal multicultural politics of 
recognition. On one hand, a number of scholars have lauded The Crown of Columbus as a 
novel that that uses a liberal multicultural paradigm of recognition to imagine utopian 
relations between Natives and non-Natives in the United States. Teresa Cid, for example, 
praises Erdrich and Dorris for achieving in The Crown of Columbus a “utopian vision” 
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that affirms the “multicultural” value of “inclusion” by depicting characters who 
“recognize” in racialized “other[s]” the potential of “never-ending dialogue” (347-49).195 
Like Cid, Susan Farrell rejoices in the novel’s “celebration” of liberal multiculturalism, 
contending that Erdrich and Dorris use scenes of political and cultural recognition to 
“show” that liberal multiculturalism is “not incompatible with traditional Indian thought” 
(127). Katalin Bíróné Nagy has recently echoed Farrell’s conclusions, interpreting scenes 
of recognition between Natives and non-Natives in the novel as interracial “healing 
ceremonies” and as signs that Erdrich and Dorris foresaw in the early 1990s the coming 
of a “new, more promising age for the race of Native Americans” (201).196  
 On the other hand, several critics have taken issue with Erdrich and Dorris’s 
apparent celebration of liberal multiculturalism in The Crown of Columbus. These critics 
have denounced the novel as an endorsement of political accommodation and cultural 
assimilation. Deborah Madsen decries The Crown of Columbus as a “fictional validation 
of American multiculturalism” and argues that the novel promotes “assimilation and 
reintegration into the contemporary American multiculture” (81). Hans Bak accuses 
Erdrich and Dorris of attempting to “soothe and pacif[y] white Western guilt” by 
“romanticiz[ing]” the possibility of achieving “historical retribution” for Native 
Americans through acts of political recognition (113). “Insofar as The Crown of 
Columbus invites us to seriously entertain this possibility,” Bak adds, “it would seem to 
subvert its credibility of purpose and intent” (112). Reiterating the objections of Madsen 
and Bak, Helen Hoy suggests that the novel’s “utopic” vision of liberal multiculturalism 
“risk[s] reinscribing a Eurocentric worldview” (54). 
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 Most critics of the novel’s politics have focused their attention on the concluding 
scenes during which the novel’s main characters, both Native and non-Native, appear to 
accept and overcome their differences. Whereas Bíróné Nagy and Quantic have 
celebrated these scenes as moments of “healing” and “radical change,” others have 
attacked them as “overly conciliatory” and “uncomfortably formulaic” (Freccero 17; 
Washburn 43). Confused by what they see as Erdrich and Dorris’s embrace of liberal 
multiculturalism in the novel’s final scenes, critics have interpreted the conclusion to The 
Crown of Columbus as “paradoxical” and “contrived,” as at odds with the rest of the 
novel and “distinctly commercial” in its “sentimental” depiction of “neat closure” 
(Jaimes 59; Breinig 339; Kakutani C25; Freccero 17). Some have gone as far as to 
suggest that Erdrich and Dorris’s apparent turn to liberal multiculturalism at the novel’s 
end amounts to a “pandering of their art” (Jaimes 59). 
 In a number of important ways, the mixed critical reception of The Crown of 
Columbus is a symptom of the novel’s own contradictory politics. Erdrich and Dorris’s 
novel does at times envision liberal multicultural forms of recognition as utopian 
solutions to the challenges that exist between Natives and non-Natives in the United 
States. After all, the events of the novel do center around a Native American woman’s 
attempt to achieve political recognition for all Native peoples in North America. When 
Vivian Twostar, an Assistant Professor of Native American Studies at Dartmouth 
College, discovers a clue that points to the location of the lost logbook from Christopher 
Columbus’s first voyage to North America, she embarks on a journey to find the logbook. 
This journey eventually leads to Eleuthera, a small island in the Bahamas where 
Columbus visited in 1492. In her search to find Columbus’s Diario, Vivian seeks to 
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produce “incontrovertible evidence” that would require the U.S. government to 
“recognize” Native Americans as rightful sovereigns of North American lands (269, 
204). When she imagines attaining official state recognition for Native Americans, 
Vivian envisions a utopian scene in which the U.S. Supreme Court “recognize[s]” the 
“full right” of “every native tribe and nation” to “govern” themselves (226, 204). It is 
through scenes of political recognition such as this, Vivian believes, that Native 
Americans will ultimately achieve the “overdue justice” they deserve (149). 
 Yet, despite the overriding focus of the novel’s plot on achieving official state 
recognition for Native Americans, The Crown of Columbus is generally critical of liberal 
forms of political recognition. Although Vivian does ultimately track down Columbus’s 
lost Diario and discovers within it a passage in which the Admiral openly acknowledges 
the sovereignty of a Native American king, her discovery does not result in any political 
recognition for Native Americans. In the novel’s final pages, we learn that the recovered 
Diario contains “material for a plethora of legal approaches under international law, 
issues of aboriginal claim and sovereignty, of premeditated fraud” (375). The “prospects” 
for legal “victories” are, we are told, “better than anyone would have expected” (375). 
Yet, Erdrich and Dorris do not depict these “victories” in the novel. They never actually 
narrate for us the scenes of political recognition that Vivian works so hard to achieve. 
Accordingly, political recognition for Native Americans remains just as prospective at the 
end of the novel as it does at the beginning. What’s more, Erdrich and Dorris spend no 
time in the novel identifying the actual effects that official state recognition would have 
on the daily lives of indigenous peoples. Any depiction of equal rights and treatment for 
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indigenous peoples in American society remain conspicuously absent from the pages of 
the novel.  
 Rather than embrace the liberal multicultural vision of official state recognition 
that Vivian seeks in the opening chapters of the novel, The Crown of Columbus 
ultimately engages in a concerted, if at times contradictory, critique of liberal 
multiculturalism. Rethinking the liberal multicultural paradigm of recognition through a 
theoretical lens of hospitality, the novel reveals how settler colonial regimes use false 
discourses of hospitality to disguise acts of oppression as acts of recognition and how 
indigenous peoples can and do employ discourses of hospitality to expose, critique, and 
resist the oppression they face.  
II 
 The first chapters of The Crown of Columbus establish a direct relationship 
between settler colonial narratives of hospitality and the colonial politics of recognition. 
Erdrich and Dorris establish this relationship by showing how settler colonial narratives 
of hospitality employ a false politics of recognition to justify and disavow acts of 
displacement, dispossession, and exploitation. Reading acts of colonial recognition 
through a framework of hospitality, Erdrich and Dorris identify acts of recognition, 
misrecognition, and nonrecognition as acts of hospitality, false hospitality, and withheld 
hospitality. They establish these parallels in the early chapters of The Crown of Columbus 
by citing and analyzing passages from Christopher Columbus’s own writing. For 
example, in the novel’s opening chapter, Erdrich and Dorris include a lengthy epigraph 
from Bartholomé de las Casas’s transcription of The Diario of Christopher Columbus’s 
First Voyage to America, which Las Casas claimed was a partly summarized and partly 
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quoted version of Columbus’s original diary.197 The famous passage, which recounts 
Columbus’s arrival in “America” and the formal declarations that he makes in claiming 
sovereignty in the “New World” on behalf of the Spanish Crown, represents for Erdrich 
and Dorris the original scene of misrecognition in Euro-American settler colonial 
discourse:  
The Admiral went ashore in the armed launch, and Martín Alonso Pinzón and his 
brother Vincente Anes, who was captain of the Niña. The Admiral brought out the 
royal banner and the captains two flags with the green cross, which the Admiral 
carried on all the ships as a standard, with an F and a Y, and over each letter a 
crown, one on one side of the U and the other on the other. Thus put ashore they 
saw very green trees and many ponds and fruits of various kinds. The Admiral 
called to the two captains and to the others who had jumped ashore and to 
Rodrigo Descobedo, the escrivano of the whole fleet, and to Rodrigo Sánchez de 
Segovia; and he said that they should be witnesses that, in the presence of all, he 
would take, as in fact he did take, possession of the said island for the king and 
for the queen his lords, making the declarations that were required, and which at 
more length are contained in the testimonials made there in writing. (5)198 
The inclusion of this passage in the opening chapter of The Crown of Columbus serves a 
number of important functions. First, it reminds us of the central importance that 
Columbus’s written narrative of his “discovery” had for the settler colonial project in 
North America. Columbus’s written records of his arrival in North America were largely 
responsible for granting legitimacy to Ferdinand and Isabella’s claim to sovereignty in 
the New World. Fully aware of this, Columbus takes great care, both in his Diario and in 
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his widely disseminated letters announcing his discovery, to confer legitimacy on his 
narrative by noting that his written account is based on the meticulous records taken at 
the scene by the fleet’s official scribe.199 Likewise recognizing the importance of 
Columbus’s written account of the discovery, Las Casas makes direct reference in this 
passage to the Admiral’s famed letters announcing his discovery (“the testimonials made 
there in writing”). Columbus’s letters, addressed to Luis de Santángel and Rafael Sánchez 
(officials of the Crown of Aragón who helped facilitate Columbus’s voyage to America), 
were immediately translated into three languages and circulated widely throughout 
Europe (Zamora 1).200 So effective was the Spanish Crown’s circulation campaign in the 
month’s following Columbus’s discovery that to this day Columbus’s account of the 
discovery in his letters serves as the dominant narrative of his arrival in America.  
 Together with Las Casas’s transcription of The Diario, the Santángel and Sánchez 
letters created a paradigm of Euro-American settler colonial discourse that is still 
employed widely today. Following this paradigm, settler colonial regimes use false 
narratives of hospitality to disavow acts of dispossession, displacement, and exploitation 
while claiming sovereignty over Indian lands, resources, and peoples. Columbus’s false 
narrative of hospitality in The Diario and letters centers around two false recognition 
claims. First, Columbus claims that indigenous Americans recognize Spanish sovereignty 
by showing “no opposition” to his royal proclamation. In his letter to Santángel, 
Columbus writes, “I found very many islands with large populations and took possession 
of them all for their Highnesses; this I did by proclamation and unfurled the royal 
standard. No opposition was offered” (Cohen 115; emphasis added).201 Second, 
Columbus claims, in turn, to recognize the agency of indigenous Americans by 
    192 
suggesting that they are given the opportunity to oppose his proclamation and choose not 
to. Of course, even if Native Americans were present at the time that Columbus made his 
royal proclamation, they would very possibly not recognize the ceremony taking place as 
a formal claim to occupation, nor would they be able to voice their opposition in a 
language that Columbus and his crew could readily understand.202 Accordingly, as 
Stephen Greenblatt has pointed out, the formal declarations of possession cited by 
Columbus in his Diario and in his letters announcing the discovery are “infelicitious” 
performatives, speech acts that formally announce the presence of the other but 
simultaneously deny the other the ability to contradict possession (Greenblatt 65).203 In 
truth, Columbus’s renowned announcement of discovery is a performative trick that relies 
on pretenses of recognition for its legitimacy. 
 Erdrich and Dorris link Columbus’s false recognition claims to his false 
hospitality claims by also including in the epigraph cited above the passage in the Las 
Casas Diario that immediately follows Columbus’s announcement of his discovery: 
Soon many people of the island gathered there. What follows are the very words 
of the Admiral in his book about his first voyage to, and the discovery of these 
Indies. 
 I, he says, in order that they would be friendly to us—because I recognized 
that they were people who would be better freed [from error] and converted to 
our Holy Faith by love than by force—to some of them I gave red caps, and glass 
beads which they put on their chests, and many other things of small value, in 
which they took so much pleasure and became so much our friends that it was a 
marvel. Later they came swimming to the ships’ launches where we were and 
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brought us parrots and cotton thread in balls and javelins and many other things, 
and they traded them to us for other things which we gave them, such as small 
glass beads and bells. In sum, they took everything and gave of what they had 
very willingly. But it seemed to me that they were a people very poor in 
everything. (5) 
Here, we see how Columbus uses acts of hospitality and narratives of hospitality to 
demonstrate power and claim superiority over indigenous peoples. In The Crown of 
Columbus, Vivian’s son, Nash, observes that Columbus arrived in America with “an 
attitude, a power attitude,” and that he “imposed it” on Native Americans (112). Later, 
building on Nash’s observation, Vivian identifies discourses of hospitality in Columbus’s 
writing as “the vocabulary of the colonizer” (200). It is in passages like the one above 
that we can most clearly see Columbus using discourses of hospitality as a colonizing 
vocabulary and doing so with the specific purpose of imposing power over Natives. In his 
account of his very first interactions with Native Americans, Columbus self-consciously 
figures himself as a host who gives generously and confers “pleasure” through his giving. 
He employs this tropology repeatedly in The Diario, continually figuring himself as a 
generous host and indigenous Americans as grateful guests. In another passage from The 
Diario quoted by Erdrich and Dorris later in The Crown of Columbus, Columbus recounts 
how Natives “received” his “gifts with a solemn courtesy” (204). Through this repeated 
tropology, Columbus establishes himself as a man recognized by Native Americans as a 
rightful host who is accorded respect and appreciation for his hospitality. In turn, he uses 
the host status that Natives confer on him in his own narrative to legitimize his false 
recognition and hospitality claims.  
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 Notably, Columbus’s narrative of his hospitality in the New World is predicated 
on a disavowal of prior Indian sovereignty. In order to figure himself as a host, Columbus 
must deny Indians their rightful claims to host status. Although, as we see above, 
Columbus occasionally figures Indians as hosts in The Diario, he always emphasizes the 
conditional quality of their hospitality. Natives in The Diario often give “very willingly” 
in exchange for Columbus’s hospitality, but what they have to give, Columbus tells us 
repeatedly, is always “very poor” in comparison. To Columbus, European hosts are 
naturally superior to Indian hosts, who are handicapped by their own ignorance and 
poverty. The fact that Indians are native to the land and possess prior rights to 
sovereignty over the land and its resources is invalidated, in Columbus’s view, by the 
Natives’ failure to use the land and its resources to their fullest potential. But, even more 
importantly, Columbus believes that Indian hospitality is ultimately deficient because the 
Natives are unable to give and provide the one thing that the Admiral values most: 
Christianity. According to Columbus, nothing that the indigenous peoples can supply him 
and his crew in return for their hospitality is commensurate with the “Holy Faith” that 
Columbus and his fellow Christians can provide them. Next to the incommensurable gift 
of Christianity, everything that Native Americans can give “counts for nothing,” 
Columbus writes in The Diario (127). Through this logic, Columbus depicts Indians in 
The Diario as parasites who gratefully and eagerly take the incommensurable gift of 
Christianity without being able to adequately reciprocate the hospitality they receive.204 
In this way, Columbus’s narrative of discovery works both to erase the truth of prior 
Indian sovereignty and to portray Indians as parasites feeding off the superior hospitality 
of Europeans. In The Crown of Columbus, Erdrich and Dorris continually return to 
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passages from The Diario in which Columbus employs tropes of hospitality to portray 
himself as a host and Natives as guests. In returning to these passages, they reiterate and 
expand on the forms of erasure and disavowal that Columbus’s colonizing vocabulary of 
hospitality performs for the settler colonial project. 
III 
 In addition to recalling how Columbus used false narratives of hospitality to 
justify and disavow settler colonial oppression during the late fifteenth century, The 
Crown of Columbus also reveals the ways in which contemporary settler colonial regimes 
utilize false discourses of hospitality for the same purposes and to the same effects. In 
telling Vivian’s contemporary story, Erdrich and Dorris show how the paradigm of settler 
colonial discourse that Columbus established over five hundred years ago is still 
employed today to excuse and deny the displacement, dispossession, and exploitation of 
Native Americans. In The Crown of Columbus, Erdrich and Dorris focus their critique of 
contemporary settler colonialism on the specific context of American academia. In doing 
so, they treat the institutions of American higher education as a microcosm of 
contemporary American settler colonialism. 
As a Native American academic, Vivian knows first-hand how American 
academic institutions use false discourses of hospitality to contain and circumscribe 
Native scholars. In the first chapter of The Crown of Columbus, we learn that Vivian has 
been “invited” by the Dartmouth alumni magazine to write an article on Christopher 
Columbus for a special issue celebrating the quincentenary of the Admiral’s discovery 
(53). Yet, it quickly becomes clear that the magazine editor’s invitation is an act of false 
hospitality. The offer entails a number of conditions, some explicit and others implicit, all 
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of which ultimately serve to reinforce the colonial character of Vivian’s relationship to 
the College and to the academy at large. The editor of the magazine makes clear that 
Vivian’s article should be written from “the” Native American “perspective” (12).205 
When Vivian tries to explain that not all Native Americans have the same “perspective” 
on Columbus (that, for example, her Indian heritage is Navajo and “Columbus never got 
near” the American Southwest), the editor insists that Vivian has to write the article 
because no one else on the Dartmouth campus “could do the subject equal justice” (13). 
As the only “aboriginal” member of the Dartmouth faculty, Vivian possesses minority 
credentials that make her uniquely marketable to the College (14). 
By inviting Vivian to write an article on Columbus for the alumni magazine, the 
College uses a pretense of hospitality to commodify these minority credentials. It 
attempts to profit off its exploitation of Vivian’s marginal and contingent status. What’s 
more, it further ghettoizes her scholarship and her position within the academy. Although 
Vivian has “other interests” she would like to pursue as a scholar, she agrees to write the 
article because she has “no choice” but to conform to an academic market that feeds off 
the compartmentalization of her scholarship (11-4).206 In the final year of her tenure 
review at Dartmouth, Vivian cannot afford to turn down an invitation to publish, 
especially one proffered by the College. As she herself reasons, “Even the house organ 
was a publication, and in this year of career decision, everything counted” (13).207 Fully 
aware of Vivian’s contingent status, the magazine editor treats his request as an invitation 
proffered on her behalf (10). But, to Vivian, the request feels more like an “order,” one 
that does not reflect any genuine effort on the part of the editor to recognize or affirm her 
individual perspective on Columbus or the Admiral’s complicated legacy (10). 
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 Erdrich and Dorris further demonstrate the role that a colonial politics of 
recognition plays in circumscribing Vivian’s academic status by figuring the physical 
space of Dartmouth Library as a metaphor for the conditional hospitality offered by 
American academic institutions to indigenous scholars. In the first chapter of The Crown 
of Columbus, Vivian arrives at Dartmouth Library in search of scholarship on Columbus 
for her article in the alumni magazine. However, when she inserts her faculty ID into the 
library’s automated entrance, she is met with the flashing words “No Admit” (14). With 
the help of a graduate student “sentinel,” Vivian eventually manages to recertify her ID, 
only to then find that her nine-month-pregnant body does not fit through the now-open 
entryway (14-6). Unable to squeeze through the entrance, Vivian is forced to enter the 
library through “the exit,” what she describes in her first-person narration as “a door of a 
more accommodating breadth” (16). 
Although we have no reason to believe that Vivian’s ID fails at the library 
entrance for any reason other than that it is simply time for it to be renewed, the symbolic 
implications of the moment of rejection are clear. As a Native American woman, Vivian 
is a marginal and contingent figure at the College and in the academy. She is a 
conditional guest in the halls of white male scholarship, an outsider who must continually 
reestablish her credentials and renew her claims to membership. The colonial politics that 
superintend Vivian’s conditional status are systemic and institutionalized, part of the 
everyday operations of the College, endemic to the comings and goings of faculty, 
students, and staff on campus. The student “sentinel” who polices Vivian’s entrance and 
recertifies her ID is an embodiment of these institutional operations. Moreover, Vivian’s 
entrance through the exit of the library symbolizes the individual and collective 
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accommodations that racialized and gendered academics are compelled to make on a 
daily basis in order to be welcomed into academic spaces, both physical and 
metaphorical. Just as the editor of the alumni magazine creates the impression that he is 
accommodating Vivian’s needs by providing her with an opportunity to publish, the 
graduate student guarding the library entrance treats the lengthy process of granting 
Vivian access to the library as a series of accommodations carried out on Vivian’s behalf. 
And Vivian’s own reference to the library’s exit as a “door of a more accommodating 
breadth,” as well as her unwillingness to admit to the library staff how long it has actually 
been since she last visited the library, seems to suggest that Vivian has, at least in part, 
internalized the colonial politics by way of which her own accommodations go 
unrecognized and the perceived accommodations of the College receive public acclaim. 
 As her entrance through the library’s exit suggests, Vivian’s Native female body 
conditions the hospitality she receives as an academic. When Vivian enters Dartmouth 
Library, she enters a space already claimed and dominated by white men. Not 
insignificantly, one of the most prominent of these white men, Roger Williams, is the 
estranged father of Vivian’s unborn child. Roger, a Full Professor at Dartmouth and a 
self-described “WASP,” is a celebrated narrative poet and a world-renowned expert on 
Columbus (16, 165). In his own work on Columbus, Roger dedicates himself to 
preserving the dominant white male narrative of New World discovery (263-65). Thus, 
Vivian’s prospective article on Columbus, though published for a college alumni 
magazine, represents to Roger a potential threat to the dominant narrative he seeks to 
uphold. Moreover, for Roger, who is very proud of the fact that he possesses a “cross-
hatched New England pedigree dating back to the seventeenth century,” Vivian’s 
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pregnant body represents a contamination of his pure white Anglo-Saxon Protestant 
bloodline (57). Her presence in the library, therefore, doubles as a threat both to his 
scholarship and to his pure bloodline. 
 Signs of the colonial circumscription of Vivian’s scholarship emerge immediately 
upon her arrival at the stacks of Dartmouth Library. When Vivian begins searching the 
stacks, she finds that all of the “important books” on Columbus are missing (16). The 
reason for all of the missing titles, we soon learn, is that Roger has already checked them 
out of the library (16). Trespassing on Roger’s scholarly “turf,” Vivian is limited by 
Roger’s prior claims to the territory of Columbian scholarship (16). She could, as she 
notes, recall the titles already checked out by Roger, but this act would, in itself, suggest 
that she had to infringe on Roger’s scholarship in order to produce her own (21). The 
very fact that Vivian’s predicament presents itself to her in these terms is further evidence 
that she has internalized the academy’s colonial politics. Either way, the titles missing 
from the shelves clearly signify the challenges that Vivian faces as a Native American 
woman attempting to intervene into a scholarly conversation that has been going on 
between and among white men for centuries. 
Yet, rather than dwell on these challenges, Erdrich and Dorris use their account of 
Vivian’s visit to the library as an opportunity to show how colonial constraints on Native 
scholarship can have the positive effect of encouraging Native scholars to explore new 
and innovative lines of inquiry. Forced to select from among the remaining titles on the 
shelves, Vivian begins leafing through alternative histories of the contact period—
histories that rethink familiar stories from new perspectives and present fresh arguments 
inspired by these new perspectives (16-25).208 Reading these alternative histories, Vivian 
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revisits and reconsiders a number of aspects of Columbus’s biography, including his 
early career as a mariner, his motivations for crossing the Atlantic, and his ambiguous 
religious affiliations (16-25). Ultimately, we find that the limited number of canonical 
titles available to Vivian reinforces her inclination to think unconventionally about 
Columbus. Accordingly, although Roger’s prior claims to the territory of Columbian 
scholarship appear at first to limit Vivian’s research, these limitations help free her up to 
think creatively. As we will later see, it is by approaching the subject of Columbus from a 
number of different marginalized and underrepresented perspectives that Vivian is able to 
deconstruct the ways in which colonial powers use pretenses of hospitality to demonstrate 
power over and circumscribe the lives of Native peoples, especially Native women. 
IV 
 Erdrich and Dorris do not limit their critique of contemporary American settler 
colonial discourses of hospitality to their account of the false hospitality offered by 
Dartmouth College to Vivian. The primary target of Erdrich and Dorris’s critique of 
settler colonialism in The Crown of Columbus is a wealthy Dartmouth alumnus named 
Henry Cobb who lures Vivian and Roger down to his beach cottage on the Caribbean 
island of Eleuthera with the promise of granting them access to an original copy of 
Columbus’s long-lost Diario. Like Roger, Cobb is a WASP from an old New England 
family who feels that his ancestry entitles him to certain privileges and courtesies. In 
inviting Vivian and Roger down to Eleuthera, Cobb hopes that his guests will help him 
use the text of The Diario to locate a long-lost, priceless crown that Columbus reportedly 
brought with him to the West Indies (192-98). Because his family has been in possession 
of the Columbus Diario for centuries, Cobb believes that he is entitled to the crown and 
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its riches, despite the fact that Columbus originally imagined it as a “gift” for Native 
Americans (187). He cares not at all about the historical significance of The Diario or the 
political implications of the document for indigenous peoples in North America. “I don’t 
give a fuck about Columbus. But he’s got something that belongs to me, and I need it,” 
he tells Vivian (191). 
 In the end, it is Cobb’s false hospitality that most clearly distinguishes him as a 
settler colonial figure in the novel. Like Columbus before him, Cobb attempts to use 
pretenses of hospitality to exploit Native Americans. Erdrich and Dorris deliberately 
figure Cobb’s encounter with Vivian in Eleuthera as a contemporary analogy to 
Columbus’s encounter with Native Americans five hundred years prior. From the very 
start, Erdrich and Dorris use tropes of hospitality to figure Cobb as a false host. Vivian’s 
first contact from Cobb comes in the form of a formal invitation of hospitality. From 
Eleuthera via Western Union, Cobb wires Vivian the following message: “I await your 
arrival. STOP. Advise flight number and date. STOP. Guesthouse at your disposal for 
duration of stay. STOP” (128).209 Before she leaves for Eleuthera, Vivian very clearly 
figures her relationship to Cobb as a relationship of hospitality between an invited guest 
and an inviting host. Reasoning that “a kind of reciprocal obligation for decency went 
into effect once hospitality or kindness was accepted,” Vivian asks Cobb what she, as a 
“guest,” can bring him from the mainland to thank him for his hospitality (155-56). After 
a brief discussion, they end up settling on a copy of The Wall Street Journal, which 
Vivian hands to Cobb as soon as she arrives on the island (156, 187). 
 When Vivian arrives in Eleuthera, both she and Cobb persist in characterizing and 
treating their relationship as a relationship of hospitality. Cobb continually reminds 
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Vivian that he has “invited” her to stay with him (191, 195, 293-94). For her part, Vivian 
reiterates this fact, addressing Cobb as her “host” and referring to herself as his “guest” 
(217, 253, 271). Through their repeated use of tropes of hospitality, Vivian and Cobb 
maintain the pretense that their encounter is civil and mutually beneficial. At first, Cobb 
plays his part well, performing the role of host with admirable “civility” and “politeness” 
(191, 233). But when he learns that Vivian is not willing to give him what he wants 
without receiving anything of value in return, his “veneer of politeness” dissolves and his 
“manners” become “sloppy” (192, 233). With Cobb’s “mask” suddenly removed, it 
becomes clear that all of his displays of civility and politeness have been just “phony 
hospitality” designed to lure Vivian into a false sense of friendship and security (209).210 
 Cobb’s example serves as a reminder that Columbus’s model of settler 
colonialism is still alive and well in North America. Like Columbus, Cobb acts as a host 
on lands where he is not native. Although he is relatively new to Eleuthera, Cobb acts as 
though the island, its people, and its resources are his to dominate and control.211 And, 
like Columbus, he justifies his colonization of the island by reasoning that the local 
population is too ignorant and inept to appreciate and utilize the island and its resources 
themselves. “These people don’t believe in work. They won’t even plant a few seeds,” he 
tells Vivian when she first arrives (187). As far as Columbus’s priceless crown is 
concerned, Cobb claims that he is entitled to ownership of it because Native Americans, 
like Vivian, are too ignorant not only to locate it but also to appreciate it once they’ve 
found it. Thus, he tries to convince Vivian that she is powerless to find and claim the 
crown in the face of his superior intelligence and wherewithal: “You have no idea how to 
use what you’ve got, but I do. So let’s deal” (187). Ultimately, Cobb represents a 
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powerful element in contemporary American society that profits off Native American 
lands and resources while pretending to engage in fair and mutually beneficial relations 
with Natives. Yet, as we shall see, Vivian’s engagements with Cobb also show how 
Native Americans can expose and resist the false hospitality of settler colonial figures 
like Cobb. 
V 
Interviewed about The Crown of Columbus in 1991, Dorris explained that he and 
Erdrich wanted to use Columbus as a “metaphor for contact between people and cultures” 
(Smith 77; qtd. in Nagy 187). Erdrich and Dorris achieve this objective by figuring 
Columbus as an exemplar of settler colonial hospitality and then establishing Henry Cobb 
and Roger Williams as contemporary representatives of Columbus’s brand of settler 
colonialism. Through the metaphor of Columbus, we come to see Cobb and Williams not 
merely as settler colonialists but as settler colonial hosts.  
The analogies between Roger Williams and Columbus are impossible to miss. 
Early in The Crown of Columbus, Vivian establishes a link between Roger and Columbus 
when, in response to her mother’s accusations of sexual promiscuity, she half-jokingly 
describes Roger’s relationship to her as analogous to Columbus’s relationship to his 
“mistress,” Beatrice de Peraza y Bobadilla: “Roger as Columbus. Me as Beatriz Peraza” 
(112).212 As the novel progresses, the analogies between Roger and Columbus come 
regularly and are similarly transparent. When, a few chapters later, Roger requests that 
Vivian welcome him to the Bahamas wearing a hula skirt and a lei around her neck, she 
responds, with obvious reference to the historical memory of Columbus, “Wrong island . 
. . Wrong ocean, wrong direction” (169). When Roger eventually arrives in the Bahamas 
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by boat (in contrast to Vivian who arrives by plane), he is clear to point out that his 
“method of transportation” affords him an experience that is “parallel” to the “Admiral’s 
own voyage” (174). And, like Columbus before him, Roger is determined to “claim” the 
“honor” of being the first on his boat to “sight” land (183-86). Yet, also like Columbus, 
Roger is “looking the wrong way” when the island of Eleuthera first becomes visible 
(183).  
 In addition to providing these obvious parallels between Roger and Columbus, 
Erdrich and Dorris establish Roger as a settler colonial figure by portraying him as a 
white man who, in the tradition of Columbus, uses pretenses of hospitality to justify and 
disavow settler colonial forms of oppression. From the very beginning of his relationship 
with Vivian and her family, Roger imagines himself as a protective host and benevolent 
provider. After his first meeting with Vivian, in which he has a paternalistic fantasy about 
comforting her while she cries into his chest, Roger figures himself as Vivian’s mentor, 
“devot[ing]” himself selflessly to her “improvement” (118).213 He begins by attempting 
to change her work and living habits, to rein them in, to make them more “predictab[le]” 
(118). She will never survive as a scholar, Roger reasons, unless she transforms her ways 
(118). In his determination to bring about Vivian’s “improvement,” Roger convinces 
himself that he takes self-interested actions for her benefit. Late in the novel, for 
example, he concludes that he should, for Vivian’s own protection, assume control over 
negotiations with Henry Cobb: “If he really had anything else, I should be the one to 
examine it. My reputation was intact. It could withstand controversy, scrutiny, if there 
was indeed something new to publish” (282). In this way, Roger uses a pretense of 
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offering Vivian what Rauna Kuokkanen has called “academic hospitality” to further his 
own academic career.214 
 Roger’s determination to view himself as a host to Vivian and her family is 
informed by his stubborn unwillingness to acknowledge the prior sovereignty of Native 
Americans in North America. We see this stubborn unwillingness on display in Roger’s 
interactions with Angeline, Vivian’s Navajo grandmother. Angeline, who lives with 
Vivian and helps care for her kids, is a reluctant and often ungracious host to Roger when 
he visits Vivian’s home. As Roger notes, “Whenever I hang my coat in the closet 
[Angeline] takes it out and puts it on the chair by the front door. She clears my dinner 
plate before I’ve finished eating and then she goes to bed, announcing that she can’t sleep 
until the house is quiet” (57). To Angeline, Roger is a parasitic white man who uses her 
granddaughter for sex and fails to fulfill his responsibilities as a father to Violet. He takes 
more than he gives and does so with an air of superiority. In his arrogance, Roger 
interprets Angeline’s inhospitality not as a sign of her disapproval of him but as a 
symptom of her “foreignness.” “I thought perhaps she expected a certain deference due to 
her age and foreign status,” he posits by way of explanation (57). Unwilling to see 
Angeline’s Navajo heritage as a sign of native Americanness, Roger insists that his 
“cross-hatched New England pedigree” grants him and his ancestors the “status” of 
sovereigns (57). Informed by this mindset, he persists in his determination to act as a host 
to Vivian and her family. Like Columbus, who tried to buy the favor of Indians with 
unsuitable gifts (gloves, red caps, and slippers for a people who did not wear clothes), 
Roger tries to win over Vivian’s son, Nash, with similarly unsuitable gifts (a necktie and 
copies of Persuasion and Bleak House for a teenage boy who does not dress formally and 
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does not read nineteenth-century British fiction). Roger, like Columbus, overestimates 
the value of his hospitality because he is unwilling to affirm the singularity of the other 
enough to seriously consider what he values.  
 However, despite Roger’s pretenses of hospitality, the novel ultimately makes 
clear that Angeline is correct: Roger is the parasite in his relationship with Vivian. Roger 
uses pretenses of hospitality to deny his own parasitic behavior. Just as Columbus 
disavowed his own parasitism by labeling Native Americans as parasites, Roger denies 
his own parasitism by convincing himself that Vivian parasites off his scholarship and 
mentorship. The novel’s opening scene in the Dartmouth library reveals how Vivian’s 
position in the academy and her scholarship are conditioned and circumscribed by a 
colonial politics of recognition. As The Crown of Columbus continues, we see this 
colonial politics at play in Roger’s efforts to devalue and inhibit Vivian’s scholarship by 
dismissing her as a parasite feeding off the prior contributions of white men. Viewing 
Vivian as “an annoying interloper in his scholarly domain,” Roger treats Vivian’s efforts 
to uncover the lost diary as parasitic acts of “revisionism” (125, 163). Rather than 
recognize that Vivian’s newly discovered Diario predates the Las Casas text and, 
therefore, could not, by definition, parasite the Las Casas narrative of contact, Roger 
disqualifies Vivian’s research as an attempt to “negotiate away established history” (263). 
 Roger’s negative example highlights the extent to which settler colonial 
discourses of hospitality are informed by and rely on misogyny and racism. Although 
Roger refuses to acknowledge openly that his responses to Vivian’s work are motivated 
by misogyny and racism, he admits as much to himself when, late in the novel, he 
reasons that Vivian should be “excluded” from negotiations with Henry Cobb on account 
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of her “gender” and Native heritage: “It was no surprise that Vivian was to be excluded—
because of her gender and her background, she was a cipher between Cobb and me, an 
auxiliary chasm of subtle contention quite apart from our intellectual disagreement” 
(280). What Roger does not understand, of course, is that Vivian’s “gender” and 
“background” are embedded in the Euro-American narrative that he seeks to uphold, 
already present as a repressed but still essential component of New World history, 
already the cipher through which the myth of white male hospitality encoded its own 
deconstruction. It is only by resisting and exposing this myth that Vivian can free herself 
from her “auxiliary” status. 
VI 
 In what is the most cited and discussed critical analysis of The Crown of 
Columbus, Deborah Madsen categorizes Erdrich and Dorris’s novel as a “trauma 
narrative” (62).215 In making this categorization, Madsen argues that the novel is a trauma 
narrative about “survival,” not “survivance” (78). Drawing on Gerald Vizenor’s concept 
of “survivance”—a portmanteau of “survival” and “resistance” that Vizenor uses to 
describe Native stories that actively renounce “dominance, tragedy, and victimry” 
(Manifest vii)—Madsen maintains that The Crown of Columbus fails as a Native 
American novel because it offers no “opposition” to settler colonial oppression and 
offers, instead, a “conventional working through of loss, through patterns of recognition 
that lead ultimately to assimilation and reintegration into the contemporary American 
multiculture” (82). In offering a “conventional working through of loss,” Madsen 
contends, The Crown of Columbus embraces “liberal solutions to historical injustice” 
(82). Chief among the liberal solutions that Erdrich and Dorris’s novel seeks is the 
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political recognition of Native tribes by the U.S. government, a solution that Vivian seeks 
through her appeal to the “international legal bureaucracy” (82). Furthermore, in 
suggesting that The Crown of Columbus embraces liberal multiculturalism, Madsen 
claims that Erdrich and Dorris present us with a “happy ending” in which “all opposition 
is subsumed into a common humanity” (82). In particular, Madsen describes the “space” 
of Vivian and Roger’s “house” as a representation of the novel’s liberal multicultural 
politics: 
Indeed, this mixing of cultures, this multiculturalism functions, in the novel, as a 
form of cultural orthodoxy that has supplanted the melting pot and even the salad 
bowl, replaces them with a house of many nations, like the one Vivian and Roger 
build at the novel’s end. This house, in which each family member has a space in 
which to be different and yet to remain defined by the encompassing space of the 
house, symbolizes the happy ending for these protagonists and by extension the 
national family of New World Americans who can rest guiltless in the knowledge 
that some kind of justice has been achieved. But in this house there is no mixing 
of cultures. Roger will eat the Navajo chili that Vivian serves him while Vivian 
will listen to the Bach that Roger favors, and yet her Native grandmother will live 
in an add-on room where Roger does not have to listen to her. There is no healing 
balance in this house or in the story that created it; all opposition is subsumed into 
a common humanity . . . (82) 
 Madsen’s description of Vivian and Roger’s house as a microcosm of “New 
World America,” where all guilt is absolved and all opposition denied in the interests of 
liberal multiculturalism, fails to account for a number of counternarrative forces in the 
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novel. Communicated both at the level of the plot and the level of the narration, these 
counternarrative forces ultimately undermine the novel’s early emphasis on achieving 
liberal forms of political recognition for Native Americans. In turn, these 
counternarrative forces teach us to read the novel’s “happy ending” with suspicion rather 
than optimism and to view Vivian and Roger’s house not as a space where opposition is 
“subsumed into a common humanity” but as one where opposition is recognized as 
fundamental to human relations. Finally, these counternarrative forces cue us to read 
Vivian and Roger’s relationship as a metaphor for Erdrich and Dorris’s literary 
collaboration and to read the novel as a narrative of survivance through which Erdrich 
exposes and resists colonial forms of oppression. 
 For Vizenor, Native American narratives of survivance represent “an active 
resistance and repudiation of dominance” (“Aesthetics” 11).216 Narratives of survivance 
actively resist and repudiate settler colonial dominance, first, by revealing the ways in 
which white narratives about Native life misrepresent indigenous peoples and cultures 
and, second, by replacing these false representations of Native life with stories that 
renounce and defy legacies of “deracination” and “victimry” (“Aesthetics” (1). Vizenor 
refers to false narratives about Native Americans as “simulations of dominance” 
(“simulations” because they are not representations of “the real”) and argues that these 
simulations produce and reproduce dominant discourses about Natives and Nativeness 
that are designed to establish and maintain power over Native peoples, lands, and 
resources (Manifest 4). Vizenor calls these dominant discourses “the manifest manners of 
domination”: “Manifest manners are the simulations of dominance; the notions and 
misnomers that are read as the authentic and sustained as representations of Native 
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American Indians” (Manifest 4-6). In justifying and explaining away white acts of 
dispossession and displacement, manifest manners function ideologically to legitimize 
the mission of Manifest Destiny (Manifest 4-5).217 Narratives of survivance “mediate and 
undermine” this mission by drawing attention to “the absence of the real in the 
simulations of dominance” and by establishing a “sense of native presence” in place of 
this previous absence (Manifest 12, 4; “Aesthetics” 1). Just as false white narratives 
simulate dominance over Native Americans, Native American narratives of survivance 
simulate acts of survival, resistance, and presence in response to white dominance: 
“simulations of survivance” are “the simulations that overcome the manifest manners of 
dominance” (Manifest 5-6). 
 The Crown of Columbus acts as a narrative of survivance in two important ways. 
The novel shows how false narratives of hospitality operate as the manifest manners by 
way of which Euro-American settler colonial regimes simulate dominance over Native 
Americans. The novel also shows how Native Americans can and do use discourses of 
hospitality to create simulations of survivance. Like Zitkala-Ša, Erdrich and Dorris use 
tropes of hospitality in their fiction to contest the foundational premises of European and 
American claims to sovereignty in North America. They deliberately contradict 
Columbus’s characterizations of Indians as inhospitable parasites by presenting their 
readers with simulations of the contact period that figure Indians as rightful sovereigns 
and hospitable hosts. In recovering this suppressed history of Native American hospitality 
to Europeans and Americans, Erdrich and Dorris restore Native presence to narratives of 
the contact period. Furthermore, in their characterization of Vivian, Erdrich and Dorris 
provide us with a modern foil to Columbus—a Native American woman who pointedly 
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rejects Euro-American claims to sovereignty and practices a model of hospitality that is 
fundamentally informed by her indigenous heritage.  
 Erdrich and Dorris counter the negative simulation of the Indian as a parasite 
largely through the voice of Vivian. In her course on Native American history at 
Dartmouth, Vivian provides her students with a narrative of the contact period that differs 
markedly from the dominant Western narrative of which they are already familiar. 
Vivian’s alternative narrative emphasizes the hospitality that indigenous peoples offered 
to Europeans when they arrived in the New World. In her lectures, she directly challenges 
Columbus’s claim that Native Americans took willingly from Europeans and were unable 
to give anything of reciprocal value in return. “It was a two-way street,” Vivian informs 
her students. “Indians gave as much as they got, though they rarely received credit” (83). 
For example, she points out, “A third of the medicines we use today were developed over 
here long before the fifteenth century. Not to mention the Iroquois concept of 
representative government or the Equal Rights Amendment” (83). In her own research on 
Columbus, Vivian chooses to focus on passages from the Admiral’s writing in which he 
describes Native hospitality as open and generous. She notes, for instance, the following 
passage from the Las Casas Diario: “They soon give what they have for anything that is 
given to them, without saying that it is too little . . .” (203-04).218 Through accounts of 
Vivian reading and focusing her attention on scenes of Native American hospitality in 
The Diario, Erdrich and Dorris reread the Las Casas text for us from a Native 
perspective. They deconstruct Columbus’s narrative by pointing out the inconsistencies 
and contradictions in his descriptions of Native hospitality, and they challenge the 
presuppositions behind the Admiral’s own claims to sovereignty in the New World. 
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 The Crown of Columbus further recovers the suppressed history of prior Indian 
sovereignty that the Las Casas text disavows by reimagining the moment of contact from 
the perspectives of Natives. These simulated moments of contact are depicted in the 
novel as scenes of hospitality in which Indians are figured both as prior sovereigns and as 
hospitable hosts. In the novel’s first chapter, Vivian announces that she is going to 
“indulge” in a “fantasy” in which she is going to envisage the “fateful event” of New 
World discovery from the “alternative perspective” of the “discoverees” (24). She goes 
on to describe a scene on the small island of Guanahani in which native Caribs spot the 
sails of three Spanish ships on the horizon and “run down to the shore to wave hello” (24-
5). It is worth noting that, in summoning this scene, Vivian does not romanticize Native 
American hospitality by imagining that it is unconditional. Rather, she recognizes the 
conditional nature of indigenous hospitality by noting that “neighboring Carib rivals” 
confront one another with “wooden fishing spears” (25). 
 Erdrich and Dorris take their critique of the Las Casas Diario a step further in The 
Crown of Columbus by reimagining within the text of their novel passages from 
Columbus’s original Diario. When Vivian arrives in Eleuthera, she discovers that Cobb 
does, in fact, possess an original copy of Columbus’s long-lost Diario. This original 
version contains passages that Las Casas did not include in his transcription, passages 
that, Vivian finds, often contradict some of Columbus’s most well-known accounts of his 
first encounters with Native Americans. In the middle chapters of their novel, Erdrich and 
Dorris recreate these recovered passages for us. One passage becomes the centerpiece for 
Vivian’s efforts to achieve political recognition on behalf of all indigenous peoples in 
North America. In this passage, Columbus describes the king of an island in the West 
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Indies as “clearly a King” and “a Sovereign the equal of Portugal or France, the Lord of 
all his dominions” (204). As Vivian immediately realizes, the discovery of this passage 
has significant implications for “every Indigenous land claims and repatriation case from 
Long Island to Hawaii” (204). By recognizing an indigenous king’s sovereignty, the 
Columbus of Erdrich and Dorris’s recovered Diario effectively recognizes the 
nationhood of “every native tribe” (204). In doing so, he affirms the longstanding claim 
that “native peoples ha[ve] the full right to govern their own territory” (204). By his own 
hand, Erdrich and Dorris’s reimagined Columbus posthumously undermines hundreds of 
years of European and American manifest manners and settler colonial logic. 
VII 
 In the end, despite Vivian’s emphasis on achieving political recognition for 
“every native tribe and nation” in North America, The Crown of Columbus does not 
attempt to rethink settler colonial narratives of hospitality from the perspective of every 
North American Indian. In many of its more pointed critiques of settler colonial 
discourses of hospitality, the novel adopts a decidedly indigenous feminist stance. It often 
narrates and reads scenes of hospitality and inhospitality between Natives and non-
Natives specifically from the perspectives of Native American women. We see this in the 
novel’s revisionist accounts of the contact period, which draw conspicuous attention to 
the crucial roles that Native women played in facilitating scenes of hospitality between 
Natives and early Europeans. Moreover, we see Erdrich and Dorris emphasize the 
perspectives of indigenous women in the novel’s narration of contemporary scenes of 
hospitality, especially those that recount encounters between Vivian and Roger.219 These 
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scenes, which expose and resist settler colonial simulations of dominance, constitute 
Native feminist simulations of survivance.  
 Vivian herself hints at the idea of anti-colonial counternarratives early in The 
Crown of Columbus. In the novel’s first chapter, she pauses at one point to describe in 
detail José Clemente Orozco’s mural The Epic of American Civilization, which hangs on 
the walls of Dartmouth Library. In particular, Vivian expresses admiration for the panel 
entitled “Gods of the Modern World” (Fig. 2), which depicts a pregnant skeleton woman 
“in the throes of delivery, her hair on fire, watched by an unimpressed row of emaciated, 
gray professors” (12).220 Vivian rejoices in the Mexican painter’s bold defiance, 





Fig. 2  José Clemente Orozco, “Gods of the Modern World,” 1932-1934 
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She especially enjoys the fact that Dartmouth alumni have “protested” against the mural, 
claiming that Orozco “bit the academic hand that fed him” by depicting academics in a 
negative light (12). For Vivian, Orozco’s mural represents a satire of academia’s colonial 
politics. Vivian identifies with the skeleton woman for persevering despite the 
indifference of the “gray professors” and with Orozco for using his art to parody those 
who attempt to colonize his life and work by pretending to offer him the hospitality of 
patronage. In its use of trickery to expose colonial oppression, “Gods of the Modern 
World” functions as a kind of subversive anti-colonial counternarrative. For Vivian, the 
mural is emblematic of what she hopes to achieve as a Native scholar. She even goes as 
far as to suggest that “Gods of the Modern World” could be “the emblem for Native 
American Studies” as a “discipline” (12).  
 A few chapters later, Vivian returns to the subject of anti-colonial 
counternarratives. In returning to the subject, she focuses her attention specifically on 
indigenous feminist counternarratives. When discussing her “mixed” ancestral 
background and her “marginal” position in academia, Vivian talks about how her outsider 
status as a Native American woman uniquely positions her to critique dominant Euro-
American ideologies, especially those ideologies espoused by academics: 
I’ve read learned anthropological papers written about people like me. We’re 
called marginal, as if we exist anywhere but on the center of the page. Our 
territory is the place for asides, for explanatory notes, for editorial notation. We’re 
parked on the bleachers looking into the arena, never the main players, but there 
are bonuses to peripheral vision. Out beyond the normal bounds, you at least 
know where you’re not. You escape the claustrophobia of belonging, and what 
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you lack in security you gain by realizing—as those insiders never do—that 
security is an illusion. (124) 
In elaborating on the sense of estrangement that she feels as a Native American woman, 
Vivian uses tropes of hospitality to describe her “marginal” position in American society 
as a product of American inhospitality. The inhospitality that Vivian feels as a Native 
American woman is both physical and metaphorical. She is both physically denied 
entrance into the dominant spaces of American society and metaphorically estranged 
from the comforting feeling of “belonging” that “insiders” enjoy. She is, she tells us, 
doubly a “stranger,” both physically unwelcomed and metaphorically made to feel 
unwelcome (124). 
Yet, as Vivian is clear point out, there can be “bonuses” to experiencing 
inhospitality. One of the principal bonuses of Vivian’s “peripheral vision” is her 
recognition that narratives of “security” are merely illusions. This recognition allows 
Vivian to question and resist her own desire to believe in utopian narratives of 
hospitality, particularly utopian narratives of hospitality that pretend to offer Native 
Americans “security” in the form of political recognition. More than anyone else in The 
Crown of Columbus, Vivian comes to understand that acts of hospitality are always 
conditional. When she observes, in preparation for her first meeting with Cobb, that the 
“one universal law of culture contact” states that “a kind of reciprocal obligation for 
decency [goes] into effect once hospitality or kindness [i]s accepted,” she follows up this 
observation by adding that the “trick [is] to be the first one out of the gate in this 
exchange” (156). In making this disclaimer, Vivian shows that she understands that 
hospitality is always already in some way or another a form of conditional “exchange.” 
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 Vivian’s skepticism of utopian narratives of hospitality serves her well in the 
novel. Because of her wariness, she is able to read Cobb as a false host. Determined not 
to be tricked by Cobb’s false hospitality, Vivian stands her ground, refusing to surrender 
her small but valuable excerpt of the Columbus Diario to Cobb for the meager offering 
that he proffers in the false spirit of a generous gift.221 Vivian has, she tells us, learned 
from the example of her Native ancestors. Establishing clear parallels between Cobb’s 
relationship to her and the relationship of Europeans to indigenous Americans in prior 
centuries, Vivian muses, “Take your twenty-four dollars’ worth of beads and trinkets, 
white man, and stuff them. This time I’ll keep Manhattan” (194). For readers, Vivian’s 
skepticism should serve as a warning: we should be wary of narratives of security as we 
make our way through The Crown of Columbus. We would be careless readers were we 
to ignore Vivian’s warning. 
VIII 
Several critics have suggested that The Crown of Columbus contains a veiled 
counternarrative that covertly undermines the novel’s apparent turn to liberal 
multiculturalism.222 Yet, the truth is that The Crown of Columbus communicates its 
critiques of liberal and settler colonial narratives of hospitality openly and directly. 
Vivian’s undisguised expression of admiration for José Clemente Orozco’s anti-colonial 
art and her equally undisguised distaste for Henry Cobb’s false American hospitality are 
characteristic of a pattern in The Crown of Columbus of undisguised resistance to and 
critique of settler colonial discourses of hospitality. The novel employs transparent and 
clearly recognizable metaphors to expose and condemn the ways in which settler colonial 
regimes use liberal discourses of hospitality to justify and disavow colonial oppression.  
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In the final chapter of The Crown of Columbus, we learn from Roger that he and 
Vivian have worked together to complete Vivian’s article on Columbus for the 
Dartmouth alumni magazine. As a result, the published article, like Erdrich and Dorris’s 
novel, “bears both [authors’] names” (375). Some critics have suggested that Vivian and 
Roger’s writing collaboration should be read as a model for imagining constructive forms 
of collaboration between Natives and non-Natives. Carla Freccero, Marianne Hirsch, Ivy 
Schweitzer, and Susanne Zantop, for example, celebrate Vivian and Roger’s partnership 
as a “blueprint” for envisioning “cooperation” between figures of colonization—between, 
as they put it, “indigenous and invader, colonized and colonizer” (17). Moreover, they 
interpret the apparent success of Vivian and Roger’s fictional partnership as a sign that 
Erdrich and Dorris achieved a mutually beneficial form of “cooperation” in their own 
lives as writing partners (18).223   
 However, The Crown of Columbus teaches us to be skeptical of precisely this kind 
of optimistic reading. Beginning with its very first chapters, the novel cues us to read 
both collaborations—Vivian and Roger’s and Erdrich and Dorris’s—not as inspiring 
examples of cooperation between figures of colonization but as representative instances 
of Native survivance in the face of colonial simulations of dominance. As I demonstrate 
in the remaining sections of this chapter, The Crown of Columbus ultimately figures 1) 
Roger and Dorris as settler colonial hosts who use false discourses of hospitality to 
disavow their own colonial behavior and 2) Vivian and Erdrich as authors of survivance 
who counter white simulations of dominance with Native simulations of survivance. 
Erdrich and Dorris include the following standard disclaimer at the outset of The 
Crown of Columbus: “All major nonhistorical characters in this book are products of our 
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imagination. Any resemblance they bear to persons living or dead is pure coincidence.” 
Yet, the resemblances between the novel’s main characters and its authors are impossible 
to deny. Vivian and Roger meet at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire, 
where Erdrich and Dorris first met in 1972 and where the couple was living in 1989 when 
they began work on The Crown of Columbus.224 Vivian is an Assistant Professor in the 
Native American Studies program at Dartmouth, a program that Dorris founded in 1972 
and for which he served as the inaugural Chair (Rawson par. 1). Erdrich and Dorris draw 
attention to this important connection between Vivian and Dorris by producing within the 
text of their novel visual reproductions of handwritten notes printed on the official 
letterhead of the Dartmouth College Native American Studies program (144-45). The 
reproduction of the Native American Studies letterhead within the text—complete with 
the Dartmouth insignia and the College’s official address—directs our attention outward 
beyond the confines of the physical book to the lives of the novel’s creators. 
 In their characterizations of Vivian and Roger, Erdrich and Dorris invite us to 
read their novel’s main characters as fictional reproductions of themselves. As Frances 
Washburn observes, “Any reader who knows anything at all of the personal lives of 
Erdrich and Dorris would recognize the personalization of the characters. The authors 
chose to insert themselves directly into the narrative instead of creating entirely different 
characters that might have unrecognizable touches of their own personalities” (43). M. 
Annette Jaimes echoes Washburn’s observation, remarking, “It is difficult to read this 
book and not wonder if the two main characters, Vivian and Roger, as antagonistic 
lovers, were not created from the actual lives of their creators, at least in part” (59). 
Despite their novel’s disclaimer, both Erdrich and Dorris freely admitted that they 
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modeled Vivian and Roger on themselves. In an interview with Allen and Nancy Feyl 
Chavkin shortly after the publication of The Crown of Columbus, Erdrich acknowledged 
that Vivian is modeled in large part on her. She confessed that many of Vivian’s habits, 
character traits, and personal experiences come directly from her real life. Commenting 
on Vivian’s trip to the Dartmouth library in the novel’s first chapter and Vivian’s 
obsession with researching the life of Christopher Columbus, Erdrich confessed, “I did 
barge around the library fully pregnant, that’s true too, and in fact I became almost 
obsessed with Columbus for several months” (236).225 Moreover, the resemblances 
between nonhistorical characters in The Crown of Columbus and “real persons living or 
dead” are not limited to the novel’s two main characters. In a joint interview with Vince 
Passaro in 1991, both Erdrich and Dorris acknowledged that Vivian’s son in the novel, 
Nash, and the couple’s daughter, Violet, were imagined as symbolic reconstructions of 
their own real-life children (165-66).226 
 But, of course, Vivian, Roger, Nash, and Violet are not identical reproductions of 
Erdrich and Dorris and their children. As Washburn points out, Vivian and Roger, in 
particular, are not only “obvious reproductions” of Erdrich and Dorris; they are also clear 
“distortions” of the two authors (43). This is especially true in the case of Erdrich and 
Dorris’s creation of Roger as a fictional stand-in for Dorris. On one hand, there are 
undeniable resemblances between the author and the character. Both are extremely 
preoccupied with maintaining impeccable public reputations and with achieving 
mainstream recognition for their academic achievements. So preoccupied is Roger with 
living up to his own romantic image of himself as a “Byronic media star” that he is 
driven to perform in every arena of his life (16). In everything he does, Roger asks 
    221 
himself the same question: “What would they think?” (49). Young and naïve, Vivian is 
initially taken in by Roger’s pretensions. She is, as she puts it, “fooled” by Roger’s 
“plumage” (34). But Vivian soon learns that, although Roger is very good at appearing to 
satisfy her “fantasy” of a man, he is very bad at living that fantasy (34). Ultimately, 
Roger is less interested in satisfying Vivian’s private fantasy than he is in feeding his 
own public self-image. In particular, he is determined to achieve mainstream fame for his 
work on Columbus. And he seems to be well on his way to achieving the fame he so 
desperately seeks. As Vivian informs us, Roger was “recently featured in People 
magazine brooding on a plaster bust of his subject, Columbus, and poising a Mont Blanc 
pen against his handsome chin” (16).227 But Roger’s appearance in People seems to have 
only heightened his fixation with receiving mainstream recognition. Upon learning that 
an NPR “Morning Edition” special on Columbus does not “mention” his narrative poem 
about Columbus, Roger grows sullen and irate (148). “Would Roger never get over his 
mention in the People forecasts?” Vivian wonders to herself (148). After thinking about it 
for a second, Vivian concludes that Roger’s “competitive myopia” will ultimately doom 
him to a life of extreme emotions: “No matter what the category, no matter how obscure 
the contest, Roger had to be the superlative, had to win or lose the most” (148).  
 It is worth commenting on Roger’s preoccupations with maintaining an 
impeccable reputation and achieving mainstream fame because all accounts suggest that 
these preoccupation are intended as a critique of Dorris’s own similar preoccupations. 
Friends and colleagues alike report that Dorris was inordinately concerned with living up 
to an impracticable public image that he had fabricated for himself. After Dorris’s death 
in 1997, Mark Anthony Rolo, editor of the Minneapolis-based Native American 
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newspaper The Circle and a friend of the family, explained, “One crucial thing to 
understand about Michael is that image was, if not everything, then of utmost importance. 
He carried a great deal of anxiety with him always – that he be seen as a nearly sainted 
father, that his literary reputation be above tarnish” (Rawson par. 18).228 Rolo continued, 
“[Dorris] spent an inordinate amount of energy – you could see it as an obsession – on 
keeping up what some have called his façade. Near the end, as he was going down his 
dark road, he may not have had the strength or the will to do it anymore. Michael started 
falling apart, I believe, when the chasm between his public persona – which was in a 
sense fictional –and his self in private life couldn’t be reconciled” (par. 19). Like Roger, 
Dorris also desperately desired and sought out mainstream fame. He achieved the 
beginnings of this fame in 1989, the year that Erdrich and Dorris began writing The 
Crown of Columbus, when his memoir about raising a child with fetal alcohol syndrome, 
The Broken Chord, received the National Book Critics Circle Award for General 
Nonfiction. Shortly after the release of The Broken Chord, Dorris struck a deal to have 
the book made into a TV movie with actor Jimmy Smits starring in the lead role. The film 
was released in September of 1991, only a few months after the release of The Crown of 
Columbus. During the time that Erdrich and Dorris were writing The Crown of 
Columbus, Dorris was heavily involved in the production and promotion of the TV 
movie. In the months leading up to and following the release of the film, Dorris was 
apparently so “relentless” in his own “self-promot[ion]” that, according to Metís historian 
David McNab, he “crossed the line of no return”: “. . . Dorris went way too far, and 
compounded his own and his family’s troubles by using and publicizing them. He crossed 
the line of no return when he sold the rights for a made-for-TV movie to Hollywood 
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immediately after the book was well received, and thereby exposed himself and his 
family to disastrous public scrutiny” (109).229  
 Yet, in addition to creating very clear parallels between Roger and Dorris, Erdrich 
and Dorris deliberately distinguish Roger from Dorris in important ways. The most 
obvious of which is that Roger is not Native American. Roger is white, as he reminds us 
on numerous occasions when recalling with great pride his “WASP” lineage (57, 165). 
What’s more, Roger is a passionate admirer of Christopher Columbus and fully dedicated 
to preserving the dominant white narrative of Columbus’s discovery of the New World. 
In this, he embodies the colonial politics in American academia that Vivian seeks to 
undermine. Erdrich and Dorris’s decision to give Dorris’s fictional counterpart the name 
“Roger Williams” complicates the symbolic meaning of his character even further. 
Roger’s reference to his “cross-hatched New England pedigree dating back to the 
seventeenth century” is a clear indication that we are supposed to associate him not only 
with Michael Dorris but also with the historical Roger Williams, the seventeenth-century 
political and religious leader (57). In addition to founding Rhode Island, establishing The 
First Baptist Church in America, and arguing fervently on behalf of religious liberty, the 
historical Williams developed strong and lasting relationships with Native tribes in New 
England, studied and learned several Native languages, and advocated vehemently 
against the confiscation of Indian lands.230 
In choosing Roger Williams as Dorris’s historical counterpart, Erdrich and Dorris 
liken Dorris to a well-known white man who was a friend and supporter of Native 
Americans and Native American causes. This choice to characterize Dorris indirectly as 
non-Native could very well have resulted from the fact that Dorris learned at some point 
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during the late 1980s or early 1990s that he was not, in fact, Native American. Raised in 
Kentucky by his non-Native mother and two aunts, Dorris had been led to believe since 
childhood that he descended, on his father’s side, from the Modoc tribe and, specifically 
from the famed Modoc Captain Jack (McNab 110-13). There is no reason to believe that 
Dorris did not genuinely believe in his Modoc heritage, and it is unclear how or when he 
discovered the truth about his family history. But we do know that it was during the early 
1990s, around the time that The Crown of Columbus was published, that he stopped self-
identifying publicly as Native American (McNab 110-13). Accordingly, Erdrich and 
Dorris’s decision to identify Dorris with the historical Roger Williams in The Crown of 
Columbus might have been the couple’s way of indirectly disclosing Dorris’s non-Native 
heritage while at the same time attempting to reassure friends, colleagues, and the reading 
public that Dorris was, nevertheless, just as committed to fighting on behalf of Native 
Americans as he had previously been. 
 Yet, regardless of whether Erdrich and Dorris were trying to use The Crown of 
Columbus to “out” Dorris as non-Native, one thing is clear: the analogies they establish 
between Roger and Dorris in the novel associate Dorris with settler colonial behavior. In 
establishing Roger as an analogy for Dorris and then portraying Roger as representative 
of a pattern of settler colonial behavior dating back to Columbus, Erdrich and Dorris 
figure Dorris as a settler colonial figure and reframe the couple’s writing relationship as a 
colonial relationship.  
IX 
 Through the explicit use of self-referential metaphors in The Crown of Columbus, 
Erdrich and Dorris invite us to reexamine the public narrative of their literary 
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collaboration and to do so through a theoretical lens of hospitality. Revisiting Erdrich and 
Dorris’s public statements about their collaboration, we find that, during the time of their 
marriage (1981-1997), the couple promoted a utopian narrative about their literary 
partnership in which they claimed to have achieved a truly collaborative writing 
exchange. We also find that, in advancing this utopian narrative, Erdrich and Dorris 
relied heavily on liberal discourses of hospitality. In interviews, book dedications, and 
other public statements, Erdrich and Dorris drew on liberal ideals of hospitality to 
describe their writing partnership as a utopian model of liberal hospitality between 
collaborating authors. Central to this utopian model were Erdrich and Dorris’s claims that 
their collaboration was based on consensus, reciprocal exchange, and mutual recognition.  
As early as their first interviews together, Erdrich and Dorris insisted that their 
writing partnership was based on consensus. Speaking to Laura Coltelli in 1985, Dorris 
maintained that he and his wife reached “consensus” on “every word” they published: 
“We go over every word and achieve consensus on every word” (28). This claim of 
categorical consensus is a refrain that runs throughout the couple’s interviews. In almost 
every one of the more than one hundred joint interviews that Erdrich and Dorris gave 
during their writing partnership, Dorris volunteered a description of the couple’s writing 
process in which he asserted that he and his wife “planned,” “wrote,” “revised,” “edited,” 
and “reedited” their books “together” on a “word-by-word basis” before sending the final 
versions to press.231 Erdrich always consented to this characterization of the couple’s 
partnership, often expressing gratitude to her husband for insisting that she place her 
“trust” in the “collaboration” (Schumacher 178).232 
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 Erdrich and Dorris created the “impression” that they were capable of achieving 
complete consensus in their writing by appearing in interviews to speak in one “single, 
shared” voice (Passaro 161; Stokes 56). As Michael Schumacher observed after 
interviewing the couple in 1991, “[T]heir levels of interaction are almost uncanny. They 
will finish each other’s thoughts, embellish or clarify ideas, banter back and forth—all in 
a way that makes their answers to a question seem to come from one person” (173-74). 
To Vince Passaro, who also interviewed the couple in 1991, it appeared that Erdrich and 
Dorris had, “by mutual consent,” embraced “one voice” and “one vision” (161). 
Accounts such as these, which romanticized the couple’s interactions in interviews, 
helped corroborate Dorris’s claim that the writing partnership was completely 
consensual. 
 Erdrich and Dorris freely admitted that achieving consensus in their writing did 
not happen naturally. The secret to their consensual collaboration, Dorris maintained, was 
their shared willingness to engage in reciprocal exchange during the editing process. In a 
1986 interview with Hertha Wong, Dorris described his and his wife’s editing process as 
a deliberative form of “trading” (“Interview” 36). “We have done things like trade,” he 
told Wong, “Louise will say, ‘I will get rid of this line, if you will get rid of this line” 
(“Interview” 36). By accommodating one another’s editorial preferences, the two authors 
could, Dorris reported, always find ways to reach consensus (Coltelli 28; Wong 
“Interview” 36). Linda Karell, whose book on literary collaboration, Writing Together, 
Writing Apart, features a chapter on Erdrich and Dorris, interprets the couple’s professed 
practice of reciprocal exchange as an indication that the two authors “consciously 
disperse[d] power and authority” evenly between themselves (36). Dorris encouraged this 
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impression by regularly contending that there was so much “give and take” and so much 
“back and forth” between him and Erdrich during the writing and editing stages that it 
had become impossible to differentiate his “contributions” from hers when reading the 
final versions of their writing (Burnside & White 107; Stokes 56; Schumacher 177).233 In 
effect, Dorris alleged that the distinction between writer and editor—between the one 
who gave and the one who gave back—ceased to exist in his writing partnership with 
Erdrich. “I guess the point to make is that ours isn’t just an editing relationship,” Dorris 
told Michael Schumacher in 1991 (177). 
 Erdrich and Dorris maintained the impression that their collaboration was 
consensual and reciprocal through public statements of mutual recognition. The two 
authors demonstrated their commitment to a practice of mutual recognition on the 
dedication pages to their books, where they repeatedly recognized one another publicly as 
equal collaborators. In Love Medicine (1984), the couple’s first book-length 
collaboration, Erdrich used the dedication page to recognize her husband as an 
indispensable collaborator: “I could not have written it this way without Michael Dorris, 
who gave his own ideas, experiences, and devoted attention to the writing. This book is 
dedicated to him because he is so much a part of it.”234 Two years later, Erdrich reiterated 
her sentiment on the dedication page of The Beet Queen: “To Michael / Complice in 
every word, essential / as air.” Dorris was equally effusive in praising Erdrich publicly. In 
his first novel, A Yellow Raft in Blue Water (1987), he wrote, “FOR LOUISE / 
Companion through every page / through every day / Compeer.” And in Paper Trail 
(1994), a collection of essays, Dorris wrote, “For Louise: Absent by name / from most of 
these pages / only because / you are so everywhere / within them.”235 
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 Previous scholars have read these dedications as signs that Erdrich and Dorris 
were intent on challenging conventional Western notions of authorship. Linda Karell, for 
example, suggests that Erdrich and Dorris insisted so publicly on the collaborative nature 
of their writing in order to undermine longstanding practices of authorial “recognition” in 
the Western tradition (46). Indeed, both Erdrich and Dorris claimed on numerous 
occasions that they were uninterested in receiving official recognition as individual 
authors. “Our emphasis is on the books, rather than the attribution,” Dorris maintained, 
“and as the book develops, we get so involved in the characters and the story that the last 
thing we think of is whose name is going to be on it” (Schumacher 177). Erdrich echoed 
her husband’s sentiments, declaring that the couple’s public statements of mutual 
recognition signified their shared willingness to sacrifice their individual “egos” for the 
good of the “work” (Schumacher 178). In a 1992 interview, Erdrich explained that she 
was initially “very wary” of writing collaboratively with Dorris and that consenting to her 
husband’s wishes required “humbling” herself for the sake of the collaboration (178). In 
the end, she explained, it was a “sacrifice” she was willing to make: “In a lot of ways, I’d 
have to sacrifice the ego for the work, because it worked better to go back and forth and 
not resist changes. It’s not easy—sometimes I want to hang onto something because it 
makes sense to me, and it seems as though it would be impossible to relinquish that 
control over it—but I know in my heart that Michael is right. It’s been a humbling 
experience” (178).236 
 Engaging in a public practice of mutual recognition allowed Erdrich and Dorris to 
market their fiction as authentically “Native American.” Indeed, their repeated claims 
that the collaboration was based on complete consensus and reciprocal exchange served 
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the same purpose. By publicly insisting on the collaborative nature of their partnership, 
Erdrich and Dorris actively encouraged the general impression that their writing practices 
were inspired by Native oral storytelling traditions. In interviews, Erdrich and Dorris 
identified as the principal inspiration for their collaboration the oral storytelling practices 
that they witnessed during their childhoods. “Sitting around listening to our family tell 
stories has been a more important influence on our work than literary influences,” Erdrich 
told Hertha Wong in 1986 (“Interview” 38). In a 1991 interview, Erdrich drew explicit 
connections between her collaborative storytelling practices with Dorris and the oral 
storytelling traditions of her Native ancestors: “Michael and I form a story between 
ourselves when talking. That’s our connection to the oral history. When we make up a 
story, we’re talking,” she added in a 1991 interview (176). In drawing these connections 
to Native oral storytelling traditions, Erdrich and Dorris succeeded in convincing literary 
critics that their collaboration and the fiction produced by it were representative of 
“Native American” values and traditions (Wong “Interview” 36; Coltelli 21-2).237 
 Furthermore, in claiming that their collaboration drew on Native oral storytelling 
traditions, Erdrich and Dorris also benefited from associating their writing partnership 
with narrative practices that are regarded by many as “democratic” in principle and 
practice (Curteis; Weaver 38-40; Roots 17-9; Nabokov 47-48).238 The couple’s insistence 
that their writing partnership was completely consensual, entirely reciprocal, and 
mutually rewarding fed into and fed off romanticized notions of Native oral storytelling 
as a collective, inclusive, and egalitarian process. In particular, Dorris’s claim that there 
was equal “give” and “take” in the collaboration echoed liberal democratic and Native 
ideals of shared sovereignty.239 If both authors did, in fact, “give” and “take” in equal 
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measure, then neither author was more or less sovereign than the other. If neither author 
was more or less sovereign, then the collaboration was devoid of antagonism. It is this 
denial of antagonism altogether that constitutes the liberal democratic character of 
Erdrich and Dorris’s utopian model of authorial collaboration.   
 Erdrich and Dorris’s utopian model of authorial collaboration offers an 
opportunity to rethink literary forms of hospitality. Traditional formulations of literary 
hospitality figure the author as host and the reader as guest, or vice versa. Theorists who 
figure the author as host privilege the author as sovereign in the hospitality relationship 
and imagine the text as a site of hospitality from and into which the author “invites” the 
reader (Still Derrida 84).240 These theorists envision the relationship between author and 
reader as one in which the author “begins as host” (Haswell & Haswell 13). In this sense, 
they view the interaction between author and reader as a temporal relationship that 
privileges the author’s prior sovereignty. On the other hand, theorists who figure the 
reader as host view the relationship between author and reader as one in which the reader 
proffers hospitality to or withholds hospitality from the author or the text, or both 
(Attridge; Hillis Miller; Eco; Haswell & Haswell; Still Derrida). Here, the reader is a 
host who welcomes and affirms the originality, singularity, and potentiality of the author 
and/or text (Attridge 80; Haswell & Haswell 4-9).  
 Erdrich and Dorris’s utopian model of literary collaboration envisions a reciprocal 
relationship in which co-authors offer and receive hospitality to and from one another 
before extending hospitality to the reader. On one hand, this model of collaborative 
authorial hospitality serves to remind us of the interchangeable nature of the host-guest 
relationship. Erdrich and Dorris’s comments about their collaboration suggested that they 
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believed both authoring and editing involved giving and receiving. Sharing equally in the 
“give” and “take” of authoring and editing, the co-authors of Erdrich and Dorris’s utopian 
model serve equally as host and guest. The author gives his or her writing to the editor 
and then receives feedback in return. Likewise, the editor gives feedback in exchange for 
receiving the author’s writing. By describing both authoring and editing as processes that 
include giving and taking, Erdrich and Dorris claimed to privilege authoring and editing 
as equally valuable to their collaboration. In a collaboration in which both authors give 
and take hospitality in an ongoing reciprocal exchange, neither author is privileged as 
sovereign, and both authors willingly perform and recognize their equal values as hosts 
and guests. 
 Yet, Erdrich and Dorris’s model of reciprocal authorial collaboration also serves 
to remind us of the dangers of utopian models of hospitality that attempt to deny the 
inherently antagonistic nature of the host-guest relationship. In insisting that their writing 
partnership was completely devoid of antagonism, Erdrich and Dorris claimed to have 
achieved a non-hierarchical form of authorial hospitality. By imagining themselves as 
equal sovereigns, Erdrich and Dorris denied the existence of any distinction between host 
and guest in their writing relationship. This was especially the case when it came to 
Dorris’s claim that there was so much “give and take” and so much “back and forth” 
during the writing and editing processes that it had become impossible to differentiate 
between his and Erdrich’s contributions (Burnside & White 107; Stokes 56; Schumacher 
177). In making this claim, Dorris attempted to deny the temporal nature of the host-guest 
relationship. He tried to deny Erdrich any claim to prior sovereignty by publicly rejecting 
the possibility that she had herself written the original drafts of her fiction. He tried to 
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erase Erdrich’s host status by pretending that she did not have any prior claim to the 
products of their collaboration. 
X 
 New details have emerged in the past few years about the Erdrich-Dorris 
collaboration that directly undermine the couple’s utopian narrative about their 
partnership. These new details suggest that Erdrich and Dorris’s collaboration was 
defined not by consensus, reciprocal exchange, or mutual recognition but, instead, by 
repression and disavowal. Revisiting Erdrich and Dorris’s public statements about the 
partnership with these new details in mind, we find that the couple’s public narrative 
about their collaboration functioned as a simulation of colonial dominance through which 
Dorris parasited off his wife’s talents and labor by grossly misrepresenting his 
contributions as an editor. Understanding how and why Dorris portrayed his collaboration 
with Erdrich as a liberal democratic model of hospitality helps us better understand the 
colonial politics of The Crown of Columbus and the important role that liberal narratives 
of hospitality play in justifying and disavowing various forms of colonial oppression. 
 Erdrich has only recently opened up about her complicated relationship with 
Dorris. After more than twenty years of relative silence on the collaboration, Erdrich 
admitted in a 2010 interview with The Paris Review that the utopian “narrative” of her 
collaboration with Dorris was a fabrication that her husband “controlled” while he was 
living and that she helped perpetuate in a futile attempt to make him “happy” (158). “I 
would have loved for Michael to have had his own life as a writer and not covet my life 
as a writer. But he couldn’t help himself,” Erdrich explained in The Paris Review 
interview. “I wanted to make him happy, you know. He was the kind of person whom 
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people want to make happy. People did this all the time, they tried to make him happy, 
but there was a deep impossibility within him and he couldn’t really be happy” (158). In 
enabling Dorris’s covetousness, Erdrich became the reluctant host to her husband’s 
parasitism. Unable to be “happy alone,” Dorris clung to and fed off his wife’s successes, 
gaining public recognition by falsely claiming to play an integral role in the production of 
her fiction (158).241 In 2012, Erdrich acknowledged the truth that Dorris was so desperate 
to deny while he was living—that the couple’s writing partnership was, despite all of 
Dorris’s claims to the contrary, very much like a traditional editing relationship. Asked 
by Terry Tazioli to explain how writing “on her own” is different from writing with 
Dorris, Erdrich answered simply, “It’s not any different. I wrote it all. . . . So, 
collaborating wasn’t like . . . he would write a page and I would write a page. It was more 
that I had someone who gave me very, very wonderful editorial advice” (qtd. in Kurup 
5).242 
 The first signs of Dorris’s covetousness came in 1985 when he took over as the 
literary agent for Love Medicine. As Erdrich recalled in The Paris Review interview, 
After [Love Medicine] won an award and The Beet Queen was published, we went 
to New York for an interview with The New York Times. I was walking out the 
door to meet the interviewer, and I noticed that he was dressed up, too. So I asked 
him where he was going. He said, “I’m going to be in the interview.” And I said, 
“No, they asked me.” And he said, “What do you mean—I can’t come?” So it was 
both of us from then on. As long as he was content with being in on the interview 
and saying what he needed to say, I wasn’t that unhappy. (159-60) 
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Why did Erdrich allow Dorris to intrude so aggressively into her public life and to claim 
so much influence over her work? Was it simply her desire to make her husband 
“happy”? Or were there other pressures at play? In what specific ways did Dorris 
“control” the narrative of the collaboration? What narrative strategies did the couple use 
when talking about the collaboration to disguise and disavow Dorris’s parasitism? And, 
finally, what role did Erdrich play in contributing to Dorris’s false narrative?  
 Erdrich and Dorris’s claim that they reached complete consensus in their writing 
was a pretense designed to disguise the extent to which the couple’s working relationship 
was fundamentally informed by a power imbalance. As Linda Karell observes in Writing 
Together, Writing Apart, despite Erdrich and Dorris’s insistence that neither author 
possessed more “power” in the collaboration, the truth was that the partnership was 
defined by imbalances of “power” at “every level” (47). Dorris compensated for the fact 
that Erdrich was a more productive and successful writer of fiction by assuming control 
over the narrative of their collaboration. Looking back over Erdrich and Dorris’s joint 
interviews, it is clear that Dorris was the dominant speaker in the couple’s interactions 
with the public. As early as 1986, Dan Cryer found Dorris’s domineering presence in the 
relationship strange and off-putting: “Sit down for an interview with novelist Louise 
Erdrich, and you will find another writer by her side, her husband, Michael Dorris. Ask 
her a question, and he is as likely to answer as she is. Since Erdrich has written the 
current best-selling novel The Beet Queen and the award-winning Love Medicine of two 
years ago, she’s been getting lots of requests for interviews. And they are giving them” 
(80). Five years later, Vince Passaro made similar observations, noting the obsessive 
control that Dorris maintained over the couple’s public statements: “Dorris is the talker, 
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the spokesman for the collaboration. . . . he speaks energetically, in long, articulate 
sentences, and is not above jumping in when Erdrich is talking, to clarify or expand. It is 
not unusual for a magazine editor working on one of Erdrich’s pieces to speak primarily 
to Dorris” (163). Through his charismatic but forceful personality and his careful 
manipulation of Erdrich’s public comments, Dorris was able to suppress his wife’s 
objections and silence her dissenting voice. 
 Both Erdrich and Dorris downplayed Dorris’s control over the couple’s narrative 
by regularly employing first-person-plural point of view when talking about the 
collaboration. The couple’s use of first-person-plural point of view, or “we” narration, 
was the primary narrative strategy through which they portrayed their partnership as a 
utopian form of collaborative authorial hospitality. When answering questions in joint 
interviews, Erdrich and Dorris almost always spoke about their collaboration in collective 
terms and rarely spoke specifically about their own individual experiences with or 
feelings about the partnership. Geoffrey Stokes wondered about the couple’s use of “we” 
narration early in the collaboration, shortly after the publication of The Beet Queen. After 
interviewing Erdrich and Dorris for The Village Voice Literary Supplement, Stokes 
observed: 
What’s odd about Erdrich and Dorris is the ease of agreement they described, and 
a couple of disquieting possibilities need to be considered. First, one wonders, 
without quite asking, whether Dorris, nine years older, is a sort of Svengali; if 
they are Erdrich’s drafts, after all, it is always she who has to yield. When I’d 
called her publisher to set up the interview, I was told, “You’ll have to talk to 
Michael Dorris. He’s her manager.” The role, even the word, is unusual in the 
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context of literary writing. But as I discovered when I replayed the tape, whenever 
he left the room—as he did a couple of times for phone calls—she shifted . . . 
from “we” to “I.” Could there be some Star Is Born trip playing out, as the young 
overnight sensation at once protects and inflates her older spouse? (57) 
Stokes ultimately dismissed his suspicions, reasoning that Erdrich’s female characters 
“radiate too much power for their creator to be involved in Judy Gardlandish self-
immolation” (57). But, it turns out, Stokes’s observation that Erdrich appeared to use 
“we” narration reluctantly and for the benefit of Dorris was entirely accurate. 
 In employing first-person-plural point of view to talk about their collaboration, 
Erdrich and Dorris utilized a narrative strategy that literary scholars traditionally 
associate with subversive expressions of collective solidarity.243 Narratologist Brian 
Richardson argues that the “vast majority” of “we” texts “valorize collective identity” 
and do so with the intention of establishing an “egalitarian” sense of community in 
opposition to repressive regimes (Unnatural 50-6). In accordance with Richardson’s 
thinking, studies of “we” narration in recent years have focused attention on examples in 
which authors from marginalized groups have used first-person-plural point of view to 
expose and resist various forms of oppression. In particular, scholars have concentrated 
on examples from postcolonial, feminist, and indigenous literatures. In theorizing the use 
of “we” narration in postcolonial fiction, Richardson and others have pointed to Indian, 
Caribbean, and African literatures, arguing that authors from these colonized lands have 
repeatedly utilized first-person-plural narration as a way of “forging a post-colonial 
narrative voice” (Richardson Analyzing World 4).244 Other scholars have noted the 
frequency of “we” narration in gynocentric fiction, suggesting that feminist authors have 
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used the narrative strategy to advocate and model “collective action” in response to 
patriarchal regimes (Richardson Unnatural 50).245 
 A number of recent scholars have also emphasized the use of “we” narration in 
indigenous literatures, especially Native American literatures. For example, Hertha Wong 
has celebrated first-person-plural narration in Native American women’s 
autobiographies, showing how Indian women use “we” narration to “(re)-construct” 
Native female subjectivities (“First Person” 176-77). In several studies of “we” narration 
in Native American fiction, Erdrich has been cited as a representative example of a 
Native writer who employs the first-person-plural point of view to communicate the 
importance of belonging to a tribal community. Fabienne Quennet has suggested that 
Erdrich’s use of “we” narration in Tracks “functions as a reminder that belonging to a 
family and to the community of the tribe is of paramount importance for Native 
American people” (61). Richardson echoes Quennet’s reading of Tracks, arguing that 
“we” narration in Erdrich’s novel establishes a “traditional, collective sensibility” that 
resists “the encroaching world of the white people” (Unnatural 51-2).246 
However, despite the widespread critical focus on authors who use “we” narration 
to establish communal voices in opposition to colonial and/or patriarchal regimes, the 
“we” narration that we see on display in Erdrich and Dorris’s public statements about 
their writing collaboration reveals how first-person-plural narration can also be used as a 
strategy for simulating colonial dominance by disguising oppression and containing 
opposition.247 Edward Said hinted at the oppressive force of “we” narration years ago 
when he noted in Orientalism that colonial discourse is centrally informed by its repeated 
insistence on distinguishing between the familiar “we” of the Occident and the foreign 
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“them” of the Orient (3, 43-4).248 As Said demonstrates through his readings of colonial 
discourse, the ideological power of “we” narration results from the fact that so many 
Western and Eastern writers “accept” the “basic distinction” between “we” and “them” 
and use this distinction as a “starting point” for describing colonial encounters (2).249 In 
Culture and Imperialism, Said again points to the oppressive power of “we” narration in 
colonial discourse when he talks about narratives of “collaboration” between “natives” 
and “representatives of imperialism” (263-64). These narratives of collaboration, which 
describe scenes of cooperation between West and East, still maintain a fundamental 
distinction between “we” and “them.” Propagated not only by Western writers but also by 
Eastern “intellectuals,” “artists,” and “journalists,” narratives of collaboration function, 
Said tells us, as “passive” forms of colonial accommodation that ultimately help 
“preserve” the “divide between native and Westerner” (263-64).250 
  The pretense of collaboration that Said sees at play in colonial examples of “we” 
narration is the driving force behind Erdrich and Dorris’s use of first-person-plural point 
of view in their public accounts of their writing partnership. For Erdrich and Dorris, “we” 
narration functioned as a strategy of dominance and containment through which Dorris 
silenced Erdrich’s reservations about the collaboration and disavowed important 
differences between the two writers. By repeatedly insisting that they represented one 
collaborative unit, Erdrich and Dorris effectively denied the significant ways in which 
their writing was informed by their own individual experiences and perspectives. The 
most important differences that the couple disavowed in their public comments about 
their collaboration were their differences in sex and gender. In Writing Together, Writing 
Apart, Linda Karell concludes that the intensely collaborative nature of Erdrich and 
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Dorris’s writing partnership made it virtually impossible to determine if the couple’s 
working relationship was “gendered in any simple or biographical way” (44). Not 
surprisingly, Dorris asserted on numerous occasions that sex and gender played no role in 
determining how he and his wife composed their books or later talked about them. “As it 
turns out,” Dorris reported to Daniel Bourne in 1996, “[Louise] writes often in male 
voices and I in female voices, and neither of us have exerted our sort of ‘insider gender 
knowledge’ to date. We make lots of other very critical remarks about what works and 
what doesn’t work, but somehow writing across gender isn’t our big problem” (par. 9). 
Identifying himself as a “feminist,” Dorris explained that his unique upbringing, raised by 
and around women, allowed him to understand, empathize with, and narrate the lives of 
women: “I was raised by women, by strong women—a mother, three aunts, two 
grandmothers. I heard their versions of the world much more clearly and consistently 
than I heard anybody else’s version. So if I have a point of view to draw on other than 
myself, it’s a woman’s point of view” (Chavkin & Chavkin “An Interview With Michael 
Dorris” 206; Wong 42).  
 However, Erdrich’s recent revelations about the collaboration suggest that issues 
of sex and gender were always a determining factor in Erdrich and Dorris’s writing and 
in how the couple talked about their partnership. In her 2010 interview with The Paris 
Review, Erdrich explained why she let Dorris accompany her to the Love Medicine 
interview with The New York Times twenty-five years earlier: “I was tired. Love Medicine 
and Jacklight were published in 1984, and I had a baby. The Beet Queen was published in 
1985, and I bore my second daughter in that year. What kind of woman can do that? A 
tired woman who lets her husband do the talking because she has the two best things—
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the babies and the writing” (160). Indications that Dorris used “we” narration as a 
strategy for both disavowing and exploiting his and Erdrich’s sexual and gender 
differences can be observed as far back as the couple’s earliest interviews together. 
Reading over a transcript of the couple’s interview with Laura Coltelli in 1985, one finds 
that Dorris spends the first part of the interview describing uninterruptedly his and 
Erdrich’s collaborative “storytelling technique” (20). Employing first-person-plural point 
of view while recounting the composition of Erdrich’s award-winning short story “The 
World’s Greatest Fisherman” and the composition of her first novel, Love Medicine, 
Dorris claims equal responsibility for the creation of his wife’s work:  
. . . there was a contest for the Nelson Algren Award for which they solicited 
stories of some five thousand or so words. We got the announcement that it was 
due by the fifteenth of January, and this was the first of January, and we just got 
back from vacation, and so we started talking about it and out of that grew “The 
World’s Greatest Fisherman,” the opening story of the novel Love Medicine, and 
we sent it off and thought of all the things that were wrong with it and what we 
would revise when it came back, and lo and behold, it won that contest. There 
were thousands of entries. We said, if it’s that good maybe we ought to think 
about expanding this and telling that same story because there are many stories in 
that story, from other points of view. And that expanded to developing the 
characters of Nector and Marie and Lulu and on and on. At first it was, I think, a 
series of stories, many of which were published independently, and then in the 
last several drafts we went back and tied them together. (20-1) 
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Following this account, Dorris goes on to describe—once again, employing “we” 
narration—the composition of Erdrich’s second and third novels, The Beet Queen and 
Tracks. Unwilling to grant Erdrich singular ownership over these novels, Dorris refers to 
them instead as “the next book” and “the third book” in their collaboration: “. . . the next 
book, which is titled The Beet Queen . . . And then Tracks, which is the third book . . .” 
(21). Finally, after having firmly established himself as an equal partner in his wife’s 
creations, Dorris turns to Erdrich, who, it turns out, has been absent from the interview up 
to this point because she has been (the transcript now tells us in square brackets) “feeding 
the baby,” and says, “Now you can speak for yourself” (22). Tired, burdened with the 
responsibility of being the primary caretaker for her children, and clearly overwhelmed 
by what Frances Washburn would later characterize as Dorris’s “smothering influence,” 
Erdrich did not then take advantage of what we can only assume was Dorris’s less-than-
genuine prompting for self-expression (Washburn 51). Years later, however, Erdrich 
would clarify that Dorris served strictly as an “editor” on these early projects and did not 
participate in the production of the writing.251 She would, for example, later recall that 
she wrote “The World’s Greatest Fisherman” by herself one day after secluding herself in 
a room in the couple’s New Hampshire home (Grantham 13).252 
 At other times, Dorris used “we” narration to claim legitimacy as a “feminist” 
writer. In a 1986 interview with Hertha Wong, he used first-person-plural point of view 
as a cover for making radical claims about his ability to write from the first-person 
perspective of a woman. Speaking about the composition of his first novel, A Yellow Raft 
in Blue Water, Dorris made the following argument for why the novel should be viewed 
as a “feminist” text: “We do a risky thing in this book. I describe giving birth from a first-
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person perspective. Those who have read it so far like it, but somebody said, ‘I don’t 
know whether they’ll ever sell it at a feminist bookstore in San Francisco.’ [Laughter.] I 
hope they do because I participated closely in the birth of two of my daughters as a 
helper, and then I delivered a baby when I was doing field work. And I’ve talked to a lot 
of women about their experience of delivery” (42). Here, Dorris uses the first-person-
plural “We” at the outset of his comments as a cover for making first-person-singular 
claims about his intimate familiarity with the experience of giving birth. Just as he did in 
the Coltelli interview a year earlier, Dorris uses “we” narration here at a time when 
Erdrich is not present to contradict him. At the point in the interview when Dorris makes 
these claims, Erdrich has, we are told, stepped away to “pick up the kids” (40). In the 
Coltelli interview, Dorris used “we” narration (and the occasion of Erdrich’s absence) to 
misrepresent his role in producing her fiction. In the Wong interview, he used “we” 
narration (and the occasion of Erdrich’s absence) to misrepresent his own fiction as 
feminist. In both cases, it is worth mentioning, Erdrich is absent because she is busy 
being a mother to the couple’s children. 
In controlling the couple’s narrative about their collaboration and misrepresenting 
his role in producing Erdrich’s fiction, Dorris acted as a colonial figure. He colonized 
both the couple’s narrative about their collaboration and the fiction that Erdrich 
produced. In their book Hospitality and Authoring, Richard and Janis Haswell draw on J. 
Hillis Miller’s notion of the “host critic” to put forward a theory of “colonial 
criticism.”253 Reframing Hillis Miller’s well-known criticism of deconstruction (1977) as 
a criticism of colonial discourse, Haswell and Haswell refigure the deconstructive reader 
as a “colonial critic” who “invades the text and takes control of it as host” (67). Rather 
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than receive the text with reciprocal hospitality, the colonial critic “betrays” the 
hospitality shown by the author by “deconstructing,” “transforming,” and “rewriting” the 
text (9). In “den[ying] the author’s presence” and “totaliz[ing] the author’s singular 
vision,” the colonial critic “repeats the gestures of first world domination of third world 
resources” (68). By “colonizing” the text and assuming the sovereign role of host, the 
colonial critic upsets the balance of relations that makes reciprocal hospitality between 
author and reader possible: “The guest-reader wrests control of the text from the author 
and assumes the role of host-critic. Initially foreign and guest, the critic cannibalizes the 
writer, once native and host. No reciprocal exchange ensues” (8-9). 
Dorris acted as a colonial critic with respect to Erdrich by publicly declaring 
equal sovereignty over her work. He betrayed her hospitality by misrepresenting the role 
he played in producing the fiction she shared with him. He denied Erdrich’s claim to 
singular host status by attempting to disavow the truth of her prior sovereignty over her 
own work. Rather than accept and acknowledge his secondary role as a guest of Erdrich’s 
hospitality, Dorris exercised control over Erdrich by colonizing the products of her labor. 
In using “we” narration to disavow the differential nature of their partnership, Erdrich 
and Dorris employed first-person-plural point of view to very different effect than we 
commonly see in colonial discourse. Whereas traditional colonial “we” narratives 
establish a familiar “we” in opposition to a foreign “them,” Erdrich and Dorris created a 
collaborative “we” with no oppositional “them.” By imagining themselves as equal 
sovereigns, Erdrich and Dorris imagined a model of collaborative authorial hospitality in 
which there was no distinction between host and guest.254 
XI 
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For Erdrich, The Crown of Columbus provided an opportunity to separate herself 
creatively from Dorris. In The Paris Review interview, she explained, “So in agreeing to 
write The Crown of Columbus I really made a deal, at least in my thoughts, that if we 
wrote this one book together, then we could openly work separately—as we always did in 
truth, of course” (158). Erdrich came up with the “idea” for the novel, conducted the 
necessary historical research, and wrote the first twenty pages herself. Then, she told 
Dorris that they could divide up the novel into parts and each contribute their own 
original writing to create their first “truly” collaborative work, one that would feature 
both of their names on the cover (158; Trueheart 118).255 Erdrich “hoped” this would 
appease her husband and make him feel that she had now given him “enough,” that it 
would no longer be necessary for him to continue coveting what she had (158). 
Instead, The Crown of Columbus became the ideal model of collaboration for 
Dorris. Rather than satiate or defuse Dorris’s need to parasite off his wife’s work, the 
new kind of partnership only intensified this need: “. . . it became the beginning of what 
he wanted for every book. When he told me he wanted both of our names on every book 
now, something in me—the writer, I guess—couldn’t bear it any longer and that was the 
beginning of the long ending” (158-59). Eventually, Erdrich found that Dorris had so 
“infected” both her writing and her life that she could no longer identify her own face in 
the mirror: “I looked into the mirror and I saw Michael” (160). Desperate to reclaim 
something of her own, something that Dorris could not contaminate, Erdrich began 
writing “in secret,” composing a novel that she “didn’t show him” (160). No longer 
willing to be host to her husband’s parasitic needs, Erdrich managed to separate herself 
from Dorris both creatively and romantically in 1995 (Washburn 51).256 But not before 
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collaborating with Dorris to write The Crown of Columbus, a novel that, in its self-
referential critique of the couple’s collaboration, directly undermines Erdrich and 
Dorris’s utopian narrative of the partnership. 
 The Crown of Columbus does not merely reframe the Erdrich-Dorris collaboration 
as a colonial relationship. It also restores Erdrich’s privileged status as the host-author in 
the relationship through its deliberate characterization of Vivian as a provider of 
hospitality and its use of a dialogic narrative structure that privileges Vivian’s indigenous 
female voice. In the process, the novel exposes the couple’s public narrative about their 
collaboration as a simulation of dominance designed to repress the real truth about the 
partnership and replaces this false narrative with a new simulation of survivance in the 
form of Vivian’s story.  
 Although Vivian willingly accepts the role of guest in her interactions with Henry 
Cobb, Erdrich and Dorris more often than not figure her as a host in scenes of hospitality. 
In Chapter 5, for example, Vivian plays “host” when she invites her students to her home 
for an end-of-the-semester dinner (79). In fact, it is while hosting her students at her 
home that she delivers her lecture on the history of Native American hospitality to 
Europeans and Americans since Columbus (81-4). In this scene of hospitality, Vivian 
performs for her students the Native hospitality that her revisionist account of the contact 
period attempts to recover. In performing the role of host for her students, Vivian models 
a cultural practice of hospitality that is cooperative and participatory. The end-of-the-
semester dinner she hosts is a modern-day “potluck,” a give-and-take-style feast to which 
each of her students “contributes” a dish (79-81). In hosting a potluck, Vivian maintains 
her sovereign status while distributing the responsibilities for providing and receiving 
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hospitality among her students. In the tradition of the Northwestern American Indian 
potlatch, Vivian uses the potluck to affirm communal ties by reminding her students of 
their social obligations to one another.257 
 In figuring Vivian as a host, Erdrich and Dorris are deliberate in figuring her as a 
female host. In no way is this more apparent than in their descriptions of Vivian as a 
provider of hospitality to Violet. Erdrich and Dorris are sure to remind us on numerous 
occasions that Vivian can provide hospitality to her daughter in ways that only a woman 
can. It is no accident that Erdrich and Dorris focus so much attention early in the novel on 
Vivian’s pregnant body or that, after Vivian gives birth to Violet, they include so many 
scenes in which she breastfeeds her daughter. In emphasizing the “nourishment” that 
Vivian provides Violet both before and after birth, Erdrich and Dorris figure the female 
body as the original home and source of hospitality (225).258 As Vivian herself observes, 
her body, unlike Roger’s, is capable of both “incubating” Violet and providing her with 
“sustenance” (225). Whereas Roger is limited in his ability to provide hospitality by his 
“maleness,” Vivian is “extended” by her femaleness (225). The hospitality that Vivian 
provides her daughter makes her feel like “more than just” herself; it makes possible an 
intimacy between her and Violet that Roger cannot know (225). Even Roger 
acknowledges as much when he grudgingly admits that Vivian is more “biologically 
equipped” than he to care for their daughter (225).  
  Erdrich and Dorris are just as deliberate in figuring Vivian as a Native American 
host. Like Zitkala-Ša, Vivian embraces a model of hospitality that is largely informed by 
the life experiences and cultural values of Native women. Centrally involved in forming 
Vivian’s viewpoints on and practices of hospitality is her Navajo grandmother Angeline, 
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who lives with her and helps her raise Nash. More than any other character in The Crown 
of Columbus, Angeline plays a role in helping Vivian maintain her cultural ties to her 
Native ancestors. One of the many ways in which Angeline does this is by serving as a 
link between traditional Navajo cultural practices of hospitality and Vivian’s own 
modern-day practices. In her role as a foil to Roger, Angeline counters Roger’s white 
male model of hospitality with a matriarchal model informed by her Navajo heritage. 
Roger criticizes Angeline for not being “hospitable” to him when he comes to visit, but 
Roger’s expectations of how he should be treated in Vivian’s home are, as we have seen, 
informed by his belief that his maleness and “cross-hatched New England pedigree” 
afford him certain privileges (180, 57). The idea that “where [Angeline] comes from, the 
woman is the king” is too much for Roger to accept (58). Because of his unwillingness to 
try to understand Angeline or the model of hospitality that she practices, Roger interprets 
her behavior toward him as “positively hostile” (58). Nevertheless, the example of 
hospitality that Angeline embodies and that Vivian emulates requires readers of The 
Crown of Columbus to question Roger’s settler colonial model and the racist and 
gendered assumptions upon which it is based.  
 In celebrating the ending of The Crown of Columbus, a number of critics have 
praised Erdrich and Dorris for creating a Native female protagonist who, they argue, 
establishes a strong, authoritative voice in the novel’s final chapters. Teresa Cid, who 
applauds the novel’s ending as an “affirmation” of multicultural “inclusion,” maintains 
that it is not until the final scenes of The Crown of Columbus that Vivian “finally 
conquers the right to speak” (347).259 According to Cid, Vivian gains the necessary self-
confidence to speak in the novel’s final chapters by learning to overcome cultural 
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“boundaries” that attempt to “circumscribe” her use of “language” (347). The 
corresponding result of Vivian’s newly discovered “authoritative voice” is, Cid tells us, 
Roger’s sudden willingness in the novel’s final scenes to “listen” to Vivian “for the first 
time” (347).   
 Yet, readings such as these, which contend that Vivian suddenly acquires an 
authoritative voice in the novel’s final chapters, fail to account for the fact that Vivian 
confidently and authoritatively claims and exercises her “right to speak” on numerous 
occasions before the end of The Crown of Columbus. In fact, if there is anything that is 
clear about Vivian as a character, it is that she is anything but reticent to speak. In her 
conversations with Roger, Cobb, and others, she speaks with unmistakable confidence 
and authority, expressing her opinions openly and with self-possession. One might even 
say that Vivian’s first encounter with Roger in the Dartmouth library, after which she is 
left wishing that she had said less, suggests that she could actually benefit from showing 
more restraint in her speech (34-43).  
 Cid’s reading of The Crown of Columbus also fails to account for the fact that, 
beginning with the novel’s very first chapter, Erdrich and Dorris indicate Vivian’s 
willingness and ability to speak confidently and authoritatively through her first-person 
narration. Vivian’s narration is candid and assertive. She describes events with self-
assurance and shares her feelings willingly. Her first-person narrative often reads like a 
confession, like it is a means through which she unburdens herself of her most private 
thoughts, fears, and desires.  
 Erdrich and Dorris use dialogic narration in The Crown of Columbus to figure 
Vivian and, by extension, Erdrich as indigenous female hosts. One cannot help but note 
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the stark differences between the styles of narration employed by Vivian and Roger in 
The Crown of Columbus and the style of narration employed by Erdrich and Dorris in 
describing their writing collaboration. In the novel, Vivian and Roger each use first-
person narration to speak on behalf of themselves. They recount events from their own 
individual perspectives and express their own individual opinions. Roger, like Vivian, is 
forthcoming in his narration, sharing his most intimate thoughts and feelings, regardless 
of how arrogant, xenophobic, or callous they sound. In contrast to Vivian and Roger, 
Erdrich and Dorris use first-person-plural narration to speak as one collective unit. They 
use the cover of “we” to deny their own individual differences and to repress their 
differences of opinion. Whereas the dialogic narration of the novel enables open 
communication, the “we” narration of Erdrich and Dorris’s public discourse enables 
repression. If Vivian and Roger are symbolic representations of Erdrich and Dorris, then 
we can read Vivian and Roger’s first-person narratives as symbolic representations of 
their own first-person voices. In other words, the dialogic narration of the novel enables 
Erdrich and Dorris to speak to one another through the first-person voices of their 
characters and to engage in the dialogue that “we” narration prohibits. Through the voices 
of their characters, Erdrich and Dorris address their own individual concerns about their 
collaboration and explore the ways in which a colonial politics of recognition 
fundamentally informs their public discourse about their collaboration. 
 Yet, it would be a mistake to read Vivian and Roger’s first-person narratives as a 
simple back-and-forth dialogue between Erdrich and Dorris. Other critics have failed to 
fully understand the implications of the novel’s dialogic narrative structure because they 
have misunderstood the text’s composition. David McNab, for example, assumes 
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incorrectly that Erdrich and Dorris divided up composition of the novel by narrator. He 
assumes that Erdrich wrote the passages narrated by Vivian and that Dorris wrote the 
passages narrated by Roger.260 Based on this presumption, McNab concludes that Dorris 
inhabits the voice of a “white” man in the novel and Erdrich the voice of a Native 
American woman (112). However, Erdrich has made clear that she and Dorris did not 
compose the novel in this way. Instead, the two authors wrote The Crown of Columbus 
episodically, handing the text off to one another between and sometimes in the middle of 
scenes. In a 1993 interview, Erdrich explained that she and Dorris did not “plan” the 
“plot” of The Crown of Columbus “completely in advance” and would often “create a 
difficult situation for a character” and then hand the text over to the other author to 
“figure out what should come next” (Chavkin 225). In taking this approach to the 
composition of The Crown of Columbus, Erdrich and Dorris shared the work of writing 
from the perspectives of both of the novel’s main characters. The result was that both 
authors gave voice not only to their own fictional counterparts but also to the fictional 
counterparts of one another. This approach to composing the novel enabled Erdrich and 
Dorris to inhabit the symbolic voices of one another and, in the process, to reflect in those 
voices the words and sentiments that they wished they could hear from one another. In 
this sense, The Crown of Columbus offered Erdrich and Dorris a space for working 
through the challenges they faced as collaborators and for imagining a more honest and 
constructive working relationship. Through the characters of Vivian and Roger, who 
ultimately achieve a more balanced partnership, Erdrich and Dorris envisioned a model 
for repairing their own writing collaboration. 
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 With this in mind, one cannot help but read Vivian and Roger’s writing 
collaboration in the final chapters of the novel as a metafictional commentary on Erdrich 
and Dorris’s own composition of The Crown of Columbus. Like Erdrich, who wrote the 
first twenty pages of The Crown of Columbus before involving Dorris in the novel’s 
composition, Vivian begins writing the Columbus article before agreeing to collaborate 
with Roger. Like Dorris, Roger claims co-ownership over his partner’s writing and 
achieves public recognition for it by having his name added to the byline. Like Dorris, in 
other words, Roger uses a pretense of collaboration to disavow his own colonial 
behavior. At the same time, it is also possible to read Vivian and Roger’s writing 
collaboration as a practical act of authorial hospitality on Vivian’s part. Vivian’s 
willingness to write collaboratively with Roger and to include his name in the author 
byline for the article does not necessarily mean that she surrenders her authorial 
sovereignty or that Roger colonizes her scholarship. Vivian’s invitation to collaborate 
with Roger could be an act of hospitality that serves to affirm Vivian’s sovereignty as an 
author and her authority as a scholar. In this way, extending hospitality to Roger could be 
Vivian’s way of establishing a new model of collaboration for the couple—a model that 
begins with the recognition, at least privately, that Vivian is the host, the one who has the 
power to offer hospitality. 
 Recognizing Vivian as a host in her writing collaboration with Roger likewise 
involves recognizing Erdrich as a host in her writing collaboration with Dorris. Just as 
Vivian’s invitation of authorial hospitality to Roger affirms her status as host, Erdrich’s 
invitation to write The Crown of Columbus with Dorris affirmed her power in the 
couple’s relationship. In agreeing to include Dorris’s name on the byline, Erdrich 
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relegated “we” to the novel’s title page while using Vivian’s first-person narration to 
voice a narrative of survivance in opposition to colonial simulations of dominance. 
Through the text of The Crown of Columbus, Erdrich externalized and overcame the 
colonial trauma that the couple’s public narrative sought to repress and disavow. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 I first started reading American literature through a theoretical lens of hospitality 
when I came across an interview that Jacques Derrida gave in October 2001. In the 
interview, Derrida interprets the events of 9/11 and the U.S.’s developing response to 
these events through a theoretical framework of hospitality. He notes, for example, that 
the 9/11 attacks were made possible by acts of hospitality—acts that granted the terrorists 
admittance into the United States and subsequently allowed them to stay in the 
country.261 He also notes that the U.S. responded to the terrorist attacks with acts of 
inhospitality—acts that withheld welcome from or conditioned the welcome of “others” 
based on racial, religious, national, and/or ethnic differences.262 With this in mind, 
Derrida frames 9/11 as an event that tests American hospitality, that compels Americans 
to reevaluate their commitment to a national ethos of hospitality.263  
 I found Derrida’s take on 9/11 to be compelling. I was intrigued by the idea of 
thinking about U.S. history and U.S. politics through a theoretical framework of 
hospitality. It provided me with a fresh approach to thinking through questions about 
immigration, racial profiling, migrant labor, and racial segregation. By chance, I read 
Derrida’s interview right before reading The Grapes of Wrath for the first time. When I 
read Steinbeck’s novel, I saw tropes of hospitality on every page. It seemed like every 
scene in the novel was in some way or another a scene of hospitality. Yet, when I started 
to read criticism about The Grapes of Wrath, I found that almost no one had written about 
hospitality in the novel. I was dumbfounded. I reread the novel. Then, I read it a third 
time. I was now even more convinced that I wasn’t imagining something that wasn’t 
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there: The Grapes of Wrath really is centrally invested in exploring questions about 
hospitality. But the more carefully I read The Grapes of Wrath the more I realized that 
Derrida’s body of theoretical work on hospitality, vast though it is, could not fully 
account for the critique of American hospitality that Steinbeck performs in the novel or 
the improvised ethics of hospitality that Steinbeck’s migrants adopt in the novel or the 
ways in which Steinbeck makes creative use of narrative form to reflect on his own 
narrative’s account of American hospitality. Derrida provided me with a theoretical 
foundation for launching my reading of The Grapes of Wrath, but it was the novel itself 
that eventually taught me how to read it. It was the Joads and not Derrida who provided 
me with an early sense of what an ethics of affirmative hospitality could look like in 
practice. 
Reading, researching, and writing about The Grapes of Wrath gave me my first 
indication that I had observed something in American fiction that other scholars had not 
yet fully explored. I started to think back over other major American fiction I had read. 
The obvious place to start was southern fiction. I knew that the South was very proud of 
its regional culture of hospitality, so it stood to reason that southern literature featured 
fiction that includes scenes and descriptions of southern hospitality. It did not take long 
for me to call to mind the formative scene in Absalom, Absalom! when Sutpen is turned 
away from the front door of a plantation house. Rereading this scene as a scene of 
inhospitality made me realize not only how central this scene is to the novel but also how 
central discourses of hospitality are to the novel. I thought back over other twentieth-
century southern fiction and came to similar conclusions about the centrality of 
hospitality to these texts. I thought of Katherine Anne Porter’s Noon Wine, Flannery 
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O’Connor’s “The Displaced Person,” and Eudora Welty’s “The Hitch-Hikers” and “A 
Visit of Charity.” I thought back over other work by Faulkner, most notably As I Lay 
Dying and Light in August. I thought back over pretty much everything I’d ever read by 
Richard Wright, both his fiction and non-fiction, both his work set in the South and his 
work set in the North. I thought about scenes of interracial hospitality and inhospitality in 
Uncle Tom’s Children, Native Son, 12 Million Black Voices, Black Boy, The Long 
Dream, and Eight Men. I thought, in particular, about the deliberate attention that Wright 
places on describing the feelings of African-American characters during scenes of 
interracial hospitality and inhospitality.264  
 I became curious about the origins of the South’s preoccupation with its regional 
customs of hospitality. I started to read historical accounts of southern hospitality dating 
back to before the founding of the nation. I read dozens of accounts from the seventeenth 
and eighteen centuries written by white male Europeans praising the hospitality they 
received from wealthy white men in the American South. I also read dozens of accounts 
written by white male southerners praising their own hospitality to European visitors. 
Many of the most romantic descriptions of southern hospitality were reports of George 
Washington’s hospitality at Mount Vernon. In these reports, Washington perfectly 
embodied the ideal of the unconditional southern host. He was praised as a man who gave 
without conditions or limitations. Yet, there were also clear indications that this was not 
true. Of course, there were conditions and limitations to Washington’s hospitality. So 
why this need to pretend that Washington and other southern hosts gave unconditionally? 
I started to consider the ideological work that accounts of unconditional southern 
hospitality played and still play in creating and maintaining the South’s regional identity. 
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I began by reading southern fiction that had a reputation for romanticizing southern 
hospitality. I read some of Thomas Dixon’s fiction, most notably The Flaming Sword. 
Dixon’s work helped me understand the racist logic of southern hospitality. But he didn’t 
offer anything in the way of complexity. I resolved to read Mitchell’s Gone With The 
Wind, a novel that I knew had been largely dismissed by literary critics but had 
nevertheless played an undeniably vital role in idealizing antebellum southern hospitality 
for a national audience. What I found when I read Gone With The Wind is that Mitchell’s 
novel does not simply idealize southern hospitality. Mitchell’s account of southern 
hospitality is much more complex. The novel’s romantic descriptions of southern 
hospitality as unconditional are not designed to idealize southern hospitality. They are 
designed to draw attention to the very real ways in which southern hospitality has always 
been conditioned by questions of race, gender, and class. With this in mind, the novel’s 
accounts of unconditional southern hospitality are also designed to allow us to better 
recognize the positive value of acts of conditional hospitality in the novel. Coming to this 
realization helped me better understand what Derrida means when he says that it is the 
idea of unconditional hospitality that enables us to appreciate the affirmative nature of 
conditional hospitality (“A” 129). 
There is no character in American Hospitality who embodies the affirmative spirit 
of conditional hospitality more powerfully or convincingly than Margaret Walker’s Vyry. 
Jubilee rethinks Gone With The Wind and southern hospitality (both antebellum and 
postbellum) from the perspective of a character who knows what it feels like to receive 
hospitality that is conditioned by her race, gender, and class. Through Vyry’s story—and 
the parallel story of Randall Ware—Walker reveals much about southern hospitality that 
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Mitchell and Faulkner never even address. Walker’s focus on the use of biblical tropes of 
hospitality by southern blacks is particularly illuminating. These biblical tropes, like 
Walker’s story of Vyry, provided and provide blacks with redemptive visions of 
hospitality to counter the harsh realities of life lived under to the racist customs of 
southern hospitality.   
 George Washington is by no means merely a southern figure. He is a national 
figure, and mythical accounts of his hospitality at Mount Vernon are tied as much to 
nationalist narratives about American hospitality as they are to regional narratives about 
southern hospitality. Rethinking narratives about American hospitality through the 
example of George Washington prompted me to revisit some other U.S. fiction I had 
read. I thought, in particular, about some Native American authors (Leslie Marmon Silko, 
Sherman Alexie, Charles Eastman, Thomas King, and Louise Erdrich) and how they 
offered a uniquely privileged vantage from which to rethink the foundational assumptions 
of dominant American discourses of hospitality. When I revisited the work of these 
authors, I found that they, like Steinbeck, Mitchell, Faulkner, and Walker, regularly 
employ tropes of hospitality but that the tropes they employ are informed by distinct 
Native American histories and cultures. Researching a Sioux legend by Charles Eastman 
(“The Badger and the Bear”) eventually led me to Zitkala-Ša, and as soon as I started 
reading the Dakota author’s legends, I knew that I had found an author who was 
deliberately and repeatedly using tropes of hospitality both to challenge dominant 
American models of hospitality and to model an ethics that is inspired by indigenous 
histories and ways of knowing. Reading Zitkala-Ša’s extensive body of non-fiction 
writings reinforced this initial impression and helped me ground the insights of her 
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legends in the historical context of Native/non-Native relations in North America. More 
than any other American writer I have read, Zitkala-Ša demonstrates a concerted 
investment in employing tropes of hospitality to narrativize the history of settler 
colonialism in North America. This concerted investment warrants future study. 
 Like Zitkala-Ša, Louise Erdrich is consistent in her use of discourses of 
hospitality to portray Native American life and to narrativize the history of settler 
colonialism in North America. Virtually every one of Erdrich’s novels opens with a scene 
in which hospitality is offered, withheld, received, rejected, taken by force, and/or 
violated in some form or another.265 Love Medicine opens with Jack Mauser inviting June 
Kashpaw to enter the Rigger Bar. The Beet Queen opens with the Adare family arriving 
by train as freeloaders in Argus, Minnesota, where they are promptly welcomed by a 
hostile native. Tracks opens with Nanapush narrating the arrival of consumption, figured 
as an uninvited guest, from the North. The Bingo Palace opens with Lulu Martin visiting 
the post office to send a letter to her grandson inviting him to return home to the 
reservation. The Antelope Wife opens with the U.S. Army invading a peaceful Ojibwe 
village. The Master Butcher’s Singing Club begins with Fidelis Waldvogel being 
welcomed home. Four Souls opens with Polly Elizabeth offering hospitality to Fleur 
Pillager. The Round House opens with Joe Coutts offering a lengthy description of the 
small trees that have penetrated the foundation of his parents’ home, a symbolic 
foreshadowing of the horrific rape that his mother experiences and that leads to a 
complete breakdown of domestic hospitality at the Coutts household. La Rose does not 
open with a scene of hospitality, but the novel is filled with tropes of hospitality, as the 
titles of the novel’s first chapter (“The Door”) and Part I (“Two Houses)” indicate. Even 
    259 
Erdrich’s young adult fiction novels open with scenes of hospitality. Like Tracks, The 
Birchbark House opens with the arrival of an “unwelcome” visitor in the form of disease 
(132, 153). The Game of Silence opens with the arrival of Ojibwe from nearby islands 
who announce that a white chief has issued a removal order to prove space for white 
settlers (21).266 
 And then there is The Crown of Columbus. Although the quality of writing in The 
Crown of Columbus is generally inferior to the quality of writing in Erdrich’s other work, 
the novel’s deliberate use of tropes of hospitality to interrogate both the history of New 
World contact and the Erdrich-Dorris writing collaboration made inclusion of the novel 
in American Hospitality practically a foregone conclusion. The principal value of The 
Crown of Columbus is what it can teach us about parasitic relationships, and the novel 
achieves this teaching most clearly through its use of discourses of hospitality to reflect 
self-consciously on the authors’ own relationship. The Crown of Columbus gives us 
something that no other text in American Hospitality gives us: a reading of authorship as 
a form of hospitality. In this, it reminds us of the inherently textual nature of all 
relationships of hospitality. 
  




The creation of the U.S. South’s regional identity during the Jim Crow period 
relied heavily on a cultural narrative of unconditional southern hospitality. Resistant to 
developments in modernity, southern critics of industrialization, urbanization, 
unionization, desegregation, and women’s rights justified their anti-progressivist politics 
through an ideology premised on a romanticized vision of southern hospitality. By 
maintaining a pretense of hospitality to strangers, southern hosts disavowed their 
rejection, exploitation, and demonization of otherness on a daily basis. Through the 
figure of the stranger, dominant white males in the South attempted to draw attention 
away from their inhospitable treatment of women, blacks, and lower-class whites.  
Moreover, through customs of etiquette codified by state laws, southern hosts constructed 
a pretense of civility that belied the significant role that physical violence played in 
preventing those not in positions of power from overstepping their prescribed roles. At 
the same time, these same customs of etiquette helped perpetuate an ideology of southern 
hospitality by interpellating individuals as subjects in both private and public spaces, by 
providing these individuals with a social framework through which they could imagine 
their relationship to the material conditions of their existence, and by reproducing 
submission to the discriminating worldview of southern hosts. An historical account of 
the South that is attentive to the ways in which the region’s culture of hospitality 
functions as an ideology helps elucidate the connections between southern customs of 
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hospitality and other previously theorized markers of southern identity, such as honor, 
chivalry, etiquette, agrarianism, nostalgia, and passion.267 
I 
The myth of unconditional southern hospitality was invented and perpetuated by 
privileged white men. As early as the first decades of the eighteenth century, hosts in the 
southern colonies and the privileged white male guests they entertained began extolling 
the virtues of the region’s purportedly limitless hospitality.268 In 1705, for example, the 
planter and historian Robert Beverley boasted that Virginians were “very Courteous to 
Travellers” and always prepared to offer “Hospitality” (312-13). Likewise, the Reverend 
Hugh Jones claimed in 1724 that “no people can entertain their Friends with better Cheer 
and Welcome” than Virginians (49). Only nine years later, William Byrd II, a Virginia 
planter and author, made reference in his journal to what he termed the region’s already 
established “Rules of Hospitality” (53). Guests from the northern colonies were no less 
effusive in their praise of southern hospitality. In 1775, Charles Roads traveled from his 
home in New Jersey to North Carolina and left that province in awe of the “Hospitality of 
the Gentlemen of Carolina to Strangers” (qtd. in Kierner 451). Similarly, Jacob Abbott, 
an Amherst College Professor, described “southern hospitality” as “free,” “generous,” 
and “open-hearted” (224). A traveler “finds a welcome at every door,” Abbott reported 
(222-3). Perhaps the most flattering descriptions of antebellum southern hospitality came 
from Englishmen. In a 1746 editorial for The London Magazine, the English adventurer, 
compiler, and novelist Edward Kimber recalled that he experienced “universal 
Hospitality” in his visit to the South.  “[T]heir Manner of Living,” observed Kimber, “is 
quite generous and open” (4). Similarly, during his visit to Virginia in 1799, the English 
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actor and biographer John Bernard characterized southern manners as “truly hospitable,” 
“refine[d],” and “convivial” (146).  
  No historical figure played a more formative role in the creation of the myth of 
southern hospitality than George Washington. Famously dedicated to an ethos of 
“common civility and hospitality,” Washington welcomed visitors to Mount Vernon on a 
massive scale. “Every one was welcome,” reports Paul Wilstach. “[B]rothers and sisters, 
nephews and nieces, and cousins to remote degrees; friends passing north and south, 
crossing from Maryland to lower Virginia, or only on their way to the plantation next 
beyond.  Not least welcome were strangers . . . (Mount Vernon 194, 89). Between 1768 
and 1775, about two thousand visitors were entertained at Mount Vernon. All were 
reportedly allowed to stay for as long as they wished (Dalzell & Dalzell 192). After the 
American Revolution, Washington assumed the role of “national host” and endeavored to 
fashion Mount Vernon into a model of hospitality for a burgeoning nation (Freeman 527; 
Lee 26). With Washington’s newfound fame came even more visitors to Mount Vernon. 
Before the war, Washington reserved the right to choose his own guests. After the war, 
however, “they came whether he invited them or not, and often the group around the 
table at dinner included people he had never met before. . . . But high or low, famous or 
not, they all had to be received with appropriate courtesy” (Dalzell & Dalzell 196). 
Mount Vernon received so many visitors after the Revolution that Washington remarked 
in a 1797 letter to a friend that he and Martha had not once had the opportunity to dine by 
themselves in twenty years (Freeman 714).   
 Interpreting his role of national host as obliging him to a kind of Cynic 
cosmopolitanism, Washington was committed to treating both familiars and strangers 
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with the same spirit of generous hospitality.269 Ultimately, Washington’s boundless 
generosity resulted in a blurring of the distinction between his private and public lives.270 
By opening his doors to thousands of guests, some known and others unknown, 
Washington surrendered both his autonomy and his privacy. As a host dedicated to 
providing a model of hospitality for a new nation, Washington often placed the needs of 
strangers above the sensibilities of those closest to him. In 1787, for example, 
Washington realized that he was unable to provide his mother with the hospitality she 
desired because he was too overburdened with the responsibility of providing for others. 
In a letter to his mother, Washington felt obliged to warn Mary of what she would find if 
she came to Mount Vernon: 
My house is at your service, and [I] would press you most sincerely and most 
devoutly to accept it, but I am sure, and candor requires me to say, it will never 
answer your purposes in any shape whatsoever.  For in truth it may be compared 
to a well resorted tavern, as scarcely any strangers who are going from north to 
south, or from south to north, do not spend a day or two at it. (Fitzpatrick 160-61) 
Here, we can see the practical limitations of Washington’s pursuit for unconditional 
hospitality: his inability to provide for his mother underscores the inevitable impossibility 
of achieving his own ideal. Even Washington, the prototype of the southern host, found 
himself so overwhelmed by the significant burdens of providing hospitality that he could 
not fulfill his obligations.   
 The cultural narrative of George Washington’s unconditional hospitality ignores 
the essential role that slaves played in the production—the labor and the presentation—of 
hospitality at Mount Vernon, as well as the grueling conditions of life for slaves on the 
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plantation. For the 317 slaves on Washington’s plantation, life at Mount Vernon was 
“rough” and “rigorous” (Haworth 212).271 In fact, despite performing “virtually all of the 
essential functions” on Washington’s estate, the President’s slaves were “entitled to 
nothing more than food and a roof over their heads” (Hirschfield 18, 32). During his visit 
to Mount Vernon during the summer of 1798, the well-known Polish soldier, poet, and 
statesman Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz observed that Washington’s slaves “work all week, 
not having a single day for themselves, except for holidays. One sees by that that the 
condition of our peasants is infinitely better” (qtd. in Hirschfeld 54).272  For Washington, 
the pretense of kindliness to his slaves was more important than his real actions. Only 
after he began to fear for his reputation did he decide to improve conditions for slaves on 
his plantation. “I will not have my feelings hurt with complaints of this sort, nor lye under 
the imputation of starving my negros,” Washington insisted at one point during the 1790s 
when he learned that he was “being criticized” for not providing his slaves with enough 
food (qtd. in Haworth 210-11). Smart enough to understand that the appearance of 
frugality, even in the treatment of his slaves, threatened his reputation as a generous host, 
Washington “hurriedly directed” that his slaves’ provisions be increased (210). In the 
end, maintaining the pretense of a hospitable plantation was Washington’s primary 
concern. 
 Despite George Washington’s admirable efforts to achieve an ideal of 
unconditional hospitality, the practical and political limitations of antebellum southern 
hospitality were significant. Although Washington made sacrifices on behalf of strangers, 
the culture of southern hospitality differentiated between familiars and strangers. 
Southern hosts claimed to offer unconditional welcome to strangers, but the truth is that 
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they were often hostile to outsiders. As Bertram Wyatt-Brown has shown, southern 
hospitality began as a “family-centered” tradition (332). Whereas those of means were 
“obliged” to extend their hospitality to less fortunate kinfolk, expectations were 
“considerably more discretionary” in the case of strangers (334). For example, in his 
Travels in the Confederation (1783-1784), the German physician Johann David Schoepf 
observed that the “much-praised” hospitality of Virginia was “by no means unrestricted” 
(93). Instead, he found that it was “confined to acquaintances and those who [were] 
recommended” (93). The hostile nature of the hospitality Schoepf experienced can be 
appreciated in the following account of his travels to the east coast of Virginia: 
We were told of a ‘mighty hospitable man’ living on the road; and yesterday’s 
praise of Virginia hospitality still resounding in our ears, we were willing to try 
our fortune, rode 12 long miles through sand, marsh, and forest on an arm of 
Nansemond Creek, and asked politely for a night’s lodgings at the house 
recommended.  It was dark, a dismal, cheerless Christmas Eve.  After repeated 
inquiries as to where we had come from, who had sent us, &c.; after so many 
reminders that this was no public house, but travelers (who withstood repulse) 
were taken in gratis; and after prolonged counsel between man and wife, we were 
at least received, with an ill grace.  The next morning we took leave early and 
expeditiously.  Not far from the house we passed Everit’s Bridge, named for our 
host, who had built it by authority from Assembly so as to bring the road, which 
lay in a different direction, before his house and store.  Although he expected and 
got advantage from this change in the road, he considered it no business of his to 
look after the comfort of travellers. (96) 
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As Schoepf’s anecdote suggests, unless a stranger could provide a “special claim to 
hospitality”—an introductory letter, for instance, or some other evidence of intimacy with 
a respected acquaintance—then he was met with “suspicion, particularly if the request for 
lodgings came unexpectedly” (Wyatt-Brown 335). Here, the distinction that Derrida 
draws between the “hospitality of invitation” (hospitality offered to an invited guest) and 
the “hospitality of visitation” (hospitality offered to an unsuspected visitor) is particularly 
relevant.273 In the antebellum households of the South, an unconditional hospitality of 
visitation did not exist because guests were not welcomed openly unless they were 
invited, either by the hosts themselves or by those whose attestations carried significant 
weight. In the case of unexpected visitations, suspicion was the rule rather than the 
exception; “special” were those who were received, and even then, they were received 
under specified conditions.274 Ultimately, the figure of the welcome stranger, upon which 
the ideology of southern hospitality predicated its discriminatory politics, was an empty 
signifier, a cultural fabrication designed to protect privileged white men behind a cloak of 
unconditional hospitality. 
 Like George Washington, southern hosts relied on the pretense of unconditional 
hospitality to establish their public reputations as honorable men.275 As an “indicator of 
wealth and cultural attainment,” the power to offer or withhold hospitality became “the 
peculiar province of elite men” and “legitimated their social dominance” in antebellum 
society (Kierner 449-52). Thus, through their public personas as hosts, white men 
reaffirmed their power over members of their households and over those of inadequate 
social standing from whom they chose to withhold hospitality. In the case of desired 
guests, the offering of hospitality took the form of a “social competition” in which hosts 
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competed for the honor of bestowing hospitality (Kierner 453). Accordingly, hosts 
throughout the antebellum South kept tabs on one another, judging the hospitality they 
received at neighboring plantations and noting the guests who came and went from the 
households of other hosts (Kierner 453). In effect, the desire of southern hosts to maintain 
the appearance of unconditional hospitality amounted to a collective compulsion. In his 
Retrospections of America, 1797-1811, the Englishman John Bernard reveals how overly 
solicitous southern hosts motivated by this compulsion often shifted the burden in the 
exchange of hospitality from the host to the guest. After describing how a Virginia 
planter spent a hot summer day “bathing, drinking, shooting, and fishing” in a pond near 
his plantation, Bernard offers the following account: 
If at length the form of a stranger appeared, he sprang from his plank and shouted 
an invitation to alight and take a drop of something sociable.  If the traveller 
refused, up went the rifle to his shoulder, and compliance was demanded in the 
tone of a European footpad.  The stranger now saw that pleasure was policy, 
however urgent might be his business; but if he were so unguarded as to yield to 
his next request to ‘strip and take a swim, he speedily found himself irretrievably 
in the clutches of this human alligator.  The planter fixed in him all the claws of 
nog, flip, sling, and toddy, until the brain of the victim became so confused that 
the grinning negroes had no difficulty in stowing him into the wagon, whereupon 
the poles were struck, the horses buckled in, and the delighted planter returned 
home with his prize, whom he probably cooped up in a back-room with a 
chevaux-de-frise of bottles, until, by some desperate effort, the captive made his 
escape.  (152) 
    268 
Here, Bernard employs hyperbole and metaphor to characterize the receiving of 
hospitality as “compliance” rather than gratitude. The host is figured as a violent and 
devious monster, a despot intent on satisfying his own “pleasure” and not the pleasure of 
his guest. Held “captive” by his host, the guest receives no welcome; stripped of his 
subjectivity, he becomes the object of his host’s fascination and amusement. A victim of 
his host’s compulsive “policy” of forcing guests to receive inhospitality disguised as 
hospitality, the guest of Bernard’s planter emerges from his captivity with a view of 
southern hospitality as “antagonist[ic]” rather than generous (153). In the end, the host’s 
compulsion to secure a guest takes precedence over any attempt to engage in a face-to-
face encounter with the individual he ensnares. So determined to perform his role as host, 
Bernard’s planter loses sight of achieving any semblance of ideal hospitality. 
 What Bernard’s critique of the Virginia planter emphasizes is the performative 
quality of southern hospitality. The pervasive nature of the ideology of southern 
hospitality dictated that exchanges of hospitality between hosts and guests were always 
performances. In fashioning themselves as chivalrous hosts, southern white men aspired 
to achieve a cultural ideal of chivalric hospitality by pretending that their offerings of 
hospitality were driven by honor rather than self-interest.  Each encounter with a guest 
amounted to an imitation of this ideal of chivalry, even in cases when the host’s 
hypocrisy was self-evident. For poor southern whites, the socially constructed desire to 
perform the duties expected of an ideal host posed significant economic challenges. After 
all, the vast majority of southerners did not possess the resources to provide the kind of 
bountiful hospitality that guests received at Mount Vernon. Therefore, when strangers 
were received at southern homes, they were often asked to give money, either to cover 
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the costs of their stay or, in some cases, for the host’s profit (Wyatt-Brown 336). “The 
charges,” Wyatt-Brown explains, “were a means to make a distinction between family-
centered obligation and the treatment of an alien. The cash signified the termination of 
obligation” (336). Here, the pretense that southern hosts proffered hospitality in the spirit 
of an unconditional gift breaks down. In truth, all exchanges of southern hospitality were 
exchanges of commodities. Interpellated as subjects in the South’s capitalist economy, 
hosts and guests were always already engaging in public transactions—transactions that 
were often made possible only because of the labor carried out by other subjects.276 In 
this sense, Marcel Mauss’s well-known deconstruction of “disinterested” gift exchange 
describes perfectly the duplicitous mentality of southern hospitality: “The form usually 
taken is that of the gift generously offered; but the accompanying behaviour is formal 
pretence and social deception, while the transaction itself is based on obligation and 
economic self-interest” (71, 1). Southern hosts often took advantage of this “social 
deception,” manipulating southern codes of honor in order to demonstrate superiority 
over others. In public taverns, for example, the tradition of offering a drink to a stranger 
in the guise of an unconditional gift was, in reality, an underhanded way of challenging 
the stranger’s honor and his financial means. “Guest and host were supposed to show 
respect for each other, and failure to do so sundered the transaction of honor in which 
they were engaged,” reports Wyatt-Brown. “The stranger in a tavern, for instance, was 
invited to be the first to drink or at least be the first to receive the gift of a glass from the 
rest.  But he was under obligation to play host to the next round—thereby making equal 
all parties present, each in turn serving as guest and host.  The coercion implicit in that 
situation should be evident, but so should the brittleness of the feelings under the restraint 
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of the hospitable code” (339). Customs of southern hospitality, therefore, were embedded 
in a capitalist economy that both shaped and helped perpetuate the privileges of southern 
hosts.   
 Performances of southern hospitality during the antebellum period were informed 
by regional codes of racial and gender etiquette. These codes and the performances they 
engendered belied the threats of physical violence that compelled blacks and women to 
participate in the production of hospitality. The decriminalization of white male violence 
in the southern states during the antebellum period not only granted southern hosts the 
legal right to exercise “unchecked authority over their wives, children, servants, and 
slaves” but also treated that violence as “necessary” and “ordinary” (Edwards 741; Fede 
93). In other words, the law sought to conceal and minimize white male violence by 
treating it as natural. Viewed by antebellum law as “domestic dependents” and as the 
“property” of their masters, women and slaves had no right to the protections of the 
common law of crimes (Edwards 739; Fede 95). “When legal institutions intervened,” 
explains Laura Edwards, “they upheld the power of individual patriarchs over their 
households and returned dependents to the confines of domestic space” (740). Masters 
could beat, whip, kill, and rape their slaves without facing any legal punishment (Fede 
95; Bardaglio 757). In addition, white males possessed the legal “prerogative” to 
“discipline” their wives through violent means (Edwards 750). Accordingly, as scholars 
have demonstrated, cases of plantation masters raping male and female slaves, as well as 
their own wives, were “common” during the antebellum period (Cardyn 716-17). 
Through sexual violence, southern hosts not only reinforced their dominance over their 
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households but also reproduced submission to the ideology of southern hospitality by 
increasing “the supply of labor” on their plantations (Cardyn 717; Bardaglio 757).   
Like the lives of slaves, the lives of antebellum white women were shaped in 
large part by the ideology of southern hospitality. Southern women both contributed to 
and undermined the region’s myth of unconditional hospitality. As hostesses, they acted 
as deputies on behalf of their husbands, delegating responsibility in the household and 
overseeing the production of hospitality to guests. In the process, southern women helped 
establish and reinforce their husbands’ public personas as reputable hosts. Just as the 
figure of the slaveholding man represented the ideal for southern hosts, the plantation 
mistress symbolized the ideal for southern hostesses. In their personification of this ideal, 
plantation mistresses perpetuated prevailing notions about gender difference, particularly 
the paternalist notions that fortified the ideology of southern hospitality.  Primarily 
confined to the space of the household, wives of plantation hosts were expected to 
supervise the production and presentation of food and entertainment. In the presence of 
guests, all actions taken by hostesses were viewed as complementing the needs and 
desires of hosts. In this sense, their actions amounted to “social statements” made on 
behalf of their husbands (Kierner 467). However, as historians have demonstrated, a 
select number of antebellum women were able to subvert the ideology of southern 
hospitality. Unlike traditional antebellum hostesses who acted as intermediaries in the 
affairs of men, female hosts assumed sovereignty over households and established 
essential roles in exchanges of hospitality.277 For example, propertied widows were 
known to proffer hospitality “as evidence of their independence as heads of households 
and their status within the community” (Kierner 453).278  
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Although the law did not punish white male violence, incidents of violence 
against women and slaves impugned the façade of benevolent paternalism that southern 
hosts strived to maintain. For slaves and women, therefore, preventing or evading 
violence required undermining the public reputation of individual southern hosts. “Wives 
in the planter class,” reports Laura Edwards, “fled abuse through extended visits or 
invited relatives and friends into their homes to moderate their husbands’ behavior” 
(745). Similarly, “slaves occasionally fled to white neighbors’ houses in order to evade 
beatings or to seek shelter afterward” (747-48). In cases where a white male’s violent 
behavior posed a serious threat to his reputation as a hospitable host, neighbors might 
intercede (Edwards 747-48). Like George Washington, southern hosts could not afford 
the appearance of impropriety. 
For guests who were not accustomed to plantation life, the forced nature of slave 
performances of hospitality could be particularly unsettling. In his visit to the South in 
the 1830s, for example, Jacob Abbott found that he could not “restrain a tribute of 
sympathy” for the “obsequious” slaves that served him (221-24). Commenting on the 
slaves who stood behind his chair to “watch and anticipate” his every need, Abbot could 
not help but think, “he knows the lash is in the yard!” (221). For Abbott, the acts of 
hospitality he witnessed took the form of compulsory performances rather than genuine 
acts of kindness: “. . . there is but little that appears like real home comfort” (221). 
Ultimately disillusioned by his observations of plantation life, Abbott described slavery 
as a “most serious political and social curse” that produces a “paralysis upon industry and 
improvement” (222). Instead of an economic system bolstered by the energetic 
productivity of slaves, Abbott saw a region whose pretensions to unconditional 
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hospitality were undermined by the apparent “joylessness” that sat “upon the 
countenances of both master and slave” (222).279  
II 
 Emancipation fundamentally altered the politics of hospitality in the U.S. South. 
In order to retain their sovereignty over private and public spaces after the Civil War, 
southern hosts revised and intensified the ideology of southern hospitality. The new post-
war ideology focused on preventing blacks and women from assuming positions of 
authority and privilege as hosts or guests. In order to accomplish their objectives, white 
male hosts adopted a politics aimed at justifying white male violence against women and 
blacks, disavowing and policing interracial desire, denying property ownership to blacks, 
preventing blacks from acquiring equal access to public accommodations, and resisting 
the growing threat of commercial hospitality in the region. Moreover, beginning in the 
final decades of the nineteenth century and continuing to the end of the Jim Crow period, 
southern hosts framed their commitment to the ideology of hospitality as a resistance to 
developments in modernity. In the process, they depicted southern hospitality as a 
defining object of cultural nostalgia and a panacea for the South’s developing anxieties 
about modernity.  
 Despite the absence of documented evidence to validate their claims, white male 
southerners after emancipation grounded their new ideology of hospitality in the 
conviction that white women needed to be protected from licentious black men.280 As 
Lisa Cardyn explains, “the southern white imaginary was imbued with the fiction that 
black men, whose base passions were artificially restrained by the apparatus of slavery 
and habitually so during the War, were now free to exercise them over the bodies of 
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innocent white women” (696). Assured in their belief that “female sexuality” was the 
“property” of men, white male hosts interpellated the bodies of white women as domains 
of the household (Bardaglio 754). In doing so, they interpreted and represented interracial 
sexual encounters between white women and black men as violations of host sovereignty. 
Accordingly, the imagined threat of sexual violence against white women was treated as 
an offense against the benevolent hospitality of southern hosts. Doubling as male 
property, the bodies of white women symbolized both the sexual prerogatives of white 
men and the sexual limitations of black men. In order to protect their property and their 
reputations, southern males during Reconstruction and throughout the Jim Crow era 
“interposed themselves as self-anointed defenders” of white female sexuality (Cardyn 
679). In the formal oath for initiation into the Ku Klux Klan, for example, future 
members were required to promise that “[f]emales, friends, widows, and their 
households, shall be the special object of my care and protection” (qtd. in Cardyn 695). 
Through the vigilante violence of the KKK and similar organizations, these self-
proclaimed protectors of white female sexuality attempted to “reinscribe” the racial and 
gender hierarchies of the antebellum period, all the while disguising this violence through 
an ideology that focused attention on their hospitality to strangers (Cardyn 718).   
 Through extralegal violence and codes of racial etiquette, the ideology of southern 
hospitality sought to disavow and police interracial sexual desire. Lynchings of black 
men accused of inappropriate gestures, behaviors, and/or glances in the company of white 
women increased “significantly” during the Jim Crow period (Cardyn 747-48). In their 
attempts to deter black male desire, the KKK made “sexual humiliation” a central focus 
of their vigilante violence (Cardyn 713). According to NAACP reports, at least 1,333 
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blacks were killed, maimed, and castrated in the South between 1900 and 1918 alone 
(Robinson 100). In the first decades of the twentieth century, antimiscegenation laws in 
the southern states enforced strict punishments for black men who were found guilty of 
having sexual relations with white women (Robinson 97-113). Although these laws were 
partially intended to curb desire, their primary objective was to prevent blacks and 
women from assuming positions of sovereignty in southern households. As Charles 
Robinson reveals, “Despite the rhetoric of the white South that commonly denounced 
interracial sex as the greatest societal tragedy, authorities usually focused the laws against 
public domestic relationships. What mattered most to whites was protecting white male 
privileges and preserving the social, not the sexual color line” (98). Private interracial 
liaisons most often went “unpunished,” but those couples who sought to “legitimize” 
their relationships publicly suffered the consequences of undermining an ideology that 
expressly forbid white women to live in homes with black hosts (Robinson 98). The 
image of a black man assuming the sovereign role of a southern host with a white hostess 
standing by his side enraged white southerners like nothing else.  Accordingly, interracial 
cohabitation, both in and out of wedlock, was met with the severest punishments by the 
KKK.281 In Colcasian, Louisiana, for example, a white woman, a black man, and their 
child were all discovered murdered for the crime of “residing as an openly married 
couple” (Cardyn 768). Ultimately, antimiscegenation laws and KKK violence against 
interracial couples reflected white male anxieties about retaining their self-proclaimed 
roles as southern hosts and the privileges these roles entailed. Southern households that 
did not include white males threatened the ideology of southern hospitality by opening up 
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the possibility that the notion of black and female hosts could someday become socially 
acceptable. 
 After emancipation, freed blacks attempted to undermine the authority and 
privileges of white male hosts by challenging the veracity of their claims to property 
ownership in the southern states. Blacks understood that without property of their own 
they would be unable to subvert the ideology of southern hospitality. In their efforts to 
secure land rights, blacks appealed to the same logic of squatter sovereignty that southern 
whites had employed for years to validate their own claims to land ownership. In 1866, 
for example, the freedman Bayley Wyat argued in a speech in Yorktown, Virginia, that 
southern blacks had earned a “divine right” to the land of their previous masters (“A 
Freedman’s Speech” 2). “I may state to all our friends, and to all our enemies, Wyat 
declared, “that we has a right to the land where we are located.  For why?  I tell you.  Our 
wives, our children, our husbands, has been sold over and over again to purchase the 
lands we now locates upon . . . didn’t we clear the land, and raise de crops of corn, ob 
cotton, ob tobacco, ob rice, ob sugar, ob ebery ting” (2). Likewise, in a petition to 
President Andrew Johnson, a group of freed slaves from South Carolina proclaimed, 
“This is our home.  We have made these lands what they are” (qtd. in Vlach ix). 
Rejecting the attempts of southern white males to naturalize their claims to the land, freed 
blacks contended that their labor on plantations made them stewards of God’s gifts and 
therefore “entitled” them to at least a share of ownership (Foner 105).  As Eric Foner 
reports, “Hundreds of freedmen refused either to sign labor contracts or to leave the 
plantations, insisting that the property belonged to them” (105). One Virginia freedman 
told his ex-master that he was “entitled to a part of the farm after all the work he had 
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done on it.  The kitchen belonged to him because he had helped cut the timber to build it” 
(qtd. in Foner 105). In subversive acts that signaled an upheaval of the most basic 
customs of southern hospitality, some freed blacks usurped the sovereignty of their 
previous masters by taking up residence in the Big Houses of the plantations (Foner 105-
06).   
 Many freed blacks believed that land redistribution would follow as a “logical 
consequence of emancipation” (Foner 105). However, they did not come to this 
conclusion on their own. Both during and after the war, Union soldiers and northern 
politicians gave blacks reason to believe that the property of their previous masters would 
be made available to them.  Prior to emancipation, the Confiscation Acts of 1861 and 
1862 made the property of Confederates liable to seizure by the federal government. 
Utilized by the Union Army as informers against white Confederates, slaves were very 
aware of the federal government’s practice of property confiscation (Fleming 722). 
Moreover, Union soldiers are known to have told slaves that if they joined the Union 
army and helped achieve a victory for the North, then they could have access to the 
confiscated lands. As Bayley Wyat proclaimed in his 1866 speech, “Dey told us dese 
lands was ‘fiscated from the Rebs, who was fightin’ de United States to keep us in 
slavery and to destroy the Government.  De Yankee officers say to us: ‘Now, dear 
friends, colored men, come and go with us; we will gain de victory, and by de 
proclamation of our President you have your freedom, and you shall have the ‘fiscated 
lands’” (2). 
In March of 1863, the precedent of freed blacks assuming ownership of 
confiscated white property was set when the federal government seized thousands of 
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acres on the coasts and the sea islands of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. When the 
land was sold at auction, freed blacks took advantage of the opportunity and purchased 
property (Fleming 724). Then, on January 16, 1865, General Sherman issued his 
infamous “Special Field Order, No. 15,” which “reserved” and “set apart” coastal and 
island lands from Charleston, South Carolina, down to St. Augustine, Florida, to be 
subdivided for the settling of freed blacks.  In particular, Sherman’s Order stipulated that 
each family of freed slaves “shall have a plot of no more than (40) forty acres of tillable 
ground . . . in the possession of which land the military authorities will afford them 
protection.”282 Encouraged by the Order, thousands of freed blacks flocked to the coast.  
By the end of 1865, “more than 40,000 freedmen” had relocated to the sea islands alone 
and began establishing residence there.283 
However, in the fall of 1865, President Andrew Johnson responded to complaints 
made by coastal plantation owners by pardoning them and restoring their property rights 
(Fleming 726). Despite the Freedmen’s Bureau’s assertions that freed blacks “had been 
led to expect permanent possession of the lands, and that to dispossess them would be an 
act of bad faith,” Johnson insisted on carrying out the pardons (Fleming 726).284 Further 
frustration ensued in the following years when the federal government failed to 
implement promises made in the Southern Homestead Act, which President Johnson 
signed into law on June 21, 1866. The Act made 46,398,545 acres of public lands in 
Arkansas, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi available for the explicit purpose 
of allowing freed slaves and southerners loyal to the federal government to homestead 
(Oubre 87). Because the Southern Homestead Act stipulated that freed slaves did not 
have to pay registration fees until they received their patents, they could begin settling on 
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and improving their land for five years without having to worry about the initial costs of 
acquiring property (Oubre 87; Canaday et al. 4). Yet, during the ten years that the Act 
was in effect, it “failed to provide landownership for significant numbers of freed people” 
(Canaday et al. 1).285 A number of factors have been cited as contributing to the Act’s 
failure—white opposition to black ownership, poor leadership, illiteracy, inferior farming 
equipment, and fraud, to name a few—but the most significant factor was the poor 
quality of the land made available for homesteading.286 As Claude Oubre reports, “Most 
of the land had been open to unrestricted purchase for at least thirty years. Therefore, the 
more accessible lands had already been taken and the remaining land available for 
homesteading was refuse land, either heavily overgrown woods, swamp, or treeless 
prairie” (187).287 In the end, of the 6,500 freed blacks who “entered land” per the 
Southern Homestead Act between 1866 and 1870, fewer than 1,000 received certificates 
at the end of five years (Oubre 188). For the majority of those who were attempting to 
homestead, the land was simply too arid to produce crops. 
The overwhelming belief among freed slaves during the Reconstruction period 
was that the federal government had “deceived” them (Fleming 727). The North’s failure 
to follow through with the guarantees stipulated in Sherman’s “Special Field Order” and 
in the Southern Homestead Act was received as a failure to provide promised hospitality. 
As Bayley Wyat put it, freed blacks felt “disappointed” that men of supposed “principle” 
and “honor” had been unwilling to keep “deir promise” (2). In the end, the federal 
government’s failure to grant blacks the legal rights of southern hosts forced blacks to 
resort to sharecropping, a form of economic servitude that allowed privileged white 
males to retain control of the South’s wealth and to maintain a pretense of benevolent 
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paternalism with regard to both blacks and poor whites.288  Although sharecroppers 
possessed more economic rights than slaves, they were denied the privileges enjoyed by 
property owners.  
In addition to resisting black property ownership, southern whites tried to uphold 
antebellum customs of hospitality by refusing to grant blacks legal rights as guests in 
public spaces. During Reconstruction, advocates of racial equality in the federal 
government passed legislation that aimed to provide blacks throughout the U.S. with 
equal access to public accommodations. Effectively annulling the decision of Dred Scott 
v. Sandford (1857), the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted on July 9, 1868, granted blacks 
citizenship and provided them with a constitutional right to equal protection under state 
and local law.289 Seven years after passing the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Congress 
issued the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which held that “all persons within the jurisdiction of 
the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, 
theaters, and other places of public amusement; subject only to the conditions and 
limitations established by law, and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, 
regardless of any previous condition or servitude.” The Act also stipulated that any 
person who denies the rights of others to “full and equal enjoyment” of accommodations 
would be required to “pay the sum of five hundred dollars to the person aggrieved” and 
“be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.” By granting southern blacks the right to appeal to 
the federal government for grievances, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 marked a shift, at least for the time being, in the political dynamics of 
hospitality in the South. Long refused the privileges of guests in the South, blacks 
    281 
suddenly found that southern legislators and judges no longer served as supreme 
arbitrators in matters regarding access to public accommodations. Blacks denied access to 
hotels, railway cars, hospitals, theaters, and other public spaces now had legal recourse in 
their efforts to achieve guest status. In effect, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 made 
hospitality a matter of federal law.290 
However, the protections provided by the Civil Rights Act of 1875 were revoked 
only eight years later when the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act unconstitutional. 
Siding with southern white males who believed that granting blacks equal access to 
public accommodations would denigrate the status of the guest throughout the South and 
therefore eliminate the privileges southern hosts received by offering hospitality to 
strangers, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Civil Rights Cases of 1883 established that 
it would not “supersede” the sovereignty of state legislatures in cases of public 
accommodations (9).291 The Fourteenth Amendment, wrote Justice Joseph Bradley, “does 
not authorize congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private 
rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action 
of state officers, executive or judicial” (7). Declaring the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
“unconstitutional and void,” the Civil Rights Cases decision affirmed the “private status” 
of proprietors and “declared that this status protected them from federal prosecution” 
(Sandoval-Strausz 301). In short, the Court’s 1883 decision pronounced that the 
sovereignty of states, local governments, and private business superseded the sovereignty 
of the nation and the rights of racialized guests when it came to questions of hospitality. 
Not until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did the federal government issue a constitutional 
guarantee entitling all persons to “the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 
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facilities, and privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public 
accommodation” (Sec. 201a).  
Rather than show deference to blacks and other marginalized minorities, the 
South adopted policies of segregation in public spaces. Between 1896 and 1954, the 
“separate but equal” doctrine introduced in the Plessy v. Ferguson case granted states 
constitutional authority to segregate public facilities based on race.292 What followed 
during the first two decades of the twentieth century was a “mushroom growth of 
discriminatory and segregation laws” in the South, a legal stampede aimed at preventing 
blacks from receiving access, protection, and due process (Woodward 98).293 Whereas 
blacks were granted limited access to public accommodations during Reconstruction and 
then excluded from public spaces in the two decades following Reconstruction, the 
Plessy decision in 1896 made separation rather than exclusion the prevailing method of 
withholding hospitality in the South.294 A host’s first order of business changed from 
deciding whether to reject or welcome a guest to determining into which space a given 
guest should be sent. Theater ushers, railway conductors, hotel clerks, bus drivers, and 
hospital administrators were granted legal authority to discriminate among guests based 
on race and to distribute them as they saw fit.  
 The South’s aversion to nationalizing hospitality law was informed significantly 
by its regional commitment to an ethos of private hospitality. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the South responded with hostility to the growing popularity of 
commercial hotels in the United States. As A. K. Sandoval-Strausz reports in his study 
Hotel: An American History, 
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While Americans were building hotels nationwide, they were not doing so with 
equal enthusiasm in all parts of the country. . . . By any available measure, the 
South was less equipped to provide for travelers than any other part of the 
country.  A few states in the region, like Virginia and Arkansas, had one inn or 
hotel for every 3,000 to 4,000 inhabitants by the 1870s, but more typical were 
North Carolina and Florida, with one per 7,000 to 9,000 in those years; there were 
also exceptionally commercially inhospitable states like Alabama at one per 8,600 
to 9,000, and South Carolina, at one per 10,000 to 14,000 from 1870 to 1880.  In 
dramatic contrast, almost every part of the West was generously supplied with 
inns and hotels by the 1870s, boasting exceptional ratios like those in Oregon (one 
per 580 to 810 residents), California (one per 500 to 550), and Nevada (one per 
310 to 350). (103-04) 
While Sandoval-Strausz suggests that the South’s lack of enthusiasm for “hotel life” may 
have been caused by the region’s “strongly rural character,” “underdeveloped railways,” 
and its appreciation for “fixity of residence,” I argue that this hostility was instigated by 
southern white males who believed that the presence of commercial hotels in the South 
threatened to undermine their reputations as hospitable hosts and therefore eliminate the 
pretenses that allowed them to disavow their oppression of women and blacks (103). In 
this sense, southern hosts viewed commercial hotels as potential usurpers of their 
culturally established authority and privileges. In addition, southern hosts were 
dissatisfied with the terms of exchange involved in commercial hospitality. During the 
nineteenth century, many Americans began to see hotels as “an integrated national 
system that could offer wayfarers predictable, dependable hospitality” (Sandoval-Strausz 
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99). This national shift from private hospitality to commercial hospitality altered the 
terms and expectations of the host-guest relationship, particularly in the South.  Despite 
the failures of federal legislators to ensure universal access to public accommodations, 
proprietors of public institutions were still subject to innkeeper laws and ran the risk of 
losing their commercial licenses if they did not treat their guests with deference.295 The 
sacrifices required of proprietors to treat guests—many of whom were foreign or racially 
other—with the deference expected of them contrasted markedly with the sovereign 
privileges traditionally afforded private hosts in the South. Thus, a welcoming of 
commercial hospitality in the South would have required a willingness to recast the host-
guest relationship to allow for a privileging of the rights of guests over and above the 
rights of hosts. This was a sacrifice that many southern hosts were unwilling to make. As 
the well-known lawyer and slavery apologist D. R. Hundley remarked in 1860, “the bane 
of hotel life and the curse of boarding houses have not as yet extended their pernicious 
influences to our Southern states” (qtd. Sandoval-Strausz 104).   
 The growing popularity of commercial hospitality was not the only sign of 
modernity that threatened to undermine the myth of the unconditional southern host. 
Modern developments, such as industrialization, urbanization, unionization, and first-
wave feminism, challenged the foundational principles of the South’s politics of 
disavowal. Still holding fast to the myth of unconditional southern hospitality, defenders 
of the Old South condemned these modern developments for interfering with the region’s 
ability to carry on with its commitment to providing hospitality to strangers. In his 
“Introduction” to the Agrarian manifesto I’ll Take My Stand (1930), for example, John 
Crowe Ransom argued that modern industry had produced a “curse” on southern 
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“manners” and “hospitality” (xv). Similarly, Josephine Pinckney, the southern poet and 
novelist, wrote in 1935 that urbanization threatened household security and therefore the 
southern ethos of hospitality. “[M]istrust of strangers,” Pinckney claimed, is “an 
inevitable part of metropolitan psychology” (42). Yearning for the old days, when 
southerners could “leave the door on the latch, secure in the knowledge that none but 
friends will open it,” Pinckney bemoaned conditions in the modern South where, she 
argued, “quick and easy transportation” was producing a region “full to overcrowding 
with people” (42, 47). Moreover, Pinckney noted feminism’s role in destabilizing 
traditional distinctions in gender roles throughout the South and the inevitable effects this 
destabilization had on the production of hospitality in southern households. The “modern 
lady,” Pinckney asserted, was in “sharp conflict” with the figure of the plantation 
mistress (43-4).  By 1936, the year that Margaret Mitchell’s Gone With The Wind 
captivated the attention of the South, there was no question that the ideology of southern 













1 Paul Wistach’s account of Washington’s hospitality is representative of the extensive 
Mount Vernon mythology: “Every one was welcome: brothers and sisters, nephews and 
nieces, and cousins to remote degrees; friends passing north and south, crossing from 
Maryland to lower Virginia, or only on their way to the plantation next beyond. Not least 
welcome were strangers . . .” (89). For other accounts that idealize Washington’s 
hospitality at Mount Vernon, see Dalzell & Dalzell 192-98, Hunter 30-3, Latrobe 50-63, 
and Lee 26. 
2 By 1786, Washington “had succeeded in establishing a slave labor force that performed 
virtually all of the essential functions of the estate: from overseer to miller, from 
household cook to blacksmith” (Hirschfield 18). According to Washington’s financial 
accounts, he owned 216 slaves in 1786, 122 of whom he identified as productive men and 
women, 88 of whom he identified as children. By 1799, he had increased his labor force 
to 317 slaves (20). Despite constituting “the backbone” of Washington’s labor force, 
Washington’s slaves were “entitled to nothing more than food and a roof over their 
heads” (32). For critical accounts of Washington’s treatment of slaves written by foreign 
visitors to Mount Vernon, see Niemcewicz 102 and Parkinson 420-54.  
3 Even the few scholars of American literature who have taken up hospitality as a central 
component of their work have failed to recognize the larger and more exigent 
implications of their inquiries, thereby severely limiting their focus. Puspa L. Damai 
concentrates in his dissertation on what he calls “minor” scenes of welcome that deal 
specifically with the “politics of belonging (11, 29), Joseph A. George focuses in his 
dissertation on scenes of hospitality in post-World War II suburban American literature, 
and Cynthia Schoolar Williams emphasizes transatlantic forms of intellectual hospitality 
between the US and Britain from 1815-1835. 
4 Derrida also uses the terms “pure” hospitality (“A” 129; “PH” 7), “absolute” hospitality 
(OH 25), and “the hospitality of visitation” (“H” 14) when referring to unconditional 
hospitality. In addition, he also uses the terms “tolerance” (“A” 127-28) and “the 
hospitality of invitation” (“H” 14) when referring to conditional hospitality.  
5 In both Of Hospitality and “The Principle of Hospitality,” Derrida argues that asking a 
guest to speak the language of the host is the “first act of violence” in an exchange of 
hospitality (OH 15-7; “”PH” 7). 
6 Derrida refers to this necessary repetition of exchange, this “double postulation of 
giving and taking,” as the “law of iterability”: “For there to be a gift, there must be no 
reciprocity, return, exchange, countergift, or debt” (“H” 7; GT 12). Accordingly, Derrida 
concludes, “no one welcomed is ever completely welcome” (“H” 6). 
7 Derrida began using the term “affirmative” to characterize deconstruction as early as the 
mid-1960s. In a number of conference papers and articles published between 1964 and 
1967, Derrida articulated his emerging theory and practice of “affirmation” through 
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repeated references to the affirmative and affirming work of his philosophical and literary 
influences. In these essays, he speaks of Edmond Jabès’s “persistent affirmation” of “le 
libre” (“EJ” 65), Emmanuel Levinas’s “reaffirming ethics” of the face-to-face encounter 
(“VM” 111), Antonin Artaud’s “revolutionary affirmation” of cruelty (“PS” 189; “TC” 
232-33), Claude Lévi-Strauss’s contradictory “affirmation” of nature and culture (“SSP” 
284), and Michel Foucault’s transgressive “nonpositive affirmation” (WD 335). Most 
importantly, Derrida concludes two of his most famous early essays—“Différance” and 
“Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”—by employing 
Nietzsche’s notion of Dionysian affirmation to describe the objectives of deconstruction 
(“D” 27; “SSP” 292). Faced with the knowledge of a world without a center—that is, 
without the presence of a transcendental signified capable of orienting and structuring all 
things—Derrida advises a practice of affirmation committed to rejoicing in the infinite 
“possibility of play” (“SSP” 292; “E” 297). As the final paragraphs of “Différance” and 
“Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences” make apparent, the 
primary source of Derrida’s notion of affirmation is Nietzsche’s idea of Dionysian 
affirmation, introduced in The Birth of Tragedy and elaborated on in several other works, 
most notably Thus Spoke Zarathustra and The Will to Power. Through his theory of “the 
eternal circulation” and his belief in the liberating power of suffering, Nietzsche argues 
that the “highest state a philosopher can attain” is an “absolute affirmation of the 
world”—that is, an affirmation of the world “as it is, without subtraction, exception, or 
selection” (Will to Power IV 1019, 1041). Positing that everything in the world amounts 
to a “great ring” where no one thing is “self-sufficient,” Nietzsche asserts that 
“everything is equally valuable, eternal, necessary” (Will to Power II 293, IV 1032). 
Accordingly, he concludes, “If we affirm one single moment, we thus affirm not only 
ourselves but all existence” (Will to Power IV 1032). For Nietzsche, therefore, 
affirmation involves accepting and celebrating time as endlessly revolving, as comprised 
of perpetually repeating moments of commensurate value. Nietzsche’s vision of 
affirming the future that “is to come” through a celebration of the eternal present is a 
central component of Derrida’s theory of hospitality. Through Derrida, we come to see 
the “gateway” of the moment as an opportunity to welcome the future in the present, to 
welcome simultaneously both the present guest and the coming guest of the future—what 
Derrida would call the guest “à venir” (“A” 120). By the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Derrida began to refer regularly to deconstruction as an “affirmative movement,” one 
focused on celebrating différance rather than bemoaning nonpresence (“WB” 149; S 36-
7). During the early 1990s, he reiterated his emphasis on the affirmative character of 
deconstruction in texts like Spectres of Marx, where he stresses deconstruction’s integral 
role in clearing the way for a radical kind of “affirmative thinking” that makes it possible 
to imagine and produce “new effective forms of action” (94, 111-12). 
8 In his essay “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce,” Derrida is clear to point 
out that the “yes of affirmation” is a “living yes,” a relational act of engagement 
addressed to the other and grounded in a specific time and place (“UG” 56). An ethics of 
affirmation, therefore, involves offering hospitality in the spirit of the affirmative: “Yes, I 
speak to you, I address you, I listen to you” (“TL” 180). Without this “yes” and the 
moment of undecidability that precedes it, affirmative hospitality would not be possible.  
9 Derrida emphasizes the important function that hospitality plays in cultivating culture. 
In “The Principle of Hospitality,” he writes, “Doubtless, all ethics of hospitality are not 
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the same, but there is no culture or social bond without a principle of hospitality” (6). In 
Rogues, he refers to the interpersonal bond that hospitality makes possible and promotes 
as “living together” (11). 
10 “The other is infinitely other because we never have any access to the other as such.  
That is why he/she is the other. This separation, this dissociation is not only a limit, but it 
is also the condition of the relation to the other, a non-relation as relation.  When Levinas 
speaks of separation, the separation is the condition of the social bond” (“HJR” 71) 
11 In Strangers to Ourselves, Julia Kristeva refers to this approach to hospitality as 
making an effort to “live as others,” to be consciously conscious of “being an other” (2, 
13). She advises an ethics of hospitality grounded in a willingness to imagine oneself in 
the “place” of the guest, which includes relating in a non-reductive way with the other by 
recalling what it feels like to be in the position of the arriving stranger (13). 
12 Derrida further describes the openness of the host as a “rational experience of 
receiving,” of responding openly to “what arrives, what comes about” (A 48; “UWC” 
234). Furthermore, the host who is open to the guest endeavors to learn from and about 
their guest without making the process of knowledge-gathering a “condition” of 
hospitality (“PH” 7). In other words, the host’s affirmation of the guest comes not in 
interrogating the other or in reducing the other to what Levinas would call “the same” but 
in affirming what they receive from the other: “Hospitality consists in doing everything 
to address the other, to accord him, even to ask him his name, while keeping this question 
from being a ‘condition’ . . .” (“PH” 7) 
13 In The Singularity of Literature, Derek Attridge advocates a similar kind of creativity 
on behalf of the host: “. . . respect for the singularity of the other person requires that 
each time we encounter him or her we do so with a readiness to be creative in our 
response—an imperative that also springs from the fact that he or she is no longer exactly 
the same person as before. ‘The other’ in this situation is therefore not, strictly speaking, 
a person as conventionally understood in ethics or psychology; it is once again a 
relation—or a relating—between me, as the same, and that which, in its uniqueness, is 
heterogeneous to me and interrupts my sameness. If I succeed in responding adequately 
to the otherness and singularity of the other, it is the other in its relating to me—always in 
a specific time and place—to which I am responding, in creatively changing myself and 
perhaps a little of the world as well” (33). 
14 My observations about the deliberative quality of affirmative hospitality are based in 
part on theories of deliberative democracy outlined by Chantal Mouffe (1999 & 2013), 
Amanda Anderson, Seyla Benhabib, and Joshua Cohen. That being said, the deliberative 
quality of affirmative hospitality is not entirely consistent with established accounts of 
deliberative democracy. 
15 As Derrida points out, the very idea of unconditional hospitality provides us with a 
foundation for imagining what a “pure ethics” might look like, but the inherent 
conditionality of hospitality is what makes an ethical decision possible: “So when I say ‘I 
don’t know what to do,’ this is not the negative condition of decision. It is rather the 
possibility of a decision” (“A” 129-131; “HJR 66). In other words, we can “take 
responsibility” for an act of hospitality only because it requires us to deliberate (“HJR” 
66). 
16 Rather than allow a fixation on the “incalculable” to result in paralysis, the host must 
accept the fact that every act of hospitality is necessarily imperfectible, inherently flawed 
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from the very outset, limited by the phenomenological fact of “infinite alterity” (“HJR” 
71). To “overcome” the “aporetic contradiction” posed by the arrival of the guest, the 
host must be willing to make a decision that “proceeds beyond knowledge,” to surrender 




17 As Robert Benton observes, “Breakfast” is the most “neglected” story in Steinbeck’s 
The Long Valley collection (33). In 1972, Steinbeck Quarterly dedicated two editions to 
critical essays on The Long Valley. However, Tetsumaro Hayashi, the journal’s editor, 
chose not to include an essay on “Breakfast,” reasoning that the story is a “comparatively 
insignificant piece” (67). In his essay on “Breakfast,” Benton limits his discussion to 
Steinbeck’s “craftsmanship” (33). He argues that the integration of the short story into 
The Grapes of Wrath demonstrates Steinbeck’s refined prose (36-7). Gary Schmidt 
suggests that “Breakfast” was inspired by Steinbeck’s “walks around the migrant camps 
of the Salinas Valley” in the summer of 1934 (304). David Wyatt has put forward the 
most comprehensive and convincing examination of “Breakfast,” especially in terms of 
the story’s relationship to the revised scene in The Grapes of Wrath. Wyatt argues that 
the encounter between Tom Joad and the Wallaces at Weedpatch suggests that the 
romantic image of “Breakfast” is “no longer attractive or credible to Steinbeck” (22). For 
more on “Breakfast,” see also Meyer and Werlock.  
18 “Breakfast” was first published in Pacific Weekly on November 9, 1936. It was then 
included in Steinbeck’s short story collection The Long Valley in 1938 (Benton 33; 
Werlock 36).  
19 I date this shift in Steinbeck’s thinking from the summer of 1934, when he composed 
“Breakfast,” to the spring of 1938, when he began working on the manuscript for The 
Grapes of Wrath. John Timmerman reports that Steinbeck composed “Breakfast” by the 
“end of August” 1934 (xvii). Steinbeck began working on what became the manuscript 
for The Grapes of Wrath in late May of 1938 (Working Days 19). 
20 See Cerce 29, Denning 266, Szalay 175, and Veggian 355. 
21 As Ann Campbell has noted, the “practical effect” of Steinbeck’s novel on the 
Roosevelt administration and Congress was undeniable: the Farm Security 
Administration, the New Deal agency in charge of the migrant federal camps, “was the 
only relief agency to get a larger appropriation out of Congress [in 1939] than the Bureau 
of the Budget had recommended” (404). 
22 Casy maintains a deferential attitude toward the Joads and the hospitality they provide. 
Perhaps more than anyone else in the novel, he is aware of the importance of reciprocity. 
His inability to return the Joads’ hospitality in any substantive way leads him to consider 
leaving the family even before he is arrested: “I was thinkin’ I’d go off alone by myself. 
I’m a-eating’ your food an’ a-takin’ up room. An’ I ain’t give you nothin’. Maybe I could 
get a steady job an’ maybe pay back some a the stuff you’ve give me” (251).  
23 However, it is also from the Hudson that the Joads withhold hospitality. In New 
Mexico, for example, Tom turns down a one-eyed mechanic’s request to join them in the 
Hudson truck: “Christ, no. We’re so goddamn full now we can’t move” (180). 
24 It is worth making a distinction here between “categorical” and “unconditional” 
hospitality. The former implies that hospitality will always be provided when a stranger 
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arrives, whether expected or unexpected. The latter implies not only that hospitality will 
always be provided but also that the hospitality proffered is unlimited. In other words, 
“unconditional” hospitality implies that the resources and patience required to provide 
hospitality are infinite. 
25 For an alternative reading of this scene, see Motley 402-03. 
26 Ma Joad demonstrates her indoctrination in this patriarchal ideology in this scene when 
Jim Casy assumes the task of salting down the meat for supper. “It’s women’s work,” she 
tells Casy (107). 
27 For analyses that focus on Steinbeck’s treatment of family in The Grapes of Wrath, see 
Cunningham 49, Hunter 44-7, Sklar 509-26, Williamson 92-3, and Wyatt 19. 
28 My analysis here is very much influenced by Homi Bhabha’s notion of fetishistic 
discourses of disavowal. Bhabha argues that colonialist discourses employs a “complex, 
ambivalent, contradictory mode” when it comes to the “ideological construction of 
otherness” (“The Other” 18-22). Through fetishism, Bhabha shows, colonialist discourse 
attempts to disavow difference. The result is a “form of multiple and contradictory 
belief,” a mode of representation that relies both on “recognition of difference and [a] 
disavowal of it” (27).  
29 For a discussion about the representatively American qualities of the Joads, see Owens 
132-34. 
30 For historical accounts of migrant farm labor in California, see Daniel, McWilliams 
Factories, and Taylor & Vasey. 
31 In 1942, Carey McWilliams reported, “Between July 1, 1935, and July 1, 1939, 
approximately 350,000 dust-bowl migrants—farmers and the descendants of farmers—
crossed the Arizona border into California . . .” (Ill Fares 30). The vast majority of these 
migrants—nine out of ten—McWilliams found, were “native White Americans” (Ill 
Fares 33; Factories 308). The result, McWilliams concluded, was that “Negroes, 
Mexicans, and foreign-born” now constituted “less than 5 per cent of the total” migrant 
population in California (33). However, more recently, James Gregory has identified a 
significant discrepancy between early reports about the number of Dust Bowl families 
who migrated to California and the actual figures. Making a distinction between Dust 
Bowl states and southwestern states, Gregory suggests that “less than 16,000 people from 
the Dust Bowl proper ended up in California, barely 6 percent of the total from the 
Southwestern states” (11). Gregory argues that the reason for the discrepancy was a 
widespread confusion by journalists about the difference between “dust” and “drought” 
(11). However, neither Gregory’s nor McWilliams’s statistics contradict the fact that The 
Grapes of Wrath does not reflect an accurate portrait of the relative number of non-white 
migrants in California during the late 1930s.       
32 Various scholars have analyzed Steinbeck’s use of the dialectical form in Grapes, but 
none has made the argument that the intercalary chapters challenge the repressive nature 
of the narrative chapters. For a sampling of these analyses, see Griesbach, Owens & 
Torres, and Motley 404.    
33 In his analysis of Morrison’s Beloved, Bhabha describes this act of literary 
reinscription as a process of releasing “unspoken” acts from “erasure and repression” 
(“The World” 146). 
34 “To take up the figure of the door, for there to be hospitality, there must be a door. But 
if there is a door, there is no longer hospitality. There is no hospitable house. There is no 
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house without doors and windows. But as soon as there are a door and windows, it means 
that someone has the key to them and consequently controls the conditions of hospitality. 
There must be a threshold. But if there is a threshold, there is no longer hospitality” (“H” 
14). 
35 “In France, the phrase ‘threshold of tolerance’ was used to describe the limit beyond 
which it is no longer decent to ask a national community to welcome any more 
foreigners, immigrant workers, and the like. François Mitterand once used this 
unfortunate expression as a self-justifying word of caution: beyond a certain number of 
foreigners or immigrants who do not share our nationality, our language, our culture, and 
our customs, a quasi-organic and unpreventable—in short, a natural—phenomenon of 
rejection can be expected” (“A” 128) 
36 “Squatter villages varying in size from a few families to several hundred persons 
located near an outlying service station or grocery store where residents obtained water 
and supplies. Estimates of the number of families living under such conditions ranged 
well into the thousands during 1937, when the squatter problem was at its worst” 
(Gregory 64). For the distinction between “Hoovervilles” and “Little Oklahomas,” or 
“Okievilles,” see Gregory 70-7. 
37 For accounts of the poor conditions in the Hoovervilles, see Stanley 25-26 and Gregory 
64-8. 
38 Charles Cunningham, for example, contends that Steinbeck “relies on the ideological 
notion of the self-contained family to win the reader’s concern for the Joads, and then 
argues for the necessity of communal, rather than familial, welfare” (358). See also 
Hunter 44-7, Sklar 509-26, Williamson 92-3, and Wyatt 19. 
39 Of all the Joads, Uncle John has the most difficulty coming to terms with 
conditionality. In the Hooverville scene, Ma’s query causes Uncle John, who has already 
filled his plate, to look up and “see” the begging children for the “first time” (257). 
Immediately feeling guilty for not being able to provide enough food for the children, 
Uncle John declares that he has lost his appetite. Unable to eat in front of the children or 
any place where he himself might be able to “see ‘em,” John foregoes his dinner (257). 
Throughout the novel, Uncle John struggles with an inability to accept his own sin: 
“Yeah, but you ain’t got a sin on your soul like me” (224). Casy tries to get him to accept 
sin as a reality of life: “Ever’body got sins. A sin is somepin you ain’t sure about. Them 
people that’s sure about ever’thing an’ ain’t got no sin . . .” (224). But Uncle John 
remains beaten down by his own guilt: “No good to nobody—jus’ a-draggin’ my sins like 
dirty drawers ‘mongst nice folks” (276). It is also worth noting that Uncle John’s inability 
to eat his food while the starving children are watching resembles a scene in Tom 
Collins’s memoir Bringing in the Sheaves, in which Collins describes Steinbeck’s 
inability to eat after having returned from the Visalia flooding in March 1938: “I can’t eat 
that after what I have seen these past two weeks Makes me sick to look at it. Why should 
I eat this fine meal while those thousands out there are in such misery?” (Collins 224). 
40 The cartoon’s accompanying article reads: “In directing the formation of a special 
Federal co-ordinating group on migrants, [Roosevelt] has authorized a constructive 
program, which we hope will be put in operation, as he directed, to ‘find a way without 
delay to extend all possible co-coperation to the state in alleviating the conditions 
existing’” (“Welcome” par. 2). However, I have been unable to identify particulars about 
the “coordinating group” referred to in the article. 
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41 In reference to state hospitality, Mireille Rosello has used the term “supra host” to 
describe the preeminent position of the state vis-à-vis other host-figures (175). 
42 This is not to say that Steinbeck entirely abandons his support of federal welfarism. 
Indeed, as Cliff Lewis has convincingly shown, Steinbeck continued to work and 
advocate on behalf of New Deal policies through the 1940s (23-36). 
43 Even before Wilson, both Art Kuhl and Burton Rascoe denounced The Grapes of 
Wrath as “usual propaganda” (163) and “silly propaganda” respectively in their 1939 
reviews (38).  
44 Focusing his attention primarily on Steinbeck’s public and clandestine work on behalf 
of the Roosevelt administration during the 1940s, Lewis argues convincingly that 
Steinbeck was a dedicated and valuable proponent of New Deal federalism. Yet, Lewis’s 
findings cannot erase the reality of Steinbeck’s critical account of the FSA program in 
The Grapes of Wrath. 
45 See Cerce for a reading of Weedpatch as a “communist utopia” (29). 
46 See Keane for a detailed and enlightening analysis of Zanuck’s film alongside 
Steinbeck’s novel.  
47 For a reading of Zanuck’s Weedpatch as a “ringing endorsement of Roosevelt’s New 
Deal,” see Denning 266. 
48 “Earlier in the novel, there had in fact been two climactic scenes, with which he might 
have concluded his tale on an upbeat note more appropriate to its avowed politics. The 
first of these (with which John Ford did in fact end his film version—in homage 
presumably to F.D.R. and the New Deal) occurs when the Joads discover . . . It seems to 
me, however, that the milk of a half-starved Okie girl is not likely to be copious and rich 
enough to sustain life and that, in any case, the old man she is suckles is beyond the point 
of saving. . . . In my opinion, therefore, The Grapes of Wrath ends not on the note of 
pseudo-Emersonian cosmic optimism which it has sustained up to that point but on a note 
of tragic despair . . .” (Fiedler 63) 
49 For readings of “The Harvest Gypsies” that treat the series as evidence of Steinbeck’s 
federalist politics in The Grapes of Wrath, see Cox “Fact” and Denning. For a reading 
that refutes Denning’s claims about the similarities between the novel and “The Harvest 
Gypsies,” see Cunningham 343-58. 
50 “Earlier in [August 1936] he had had a visit from George West, chief editorial editor 
for the San Francisco News, who asked him to write a series of articles for the News on 
migrant farm labor in California. West wanted Steinbeck to go into the agricultural areas 
of the state and observe living and working conditions for himself, to report on these and 
to focus particularly on the Dust Bowl migration and attempts by the federal government 
to ease the problem by constructing sanitary camps for the migrants” (Benson True 332). 
Benson suggests that the Resettlement Administration sought out Steinbeck because the 
agency was “having a hard time selling its program” (332).  For more on the historical 
origins of “The Harvest Gypsies” series, see Benson “To Tom” 173-75 and 181-82, as 
well as Benson True 332-38. On the role that In Dubious Battle played in generating 
Steinbeck’s reputation as a labor sympathizer, see DeMott Working xxxiv-xxxvi.  
51 For more on the history of the Arvin Camp, see Stanley 29-33 and Campbell. 
52 Roosevelt created the Resettlement Administration (RA) in the spring of 1935 by 
executive order. The RA “gathered together several administrative bits and pieces and 
consolidated them as a new federal agency” (Baldwin 3). During the summer of 1937, the 
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RA was transformed into the Farm Security Administration and placed under control of 
the Department of Agriculture (Baldwin 3; Stein 155). Within the reconstituted FSA was 
the Resettlement Division, which was responsible for administering the migrant labor 
camps (Baldwin 222). As Sidney Baldwin reports, “With establishment of the FSA in 
1937, a Migratory Farm Labor Section was created in the Resettlement Division, with 
responsibility for administering a labor camp program. . . . The program promptly 
expanded to include temporary and permanent camps and shelters, with sanitary 
facilities, medical care, and recreational facilities, located wherever migrants congregated 
along the routes of seasonal travel in several states. By the end of 1942, the FSA had built 
ninety-five camps, with accommodations for approximately 75,000 people. Although the 
primary purpose of the program was merely to improve the living conditions of the 
migrants while en route between work and not to alter their status, the leaders of the FSA 
continued to dream of a program that some day might grant this class of farm families 
great permanent economic and social security and stronger bargaining power” (222). For 
more on the origins and history of the RA/FSA camps, see Benson “To Tom” 160-63 and 
Stein 150-92. 
53 Collins is also the “Tom” to whom Steinbeck dedicates his novel: “To TOM who lived 
it.” 
54 For more on Steinbeck’s visit to Arvin and the relationship between Steinbeck and 
Collins, see Benson “To Tom,” Collins, Cox “Fact” 12-5, DeMott “Truly” 274-77, and 
Wollenberg vii. 
55 After visiting the San Joaquin Valley but before his “Harvest Gypsies” series was 
featured in The San Francisco New, Steinbeck also published an article in The Nation 
(“Dubious Battle in California”) on September 12, 1936. Like his “Harvest Gypsies” 
articles, the piece in The Nation characterizes the Okies as a “new race” of migrants who 
should be “given the right to live decently” (304). However, in The Nation, Steinbeck 
mentions the federal camps in only one sentence, focusing his attention instead on the 
horrid conditions in the squatters’ camps (303).  
56 For critical readings of Steinbeck’s “Harvest Gypsies” series, see Cunningham 18-29 
and Wollenberg. 
57 As one Weedpatch resident explains, “This here’s United States, not California” (334). 
58 I am by no means suggesting that Steinbeck abandons his support for Roosevelt’s New 
Deal welfarism. Indeed, Steinbeck’s first contact with Roosevelt comes on February 9, 
1939, when he sends a telegram to the White House protesting the “curtailment of the 
FSA Camps and relief program” (qtd. in Lewis 24). I am simply suggesting that 
Steinbeck came to the conclusion during the late 1930s that federal relief camps were not 
a solution to the migrant labor problem in California. 
59 Steinbeck returned to the San Joaquin Valley for a month during the fall of 1937, then 
for two weeks in February of 1938, and finally for approximately a week during March of 
1938. For more on the precise details of these visits, see Steinbeck Life 158-62, Collins 
213-26, Benson True 369-77, DeMott Working Days xxxvi-xlii, and DeMott “Truly” 
281-83. 
60 Steinbeck’s “Foreword” to Collins’s memoir attests to the accuracy of the camp 
manager’s accounts, as do Steinbeck’s diary and letters, which confirm the timeline of 
events outlined in Bringing in the Sheaves. For a history of Collins’s memoir, see DeMott 
“Introduction” xxix. 
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61 In part, Steinbeck’s changed attitude toward welfarism resulted simply from his 
realization that federal aid was an inadequate solution as long as citizens, businesses, and 
organizations in California persisted in “sabotaging” the government’s relief efforts 
(Steinbeck Life 158). Until Californians were ready to treat migrant laborers as welcome 
guests and not as uninvited “outsiders,” the hospitality of the federal government served 
merely as a temporary solution to a much larger problem (Life 158). 
62 As Steinbeck’s diary and letters make clear, it was the sickening images that he 
observed and the tragic stories that he heard during the Visalia flood that provided the 
impetus for his narrative about the Joads and the source material for the final chapters in 
his novel. In particular, one story that Steinbeck describes in a letter to Elizabeth Otis 
seems to have provided him with the idea for the novel’s final scene: “And we found a 
boy in jail for a felony because he stole two old radiators because his mother was starving 
to death and in stealing them he broke a little padlock on a shed” (Life 161). 
63 For more on the “grand-in-aid” program and other similar New Deal programs, see 
Stein 140-44.  
64 Walter Stein notes that the Roosevelt administration initially provided support to 
interstate migrants through relief measures passed during the First Hundred Days but that 
this support was abandoned by mid-1935: “By mid-1935, the Roosevelt administration 
had determined that the federal government could well afford to remove itself from the 
business of direct relief. FERA was gradually phased out, and direct relief was replaced 
with public works and work relief programs. . . . The federal government’s sole attempt 
to aid interstate migrants ended” (143). 
65 Through Tom’s dialogue with the Wallaces, we get the impression that the FSA culture 
at Weedpatch discourages migrants from identifying themselves by name. As Timothy 
Wallace explains, “you git outa the habit a mentionin’ your name” (292). The fact that 
Tom learns the Wallaces names in Grapes is another way in which the hospitality he 
receives is conditional. As Derrida explains, the difference “between the foreigner and 
the absolute other is that the latter cannot have a name or a family name” (OH 25).  
66 In this sense, Steinbeck’s account of Weedpatch accords with Carey McWilliams’s 
renowned account in Factories in the Field: “But the migratory camps are not a solution” 
(303).  
67 Tom is asked to identify his name, his father’s name, his state of origin, his occupation, 
his family’s financial status, and the details of his stay in California thus far (286-87). 
68 Of course, the Joads are welcomed into Weedpatch only because the watchman does 
not know that Tom is a fugitive from the law who has broken his parole by leaving the 
state of Oklahoma. 
69 In rare cases when non-whites were received into federal camps, the FSA maintained a 
system of racial segregation (Stein 171). However, aware that California’s non-white 
population was “strongly opposed to segregation in tax supported camps,” the FSA never 
formally acknowledged its “unofficial practice” of internal segregation (Stein 171). 
According to Walter Stein, when Tom Collins, the manager at the Arvin Federal Camp, 
was asked about the FSA practices of racial exclusion and segregation in the case of 
African-Americans, he reported that the FSA “do[es] not discriminate—color—race or 
creed” but that if “a need arises . . . we . . . can easily solve it by suggesting to the Negro 
group that they occupy a certain section, and if necessary explain to them the advantage 
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of having the colored group to itself” (171). For more on the demographics of the FSA 
camps, see Gregory 143, 183, and 264 n. 42. 
70 Whereas Steinbeck describes the New Deal relief camps as a “unique” form of federal 
hospitality in his “Harvest Gypsies” series (40), he deliberately portrays Weedpatch in 
The Grapes of Wrath as representative of an existing tradition of exclusive and 
contingent American hospitality. In particular, Steinbeck draws a subtle but significant 
parallel between the federal hospitality offered to migrant laborers at FSA camps and the 
federal hospitality offered to Native Americans on reservations. In response to Tom’s 
observation that he looks “all Injun,” Jules Vitela, the “half-Cherokee” laborer at 
Weedpatch, bemoans the fact that he does not possess enough Indian blood to warrant 
receiving a plot of land on a reservation: “Wisht I was a full-blood. I’d have my lan’ on 
the reservation. Them full-bloods got it pretty nice, some of ‘em” (339). Vitela’s allusion 
to the similarly conditional nature of federal hospitality on Native-American reservations 
invites us to view the FSA camps not as unprecedented experiments in New Deal 
welfarism but as symptomatic of a longstanding pattern in American political history. 
71 Critics have traditionally interpreted Steinbeck’s depiction of the Weedpatch Ladies’ 
Committee and of the camp itself as endorsing the FSA’s Marxist culture of welfarism. 
Danica Cerce, for example, argues that Steinbeck’s Weedpatch imagines a “utopian 
communist society,” inasmuch as “all the mebers work towards a common goal (the 
welfare of the whole community and each individual), help and respect each other, and 
share their sorrows and joys” (30). 
72 Earlier scenes in the novel draw our attention to a pervasive anxiety in the migrant 
community about being seen as soliciting the “charity” of others. When the Joads stop at 
a gas station in western Oklahoma, they become offended when the proprietor implies 
that they might be “beggin’”: “We’re payin’ our way . . . You got no call to give us a 
goin’-over. We ain’t asked you for nothin’” (126). Shortly thereafter, Pa proudly 
announces, “We never took nothin’ we couldn’ pay; we never suffered no man’s charity” 
(139). The Joads’ opposition to charity—that is, to receiving something without paying 
for it—is grounded in their fervent belief in reciprocal exchange. They believe they have 
an ethical obligation to pay, work, or trade for what they receive, and they are hostile to 
any suggestion to the contrary. As their relationship with the Wilsons demonstrates, this 
sense of ethical obligation is particularly important to the Joads in cases of offering 
and/or receiving hospitality. When the Wilsons’ welcome a dying Grampa into their tent, 
the Joads feel “beholden” to their hosts (139). 
73 For other discussions on the subject of “charity” at Weedpatch and in other FSA 
camps, see Gregory 283 n. 103, Cox 20, and Cunningham 340-41. 
74 In his parody of the Weedpatch Ladies’ Committee, Steinbeck demonstrates how the 
FSA camps, as American spaces of exceptional hospitality, functioned as ideological 
apparatuses of the state. Although the FSA camps did provide hospitality to homeless and 
unemployed migrants, they also worked to reassert and normalize codes of behavior 
according to the prevailing values of the federal government. Like Indian reservations, 
which were designed to fundamentally transform the cultural patterns of Native 
Americans, and, later, Indian boarding schools, which were devised to destroy tribal 
identities, the FSA camps were envisaged as spaces that could facilitate the “obliteration” 
of migrant individualism (Stein 173). Crediting an ethos of rugged individualism with 
causing the Dust Bowl in the first place, FSA officials hoped to use the relief camps to 
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“remake” Okies in the image of “cooperative citizens” by teaching them to subordinate 
their private interests to the welfare of the community (Stein 166-73). 
75 Desperate to have something to believe in, they dream of a “rich” and “new” land 
where “you can reach anywhere and pick an orange” and where anyone “can start again” 
(87, 34). For critics who have written about Steinbeck’s engagement with the mythology 
of California in The Grapes of Wrath, see August, Fossey, Owens, and Wyatt. 
76 The Joads’ stubborn belief in the trustworthiness of advertisements is not limited to 
handbills. Rose of Sharon, for example, fashions her imagined future life in California 
with Connie out of what she’s “seen” in pulp romance magazines: “An’ after he studies at 
night, why—it’ll be nice, an’ he tore a page outa Western Love Stories, an’ he’s gonna 
send off for a course, ‘cause it don’t cost nothin’ to send off. Says right on that clipping. I 
seen it” (164-65). 
77 As a metaphor for false gestures of hospitality, the handbills could signify what Walter 
Benjamin might call the “decay” of hospitality’s “aura” (“Work” 223). In the absence of 
the face-to-face encounter, the textual invitation replaces “authenticity” and “uniqueness” 
with “reproducibility” (“Work” 220-24). 
78 As Frank Taylor reported as early as November of 1939, “Only two cases were 
unearthed, one by a labor contractor in Santa Barbara County, another by an Imperial 
Valley contractor. The licenses of both have since been revoked. At the Associated 
Farmers head office in San Francisco, I saw hundreds of clippings from Midwest 
newspapers—publicity inspired by the Association—advising migrants not to come to 
California” (238).  
79 For Derrida’s work on written speech acts, see “Signature Event Context” in LI 1-23. 
For scholars who have written about Derrida and hospitality within the context of speech-
act theory, see Burt 109-39 and de Ville 45-57. 
80 At the same time, however, Steinbeck demonstrates the extent to which survival in the 
migrant world often depends on the hospitality of others and, therefore, requires migrants 
both to be more cognizant of false invitations of hospitality and to be less selective at the 
same time. 
81 It is worth noting that one of the conditions of the driver’s hospitality is that Tom must 
withstand his host’s “secret investigating casualness” (9). Observing from the start that 
Tom is wearing brand new clothes, the driver engages in a “subtle examination” 
throughout their ride in an attempt to learn Tom’s background, particularly the reason for 
his imprisonment at McAlester (8).  
82 The truckers, on the other hands, are a different case altogether. Mae sees them as “the 
backbone of the joint” (154). Unlike the migrants, the truckers are worth Mae’s time: 
“Treat ‘em right an’ they come back” (154). Hence, Mae always “smiles” at them, “fixes 
her hair back so that her breasts will lift with her raised arms,” and “passes the time of 
day” with them over “jokes” (154).  
83 This lawless notion of hospitality extends to the Joads’ treatment of Grampa after he 
passes away.  Although they wish they could bury him back in Oklahoma, they are 
grateful for the opportunity to bury him themselves.  “Grampa buried his pa with his own 
hand, done it in dignity, an’ shaped the grave nice with his own shovel,” Pa explains.  
“That was a time when a man had the right to be buried by his own son an’ a son had the 
right to bury his own father” (140).  Here, Pa makes a clear distinction between the law 
and what he calls “decency” (140).  “Sometimes,” he argues, “the law can’t be foller’d no 
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way. . . . Sometimes a fella got to sift the law” (140).  Here, Pa advocates an ethics that 
values hospitable obligations to the dead above the rule of law.  Although they are forced 
to bury Grampa in a land that is “foreign” to him, they strive to maintain the rituals of 
tradition: “Then the shovel went from hand to hand until every man had his turn.  When 
all had taken their duty and their right, Pa attacked the mound of loose dirt and hurriedly 
filled the hole” (144).  Later, after Granma dies, the Joads feel the same responsibility to 
give her a proper burial, but they no longer have enough money to be hospitable to the 
dead: “You ain’t to feel bad.  We couldn’ no matter how hard we tried, no matter what 
we done.  We jus’ didn’ have it; embalming, an’ a coffin an’ preacher, an’ a plot in a 
graveyard.  It would of took ten times what we got.  We done the bes’ we could” (240-
41). 
84 Perhaps the most powerful patriarchal image in the novel is Steinbeck’s tableaux of the 
Joads’ squatting circle: Pa, Uncle John, and Grampa—“the nucleus” of the family—squat 
in the center of the circle, close to the land, while the women and children take their 
places around the men (100). See Motley for a detailed analysis of the “patriarchal 
structure” of the squatting circle (402-03). 
85 For more on the distinction between the trope of the female “hostess” and the “female 
host,” see Still and McNulty. 
86 In perhaps the most scathing attack of Steinbeck’s final scene, Howard Levant 
describes the end of The Grapes of Wrath as “a disaster from the outset” and charges 
Steinbeck with allowing his “extreme dependence on allegory” to prevent him from 
achieving any semblance of narrative “credibility”: “. . . there is no more than a 
formulated ending, a pseudoclose that does not convince because its design is an a priori 
assertion of structure, not the supportive and necessary skeleton of a realized context” 
(32-3). Furthermore, Leslie Fiedler denounces Rose of Sharon’s gesture as futile, arguing 
that “the milk of a half-starved Okie girl is not likely to be copious and rich enough to 
sustain life and that, in any case, the old man she suckles is beyond the point of saving . . 
.” (63).  
87 Of course, numerous scholars have also celebrated Steinbeck’s final scene, lauding it 
as “splendid” (de Scheinitz 369); “honest, honorable, and even prophetic” (Chametzky 
57); and “optimistic” (Pollock 226). In vigorous defense of Steinbeck, Peter Lisca argues 
that “the novel’s thematic treatment of material made it possible for Steinbeck to end on a 
high point, to bring his novel to a symbolic climax without doing violence to credulity, 
structure, or theme” (308-09). A number of critics have also argued that Rose of Sharon’s 
act is representative of hope and regeneration (see Carpenter 321, Ditsky 43, Hunter 47, 
McCarthy 66-7, and Sklar 526-27). Others have focused attention on the Christian 
symbolism in the scene (see Shockley, Dunn, and Rombold). 
88 A number of scholars have put forward detailed interpretations outlining and 
identifying the significance and meaning of Roseharn’s “mysterious” smile. Howard 
Sklar argues that the smile represents “a silent recognition of the naturalness of extending 
sympathy beyond the confines of one’s circule of family” (526). Jennifer Williamson 
suggests that the smile “holds as much threat as it does allure” (92). Warren Motley 
maintains that Roseharn’s smile “announces her initiation into a matriarchal mystery: the 
capacity to nurture life” (411). However, what these analyses fail to recognize is that 
Steinbeck repeatedly associates Roseharn with an enigmatic smile throughout the novel. 
When we are first introduced to her, she is described as having a “self-sufficient smile” 
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(95). Shortly thereafter, we hear of her “self-satisfied smile” (98). Later, we are told that 
she looks at Connie and “smile[s] secretly” (129). Although Rose of Sharon clearly 
undergoes some sort of transformation in the final chapters of the novel, her “mysterious” 
smile in the closing scene does not point to that transformation. 
89 “. . . I am not claiming that hospitality is this double bind or this aporetic contradiction 
and that therefore wherever hospitality is, there is no hospitality. No, I am saying that this 
apparently aporetic paralysis on the threshold ‘is’ what must be overcome . . . It is 
necessary to do the impossible. (“H” 14) 




91 Gone With The Wind is filled with clearly identifiable scenes of hospitality and 
inhospitality. The novel opens with a scene in which Scarlett O’Hara commits a “breach 
of hospitality” when she fails to invite the Tartleton twins to stay at Tara for supper (43). 
Following this scene of withheld hospitality is the barbecue at Twelve Oaks, in which 
John Wilkes, “famed throughout the state for his hospitality,” welcomes friends and 
family to his plantation (107). Then, there is the dramatic scene after Charles Hamilton’s 
death when Aunt Pitty and Melanie welcome Scarlett into their Atlanta home and invite 
her to “make her home permanently with them” (160). There are the many scenes in 
which Rhett Butler is welcomed into the homes of female aristocrats in Atlanta (201, 
224-26, 235-36). During the war, there are several scenes in which Scarlett and Melanie 
are forced to offer or withhold hospitality from starved and wounded soldiers (309, 320, 
392, 418, 436, 451, 472-473, 478). Following the war, there are scenes in which Melanie 
welcomes strangers into the basement rooms of her Atlanta home (697-98, 704, 760). 
Finally, there are a number of scenes in which Scarlett and Rhett, once married, are either 
invited to or turned away from Atlanta parties based on their politics (804, 833, 863). 
92 There are also passages in Gone With The Wind when the novel appears to suggest that 
the South did not abandon its commitment to unconditional hospitality in the postbellum 
period: “Times had changed, money was scarce, but nothing had altered the rule of 
Southern life that families always made room gladly for indigent or unmarried female 
relatives” (681-82). 
93 Unlike the broader category of the other, the stranger is, by definition, part of the 
traditional tropology of hospitality narratives. In hospitality stories, the stranger is a 
prospective guest. The stranger becomes a guest after receiving hospitality, which 
involves entering into a pact of hospitality with a host. The act of hospitality signals that 
the host has deemed the stranger non-hostile and capable of reciprocity. In addition, the 
act of hospitality confers on the stranger the status, privileges, and responsibilities of a 
guest (Benveniste 71-5; Maline 182-86; Ricoeur 38; van der Waat 22-3).  
94 In Chapter 13, Rhett asks Scarlett, “Why should I fight to uphold the system that cast 
me out?” (238). 
95 In the case in question, Rhett silences himself by asking to see John Wilkes’s library 
before any of the guests have a chance to confront him (124). At no point in Gone With 
The Wind is any character prevented from entering a household or forcibly removed from 
one. The closest incidence of an aspiring guest being sent away is when Melanie Wilkes 
persuades a Yankee soldier that it would be disrespectful to enter her home in search of 
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her husband and his Klu Klux Klan friends: “I beg your pardon, Mrs. Wilkes. I meant no 
disrespect. If you give me your word, I will not search the house” (744). 
96 For a detailed discussion on Mitchell’s coding of Rhett as black, see Joel Williamson 
97-100. 
97 Responses to the “rape” scene vary considerably in criticism about the novel.  On one 
hand, Leslie Feidler writes that Rhett’s rape of Scarlett is “based on a fantasy of inter-
ethnic rape as the supreme expression of the violence between sexes and races” (247).  
On the other hand, Kenneth O’Brien argues that “Mitchell portrays rape as an integral 
facet of human sexual relations, having nothing to do with race” (162). At the same time, 
Kathryn Lee Seidel notes that Scarlett is “raped within the bounds of marriage: it is a rape 
but it is not” (56). 
98 Rhett Butler is not the only character in Gone With The Wind who Mitchell figures as a 
stranger and who provides us with a stranger’s perspective on southern hospitality. For 
example, though he has been accepted into the aristocracy, Gerald O’Hara was originally 
a stranger to the South. Mitchell figures O’Hara as a stranger on multiple occasions (60, 
68-69) and uses O’Hara’s outsider’s perspective to critique various aspects of southern 
hospitality (62).  
99 For studies about the secretive and deceptive elements of the Klan organization, see 
Chalmers and MacLean.   
100 Tracy McNulty and Judith Still have recently distinguished between “hostesses” and 
“female hosts.” According to McNulty and Still, the traditional hostess functions as a 
sexualized body through which two or more men communicate with one another, 
whereas a female host assumes and displays sovereignty over a household and in 
exchanges of hospitality. In other words, whereas a hostess possesses authority that is 
inextricably linked to her sexuality and that is “delegated” to her by a male host, a female 
host operates with independence and autonomy in her relations with guests and 
household members (Still 151-52; McNulty xxxvii-xlii). 
101 See, for example, Tippen. 
102 One of the first things that Sutpen observes about life in coastal Virginia that is 
different from life in the mountains of western Virginia is that white men on the coast 
“evade” physical labor by having their slaves perform it for them (180). He first notices 
this when his family descends from the mountains and he sees “niggers working in the 
fields while white men sat fine horses and watched them” (183). This image of white men 
watching while their black slaves perform physical labor for them recurs over and over 
again in Sutpen’s early observations of Tidewater life (179-85). In particular, Sutpen is 
mesmerized by the sight of black slaves performing menial “personal offices” for their 
white masters, the kinds of personal offices “that all men have had to do for themselves 
since time began and would have to do until they died and which no man ever has or ever 
will like to do but which no man that he knew had ever anymore thought of evading than 
he had thought of evading the effort of chewing and swallowing and breathing” (180). 
Among the personal offices that Sutpen observes slaves performing for their white 
masters are “pouring the very whiskey from the jug and putting the glass into his hand or 
pulling off his boots for him to go to bed” (180). In one instance, Sutpen fixates on the 
sight of a plantation owner lying comfortably in a hammock while his slave “fan[s] him,” 
“bring[s] him drinks,” “hand[s] him” jugs of water, and “carr[ies]” wood for him (184-
85). So fascinated is Sutpen by the image of the plantation owner “being waited on” that 
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he “creep[s] up among the tangled shrubbery of the lawn and lie[s] hidden and watch[es]” 
as the black slave performs “endless repetitive personal offices” for him (179-80, 184-
85). In this scene, the young Sutpen voyeuristically satisfies his own desire to evade work 
by watching the plantation owner being waited on by his slave. Putting himself in the 
place of the plantation owner, he imagines what it would be like to “not have to” perform 
personal offices for himself (185).  
103 As Sutpen watches the slave carry wood and water into the big house for the 
plantation owner’s sisters to wash and cook with, he notes “the pleasure” it would give 
his own sisters “for their neighbors . . . to see them being waited on” (185). In coming to 
this understanding, Sutpen realizes that it is not just the desire to evade work that 
motivates slaveholding southerners to have their slaves perform personal offices for 
them; it is also their desire to be seen not having to perform these offices themselves. 
Sutpen describes the kinds of work that his sisters perform—washing and cooking—as 
“brutish and stupidly out of all proportion to its reward,” as labor that “only a beast could 
and would endure” (191). If his sisters cold evade this “brutish” work and be seen 
evading it, Sutpen concludes that his sisters would appear more human in the eyes of 
their neighbors. The “pleasure” that Sutpen imagines his sisters would receive by 
knowing that they are being watched by their neighbors is experienced vicariously by 
Sutpen as he watches the plantation owner and his sisters being attended to. This 
vicarious pleasure explains not only why Sutpen enjoys watching but also, in a more 
general sense, how and why the South’s fetishism of hospitality during the antebellum 
period was fed by the voyeuristic instinct. By engaging in voyeuristic acts like the one 
Sutpen engages in, non-slaveholding whites in the South could vicariously satisfy their 
own desires to evade physical labor and to be seen evading it. 
104 Sutpen also emphasizes the fetishistic nature and function of southern hospitality 
when he talks about how southerners are always “talking about” southern hospitality but 
“never” acknowledge out loud what they are really talking about: “. . . the men and the 
women were talking about the same thing though it had never once been mentioned by 
name, like when people talk about privation without mentioning the siege, about sickness 
without ever naming the epidemic” (186-87). 
105 See Freud’s essay “Fetishism” for the role that substitutive ideas play in helping to 
disavow fetishes.  
106 In Freudian terms, Sutpen’s positive vision of hospitality masks the class difference 
that was revealed by the scene at the big house and “restores” that difference with the 
appearance of an “original presence” (Bhabha “The Other Question” 27).  
107 The experience of being turned away from the front door of the big house upends 
Sutpen’s existing worldview and requires him to fundamentally reassess his place in the 
social order. He undertakes this reassessment by imagining himself through the eyes of 
the plantation owner. In replaying the encounter at the big house in his mind, Sutpen 
imagines the plantation owner looking out from inside the big house through the half-
closed door and “seeing” him standing there and thinking that he and his family are no 
better than “cattle,” “creatures” without “hope” or “purpose” (190). He then begins to 
think of his “home” through the eyes of the plantation owner and suddenly realizes how 
“rotten” the log walls are, how “sagging” the roof is, and how “brutish” and “crude” and 
“out of all proportion to its reward” the labor is that he and his family perform there (190-
91). Seeing himself, his home, and his family through the eyes of the plantation owner 
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forces Sutpen to recognize his own “difference” from the plantation owner (183). It 
forces him to recognize not only how different his circumstances are from the plantation 
owner’s but also how differently he and his family are seen by others. This recognition of 
difference shatters Sutpen’s “innocence” and produces an “explosion” in his worldview 
(192). 
108 From the moment that he formulates the design, Sutpen remains constantly “vigilant,” 
always “alert” to how every possible “circumstance” can impact the design (41). Every 
action Sutpen takes is “measure[ed]” and “weigh[ed]” according to whether that action 
will help him achieve his design (41). Thus, when he learns that Eulalia is of mixed 
descent and no longer “incremental” to his design, he promptly “put[s]” her “aside” 194). 
No longer capable of helping him achieve his design, Eulalia ceases to serve any 
redeeming purpose. Sutpen views his marriage to Eulalia as his one permissible 
“mistake” in the execution of his design and allows himself no other (41). To his 
thinking, a second mistake could lead to his “doom” (41). Sutpen’s unwavering 
commitment to his design is also evident in his calculating frugality. Intent on 
accumulating the wealth required to achieve self-reliance, Sutpen is steadfast about not 
amassing debts in the meantime. He does not drink in public taverns because he does not 
want to put himself in a position where he might not be able to “pay his share or return 
the courtesy” (25). Sutpen exhibits the same frugality when men from Jefferson come out 
to Sutpen’s Hundred to camp in the empty rooms of his incomplete plantation home: he 
partakes of the liquor that his guests provide with “sparing calculation,” “keeping” a 
“mental” tally of the amount he “accept[s]” alongside the amount he “supplie[s]” (30). 
All of this frugality is motivated by an all-encompassing commitment to the design. 
109 Much has been said about the attitudes of characters in Absalom, Absalom! toward the 
past and history. Robert Dunne argues that Sutpen fails to achieve his design in large part 
because he “fails to keep past events in the past” (60). According to Dunne, Sutpen’s 
repeated efforts to erase his past and to start over reflect a preoccupation with the past 
that leaves him “helpless against the impending reality of the future” (61).109 Jessica 
Hurley likewise maintains that Sutpen spends much of the novel struggling to keep his 
“past at bay” only to find that he is unable to “keep his past where it should be” (66). 
Hurley suggests that the combination of Sutpen’s rejection of his past and the continuing 
reappearance of his past in the novel makes for a “haunted” narrative in which ghostly 
figures from the past constantly haunt the present (66). Like Hurley, Wade Newhouse 
contends that Sutpen’s “failures” to come to terms with his past are intended to be read as 
“representative” of the South’s failures “generally” and, more specifically, of its 
“strategies of concealing and evading” its “dark flaws” (146). In contrast to Dunne and 
Hurley, Joshua McClennen suggests that Sutpen shows not a preoccupation with the past 
but, instead, a complete disregard for its “meaning” (358).109 In McClennen’s estimation, 
Sutpen views history, including his own history, as “the meaningless product of accident 
and human activities” (359). 
110 Sutpen is a “ghost” who haunts Quentin like a “fever” (8). Rosa is a “ghost” who 
haunts the present due to her inability to “forgive” or “revenge” Sutpen (8). Charles Bon 
is a “phantom” from Sutpen’s repressed past who . . . (82). 
111 We learn in the first chapter that Quentin is haunted by a constant barrage of living 
and dead “ghosts” who have arrived unbidden and taken up residence in his “body”: “His 
childhood was full of them; his very body was an empty hall echoing with sonorous 
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defeated names; he was not a being, an entity, he was a commonwealth. He was a 
barracks filled with stubborn back-looking ghosts . . .” (7). Quentin’s “very body” is a 
“hall” where the “defeated” ghosts of the South’s past seek recognition from a present 
that is intent on disavowing any memory of them. 
112 Sutpen’s internalization of the logic of southern hospitality is evidenced by the fact 
that he makes his decision to reject Bon based not on public opinion. As he himself is 
willing to admit, the union between Charles Bon and Judith Sutpen would appear 
“normal,” “natural,” and “successful” to the “public eye” (220). 
113 Like their father before them, both Henry Sutpen and Charles Bon also fail miserably 
in their efforts to keep the past at bay. Charles Bon’s efforts to deny his parentage of an 
interracial son cannot prevent that son and that son’s son from haunting Sutpen’s 
Hundred for years to come (300).  
114 As Rosa’s narration makes very clear, Clytie plays the role of a “cold Cerberus” at 
Sutpen’s Hundred (109). Guarding the gates of Sutpen’s “private hell,” she keeps watch 
for visitors and prevents the unlicensed escape of those who enter the mansion (109). As 
a “replica” of Sutpen and an “instrument” of his will, Clytie is ordered to “preside” over 
his home in “his absence” (110-11). In her position as the black mistress of Sutpen’s 
Hundred, Clytie temporarily assumes the privileged role of the white male host. 
Therefore, when Wash Jones tries to enter the Big House while Sutpen is away at war, 
Clytie lays down the law of Sutpen’s inhospitality: “Stop right there, white man  Stop 
right where you is. You aint never crossed this door while Colonel was here and you aint 
going to cross it now” (226). Like the “monkey-dressed nigger” who directs the young 
Sutpen around to the back door of the Big House, Clytie has been granted the authority to 
proffer or withhold hospitality, both because of and despite the “coffee-color” of her skin 
(126). 
115 Although Clytie is half-black and, therefore, also half-white, Rosa is not capable of 
thinking beyond the legal designations of her time. To Rosa, Clytie is defined by what 
she is not.  As the daughter of a slave woman, Clytie is “inscrutable,” “perverse,” 
“amoral,” “evil,” “untamed,” “indolent,” and “savage” (110-11, 126). 
116 However, it is worth nothing that Rosa claims to have demonstrated an aversion to 
physical intimacy with Clytie as a child: “But not I. Even as a child, I would not even 
play with the same objects which she and Judith played with, as though that warped and 
spartan solitude which I called my childhood, which had taught me (and little else) to 
listen before I could comprehend and to understand before I even heard, had also taught 
me not only to instinctively fear her and what she was, but to shun the very objects which 
she had touched” (112). 
117 In his first two visits to Sutpen’s Hundred, Bon is clearly figured as Henry’s invited 
“guest” (77, 215, 255). In his third visit, Henry shoots Bon for disregarding his directive 
not to pass through the plantation gates: “Don’t you pass the shadow of this post, this 
branch, Charles; and I am going to pass it, Henry” (106). Fittingly, Rosa describes 
Henry’s murder of Bon as an irrevocable act of inhospitality: “That sound was merely the 
sharp and final clap-to of a door between us and all that was, all that might have been . . 
.” (127). 
118 General Compson’s “offer to lend [Sutpen] seed cotton for his start,” and Goodhue 
Coldfield’s offers to “shield” Sutpen and offer him “protection” (23, 12, 9). It is 
ultimately General Compson and Goodhue Coldfield’s hospitality to Sutpen that enables 
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him to become “the biggest landowner and cotton player in the county” (56): 
“Yoknapatawpha County supplied him with it. He sought the guarantee of reputable men 
to barricade him from the other and later strangers who might come seeking him in turn, 
and Jefferson gave him that. . . . the men who had given him protection . . . it was mine 
and Ellen’s father who gave him that” (9).  
119 Even in death, we are told, Sutpen remains a stranger to Jeffersonians: his gravestone, 
unlike Ellen’s, does not “divulge where and when” he was born (153).  
120 The Holston House, located on the Square in the center of Jefferson, appears in a 
number of Faulkner’s Yoknapatawpha stories, including Light in August, The 
Unvanquished, The Mansion, and Flags in the Dust, among others. 
121 It is ultimately General Compson and Goodhue Coldfield’s hospitality to Sutpen that 
enables him to become “the biggest landowner and cotton player in the county” (56): 
“Yoknapatawpha County supplied him with it. He sought the guarantee of reputable men 
to barricade him from the other and later strangers who might come seeking him in turn, 
and Jefferson gave him that. . . . the men who had given him protection . . . it was mine 
and Ellen’s father who gave him that” (9).  
122 “. . . if conditions were reversed and Henry was the stranger and he (Bon) the scion . . 
.” (255). 
123 This latter threat, at least in Quentin and Shreve’s estimation, ultimately leads to 
Henry’s decision to kill Bon (285). Ultimately, it is Bon’s racial otherness that most 
clearly demarcates him as a stranger in the novel. On how Bon is both familiar and 
strange. 
124 “. . . the house which he had built, which some suppuration of himself had created 
about him as the sweat of his body might have created, produced some (even if invisible) 
cocoon-like and complementary shell in which Ellen had to live and die a stranger . . .” 
(111). 
125 “. . . the My dear son in his father’s sloped fine hand out of that dead dusty summer 
where he had prepared for Harvard so that his father’s hand could lie on a strange lamplit 
table in Cambridge; that dead summer twilight—the wisteria, the cigar-smell, the 
fireflies—attenuated up from Mississippi and into this strange room, across this strange 
iron New England snow” (141). 
126 Descriptions of southern hospitality and inhospitality abound in Absalom, Absalom! 
These descriptions often repeat and echo one another. Early on, Mr. Compson describes 
the hospitality that Rosa’s family provides her after her father’s death as a proffering of 
“food and shelter and protection” (47). Later, Rosa uses the same words when speaking 
about the hospitality that she receives at Sutpen’s Hundred: “. . . food and protection and 
shelter . . .” (137). Mr. Compson then repeats himself, using a strikingly similar phrase 
when characterizing the hospitality that Sutpen provides to his family at Sutpen’s 
Hundred: “. . . food and shelter and clothing . . .” (88). And, toward the end of the novel, 
Quentin echoes the same language that he has heard previously from his father and Rosa, 
describing southern hospitality to Shreve as offering “food and clothes and shelter” (279). 
There are also, of course, the repeated descriptions of the inhospitality Sutpen shows 
Wash Jones. These repeated descriptions serve both to recall and repress Sutpen’s 
childhood trauma. See Brooks, Casero, and Dalziel on the repressive qualities of the 
narration in Absalom, Absalom! 
127 For a reading of Jubilee in terms of Gone With The Wind, see Mary Condé 212-14. 
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128 For a reading of Jubilee that focuses on the novel’s participation in the black 
revisionist movement of the 1930s, see Dieng.   
129 With their trust in the federal government “shaken” after failed attempts at land 
confiscation and redistribution, the freedman Bayley Wyat proclaimed that the only 
chance blacks had of receiving hospitality in the future was to turn to God: “I tell you 
who we is to trust. We is to trust God, and he will bring us all out ob de wilderness, 
somehow, and sometime, and somewhere” (2). But God’s hospitality, Wyat explained, is 
not proffered to everyone. One must demonstrate hospitality to others before receiving 
God’s gifts: “We must form societies to help each other who cannot help demselves . . . I 
tell you dat God won’t help those dat won’t help themselves” (3).   
130 For a study on Walker’s “humanism,” see Gwin. 
131 For a reading of Jubilee that pays particular attention to Vyry’s racial identity, see 
Cliff. 
132 For a discussion on the figuration of Heaven as home in black folklore, see Mason 
Brewer 146. 
133 In keeping with the analogies of folklore, Brother Ezekiel refers to Lincoln as “our 
Moses” (242-43). In her essay “How I Wrote Jubilee,” Walker explains that she wanted 
“to press the leitmotiv of the biblical analogy of Hebrews in Egypt with folk in America.  
I had always known that Negro slaves prayed for a Moses to deliver them from Pharaoh” 
(62). 
134 For analyses of the folk elements in Jubilee, see Carmichael 74; Thomas 137-40; and 
Traylor 513-18. 
135 James E. Spears reports that “Of the fifty-eight chapters, twenty-two begin with 
spiritual, and thirty-six with secular, epigraphs” (14).  
136 All biblical quotations are taken from The New Oxford Annotated Bible: New Revised 
Standard Edition. 
137 For a detailed critical analysis of Leviticus 25, see John Bergsma 81-105. 
138 “Innis Brown had always had a dream, a daydream, something like a castle in the air.  
He dreamed of a farm of his own, a place further west with a team of mules, with a house 
for a family, and a cotton crop of his own” (296). 
139 Less optimistic, Vyry recognizes Sherman’s “Special Field Order” as “too good to be 
true” (343). She also questions Innis’s reference to the “word” of the government by 
asking, “What kinda word?” (343). 
140 For a reading of Vyry in terms of her insistence on “resolution and forgiveness,” see 




141 For definitions of “politics of recognition,” see Taylor, Fraser “Why Overcoming 
Prejudice” 22-4, Day 34-38 and 197-199, and Coulthard 3. 
142 “. . . the state does not recognize the value or equality of all ‘communities’; rather, it 
merely recognizes their ‘existence’” (198). 
143 “. . . the expression of Indigenous anticolonial nationalism that emerged during this 
period forced colonial power to modify itself from a structure that was once primarily 
reinforced by policies, techniques, and ideologies explicitly oriented around the genocidal 
exclusion/assimilation double, to one that is now reproduced through a seemingly more 
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conciliatory set of discourses and institutional practices that emphasize our recognition 
and accommodation. Regardless of this modification, however, the relationship between 
Indigenous peoples and the state has remained colonial to its foundation” (6) 
144 Even Charles Taylor, the leading proponent of recognition politics in North America, 
has admitted that liberal regimes of recognition in Canada and the U.S. have tended to be 
“inauthentic,” “condescending,” and “homogenizing” (50, 71-2). 
145 The practice of settler colonialism is a distinct form of colonialism in which the settler 
colony invades the settler society and establishes sovereignty. For definitions of settler 




146 All references to writings by Zitkala-Ša are taken from American Indian Stories, 
Legends, and Other Writings unless otherwise noted.  
147 After having been virtually ignored by academic scholars for most of the twentieth 
century, Zitkala-Ša has recently emerged as a seminal figure in Native American studies 
and American literary studies. The Yankton Dakota author’s life and work now figure 
prominently as subjects of study in leading journals and collections of criticism. Since 
2000, no fewer than twenty books of literary and/or cultural criticism have included a 
chapter on Zitkala-Ša. During the same time period, as many as twelve articles on 
Zitkala-Ša have appeared in Arizona Quarterly, American Indian Quarterly, and Studies 
in American Indian Literatures alone. Moreover, it has become commonplace to feature 
selections of Zitkala-Ša’s fiction and non-fiction in anthologies of American literature. 
The editors of the most recent Norton Anthology of American Literature, for example, 
devote twenty-three pages to Zitkala-Ša, more pages than they devote to several major 
authors from the first half of the twentieth century, including Hemingway, Steinbeck, and 
Dreiser. Likewise, recent editions of The Bedford Anthology of American Literature, The 
Heath Anthology of American Literature, and The Vintage Book of American Women 
Writers feature work by Zitkala-Ša. 
148 Lyons defines “rhetorical sovereignty” as “the inherent right and ability of peoples to 
determine their own communicative needs and desires in this pursuit, to decide for 
themselves the goals, modes, styles, and languages of public discourse” (449-50). See 
Enoch for a reading of Zitkala-Ša’s boarding school narratives in terms of Lyons’ theory 
of rhetorical sovereignty. 
149 Dreams and Thunder consists of ten legends, four original short stories, five poems, 
and one opera. Jane Hafen selected and edited the texts in the volume. For more on 
categorizing the tales in Dreams and Thunder, see Hafen “Stories” 3-5. For discussions 
on the literary category of the legend, particularly in the context of Native American 
literature, see Ballinger 12, Beckwith 339-40, and Ramsey 6. For a particular focus on the 
cultural functions of Sioux legends, see Beckwith, Gibbon 151, and Marshall. 
150 Although I do not speak the Dakota language, the changes that Zitkala-Ša makes to 
the traditional Dakota legends can be ascertained through comparisons to other 
translations published by other Sioux authors during the first decades of the twentieth 
century. Notable examples are Charles Eastman’s Wigwam Evenings (1909) and Ellen 
Deloria’s Dakota Texts (1932), both of which include some of the same tales. Deloria’s 
collection is particularly valuable because it includes both literal and creative translations 
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of traditional legends. For discussions on the differences between Zitkala-Ša’s 
translations and other contemporary translations, see Davidson & Norris 3-4, Smith 47-
52, and Stout 304-05. 
151 As Robert Williams notes, “Indians, particularly during the crucial early stages of the 
Encounter era, did not act as obstacles to white expansion in North America. Quite the 
opposite, Indians responded as active facilitators of the many multicultural 
accommodations that Europeans found absolutely essential for survival on a colonial 
frontier” (20). Likewise, Francis Jennings argues, “Indian cooperation was the prime 
requisite for European penetration and colonization of the North American continent” 
(367). For more accounts of Native American hospitality to Europeans and Americans, 
see Bartram 16, Carver 25, Franklin, Heckewelder 148-49, Newquist 23-6, Thwaites 207-
09, Wallace 27, Williams 28-36, and Zeiseberger 116-23. 
152 Much of the scholarship about Zitkala-Ša’s legends has focused attention on her 
“Preface.” For two particularly insightful examples, see Myers 121-22 and Smith 47-8. 
153 For a history of ohunkakan, see Myers 122-23 and Stout 304-05.  
154 Michael Dorris makes a similar claim in his account of the contact period: “though 
Europeans looked like adults, they frequently seemed unable to feed themselves and to be 
perpetually on the brink of starving to death” (“Grass Still” 45). 
155 For a history of European and American characterizations of Indians as child-savages, 
see Roy Harvey Pearce’s The Savages of America. 
156 See Rogin 114-23 and 169-232 for a historical account of American paternalistic 
discourse as it relates to Native Americans. For specific examples of American 
government officials employing a paternalistic discourse when referring to Native 
Americans, see Dawes 29.  
157 As Mary Lethert Wingred notes, extended kinship has been the central “organizing 
principle” of Dakota society for centuries (1). For more on Sioux kinship systems, see 
Gibbon 100-01 and Hassrick 107-19.  
158 According to Zitkala-Ša’s narrator, this is the bear’s “noisy way of saying ‘the food 
was very good!’” (28). 
159 No early American writer more astutely or passionately describes the European 
exploitation of Native American hospitality than Benjamin Franklin. See, for example, A 
Narrative of the Late Massacres.  
160 See, for example, “A Dream of Her Grandfather” (141). For a history of international 
treaty law pertaining to Indian tribes, see Cohen 1-2, 10-13, 20-26, and 204-05; Murray 
54-5; and Williams 43-8, 50-3. 
161 This historical rhetoric and the acts of exploitation that accompany it are described 
well in a passage from a speech given by Henry Dawes in 1883: “When we were weak 
and he was strong we begun by deceiving him, and getting away from him by fraud or 
chicanery, what we were unable to get by power.  When we became strong and begun to 
push him back from his own heritage, that we claimed the right to possess, then we 
undertook to isolate him and draw a line making it a penitentiary offense for a white man 
or an Indian to cross it . . .” (28). 
162 The discovery doctrine dates back to the period of European discovery in North 
America and was codified into American law in Chief Justice John Marshall’s 1823 
decision in Johnson v. McIntosh. For a history of this doctrine, see Watson “The 
Discovery Doctrine.” 
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163 Ultimately, the badger in Zitkala-Ša’s legend turns to the Great Spirit for help. He 
builds a sacred lodge and makes an offering of buffalo blood. In reply to the badger’s 
sacred prayer, the Great Spirit sends him “the avenger” in the person of a Dakota man 
with a magic arrow (31). After hearing the badger’s story, the avenger offers to 
accompany him to his old home to seek the bear’s hospitality. Unsatisfied with the bear’s 
offering of a knife as recompense for his actions, the avenger announces that he has 
“come to do justice” and demands that the bear “return” the badger’s dwelling to its 
rightful owner (32). Fearing the well-known power of the avenger, the bear flees to the 
forest. As the badgers repossess their old home, the avenger bids them goodbye, 
proclaiming, “I go . . . over the earth” (32). 
164 In addition to Iktomi, Wakan Tanka, Inyan, and Wakinyan are three of the most 
important figures in Sioux mythology. Wakan Tanka is the all-powerful Great Spirit 
(Walker 8-10; 206-41). Inyan, the great stone god, is the “first in existence” and the 
“grandfather of all things” (Walker 10). Wakinyan is the great thunderbird, or the 
Winged-One, who also happened to give birth to Iktomi (Walker 46). 
165 For further discussion on these statistical differences, see Smith 58. 
166 The four tales in Old Indian Legends in which Iktomi does not appear are “The 
Badger and the Bear,” “Dance in a Buffalo Skull,” “The Toad and the Boy,” and “Iya, the 
Camp-Eater.” The three tales in Dreams and Thunder in which Iktomi does appear are 
“Buzzard Skin and the Sea Monsters,” “Zicha, the Squirrel, and Iktomi,” and “When the 
Buffalo Herd Went West.” 
167 In the limited scholarship that has been produced on Zitkala-Ša’s legends, occasional 
attempts have been made to explain the Dakota author’s fascination with Iktomi. Jeanne 
Smith has suggested that Iktomi holds appeal for Zitkala-Ša because he provides her with 
a medium through which to explore and reflect on her own efforts at playing the trickster: 
“The trickster, whose survival depends largely on techniques of masking, deceptive 
speech, and subversion, is a highly appropriate choice for an author faced with having to 
preserve her culture by publishing for an American audience in English . . .” (49). 
Arguing that Zitkala-Ša herself performs the role of the trickster in her “Preface” to Old 
Indian Legends through her skillful employment of “smooth-talk” and “tactful 
diplomacy,” Smith maintains that Zitkala-Ša uses Iktomi to model the kinds of 
subversive trickery that she hopes to inspire in her Native American readers (47). More 
recently, Robin DeRosa has put forward a reading in which she contends that Zitkala-
Ša’s Iktomi challenges existing cultural paradigms from the “borderland position” of an 
“outsider” (182). Reiterating conventional characterizations of Indian trickster figures, 
which rely heavily on a discourse of marginality, DeRosa insists that the Iktomi of 
Zitkala-Ša’s legends “remains an outsider” despite his destructive behavior (182). 
Restricted to the margins of society, where cultures intersect and clash, the Iktomi of 
DeRosa’s reading is treated as an exterior threat. As such, he is disassociated from the 
dominant culture he threatens, held at a distance, othered, treated as essentially different. 
For further discussion on the use of metaphors of marginality in theoretical 
characterizations of tricksters, see Ballinger 25-6. For an example of a theorization of the 
Indian trickster figure that relies heavily on metaphors of marginality, see Babcock-
Abrahams. For readings of Iktomi more generally as a liberating figure, see Vizenor 
“Trickster Discourse.” 
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168 In other translated versions of this legend, Iktomi does not build an improvised space 
in which to sing his songs. Instead, he simply sings his songs out in the open. See, for 
example, Ellen Deloria’s “Ikto’mi Tricks the Pheasants” (20). 
169 During the 1850s, the US federal government abandoned an existing strategy of Indian 
removal and adopted a new and seemingly more benevolent policy of confining Native 
Americans on reservations (Cave 1330-42; Satz 126-45; Phillips 5-6; Cohen 65). Unlike 
Indian removal, which aimed simply at excluding Native Americans from the dominant 
spaces of American society, the reservation system was represented as a measure taken in 
order to protect and provide for indigenous peoples. Echoing the rhetoric used to justify 
the confinement of the mentally ill and the poor, federal officials argued that the 
implementation of the reservation system was motivated by a “sincere humanitarian 
desire” to provide for the “general improvement” of Native Americans (Satz 2; Lea 3-4). 
Reservations were, therefore, portrayed as “refuges” created in order to make it possible 
for Indian tribes to survive and flourish without having to fear encroachments from 
hostile whites (Perry 6). 
170 Zitkala-Ša herself refers to alcohol as “the European liquid fire” (“Side by Side” 223). 
171 “It appeared to me to be a race of people very poor in everything. They go as naked as 
when their mothers bore them . . . The people are very docile, and for the longing to 
possess our things, and not having anything to give in return, they take what they can get, 
and presently swim away. Still, they give what all they have got, for whatever may be 
given to them, down to broken bits of crockery and glass” (Columbus 110-11, 113) 
172 A devout Christian himself, Columbus was insistent that indigenous peoples in the 
New World would eventually “all turn Christians” (142). Accordingly, he urged 
Ferdinand and Isabella to “resolve upon” the conversion of Indians to Christianity and “to 
bring so many great nations within the Church” (142).  
173 “The first European to encounter Native Americans, Christopher Columbus, noted 
how freely Native people shared among themselves, but he was not the last non-Indian to 
dismiss this behavior as simplistic and childlike, an indictator of cultural inferiority” 
(Stremlau 268) 
174 Ginny Carney offers a succinct description of the changing meaning of the phrase 
“Indian gift” over time: “Indian gift, originally an expression signifying a present for 
which an equivalent is expected, was corrupted to mean (as it does today), a gift that is 
taken back” (195).  
175 According to Bartlett, “This term is applied by children in New York and the vicinity 
to a child who, after having given away a thing, wishes to have it back again” (189).  
176 “If they take your gifts, they will prove like Indian gifts, for which you will exact, in 
return, much more in amount” (Woodbury 200).  
177 “. . . one must remember that Andrew Jackson not only refused to honor the 
obligations contained in treaties negotiated by his predecessors, but also ignored treaty 
promises made by his own administration” (Cave 1341). 
178 As Cohen notes, “Although tribes were not parties to the Constitution, the 
Constitution recognizes their existence, and in the commerce clause treats them as 
sovereigns along with the states and foreign nations. The Constitution also authorizes the 
United States to enter into treaties with Indian nations” (1). The Appropriations Act of 
1871, however, reversed this principle: “Provided, That hereafter no Indian nation or 
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tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an 
independent nation, tribe or power . . .” (qtd. in Cohen 75). 
179 “. . . all Indians within the Territorial limits of the United States, are considered 
subject to its sovereignty, and have only a possessory right to the soil, for the purpose of 
hunting and not the right of domain, hence I conclude that Congress has full power, by 
law, to regulate all the concerns of the Indians” (II 280). 
180 Jackson returns to the subject of Indian avarice in an 1837 letter to Joel Poinsett: “In 
respect to the suggestions you make concerning the management of our Indian relations, 
allow me to remark that long experience satisfies me that they are only to be well 
governed by their fears. If we feed their avarice we accelerate the causes of their 
destruction” (V 507). 
181 See, for example, Zitkala-Ša’s reference to Justice Marshall’s terminology in 
“America’s Indian Problem”: “History tells us that it was from the English and the 
Spanish our government inherited its legal victims, the American Indians, whom to this 
day we hold as wards and not as citizens of their own freedom loving land. . . . Wardship 
is no substitute for American citizenship . . .” (155-56).  
182 Motivated by the Gold Rush, the first Indian reservations were created in California in 
1853 (Cohen 65; Phillips 6). By 1858, federal policy had shifted entirely from exclusion 
to confinement. As Charles E. Mix noted in his 1858 Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, “Our present policy . . . is to permanently locate the different tribes on 
reservations embracing only sufficient land for their actual occupancy; to divide this 
among them in severalty, and require them to live upon and cultivate the tracts assigned 
to them” (7). 
183 The compulsory nature of boarding school education for Native Americans was not 
enforced legally until 1891: “On March 3, 1891, Congress authorized the Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs ‘to make and enforce by proper means such rules and regulations as will 
secure the attendance of Indian children of suitable age and health at schools established 
and maintained for their benefit.’ Two years later Congress addressed the issue of 
enforcement again, this time authorizing the Indian Office to ‘withhold rations, clothing 
and other annuities from Indian parents or guardians who refuse to neglect to send and 
keep their children of proper school age in some school a reasonable portion of each 
year’” (Adams 63-4) 
184 In “Iktomi and the Fawn,” for example, the trickster is told on numerous occasions 
that he must accept “one condition” in order to receive his share of an exchange but, 
nevertheless, still fails to comply, even after receiving what he has been promised (23-4). 
185 For accounts of the historical convergence of Euro-American and indigenous cultures 
of exchange, see Mallios, Murray, Newquist, and Williams. For a history of the 
commodification of Indian land during the Jackson administration, see Rogin 12-3, 79, 
and 212. 
186 See Butler’s Bodies That Matter and Muñoz’s Disidentifications for useful 
theorizations of disidentification. 
187 For a detailed discussion of “Iktomi and the Ducks” from an ecological perspective, 
see Myers 123-25. 
188 Of course, Zitkala-Ša is clear to point out that De Soto and his men abuse the 
hospitality they receive from Lady Cofitachequi by entering the ancestral tombs of the 
tribe, to say nothing of kidnapping her (155). 
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189 For historical accounts of complementarity in Sioux cultures, see Albers 117-18; 
Wingred 13-4, 42-3; Gibbon 74-5; and Stremlau 266-67. 
190 Charles Eastman, Ella Deloria, and James Walker have all composed versions of this 
popular legend. For a history of the tale and comparative analyses of these different 
versions, see Hafen, Dreams 41 and Jahner “Stone Boy: Persistent Hero.” 
191 Zitkala-Ša also uses her descriptions of her childhood invitations to establish a clear 
opposition between her mother’s hospitality and the hospitality of the United States 
federal government. In the opening scene of “Impressions,” wherein Taté I Yóhin Win 
instructs her daughter to avoid “intruding [her]self upon others,” she also recounts for 
Zitkala-Ša the history of her ancestors’ “forced” relocation to the Yankton Sioux 
Reservation three decades earlier (69). In her retelling, Taté I Yóhin Win denounces 
Americans as intruders who invaded Indian lands and then “defrauded” Indians of those 
lands by promising to provide them with hospitality on reservations (69-70). 
192 Zitkala-Ša’s deceased uncle, who was apparently famous for his bravery on the 
battlefield, was an important figure during her childhood, but his absence, like Zitkala-
Ša’s father’s, is his defining characteristic in “Impressions.” See 70-1.  
193 Zitkala-Ša never identifies her aunt’s name in “Impressions.” 
194 In place of existing Native American kinship systems, which relied on extended, 
multifamily households and communal resource ownership, allotment advocates insisted 
on the vital importance of requiring Indians to embrace the single family home as the 
centerpiece of civilized life. As Merrill Gates, President of the Board of Indian 
Commissioners, argued in 1885, “There is no way of reaching the Indian so good as to 
show him that he is working for a home. Experience shows that there is no incentive so 
strong as the confidence that by long, untiring labor, a man may secure a home for 
himself and his family” (51). Forcing Native Americans to accept a new conception of 
the home and a new culture of social exchange would, Gates realized, first require 
dismantling the Indian “tribal organization” model and the values it espoused (52). This, 




195 “The epic of America is, once more, sharply focused on the individual being and the 
power or ability to recognize and accept oneself and the other as sites of a never-ending 
dialogue that may bring about, if only for brief fleeting moments the experience of 
plenitude it craves for without every completely achieving it” (347). 
196 Likewise, Diane Quantic has concluded that the “radical change” we witness in 
Erdrich and Dorris’s characters toward the end of The Crown of Columbus suggests that 
“there is hope for us all” (370). The overriding message of the novel, Quantic submits, is 
that we, too, can “be saved” if we but embrace the liberal multicultural politics that the 
novel seems to espouse (370). 
197 Bartholomé de las Casas, a Dominican friar, historian of the West Indies, and friend of 
the Columbus family, made his transcription in the 1530s (Dunn & Kelley 4-5). The 
transcription claims to be a partly summarized and partly quoted version of Columbus’s 
original diary. The Las Casas transcription “disappeared for about 250 years but was 
found around 1790 by Martín Fernández de Navarette in the library of the Duke of 
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Infantado. It is now in the National Library, Madrid. As far as is known, the manuscript is 
unique. There are no other ‘original’ versions” (Dunn & Kelley 4-5).  
198 Erdrich and Dorris excerpt passages of The Diario of Christopher Columbus’s First 
Voyage to America, 1492-1493 from Oliver Dunn and James E. Kelley, Jr.’s translation 
(63-9).   
199 Later in the novel, Vivian notes the emphasis that Columbus puts on the written 
records taken at the scene of discovery when she points out that the Admiral insists in his 
letters that “the secretary carefully recorded and the comptroller duly witnessed what fell 
from his lips” (186). 
200 For more on Columbus’s letters, see Cachey, Jr. 28-9, Greenblatt 52-72, and Zamora.  
201 In his letters to Ferdinand and Isabella, discovered in 1989, Columbus writes that his 
proclamation “was not contradicted” (Zamora 3). 
202 Aside from the language of violence, of course, which might have been the only 
language that Columbus and his crew would have accepted as representing opposition. 
203 “It enables him, as we have seen, to stage a legal ritual that depends upon the formal 
possibility of contradiction without actually permitting such contradiction; that is, it 
enables him to empty out the existence of the natives, while at the same time officially 
acknowledging that they exist. . . . Columbus’s founding speech act in the New World is 
spectacularly ‘infelicitous’ in virtually every one of the senses detailed by Austin in How 
To Do Things With Words: it is a misfire, a misinvocation, a misapplication, and a 
misexecution. And it is difficult to believe that Columbus is unaware of these infelicities, 
for he knows very well that these are not uninhabited territories; indeed he notes that they 
have an immense population . . .” (Greenblatt 65) 
204 Since Columbus, settler colonial discourse in the New World has rationalized the 
dispossession and exploitation of indigenous peoples by treating Christianity as an 
“incommensurable” gift. See Murray 18. 
205 The editor’s exact words are “from the Indian, uh, Native American Indian, 
perspective” (12). 
206 For more on the commodification and ghettoization of indigenous scholarship, see 
Kuokannen 274-83. 
207 For a discussion about Vivian’s contingent status and the editor’s exploitation of it, 
see Quantic 370. 
208 Vivian is particularly “hooked” by two titles: The Secret of Columbus and Colón: 
First Ambassador to the Heathens (19). As far as I can tell, both of these titles are 
invented by Erdrich and Dorris. 
209 Along with his telegram, Cobb includes a money order for one thousand dollars (128). 
210 Cobb is not simply a false host. He is an invasive one. He advises Vivian and Roger 
and their two children to take a day trip on the island so that he may, without their 
knowledge, “thoroughly search the beach house” where they are staying (268). This 
invasion of Vivian and Roger’s privacy is figured in the novel as a violation of the laws 
of hospitality. As Roger informs us earlier in the novel, “The place one sleeps, where one 
lies unconscious and vulnerable, must above all else be secure from invasion or 
unwelcome intrusion . . .” (61). 
211 Cobb explains to Vivian that his uncle Harrison purchased the land where his beach 
cottage sits because he was “convinced that the crown mentioned in the Diary” was 
“hidden somewhere” on the island (190).  
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212 As Roger’s “mistress,” Vivian is, like Beatrice before her, a woman claimed by a man 
out of the bonds of marriage. For a history of Columbus’s relationship with Beatrice de 
Peraza y Bobadilla , see Hume 21. 
213 In Chapters 2 and 3 of The Crown of Columbus, Erdrich and Dorris present us with 
two different accounts of Vivian and Roger’s first encounter. Vivian narrates the first 
account, Roger the second. On the surface, the two passages simply describe the original 
meeting between future lovers from two different points of view. Yet, taken together, the 
passages also double as symbolic critiques of settler colonial narratives of hospitality. 
The meeting between Vivian and Roger takes place in the Dartmouth library 
where, having been assigned adjacent study carrels, the two are “next-door neighbor[s]” 
(44). Roger spends his days in his carrel writing an unrhymed Columbus monologue, 
speaking aloud to himself while experimenting with different poetic choices (43). 
Meanwhile, Vivian is hard at work on her on her first book, a study of pan-Indian 
religions (35). On the day when the two first meet, Roger is afflicted with a violent 
“hacking” cough, and Vivian knocks on his door to give him a packet of lozenges (34-5). 
In her retelling of the encounter, Vivian portrays Roger as an “arrogant” and 
“thoughtless” man so absorbed by his own ego that he has no problem “impos[ing]” his 
“afflictions” on others (34). Insensible to those around him, Vivian’s Roger “hacks” away 
in his carrel, disturbing the peace and quiet of the library, not bothering to take any steps 
to alleviate his “irritating” and “distracting” behavior (34-5). Unable to get any work 
done, Vivian eventually yells at Roger from her carrel: “For Godsake, shut up!” (35). 
Immediately feeling “contrite,” “small,” and “foolish” for having yelled at a man whom 
she has never met, Vivian hurries over to Roger’s carrel, knocks on the door, apologizes 
to him, and offers him a packet of lozenges (35). In Vivian’s account, the lozenges 
clearly represent an act of contrition, a kind of peace offering. They function both as an 
act of apology and as a gift. In her capacity as gift giver, Vivian plays the role of host. By 
receiving Vivian’s hospitality, Roger plays the role of needy guest.  
However, in his account of the encounter, Roger completely reverses the 
symbolism of the scene. In his retelling, Roger figures Vivian as an uninvited and 
unwelcome guest who invades his sovereign space. After screaming for Roger to “SHUT 
UP” (in Roger’s retelling, Vivian’s command is capitalized), the Vivian of Roger’s story 
“pound[s]” on his door and then “rude[ly]” forces his way into his carrel (42-3). Roger’s 
first impression of Vivian is that she is a “lunatic” with “wild” eyes (43). To him, 
Vivian’s sudden and unsolicited entrance into the “small space” of his carrel feels like an 
“invasion” (43). Yet, despite Vivian’s “rude” behavior, Roger reports that he shows his 
uninvited guest “no resistance” (43). He allows her to enter and to speak her mind 
without offering any opposition. He is her hospitable host. 
By presenting us with two different accounts of Vivian and Roger’s first 
encounter, Erdrich and Dorris take an expository scene and give it far-reaching symbolic 
implications. In addition, by framing the first encounter between Vivian and Roger as a 
scene of hospitality, Erdrich and Dorris also help prepare their readers to read future 
encounters between the novel’s two main characters through a theoretical lens of 
hospitality. From this point forward in the novel, Roger figures himself as a host in his 
relationship with Vivian. Roger concludes his account of his first meeting with Vivian by 
informing us that he is unable to concentrate for the rest of the afternoon because he is 
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“subject to a persistent fantasy” (45). In his fantasy, Roger imagines what he “should 
have done” and “said” to Vivian: 
In this scenario, there Vivian was, her head bent against the wall, her shoulders 
shaking. I sought to comfort her, to tell her that she need not castigate herself, and 
I gently touched her arm. But then, the turn of my imagination surprised me. The 
plot changed. It was not humiliation that inhabited her body, not suppressed tears. 
She buried her face in my chest and laughed. What could I do? I put my arms 
around her, embraced the soft knit of her sweater, drew her to me. Her hair 
brushed my chin, our bodies elided at every crucial juncture, and I felt myself 
irresistibly infected, incapable of not joining in. (45) 
214 For Kuokannen, “academic hospitality” takes place when “the academy” or a 
representative of the academy “recognize[s] and accept[s] its [or their] responsibility 
toward the other” (267). Kuokannen advises that the academy “revive an understanding 
of hospitality grounded on a sense of social responsibility and reciprocity” (285).  
215 The Crown of Columbus is a “trauma narrative,” Madsen tells us, inasmuch as its 
writers “engage, whether deliberately or not, in the representation of historical trauma” 
and do so “as a consequence” of their “self-identified” status as Native American writers 
(62). 
216 Vizenor outlines his theory of survivance in a number of critical works, most notably 
Fugitive Poses: Native American Scenes of Absence and Presence (1998), Manifest 
Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance (1999), and “Aesthetics of Survivance: 
Literary Theory and Practice” (2008). 
217 For a brief description of Vizenor’s notion of manifest manners, see Manuel 49. 
218 This passage appears in the Las Casas Diario on Monday, December 3, 1492 (Dunn & 
Kelley 197). 
219 For example, the novel’s opening scene, which takes place on Christmas Eve in 1990, 
reimagines a contemporary scene as a parallel to the moment of discovery, and it does so 
from the perspective of a young Native woman named Valerie Clock. For more on the 
novel’s opening scene, see Freccero et al. (18).  
220 For more on the mural and its history at Dartmouth College, visit 
http://hoodmuseum.dartmouth.edu/objects/p.934.13.3.   
221 Cobb offers Vivian two hundred and then three hundred thousand dollars for the pages 
. . . (193-94). 
222 A number of critics have suggested that The Crown of Columbus contains 
counternarrative forces that secretly undermine the novel’s seeming endorsement of 
liberal multiculturalism. In their collaborative review of the novel, for example, Carla 
Freccero, Marianne Hirsch, Ivy Schweitzer, and Susanne Zantop write that Erdrich and 
Dorris’s novel “might border on the trite or the sentimental were it not for voices of 
resistance that undermine and open up the neat closure of a paradise regained” (17). To 
Freccero et al., authorial choices by Erdrich and Dorris that at first glance appear to be 
“overly conciliatory moves” suggestive of an assimilationist politics (Roger’s 
“transformation” into a responsible father and husband, Roger’s acceptance of Vivian’s 
alternative “version of the discoverer and the Discovery,” Nash’s sudden embrace of 
Roger as a father figure) are all ultimately undercut by dissenting voices in the text (17). 
Birgid Däwes likewise draws attention to the novel’s internal contradictions and 
resistances. Like Freccero et al., she concludes that “subversive” elements in the text 
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produce contradictory “interpretations” and prevent any sense of narrative “closure” 
(255). According to Däwes, the counternarrative forces in The Crown of Columbus are 
ultimately designed to teach us “to listen closely and not to content ourselves with 
preconceived illusions of fixity” (255). 
223 “The novel itself, after all, treats marriage and collaboration as central issues in 
American history, and it does cast collaboration—be it between Vivian and Roger, 
between Vivian and Cobb, between native and colonizer, or between woman and man—
as fierce, life-threatening competition. But Vivian and Roger, like, one imagines, Erdrich 
and Dorris, work through competition to an (albeit imperfect) cooperation” (18). 
224 Erdrich and Dorris met at Dartmouth in 1972 when Erdrich was an undergraduate and 
Dorris was a first-year professor (Trueheart 117). Dorris left his job at Dartmouth in 1989 
to become a full-time writer. 
225 For more on the resemblances between the novel’s authors and the novel’s two main 
characters, see Wood 01E. 
226 “And the overall thematic conflict of the book—the question Dorris posed as ‘What 
do you do when you discover something you didn’t expect to discover?’—flips back in 
an intriguing way on The Broken Cord, which is a narrative about Dorris’s discovery of 
his son’s problems, a discovery that ran counter to his expectations and that he strongly 
resisted. The issue of Dorris and Erdrich’s relationship with their son is symbolically 
reconstructed in The Crown of Columbus in the person of Nash, Vivian’s 16-year-old son 
by an earlier marriage. Roger’s rage at Nash, a difficult and unkempt boy who exposes 
Roger in surprising ways, forms a subtle parallel with the father-son relationship Dorris 
described in The Broken Cord. Their union at the end of the novel is a fictional working 
out of a problem that in the earlier book was never fully resolved” (Passaro 165-66). 
227 Interestingly, Erdrich appeared in People magazine in May 1990. 
228 Mark Anthony Rolo went on to become a correspondent for Indian Country Today, 
director of the Native American Journalists Association (NAJA), and author of the 
memoir My Mother Is Now Earth (progressive.org). 
229 Despite his accusations of self-promotion, McNab is clear to acknowledge the 
important role that The Broken Chord, both the book and the film, played in exposing the 
dangers of fetal alcohol syndrome: “There is no doubt that the publication of this book 
was a significant even in drawing national recognition of the syndrome and we have 
much to thank Dorris for the writing of it” (109). On the other hand, Elizabeth Cook-
Lynn famously decried The Broken Chord, declaring it “a dangerous book for those of us 
still committed to ideas inherent in the tiospaye concept of reciprocity which the 
Dakotapi devised as a way to live” (42). 
230 For a historical account of Roger Williams’s relations with Native Americans, see 
Davis. 
231 See, for example, Wood 1E and Schumacher 177. See also Dorris’s interviews with 
Stokes and Huey, where he once again claims that he and Erdrich “agree on every word” 
(Stokes 56; Huey 125). Critics have often reiterated Dorris’s claim that they reached 
consensus on every word. Allan Chavkin and Nancy Feyl Chavkin report that “Erdrich 
and Dorris together do the research, develop the plot and characters, discuss all other 
aspects of the work, and ultimately agree on every word before it is submitted for 
publication” (ix-x). Linda Karell, likewise, writes that Erdrich and Dorris’s “writing 
process is densely mutual and eventually requires that each agree on every word before 
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publication” (32). For the number of joint interviews that Erdrich and Dorris gave during 
their collaboration, see Seema Kurup, who calculates that the two authors participated in 
“more than one hundred” joint interviews (5). 
232 “I started out being very way of collaboration and working together, but I trusted it 
and trusted it, and when I would have trouble with it, I would really look at the work and 
I’d realize it was better for the efforts” (Schumacher 178). See also Coltelli 26. 
233 See Schumacher 177. Dorris says that wasn’t always the case. It became more so over 
time. 
234 In the newly revised edition of Love Medicine, published by HarperPerennial in 2009, 
Erdrich replaced the dedication to Dorris with a dedication to her brothers. 
235 For further discussion on the dedications in Erdrich and Dorris’s books, see Karell 41-
2 and Washburn 51-2. 
236 In their book Intimate Creativity: Partners in Love and Art, Irving and Suzanne 
Sarnoff interpret Erdrich’s sacrifice of her ego as an “intimate” act, one in which she 
“give[s]” her “sel[f] over” to the collaboration (103). Determining that Erdrich and 
Dorris, more than any other collaborating writers, “exemplify” the ideals of “intimate 
creativity,” the Sarnoffs identify the Erdrich-Dorris partnership as the “most complete 
form of collaboration” possible in literature (103). 
237 What’s more, Erdrich and Dorris benefited from associating their collaboration with 
storytelling traditions that many regard as “democratic” in principle and practice 
(Nabokov 47). See Nabokov, who argues the following: “It is the innately democratic 
virtue of much oral tradition that its multiple versions ‘enrich the listener’s experience,’ 
in Tapahonso’s words, and do so by providing cross-referencing native glosses and 
commentaries that are themselves underlain with complementary fragments or competing 
claims that usually require an intimate awareness of the community’s different, perhaps 
contradictory microhistories to interpret” (Nabokov 47-8).  
238 “It is the innately democratic virtue of much oral tradition that its multiple versions 
‘enrich the listener’s experience,’ in Tapahonso’s words, and do so by providing cross-
referencing native glosses and commentaries that are themselves underlain with 
complementary fragments or competing claims that usually require an intimate awareness 
of the community’s different, perhaps contradictory microhistories to interpret” 
(Nabokov 47-8). 
239 For accounts of North American Indian notions and practices of shared sovereignty, 
see Biolsi 246-47, Macklem 1346-57, and Chartrand 12-15. 
240 See also Hollander; Hull, Stornaiuolo, and Sterponi; and Völz 
241 Looking back, we can see that the signs of this parasitism were present all along. 
Interviewers, for example, often qualified their characterizations of the collaboration. 
Schumacher sensed enough to note that the answers to his questions only “seemed” to 
indicate consensus between Erdrich and Dorris (173-74). Likewise, when remarking that 
the “ease of agreement” between Erdrich and Dorris “seem[ed]” as “natural” as “apple 
pie,” interviewer Geoffrey Stokes could not help but add that it also appeared just as 
“fragile” (57). 
242 This quotation is from an interview that Terry Tazioli conducted while Erdrich was 
promoting The Round House. 
243 For an overview of theories on “we” narration and examples in literature, see 
Richardson Unnatural 46-56. 
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244 “Probably most compelling is the large and diverse group of postcolonial authors who 
have used ‘we’ narration to articulate collective struggles against colonialism: Raja Rao 
(Kanthapurna), Ngugi wa Thiong’o (A Grain of Wheat), Ayi Kwei Armah (Two 
Thousand Seasons), Edouard Glissant (La Case du commandeur), Patriack Chamoiseau 
(Texaco), and Zakes Mda (Ways of Dying). These authors come from a broad range of 
places, from Indian to the Caribbean to East, West, and South Africa; all have found ‘we’ 
narration to be a crucial strategy in forging a post-colonial narrative voice” (Richardson 
Analyzing World 4). For other analyses of postcolonial “we” narration, see Fasselt and 
Marcus.  
245 For an overview of theories on “we” narration and examples in literature, see 
Richardson Unnatural 46-56. 
246 Interestingly, Dorris has also been singled out as a Native “feminist” for his use of 
first-person-plural narration in his novel A Yellow Raft in Blue Water. In A Yellow Raft, 
Adelaide Morris argues, Dorris creates a feminist “ethics of coalition” by joining together 
three female voices to create one “plural protagonist” (22-3). In doing so, Morris 
suggests, Dorris produces a “field of reciprocal subjects, all crucial to the story but none 
exclusively privileged or central” (23). Ultimately, Morris concludes, “Dorris uses the 
plural point of view to correct for the ‘egotistical warp’ of the ‘I’” (23). 
247 For recent critics who read “we” narration as an oppressive narrative strategy utilized 
by colonial regimes, see Fasselt and Marcus.  
248 “For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted 
the difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, 
the East, ‘them’). This vision in a sense created and then served the two worlds thus 
conceived. Orientals lived in their world, ‘we’ lived in ours” (3, 43-4). 
249 “Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority 
over the Orient” (Orientalism 3). In his book Colonial Encounters, Peter Hulme reiterates 
Said’s point when he writes that “colonial discourse” relies on the binary distinction 
between “we” and “them” in structuring its accounts of “colonial relationships” (2).  
250 See also Bhabha, who describes colonial discourse as an “apparatus of power” that 
“turns on the recognition and disavowal of racial/cultural/historical differences” (23) 
251 See an interview that Terry Tazioli conducted while Erdrich was promoting The 
Round House (qtd. in Kurup 5). 
252 In an interview with Shelby Grantham, Erdrich recalled the details of her composition 
of “The World’s Greatest Fisherman”: “I hate having to block off a quiet part of the 
house, but I barricaded myself at the kitchen table behind closed doors. It seemed very 
depressing. But as soon as I got the first section down, I knew I couldn’t stop writing. It 
was upsetting, and I had to go on” (Grantham 13).  
253 In his essay “The Critic as Host” (1977), J. Hillis Miller famously disparages the 
“deconstructive” reader as a “parasite” who “invades” the text and ultimately “kills” it 
(439-40). In Hillis Miller’s formulation, the text is a “host” that is “broken,” “divided,” 
“passed around,” and “consumed” by deconstructive readers (446). In addition to 
parasiting the text, Hillis Miller declares, the deconstructive reader parasites the “obvious 
or univocal reading” of the text (444). “Both readings,” Hillis Miller tells us, “the 
‘univocal’ one and the ‘deconstructive’ one, are fellow guests ‘beside the grain,’ host and 
guest, host and host, host and parasite, parasite and parasite” (444). The text plays host to 
both the univocal reading and the deconstructive reading. The univocal reading serves as 
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guest to the text and then as host to the deconstructive reading. And, finally, the 
deconstructive reading parasites both. In figuring the univocal reading as host and the 
deconstructive reading as parasite, Hillis Miller draws an analogy of sexual difference: 
the univocal reading, he tells us, is a “mighty, masculine oak or ash, rooted in the solid 
ground,” and the deconstructive reading is “feminine, secondary, defective, or dependent, 
a clinging vine, able to live in no other way but by drawing the life sap of its host, cutting 
off its light and air” (440). 
254 That being said, Erdrich and Dorris did also project an ethos of openness to the public 
that could be seen as a form of hospitality to their readers. In their joint interviews and 
book dedications, the couple created the appearance of being extremely open to their 
reading audience. By sharing candid stories about the inner workings of their 
collaboration and openly expressing appreciation for one another publicly, the two 
authors appeared to welcome their readers into the interior spaces of their private lives. 
Erdrich and Dorris enhanced this impression in their fiction through their regular use of 
self-referential metaphors. Employing undisguised references to themselves and to their 
collaboration, Erdrich and Dorris invited their readers to read their fiction as intimate 
meditations on their own private thoughts, feelings, and experiences. As Johannas Voelz 
has recently pointed out, the kinds of self-referentiality often featured in Erdrich and 
Dorris’s fiction produce a “sincerity effect” whose function is to make readers believe 
that what they say about themselves in the guise of their characters “correspond[s]” to 
what they feel and believe in “private” (212-15).254 In this way, Erdrich and Dorris used 
moments of self-referentiality in their fiction as sites of hospitality through which they 
appeared to offer their readers sincere welcome. 
255 The Crown of Columbus was not Erdrich and Dorris’s first attempt at collaborative 
writing. The couple published a number of short stories together during the early years of 
their marriage under the pseudonym “Milou North.” These stories were in the tradition of 
romance fiction. “Milou” represented a combination of their first names, and “North” was 
apparently a reference to the location of their New Hampshire home (Stookey 4; 
Washburn 31). For more on the Milou North stories, see Matchie 148, Stookey 4-6, and 
Trueheart 115-17. 
256 In his wife’s absence, Dorris reportedly turned to alcohol and prescription drugs 
(Washburn 55). Faced with an imminent divorce and additional legal troubles, Dorris 
committed suicide in a New Hampshire motel in April of 1997 (Washburn 54-5). 
257 Although clearly inspired by the potlatch traditions of Northwestern Indian tribes, 
Vivian’s modern-day potluck is mostly devoid of the competitive and antagonistic 
tendencies that Marcell Mauss and others have associated with the Tlingit and Haida 
tribes of Alaska and the Tsimshian and Kwakiutl tribes of British Columbia. See Mauss 
31-37.  
258 In this, Erdrich and Dorris echo and anticipate several theorists who treat the female 
body as the original site of hospitality. See, for example, Irigaray xi-xiv, 2; McNulty xxv-
xxvii; and Still “Hospitality” 151-52. 
259 “Thus, Vivian finally conquers the right to speak regardless of circumscribed 
boundaries, while Roger, the owner of the authoritative voice, learns how to relent his 
exclusive grip on language, starting to listen for the first time” (Cid 347). 
260 “In the novel The Crown of Columbus (1991) co-written with Louise Erdrich, a novel 
of multiple narrators, [Dorris’s] narrator was ‘Roger Williams’” (McNab 112).  





261 “Immigrated, trained, prepared for their act in the United States by the United States, 
these hijackers incorporate, so to speak, two suicides in one: their own (and one will 
remain forever defenseless in the face of a suicidal, autoimmunitary aggression—and that 
is what terrorizes most) but also the suicide of those who welcomed, armed, and trained 
them” (“A” 95).  
262 Derrida’s interview with Giovanna Borradori took place on October 22, 2001, four 
days before President George W. Bush signed the USA PATRIOT Act into law. Yet, 
Derrida was already able to draw attention to what he calls “the precursory signs of what 
threatens to happen” (“A” 96-7).  
263 Derrida characterizes this combination of American hospitality and inhospitality as a 
“doubly suicidal” form of “autoimmunity”: hospitality to others leaves the U.S. “exposed 
to aggression,” whereas inhospitality in response to aggression threatens to “destroy” the 
nation by undermining the principles of democracy upon which the U.S. was founded 
(94-5). 
264 Scenes of interracial hospitality are a constant in Wright’s work. They occur with 
regularity in both his early short fiction and late short fiction, both his major novels and 
lesser known novels, both his autobiographical writings and cultural criticism. Aside 
from their regularity, what is most striking about scenes of interracial hospitality in 
Wright’s work is the emphasis that Wright places on describing the feelings of fear 
experienced by black characters in these scenes. Consider, for example, the “Fear” that 
“grip[s]” Reverend Dan Taylor and his family in “Fire and Cloud” when Mayor Bolton 
and Chief of Police Bruden arrive unexpectedly at Taylor’s home and take up residence 
in the parlor (162-72). Likewise, consider the “fear” that “grip[s]” Sue in “Bright and 
Morning Star” when Booker, a white party member, makes an unannounced visit to her 
home (242). Consider, also, the “fear” felt by Fishbelly in The Long Dream when he 
welcomes Harvey McWilliams, the first “white visitor” he has ever “received,” into his 
home (333-35). At the same time, consider the “fright” felt by Carl in “Man Of All 
Work” when he, disguised as Lucy, is invited to assist Anne Fairchild in the bath at the 
Fairchild home (128-29). Similarly, consider the “fright” that Wright himself feels in 
Black Boy when he first arrives in Memphis and stays at the home of Mrs. Moss and her 
daughter (217). In each of these examples and many others like them, Wright treats 
scenes of interracial hospitality as opportunities to explore what it feels like for African 
Americans to experience exchanges of interracial hospitality. 
265 See the chart below: 
 
Title Year Opening Scene 
Love Medicine 1984 
Jack Mauser invites June Kashpaw to enter the Rigger 
Bar, an offering of hospitality that leads to June’s 
death. 
The Beet Queen 1986 
The Adare family arrives by train as freeloaders in 
Argus, Minnesota, in 1932. They are promptly 
welcomed by a hostile native who sends her dog to 
attack young Karl. 
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Tracks 1988 Nanapush narrates the seemingly “impossible” arrival of an uninvited guest (consumption) from the North. 
The Bingo Palace 1994 
Lulu Lamartin visits the post office to send a letter to 
her grandson, Lipsha Morrissey, inviting him to 
return home to the reservation. 
Tales of Burning Love 1996 
Jack Mauser’s desperate attempt to gain admission to 
a dentist’s office is followed by a retelling of the 
fateful opening scene from Love Medicine that 
refigures Jack as a guest and June as a host: “She’d 
take him in like a stray . . .” 
The Antelope Wife 1998 The United States Army invades a “peaceful” Ojibwe village on the Dakota. 
The Master Butcher’s Singing 
Club 2003 
German soldier Fidelis Waldvogel is welcomed 
home. 
Four Souls 2004 
Polly Elizabeth naively offers hospitality to a 
seemingly destitute Fleur Pillager, a dissembling and 
vengeful guest. 
The Plague of Doves 2008 
In 1896, a Catholic priest invites his parishioners to 
gather together with the purpose of driving away 
unwanted doves. 
The Round House 2012 
Joe Coutts offers a lengthy description of the small 
trees that have “penetrated” the foundation of his 
parents’ home, a symbolic foreshadowing of the 
horrific rape that his mother experiences and that 
leads to a complete breakdown of domestic 
hospitality at the Coutts household. 
 
266 In her Birchbark House series, which now includes four titles (The Birchbark House, 
The Game of Silence, The Porcupine Year, Chickadee), Erdrich tells the story of a band 
of Ojibwe forced to adapt to the intrusion of whites during the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century. Like Tracks, The Birchbark House (1999) opens with the arrival of an 
unwelcome “visitor” in the form of disease (132, 153). Personifying smallpox as an 
uninvited guest that parasites and kills its hosts, Erdrich asks her readers to weigh the 
ethical responsibilities that hosts have to diseased guests. After her entire island 
community is ravaged by a smallpox epidemic in 1847, a young Ojibwe girl named 
Omayakas is taken in and raised by a nearby clan on Moningwanaykaning, an island in 
the south of Lake Superior. The clan’s offering of hospitality to Omayakas turns out to be 
a blessing for both the young girl and her adopted family. Later, when a group of sick 
white men arrive on the island, they are fed and housed. Responding to the “discomfort” 
of one of the strangers, one young woman graciously puts “her own bowl, filled with 
soup, into his hands” (135). But the sick guests infect most of the clan with smallpox, and 
eighteen members of the community eventually die as a result of their generous 
hospitality (145). What prevents more Ojibwe from dying is the presence of Omayakas, 
now eight years old, who can act as a caretaker because she has already had the disease. 
A prior act of hospitality, it turns out, helps mitigate the negative effects of a subsequent 
act of hospitality. Hence, rather than treat the offering of hospitality to the sick white men 
as an imprudent act representative of the clan’s need to be less hospitable, Erdrich instead 
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uses the character of Omayakas to emphasize the redeeming value of welcoming those in 
need. Here, Erdrich offers us a model of hospitality premised not on assessing the 
positive or negative effects of each act of hospitality but, rather, on the belief that 
repeated acts of hospitality ultimately reward those who provide them. Together, these 
repeated acts lead to a generalized form of reciprocity, one that Erdrich’s Ojibwe 
characters envision as a kind of “circle” of hospitality (220). In the case of Omayakas, the 
“circle” that “began” when she was found and taken in is “complete[d]” when she 
“save[s]” many of her sick hosts during the epidemic (220). 
 The Game of Silence (2005), the second installment in Erdrich’s series, focuses on 
the forced displacement experienced by the Ojibwe clan in 1849, the role that contrasting 
forms of communication played in complicating intercultural exchange, and the 
continuing threat posed by Catholic missionaries intent on converting Indians. The novel 
opens with the arrival of Ojibwe from nearby islands who announce that a white ogimaa 
(chief) has “issued a removal order” in order to provide space for “white settlers” (21). 
Forced to move west—away from their “gardens,” their “ancestors’ graves,” their 
“fishing grounds,” and their “lodges”—the Ojibwe find that the U.S. government has 
robbed them not only of their physical “island home” but also of their previously 
unquestioned assurance in the very idea of “home” itself: “For that night they knew the 
threat of a much bigger loss. They would all fear to lose something huge, something so 
important that they never even knew that they had it in the first place. Who questions the 
earth, the ground beneath your feet? They had always accepted it—always here, always 
solid. . . . That something was home” (19). Although the Ojibwe do not believe that they 
“own” Moningwanaykaning, they do believe that their stewardship of the island and its 
resources, as well as their long history of habitation, do accord them the right to occupy 
the land without the violent intrusion of outsiders (21). Paradoxically, then, the federal 
government’s seizure of Moningwanaykaning and other nearby Ojibwe islands violates 
the most fundamental principles of the Lockean claim to private property rights. It is 
precisely the labor of the Ojibwe and their use of the island’s resources—their gardening, 
in particular—that should, according to Lockean liberal logic, grant them undisturbed 
status as hosts on Moningwanaykaning.  
 However, rather than use Lockean liberalism to claim Ojibwe ownership of the 
island, Erdrich uses the example of Omayakas and her clan to propose alternative criteria 
for evaluating both the eligibility and the actions of hosts, criteria that value preservation 
over parasitism and restraint over gratuitous exploitation. In contrast to the 
Chimookomanug (white men), who consume the land and its resources with a seemingly 
“infinite” hunger (Birchbark 78), Erdrich’s Ojibwe take only what they need and do so 
while performing tribal rituals that reflect solemn gratitude and remind them of their 
indebtedness to the island. For example, even as a young child, Omayakas recites a 
traditional apology when she captures some birds in a nest for her family: “forgive us, 
forgive us, we have need, we have need” (Birchbark 56). The distinction between the 
Ojibwe ethos of preservation and the American practice of parasitism reaches its climax 
in Chickadee when, in 1866, Omayakas’s young son is introduced to the city of St. Paul, 
Minnesota: 
Chickadee could see that they used up forests of trees in making the houses. He 
could see that they had cut down every tree in sight. He could feel that they were 
pumping up the river and even using up the animals. He thought of the many 
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animals whose dead hides were bound and sold in St. Paul in one day. Everything 
that the Anishinabeg counted on in life, and loved, was going into this hungry city 
mouth. This mouth, this city, was wide and insatiable. It would never be satisfied, 
thought Chickadee dizzily, until everything was gone. (155) 
Like Faulkner’s young Thomas Sutpen, who experiences a life-altering revelation when 
he descends from the mountains of Appalachia to the more densely populated Virginia 
coast, Erdrich’s young Chickadee is shocked by the sight of a civilization so at odds with 
his own. Moreover, like Sutpen, Chickadee recognizes the disparity in power created and 
maintained by a model of hospitality that allows the strong to parasite at will: “The ones 




267 Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, dozens of scholars have presented 
arguments about the central components of southern identity. For scholarship on the 
centrality of honor to southern identity, see Wyatt-Brown and Nisbett/Cohen; for 
chivalry, gallantry, and gentility, see Taylor; for etiquette, see Doyle and Ritterhouse; for 
agrarianism, see Ransom (ix), Owsley (74), and Lytle (202); for nostalgia, see Cash (x-
xi), Donaldson (270), and Wilson (30); and for passion, see Starr (xi-xii). 
268 Concerning the pre-colonial origins of southern hospitality, Malcolm Gladwell has 
recently argued that the traditions of Appalachian hospitality originate in Scottish and 
Irish “cultures of honor” (167). Similarly, in his visit to Virginia in 1799, John Bernard 
noted that the hospitality he found there was “truly Irish” (149). In The Encyclopedia of 
Southern History, Richard W. Lykes writes that southern hospitality “has its roots in the 
geography and economy of the South” (“Southern hospitality” 607-08). On the other 
hand, Bertram Wyatt-Brown contends that the sources of southern notions of hospitality 
and honor “lay deep in mythology, literature, history, and civilization” (13-4). 
269 Following Diogenes of Sinope, who famously declared, “I am a citizen of the world 
(kosmopolitês),” proponents of Cynic cosmopolitanism, as opposed to those of Stoic 
cosmopolitanism, do not allow the ties of family or community to affect their ethical 
obligations to strangers. See John L. Moles’s “Cynic Cosmopolitanism” and Martha 
Nussbaum’s “Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism.” 
270 “If he was obliged to transform his private life into a perpetual performance for the 
touring public, surely the performance itself was a public act. Where, then, did the 
boundary lie? What was public and what was not, or had the two simply flowed together 
in a formless muddle?” (Dalzell & Dalzell 196-97). 
271 Fritz Hirschfeld reports that Washington owned 317 slaves in 1799, 201 of whom 
were productive men and women and 116 of whom were children or disabled. This 
number increased from 1786 when Washington had only 216 slaves (20). 
272 For a comparative study of U.S. slavery and eastern European forms of serfdom, 
particularly Russian serfdom, see Kolchin. 
273 “This is the difference, the gap, between the hospitality of invitation and the 
hospitality of visitation. In visitation there is no door. Anyone can come at any time and 
can come in without need of a key for the door. There are no custom checks with a 
visitation” (Derrida “Hostipitality” 14). 
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274 As Richard W. Lykes explains in his entry on southern hospitality in The 
Encyclopedia of Southern History, “the graciousness with which hospitality was extended 
depended in large measure upon the position of the recipient within that structure. Thus, 
aristocratic planters would extend unlimited hospitality to persons of a rank equal to 
themselves from all parts of the United States and abroad.  Persons lower in the social 
structure would be welcomed, but they would receive only limited attention directly from 
the host. Those of the lowest rank would, quite likely, be provided material assistance 
outside of the main house. Persons below the planter class would be equally liberal with 
their peers or those of higher rank, but they carefully maintained a similar reserve toward 
their ‘lessers’” (607). 
275 As Bertram Wyatt-Brown reveals, southern conceptions of honor were inseparable 
from southern conceptions of hospitality: “. . . hospitality could not be divorced from 
honor, nor honor separated from the coercions of public opinion” (337).  
276 Fox-Genovese astutely describes the antebellum southern economy as a “slave system 
within a capitalist mode of production” (55). Until emancipation, the South’s economy 
was “indissolubly linked” with a capitalist “translatlantic market” (55).   
277 For more on the distinction between female hostesses and female hosts, see Still (151-
52) and McNulty (xxxvii-xlii). 
278 In 1755, for example, a Surry County, Virginia, widow named Mrs. Allen so 
impressed William Byrd II that he described her hospitality as “elegant” (qtd. in Kierner 
454). 
279 Abbott’s sentiments about the self-destructive nature of southern hospitality mirror 
those expressed by an anonymous southerner who published his findings in the Southern 
Literary Messenger in 1834. “To us, who enjoy the credit and the pleasure of entertaining 
a guest, while the drudgery devolves upon our slaves,” the writer explains, “hospitality is 
a cheap, easy, and delightful virtue” (166). In his travels to New England, the writer 
encountered not an absence of hospitality but instead what he described as “much of the 
original material of hospitality” that he found lacking in the South (167). Unaided by 
slaves, northern hosts bestowed hospitality at the expense “not only of money, but of 
time” (167). Unlike the hospitality of the South, the hospitality experienced by the writer 
in the North actually required significant “sacrifices” on the part of hosts (167). The 
result was a “more salutary” hospitality—one that was “better for the guest, better for the 
host, better for society” (167). 
280 “. . . there are relatively few documented instances of black men assaulting white 
women during these years” (Cardyn 698). 
281 As Lisa Cardyn explains, “Klansmen punished interracial cohabitation in the absence 
of marriage with equal vigor, and neither race, sex, professional stature, nor wealth 
provided certain protection from attack” (768).   
282 As Claude Oubre points out, “Sherman’s decision to lend the freedmen horses and 
mules probably accounted for the inclusion of the animal” in the slogan “Forty Acres and 
a Mule” that eventually became widespread in the South (183).  
283 “Thousands of acres were allotted to blacks; negro communities grew up; the 
government was carried on, churches and schools were established and roads made, by 
the negroes under the supervision of army officials” (Fleming 725-26). 
284 Claude Oubre argues that President Johnson “was the one person who controlled the 
actual destiny of the freedmen. Had he enforced the confiscation legislation and 
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supported the land program of the Freedmen’s Bureau, the history of Negro land 
ownership could have been drastically changed. Instead of making land available for 
freedmen to purchase, he chose to ingratiate himself with southerners by restoring their 
property, regardless of all the promises made to the freedmen” (189). 
285 The repeal of the Southern Homestead Act in 1876 left “the public lands in the five 
southern public-land states subject to the provisions of the Homestead Act of 1862, thus 
making the land available for purchase and homesteading” (Canaday et al. 5). 
286 “The reasons for the failure to establish the freedmen as land owners by 1870 are 
varied, yet the responsibility must be shared by Congress, the president, the military, the 
federal land offices, white apathy and opposition, the Freedmen’s Bureau, and the 
freedmen themselves” (Oubre 185). 
287 A recent study on the Southern Homestead Act, conducted by Neil Canaday and 
others, concurs with Oubre’s claims and concludes that “the primary reason for the act’s 
failure was the overall poor quality of land available” (13).   
288 “Although one cannot say that freed blacks accepted the accepted the attitudes of 
paternalism or deny that in sharecropping they had achieved a kind of compromise with 
whites, sharecropping enabled planters to perpetuate their paternalistic sense of 
themselves, and it helped them redevelop their wealth and maintain their power . . .” 
(Railey 9).   
289 The Fourteenth Amendment established all “persons born or naturalized in the United 
States” as citizens and declared that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.” 
290 Despite the due process and equal protections allowed for by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1875, local and state officials in the South 
regularly “refused to enforce the antidiscrimination laws, and even when charges were 
filed, judges and juries declined to convict white proprietors” (Sandoval-Strausz 288). 
291 The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 involved five similar cases that were brought before 
the Supreme Court on the basis of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. All five of the defendants 
had been indicted for denying to persons of color or of unknown color equal access to 
public accommodations. Two were innkeeper cases, two were theater cases, and one was 
a railroad case. 
292 As Leigh Anne Duck points out, the Plessy decision “enfolded” segregation into 
national law and codified a vision of the South as a region “impervious to governmental 
intervention” and politically, culturally, and temporally isolated from the rest of the 
nation (22-5). 
293 “There was no apparent tendency toward abatement or relaxation of the Jim Crow 
code of discrimination and segregation in the 1920’s, and none in the ‘thirties until well 
along in the depression years. In fact the Jim Crow laws were elaborated and further 
expanded in those years” (Woodward 116). 
294 C. Vann Woodward describes the shift from the Black Codes to Jim Crow laws as a 
shift from ostracism to segregation: “Exploitation there was in that period, as in other 
periods and in other regions, but it did not follow then that the exploited had to be 
ostracized. Subordination there was also, unmistakable subordination; but it was not yet 
an accepted corollary that the subordinates had to be totally segregated and needlessly 
humiliated by a thousand daily reminders of their subordination” (44). For a detailed 
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legal history of this shift from “access” to “exclusion” to “segregation,” see Joseph 
William Singer 1351-52. 
295 “Hotels were more than just private businesses that functioned according to the rules 
of the market. They were also public institutions that were subject to extensive 
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